Conservative Thought

MITCH AND THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY PICKED CONSERVATIVES, NOT TRUMPISTS:

The Hard Right Hates Neil Gorsuch: How the freakout over Gorsuch’s comments reveals a deeper rift between constitutionalists and nativists. (Daniel Ruggles, May 18, 2026, The Bulwark)

During a media blitz this month to promote his new children’s book, Heroes of 1776: The Story of the Declaration of Independence, Gorsuch repeated the same message over and over: The United States is a “creedal” nation—that is, a nation unified by common belief in rights, liberties, and democratic institutions. Yes, he explained, we are a people with a singular “heritage,” but it’s one of ideals, not ethnicity. Being an American requires not lineage, but belief.

It was a gentle rebuke of nationalism—and it drove the hard right nuts.

Americans largely agree with Gorsuch that, when it comes to citizenship, belief in American ideas trumps genealogy. In an earlier dispensation, his comments would have been taken as an innocuous, even saccharine, idealism about the nation’s founding and self-rule—totally typical for a conservative jurist.

But we are not in that earlier dispensation. Gorsuch’s repeated references to “creed” exposed a stark divide between far-right ideologues (with their nativist America First agenda) and the conservative originalist old guard. For decades, the right has campaigned to fill courtrooms with self-professing originalists. Now, that old guard—personified by Gorsuch, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, and Chief Justice John Roberts—is something of a wild card on the Supreme Court. And it’s causing tension, especially as the court gets ready to rule on birthright citizenship.

ALL COMEDY IS CONSERVATIVE:

Freud’s Greatest Critic: The Legacy of Frederick Crews (Carlos Orsi, May/June 2026, Skeptical Inquirer)

During a very productive life of more than nine decades, Crews—literary critic and professor emeritus of the University of California Berkeley—became famous twice. The first round, between 1963 and 1965, came after the publication of The Pooh Perplex, an erudite satire that became an unexpected bestseller. The second time, from 1993 onward, came after his explosive article “The Unknown Freud,” which appeared in The New York Review of Books, igniting the so-called Memory Wars and opening up the debate about the true cultural, social, and scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytic movement.

As far as psychological science and neurology went, when Crews’s explosive article came out, Freudianism had been reduced, at least in the United States, to a kind of historical landmark in the field, much like the miasma theory of disease in medicine. But in certain branches of the humanities, such as literary criticism, and several “critical theory” models in sociology and political philosophy, it was still taken quite seriously. Being part of that world, Crews was acutely aware of that fact and of the need for correction.

Separated by thirty years, The Pooh Perplex and “The Unknown Freud” are animated by the same skeptical and critical spirit. This spirit is manifested in a relaxed and playful way in The Pooh Perplex and in an acutely and decidedly serious manner in “The Unknown Freud.” The Pooh Perplex is a satire, a series of alleged academic analyses of the adventures of Winnie-the-Pooh, each of them written by Crews as a parody of the dominant style in some branch of the humanities: Marxist, Freudian, existentialist, etc. The Marxist sees in Piglet the revolutionary potential of the proletariat; the Freudian finds sinister Oedipal implications in the fact that none of the stuffed animals in Christopher Robin’s collection has a dad.

The collection of parodies, signed by a then newly minted PhD (Crews had obtained the degree at Princeton in 1958), already pointed to what would become one of the dominant concerns of the mature author: the fatal attraction of the humanities to farfetched, logically circular theoretical schemes that lose themselves in doctrinal labyrinths and generate texts that confuse rhetoric with rigor, leaving behind any contact with empirical, verifiable reality.

We got a lovely note from the late Professor Crews when we reviewed his Postmodern Pooh. He’d taken so many slings and arrows he was gratified to find fans.

FREEDOM IS AN IRKSOME BURDEN:

Mythology and what it means to be human (Thomas M. Doran, 4/22/26, The Dispatch)

The best modern mythology that seeks answers to what it means to be human includes epic mythology that depicts big events and often reduces those events to a page or so of text; heroic mythology by depicting what humans should and should not do; and granular mythology, where one may feel that the myth describes the real world, or an actual era of human history.

At the epic mythology level, we have Tolkien’s The Silmarillion, which describes the creation of the world and all its creatures, high and low; the rebellion of many of the elves and their age-long war with the rebel angel, Morgoth; and the collaboration of many men in the elves’ disordered enterprise. Tolkien’s myths depict in a profound manner the Creator’s gift of freedom and corresponding consequences, a moral momentum that corresponds to physical momentum in the created universe, where objects in the physical world—apart from the object(s) imparting the initial momentum—are also radically displaced.

So too, the moral momentum of the elves’ disordered use of the gift of freedom produces dire consequences for many elves and men who associate with the rebels. Not only that, the moral momentum of the elves’ original rebellion against their angelic benefactors cascades into more abuses of freedom, including “kin-slaying,” when the rebel elves steal their brethren’s ships to travel to Middle-earth. In the Creator’s lexicon, the radical gift of freedom cannot be true freedom unless consequences somehow correspond to the majesty of the gift itself.

The “problem” of Free Will is that opponents abhor the responsibility it imposes:

WORTH THE EFFORT:

Conservative Credo (Barbara J. Elliott, April 14th, 2026, Imaginative Conservative)

Because man is fallible by nature, the conservative seeks to limit the damage that can be done through the abuse of power by limiting its concentration.

The conservative fosters the fullness of human potential by protecting the freedom and dignity of each person, acknowledging that responsibility comes with freedom. Rights and duties are always linked.

For the conservative, each man and woman is equal in dignity and equal before the law, but gloriously individual and unequal in talents, aptitudes, and outcomes. The conservative celebrates the uniqueness of individuals and does not level to eliminate differences.

It’s how we avoided the damage Reason did to the Continent.

GUESTING:

Annotation Tuesday! Tom Wolfe and radical chic ( Elon Green, 5/13/14, Nieman Storyboard: Why’s This So Good)

Storyboard: How did you get the idea for “Radical Chic”?

Tom Wolfe: It was December of ’69, it must have been, that I learned about this party for the Black Panthers, in the following manner: I was at Harper’s magazine, waiting for my wife-to-be — who was the art director — to get a break so we could go to lunch. And I just started wandering around — everybody was at lunch — poking my nose into other people’s business. And I was in David Halberstam’s office. There, on his desk, was an invitation to this party. And I said, “My God! 895 Park Avenue! That’s one of the greatest Park Avenue buildings.” And I said, “Somehow I have got to go to this thing.” So I copied down the phone number that was on the invitation to call to respond, and took a chance on it being a committee of some kind — which, in fact, in must have been, because there was a security check outside the door to Leonard Bernstein’s apartment. I mean, they put some big desks out there, so you couldn’t get by. There was no way you could sneak by. And my name was on the list, so no problem! And I immediately introduced myself to Felicia Bernstein and to Leonard Bernstein. I didn’t know them. I told them that I was from New York magazine.

CONSERVING THE CENTER:

Can Danielle Allen Save Academe From Itself?: The Harvard political theorist is the sector’s most interesting reformer. (Charlie Tyson, March 20, 2026, Chronicle Review)

Was it a pep talk or a provocation? Allen’s response, in October, to the Trump administration’s “Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education” had elements of both.

The proffered “compact” marked a grim phase in the Trump administration’s dealings with elite universities. The letter from the U.S. Department of Education, sent to nine leading universities, offered a leg up in federal funding to universities willing to accept a broad range of conditions — including “abolishing institutional units” that “belittle” conservative ideas, defining “male” and “female” “according to reproductive function and biological processes,” and ensuring that foreign students “are introduced to, and supportive of, American and Western values.” Such demands left many on campus feeling a bleaker-than-usual sense of persecution. In one characteristic opinion essay, Lisa Fazio and Brendan Nyhan, professors at Vanderbilt University and Dartmouth College, respectively, called the deal a “devil’s bargain,” warning that “any institution that yields to these broad and intrusive demands would give up its legal rights and forever be subservient to the whims of the government.”

Allen’s reply went against the prevailing mood. In an essay titled “Why I’m Excited About the White House’s Proposal for a Higher Ed Compact,” published on her Substack before appearing in these pages, she framed the compact as an opportunity for universities to work in concert to develop a package of higher-ed reforms. While urging university leaders to reject the compact as written, she insisted that universities needed “to talk to each other” to arrive at some deal that would address the sector’s problems. (Rules intended to prevent collusion on tuition, she told me, have hampered cross-institutional collaboration.)

“By allowing civic education to erode, by abandoning a commitment to pluralism that includes viewpoint diversity, and by failing to achieve approaches to admissions and credentialing that are broadly experienced as fair,” she wrote, “universities have failed to contribute as they might” to the health of American democracy.

In staking out this position, Allen was elaborating upon an essay she’d published some months before in The Atlantic. That essay proposed several concrete reforms through which universities might begin to establish “a new social contract” with the American people. Elite institutions, Allen argued, should move toward lottery admissions so that students who clear a certain merit threshold are selected by geographic or socioeconomic criteria. (In addition to fostering “cultural cohesion,” she told me, a lottery would curb the “meritocratic arrogance that is a feature of our current system.”) Selective universities, she suggested, should increase the size of their undergraduate-student bodies. They should experiment with three-year degrees as a way of controlling tuition costs. And they should support “viewpoint diversity” through faculty recruitment and perhaps by establishing two-year visiting professorships for scholars in right-leaning think tanks.

For decades, higher-ed policy has, via investments in STEM education, focused on national security and economic productivity. We have, Allen warned, neglected the university’s deeper purpose, which is the maintenance and fortification of civic strength.

To many observers of higher education, such ideas seem reasonable and overdue. Aspects of Allen’s agenda, however, might seem to align suspiciously well with emerging trends that many scholars view as noxious. In recent years, a spate of civics institutes and Great Books programs has arisen across the nation. Many of these programs are conspicuously conservative. Gov. Bill Lee, a Republican of Tennessee, announced a $6-million civics institute at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville as a way of fighting “anti-American thought”; the University of Florida’s Hamilton School for Classical and Civic Education was conceived, by a shadowy nonprofit called the Council on Public University Reform, as a countermove against “cancel culture and uniformity of opinion on campus.” Tens of millions of dollars in grants awarded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, in January, went to support professorships in programs in civic leadership and Western civilization — programs some faculty regard as affirmative action for right-leaning scholars at a time when jobs in the humanities are punishingly scarce.

Allen believes, Ober told me, that the new civics institutes, even those mandated by legislators with an “ideological agenda,” could play a role in strengthening democracy. “Danielle is saying, let’s work and try to make them part of the solution rather than marginalizing them and saying they’re impure.” (Ober is a co-director of the Stanford Civics Initiative.)

While Allen singled out UT-Knoxville’s civics program for praise, she was cautiously measured in describing the curricular battles that have engulfed the humanities. “Some of the critiques that conservatives have made about college curricula are sound,” she told me. “We haven’t taught enough bread-and-butter basics of U.S. history, constitutionalism, and the like. Some of the critiques from Black studies, which require us to expand our horizon of what voices matter, are also sound.”

Is this fairmindedness simply — centrism? For some of Allen’s collaborators and admirers, the appeal of her higher-ed reformism lies in its promise to reorient academic discourse around the center. Paul Carrese, director of Arizona State University’s Center for American Civics, sees Allen’s project as “rebuilding a broad middle” in higher education. He hopes that Allen-style civic education might help alleviate the angry polarization that characterizes contemporary American political life. “More critical, radical views farther to the left, farther to the right — in a way, these views might be too prominent right now,” Carrese told me. “The focus should be on expanding the center and a healthy culture of Socratic dialogue across center-left and center-right.”

BEAUTY IS OBJECTIVE:

Political Philology: J. R. R. Tolkien Against the Leftists (Adam F. Bishop, 2/09/26, Public Discourse)

In Tolkien’s deeply Catholic theology, language is the key element of sub-creation, the artist’s ability to form a Secondary World into which the mind can enter. As Tolkien claims in his 1947 essay “On Fairy-stories,” through the “enchanter’s power” of language, “new form is made; Faërie begins; Man becomes a sub-creator.” This use of language is “a human right: we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.”

God has bestowed on man a remarkable gift: the ability, through words, to abstract universals from the world around him. Tolkien provides the example of perceiving green grass and recognizing that the greenness can be separated from the grass. The “enchanter’s power” then lies in using those universals in an act of sub-creation, being able to consider these words apart from the physical world and to create Fantasy. Through this gift, we imagine what does not physically exist, calling into our minds and the minds of others “ideal creations” that have “the inner consistency of reality.”

Tolkien holds such a high view of the sub-creative power of language that he states, “The maddest castle that ever came out of a giant’s bag in a wild Gaelic story is not only much less ugly than a robot-factory, it is also (to use a very modern phrase) ‘in a very real sense’ a great deal more real.” The sub-creation of the human word reflects God and His Creation in such a way that Fantasy, insofar as it leads one to God, can be more real than the physical objects around us. The robot factory, being an artifice that exists to produce more artificial constructs, separates man from his sub-creative ability; there is no art in the robot factory, but only brute utilitarianism. In the imaginative realm of Fantasy, the art and the artist signify God. As Tolkien states, “[the Christian] may now … fairly dare to guess that in Fantasy he may actually assist in the effoliation and multiple enrichment of creation.”

Therefore, language is more than just a tool; it is a way in which man resembles God and participates in truth and reality.

DECENCY REQUIRES SUPPRESSING THE SELF:

The ‘Me’ Decade: The new alchemical dream is: changing one’s personality—remaking, remodeling, elevating, and polishing one’s very self. (Tom Wolfe, August 23, 1976, New York)

We are now—in the Me Decade—seeing the upward roll (and not yet the crest, by any means) of the third great religious wave in American history, one that historians will very likely term the Third Great Awakening. Like the others it has begun in a flood of ecstasy, achieved through LSD and other psychedelics, orgy, dancing (the New Sufi and the Hare Krishna), meditation, and psychic frenzy (the marathon encounter). This third wave has built up from more diverse and exotic sources than the first two, from therapeutic movements as well as overtly religious movements, from hippies and students of “psi phenomena” and Flying Saucerites as well as charismatic Christians. But other than that, what will historians say about it?

The historian Perry Miller credited the First Great Awakening with helping to pave the way for the American Revolution through its assault on the colonies’ religious establishment and, thereby, on British colonial authority generally. The sociologist Thomas O’Dea credited the Second Great Awakening with creating the atmosphere of Christian asceticism (known as “bleak” on the East Coast) that swept through the Midwest and the West during the nineteenth century and helped make it possible to build communities in the face of great hardship. And the Third Great Awakening? Journalists (historians have not yet tackled the subject) have shown a morbid tendency to regard the various movements in this wave as “fascist.” The hippie movement was often attacked as “fascist” in the late 1960s. Over the past several years a barrage of articles has attacked Scientology, the est movement, and “the Moonies” (followers of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon) along the same lines.

Frankly, this tells us nothing except that journalists bring the same conventional Grim Slide concepts to every subject. The word fascism derives from the old Roman symbol of power and authority, the fasces, a bundle of sticks bound together by thongs (with an ax head protruding from one end). One by one the sticks would be easy to break. Bound together they are invincible Fascist ideology called for binding all classes, all levels, all elements of an entire nation together into a single organization with a single will.

The various movements of the current religious wave attempt very nearly the opposite. They begin with … “Let’s talk about Me.” They begin with the most delicious look inward; with considerable narcissism, in short. When the believers bind together into religions, it is always with a sense of splitting off from the rest of society. We, the enlightened (lit by the sparks at the apexes of our souls), hereby separate ourselves from the lost souls around us. Like all religions before them, they proselytize—but always on promising the opposite of nationalism: a City of Light that is above it all. There is no ecumenical spirit within this Third Great Awakening. If anything, there is a spirit of schism. The contempt the various seers have for one another is breathtaking. One has only to ask, say, Oscar Ichazo of Arica about Carlos Castaneda or Werner Erhard of est to learn that Castaneda is a fake and Erhard is a shallow sloganeer. It’s exhilarating!—to watch the faithful split off from one another to seek ever more perfect and refined crucibles in which to fan the Divine spark … and to talk about Me.

Whatever the Third Great Awakening amounts to, for better or for worse, will have to do with this unprecedented post-World War II American development: the luxury, enjoyed by so many millions of middling folk, of dwelling upon the self. At first glance, Shirley Polykoff’s slogan—“If I’ve only one life, let me live it as a blonde!”—seems like merely another example of a superficial and irritating rhetorical trope (antanaclasis) that now happens to be fashionable among advertising copywriters. But in fact the notion of “If I’ve only one life” challenges one of those assumptions of society that are so deep-rooted and ancient, they have no name—they are simply lived by. In this case: man’s age-old belief in serial immortality.

The husband and wife who sacrifice their own ambitions and their material assets in order to provide “a better future” for their children … the soldier who risks his life, or perhaps consciously sacrifices it, in battle … the man who devotes his life to some struggle for “his people” that cannot possibly be won in his lifetime … people (or most of them) who buy life insurance or leave wills … and, for that matter, most women upon becoming pregnant for the first time … are people who conceive of themselves, however unconsciously, as part of a great biological stream. Just as something of their ancestors lives on in them, so will something of them live on in their children … or in their people, their race, their community—for childless people, too, conduct their lives and try to arrange their postmortem affairs with concern for how the great stream is going to flow on. Most people, historically, have not lived their lives as if thinking, “I have only one life to live.” Instead they have lived as if they are living their ancestors’ lives and their offspring’s lives and perhaps their neighbors’ lives as well. They have seen themselves as inseparable from the great tide of chromosomes of which they are created and which they pass on. The mere fact that you were only going to be here a short time and would be dead soon enough did not give you the license to try to climb out of the stream and change the natural order of things. The Chinese, in ancestor worship, have literally worshiped the great tide itself, and not any god or gods. For anyone to renounce the notion of serial immortality, in the West or the East, has been to defy what seems like a law of Nature. Hence the wicked feeling—the excitement!—of “If I’ve only one life, let me live it as a ———!” Fill in the blank, if you dare.

And now many dare it! In Democracy in America, Tocqueville (the inevitable and ubiquitous Tocqueville) saw the American sense of equality itself as disrupting the stream, which he called “time’s pattern”: “Not only does democracy make each man forget his ancestors, it hides his descendants from him, and divides him from his contemporaries; it continually turns him back into himself, and threatens, at last, to enclose him entirely in the solitude of his own heart.” A grim prospect to the good Alexis de T.—but what did he know about … Let’s talk about Me!

Tocqueville’s idea of modern man lost “in the solitude of his own heart” has been brought forward into our time in such terminology as alienation (Marx), anomie (Durkheim), the mass man (Ortega y Gasset), and the lonely crowd (Riesman). The picture is always of a creature uprooted by industrialism, packed together in cities with people he doesn’t know, helpless against massive economic and political shifts—in short, a creature like Charlie Chaplin in Modern Times, a helpless, bewildered, and dispirited slave to the machinery. This victim of modern times has always been a most appealing figure to intellectuals, artists, and architects. The poor devil so obviously needs us to be his Engineers of the Soul, to use a term popular in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. We will pygmalionize this sad lump of clay into a homo novus, a New Man, with a new philosophy, a new aesthetics, not to mention new Bauhaus housing and furniture.

But once the dreary little bastards started getting money in the 1940s, they did an astonishing thing—they took their money and ran. They did something only aristocrats (and intellectuals and artists) were supposed to do—they discovered and started doting on Me! They’ve created the greatest age of individualism in American history! All rules are broken! The prophets are out of business! Where the Third Great Awakening will lead—who can presume to say? One only knows that the great religious waves have a momentum all their own. Neither arguments nor policies nor acts of the legislature have been any match for them in the past. And this one has the mightiest, holiest roll of all, the beat that goes … Me … Me … . Me … Me . . .

CONSERVATISM SEEKS TO CONSERVE LIBERALISM:

Toward a Conservatism of Hope: a review of Religious Freedom: A Conservative Primer by John D. Wilsey (Brady C. Graves, February 10, 2026, Modern Age)

Wilsey argues that “American conservatism since 1990 has demonstrated a turn towards Ottantottism,” a term Peter Viereck used for a reactionary disposition, and “while the Ottantott may see change as inherently bad and something to be resisted, the measured Burkean conservative—the conservative of American tradition—sees change, while inexorable, through the lens of caution.”

The modern perception of conservatism tends to be that it is prudish, stuffy, and roundly unimaginative. Wilsey laments that “the rightism of contemporary times is populist, obsessed with politics, and fueled by social-media-inspired outrage in a similar style as their leftist counterparts. The American Right has thus far failed to conserve American ideals, Western civilization and culture, and religious values and liberty.” Modern conservatism is so inflammatory, Wilsey argues, because it has abandoned its moorings.

When political expedience superseded transcendent virtue, conservatism morphed into political rightism. Wilsey proposes that conservatives should coalesce not around policy stances or political candidates but around a shared commitment to the transcendent as manifested through the good, the true, and the beautiful. When conservatism’s telos becomes political power, it loses its soul and its imagination and ceases to be conservatism. Echoing Burke, Kirk, and Weaver, Wilsey then concludes that “belief in the transcendent is primary in conservative thought.”

DARWINISM IS FOREIGN:

Identity crisis: Importing foreign ideas is no way to strengthen American conservatism (Freedom Conservatism, Jan 19, 2026)

What separates us from the NatCons isn’t our respective commitments to preserving and strengthening the American nation. It is how we define that nation.

As American conservatives, we reject any attempt to import from Europe or elsewhere conceptions of nationhood that are inconsistent with America’s history, founding documents, and civic traditions. Other nations may profess allegiance to a throne or altar, or define citizenship based on shared ethnicity or religious affiliation.

Here in America, however, those are foreign ideas.

At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the populations of the rebellious 13 colonies included people of English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Dutch, French, German, Scandinavian, African, and Native American ancestry. Most were Protestant but some professed other faiths or none at all.

Later additions to the union such as Florida, Texas, and New Mexico included people of Spanish and indigenous descent who possessed distinctive cultures and whose ancestors lived in America before the settlement of Jamestown and Massachusetts. The final two states admitted, Alaska and Hawaii, contain descendants of other ethnic groups living in those lands long before the 1500s.

Add in the descendants of generations of immigrants to the present-day United States, and you have a mix of cultures, folkways, and histories that renders incoherent and absurd the notion of “heritage Americans.”