Deflation

IT’S IMPOSSIBLE TO OVERSTATE DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES:

Corporate Adviser Says the Ideal Number of Human Employees at a Company Is Zero (Joe Wilkins, Mar 8, 2026, futurism)

That, at least, seems to be the contention of Daniel Miessler, an outspoken cybersecurity engineer and AI booster. In a rambling post on his personal blog, Miessler takes the position that human workers are already obsolete, so the best thing we can do is accept it and fall in line with the AI revolution.

“My favorite way of capturing this: the ideal number of human employees inside of any company is zero,” he wrote. “That is the number that they’re trying to get to.”

He’s not just using hyperbole, he takes pains to clarify.

“When I say zero, I mean zero workers,” the AI wonk told Fortune in a followup interview. “As in factory [or] machine jobs. Like regular working people.”

…coupled with renewable energy.

…AND RICHER…:

Are Americans Getting Richer? (Washington Post Editorial Board, Feb 20, 2026)

The premise of the index is simple: how many hours do you need to work, compared to the month or year before, to be able to afford the “basket of goods,” which is a standard set of household items and services that comprise the Consumer Price Index used to calculate inflation.

The “time price” is how many hours of work it takes to purchase the basket of goods. The “abundance” is how much of the basket one hour of work can buy. The story told by the index is a very good one: since recordkeeping began, “abundance” for average private sector workers comes out to a net increase of 13.8 percent.

…AND CHEAPER…:

Your Fridge Is Bigger and Cheaper Today, Thanks to Global Trade and Innovation (Jeremy Horpedahl, 11/26/25, Cato)

In 1984, the average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers (representing about 80 percent of the private workforce) stood at roughly $8.32. Acquiring the Kenmore would thus require approximately 163 hours of labor, equivalent to more than three full workweeks.

By contrast, a comparable 2024 model from a major retailer like Home Depot—matching size and features—retailed for $998 in nominal terms in 2024, when I last checked it, a direct reduction without inflation adjustment. With average hourly earnings in 2024 at about $29.85 for the same worker category, the labor investment drops to around 33 hours. In relative terms, refrigerators have become nearly five times more affordable, reflecting efficiencies from global supply chains, automation, and competition.

Interestingly, that fridge has increased in price sharply since 2024, almost certainly in part because of trade policy, and is currently listed at $1,658—even so, it is still much cheaper when measured in time prices, requiring just 53 hours of labor, compared with 163 hours in 1984 (and you can probably find a Black Friday deal on it too).

NO ONE WILL MISS JOBS:

Middle managers fade as AI rises (Emily Peck, 7/07/25, Axios)

There are now nearly six individual contributors per manager at the 8,500 small businesses analyzed in a report by Gusto, which handles payroll for small and medium-sized employers. That’s up from a little over three in 2019.

“It’s happening broadly across the economy,” Nich Tremper, a senior economist at Gusto, told Axios.
For small companies, a lot of this happened through attrition, he says. “Rather than replacing a manager, an existing one will just see an expanded scope.”

The massive inefficient expansion of management was how white men integrated women and minorities into the workforce without giving up our own jobs.

CAPITALISM IS IN ITS INFANCY:

The AI Efficiency Trap: When Productivity Tools Create Perpetual Pressure (Knowledge Wharton, July 05, 2025, Fair Observer)

Three-quarters of surveyed workers were using AI in the workplace in 2024, but instead of experiencing liberation, many found themselves caught in an efficiency trap — a mechanism that only moves toward ever higher performance standards.

Imagine thinking that creating wealth ever more cheaply is a problem?

INFLATION IS A FUNCTION OF WAGES:

US wage patterns during and after the pandemic: Insights from a novel data source [Jeff Nezaj (ADP Research), Nela Richardson (ADP Research) and Liv Wang (ADP Research)
Working Papers 25-5]


This paper adds to a growing body of evidence on the underlying determinants of pandemic and postpandemic wage patterns by leveraging private-sector payroll records from ADP Inc., a dataset that comprises more than 25 million employees, or about 1 in 6 workers in the United States. The paper finds that the pandemic’s disruption of industry sectors and workers drove large swings in pay growth as lower-wage workers left the labor force in the spring of 2020 and were hired back a year later. It also triggered a shift to larger year-over-year pay gains that so far have endured, albeit with some moderation.

CAIN WON:

Abundance and Its Discontents (James Livingston, 3/07/25, Project Syndicate)

[T]he vision Klein and Thompson offer makes the idea of abundance sound like what awaits the Tribulation Force of the Left Behind film franchise, whose members prove they are worthy of joining the Raptured in heaven by working hard against the anti-Christ on Earth. The abundance we need and deserve cannot be incentivized by monetizing it and attracting private investors and contractors emboldened by relaxed regulations and officials who are willing and able to bend the rules. Nor does it have to wait on the arrival of another “political order” that will deliver the goods because it tells a “better story,” as per the historian Gary Gerstle’s periodization of the US political party system (eagerly cited by Klein and Thompson). Abundance is here and now, abiding in the simple fact that economic growth doesn’t require more savings, more work, and more fossil fuels (and thus the incineration of the planet), because growth – at any pace – no longer demands larger inputs of either capital and labor.

It’s impossible tyo overstate deflationary pressures.

REDUCING LABOR IS PRODUCTIVITY:

Automate the Ports (Eric Boehm | 10.4.2024, reason)

But whether they are open or closed, many American ports rank among the least efficient in the entire world. The ports in New York, Baltimore, and Houston—three of the largest of the 36 ports that could have been shut down by the ILA strike—are ranked no higher than 300th place (out of 348 in total) in the World Bank’s most recent report on port efficiency. Not a single U.S. port ranks in the top 50. Slow-moving ports act as bottlenecks to commerce both coming and going, which “reduces the competitiveness of the country…and hinders economic growth and poverty reduction,” the World Bank notes.

That so many American ports are struggling to keep up with the rest of the world should be unacceptable.

NO ONE EXPECTS MAGA TO UNDERSTAND ECONOMICS:

American economists and consumers got inflation wrong during its recent surge. They still do (Michael Hiltzik, Sept. 27, 2024, LA Times)

One can’t really blame a politician for lying about a fundamental fact, any more than one can punish a dog for drinking out of the toilet. It’s what they do.

But Vance’s misstatements point to an important feature of Americans’ thinking about inflation in recent years: We haven’t understood it from the moment it first appeared in early 2021. We still don’t. But no one should feel ashamed, because economists and policymakers have gotten it wrong too.

Let’s start with the most fundamental debate among the policymakers: whether inflation would be “transitory” or long-lasting. The Federal Reserve first used the term in a policy statement in April 2021, after the annualized inflation rate had climbed to 2.6%. (“Inflation has risen, largely reflecting transitory factors.”)

As Fed Chair Jerome H. Powell recollected in a speech last month, “the good ship Transitory was a crowded one, with most mainstream analysts and advanced-economy central bankers on board.” Beginning in October 2021, however, “the data turned hard against the transitory hypothesis. Inflation rose and broadened out from goods into services. It became clear that the high inflation was not transitory, and that it would require a strong policy response.”

The “transitory” camp was ridiculed as Pollyannaish. The “strong policy response” Powell referred to was the Fed’s raising of short-term interest rates 11 times, a total of 5.25 percentage points, from March 2022 through July 2023.

Yet in retrospect, team transitory was right.

MORE “A” THAN “THE”:

The Number (John Lanchester, September 24, 2024, Washington Post)

The government agency with the responsibility of calculating the CPI is the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is how it works out the changing price of cheese:

“A particular item enters the CPI sample through a process called initiation. This initiation process, typically carried out in person by a CPI data collector, involves selecting a specific item to be priced from the category that has been designated to be priced at that store. For example, suppose a particular grocery store has an outlet where cheese will be priced. A particular type of cheese item will be chosen, with its likelihood of being selected roughly proportional to its popularity. If, for example, cheddar cheese in 8 oz. packages makes up 70 percent of the sales of cheese, and the same cheese in 6 oz. packages accounts for 10 percent of all cheese sales, and the same cheese in 12 oz. packages accounts for 20 percent of all cheese sales, then the 8 oz. package will be 7 times as likely to be chosen as the 6 oz. package. After probabilities are assigned, one type, brand, and container size of cheese is chosen by an objective selection process based on the theory of random sampling. The particular kind of cheese that is selected will continue to be priced each month in the same outlet.

“This item will be repriced, monthly or bimonthly, until it is replaced after four years through sample rotation. Repricing is usually done in person, but may be done via telephone or the internet. The process of selecting individual quotes results in the sample as a whole containing a wide variety of specific items of a category roughly corresponding to consumer purchases. So the cheese sample (or the new vehicle sample, the television sample, etc.) contains a wide variety of styles and brands of cheese, vehicles, televisions, etc.”

And that’s just cheese. Now scale the same process, with the same level of detail, complexity and wonkery among all the items bought by a typical consumer — pausing for a moment to chuck a large concealing tarpaulin over all the questions prompted by the idea of a “typical consumer.” We’re talking about not dozens or hundreds but thousands of possible items — and not just in one place but all over the country. Not just canned tuna and breaded fish sticks, cornflakes and granola bars but all types of bread and tortillas and rolls (including gluten free, obviously — it’s 2024). Cheesecakes and banana-nut breads and bacon — defined as “all types and forms (or cuts) of pork bacon, Canadian bacon and bacon substitutes such as turkey bacon, beef bacon, vegetarian bacon … slab bacon, sliced bacon, end pieces and jowl bacon … various types and forms of breakfast sausage such as, pork sausage, vegetarian based sausage, and other meats based sausage including a variety of meat combinations. Examples of meat combinations may include pork and turkey, pork and beef, etc. Forms of breakfast sausage may include loose, unlinked and linked in casings, and patty meat substitutes, formed links without casings, etc. The ingredients for breakfast sausage may include meat, poultry, cereal, soy protein, and other extenders” — and all types of pork and beef and chicken and organ meats and smoked salmon and eggs and ice cream (including nondairy, obviously; it’s still 2024) and lettuce and herbs. All types of fresh fruit, canned fruit, dried fruit, cocktail mixes, barbecue rubs and ketchups. All organ and wild meats including liver, kidney, heart, brains, tripe, chitterlings and tongue, and, obviously, game. Examples of game tagged by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are buffalo, bison, venison, goat, rabbit, quail, rattlesnake, pheasant, grouse and quail.

But wait! The CPI, obviously, isn’t mainly about food because most household expenditure isn’t on food. In fact, food occupies only 13.4 percent of a typical household budget. To track a typical household’s expenditure, the BLS also tracks price changes on apparel and health and education and insurance and transport and recreation/entertainment. Within that last category, there are tents for camping, table tennis rackets, outboard motors, fish food, scuba equipment, dog grooming services, digital cameras, sewing machines, thread, needles, health club memberships, hunting knives, sheet music, every kind of recorded music, TV subscriptions (both basic and premium), dog collars, golf carts. And much, much more.

The list of tagged items is so extensive it is vertiginous. In the course of making these categories, the BLS has finally settled the question of whether professional wrestling is fixed: The category of admission to sporting events includes “football, baseball, basketball, hockey, boxing matches, horse races, and dog shows” at “all levels of competition, such as professional, collegiate, high school,” but it specifically excludes wrestling. “Flea markets, art shows, fashion shows, Wrestling” are instead in the category of “admission to movies, theaters, concerts, & other recurring events.” It is fun to imagine the meeting where that question was settled — and perhaps there is a tiny glimpse of backroom drama in the fact that Wrestling, apparently uniquely among these many thousands of CPI entry items, has a capital letter.

In the middle of all this colossal project of categorization and enumeration, the single biggest category by far is shelter, which is how the BLS defines what most of us would call housing. Shelter takes up 36.3 percent of the CPI, a long way ahead of food (8 percent at home, 5 percent elsewhere), energy (7 percent), transportation (6.5 percent) and medical services (6.5 percent). The number for shelter includes all rentals, from people living in trailers in West Virginia to oil workers in company housing in Anchorage to crypto bros renting Miami condos. It covers homeowners too. In economics, there are many things that are counterintuitive, and one of them is the idea that the value of your house, in income terms, is the rent it is saving you. The “shelter” cost, for CPI purposes, is the number you would be paying for your property if you rented it. This is called “owners’ equivalent rent,” and it means that even if your housing costs haven’t in fact gone up because you own the place where you live your shelter costs, as measured by the CPI, will have increased.


There is something intellectually thrilling about this: millions of data points, from tens of thousands of sources, being recorded, categorized, quantified, analyzed and weighted, through the labor of thousands of people, and all of it to produce one single apparently simple and self-explanatory number. It is the principle of e pluribus unum, applied to data. All that work ends with a single number to represent all inflation, the CPI-U, which, at the time of writing, stands at 2.9 percent. (U stands for “all urban consumers” — about 93 percent of the U.S. population.)

Nothing about this is self-evident, though much of it, when you look underneath the hood, is the product of a rarefied form of common sense. The CPI in its modern form is the result of a continuing series of debates and arguments in the area where economics and politics overlap. The first attempt at producing a single number for inflation began in 1921, using data which had begun to be collected in 1913. The data for this “cost of living index,” as it was called, was collected from a survey of White wage-earner families in 92 cities. The collection of goods used to measure inflation is known as a basket, and that first basket contained items that seem less essential today: a straw boater, for example. The category of beef cuts is wonderfully specific, and there’s a helpful diagram of a cow to assist the person compiling the data.

The inflation basket has changed over time, and so has awareness of the different rates of inflation that apply to different citizens. The older index for urban wage earners was in 1978 renamed the CPI-W, and the newer index for all urban consumers — today the standard measure of inflation — became the CPI-U. And then there’s the reality of substitution, as economists call it: the fact that as prices change, our behavior changes too. The CPI can go up so much that it forces your spending to go down. As beef becomes more expensive, we switch to pork or chicken; if you can’t afford prime cuts to cook a steak, you use cheaper cuts to make a casserole. The BLS acknowledges this through an index that attempts to track substitution: the “chained CPI” or C-CPI-U. It was introduced in 2002. There is also a separate index for older Americans, CPI-E, introduced in 2008 after being mandated by Congress. This happened in response to political concerns that older people have different needs and spending patterns not reflected in the ordinary CPI-U. A cynic would point to older citizens’ tendency to turn out and vote. All these emendations reflect the fact that inflation indexes are things that are made, created through intellectual and practical work, and are prone to give different answers when asked different questions. It has never not been argued over, and it is often the case that people like the CPI when it’s telling them something they want to hear and level furious accusations against it when it’s saying something inconvenient.

The end product of this is a paradoxical number. For one thing, it is possible that it doesn’t often correspond to reality. As the BLS itself points out, because people’s lives are so different, it seldom mirrors a particular consumer’s experience. In particular, the poor tend to suffer higher inflation than the rich. Better-off people have assets, which, broadly speaking, rise in value as inflation climbs. Poorer people don’t, and they spend a bigger proportion of their income on those basics of life that are particularly exposed to surges in inflation: food and fuel. These are part of what is called “noncore inflation,” a strange term that tries to separate out from the rest of the economy the part of inflation that is chronically affected by fluctuating prices. But if you’re poor, there’s nothing noncore about the cost of the food on your plate or the gasoline in your tank: They are central to your experience of living day to day. Noncore is as core as it gets.

Because of all this, inflation is always and everywhere a political phenomenon.