Long War

THE WAGES OF iDENTITARIANISM:

REVIEW: of Allen Buchanan, Political Tribalism: How It Hijacks Our Minds and Diminishes Our Humanity (Alexander Motchoulski, 2026.06.2, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

Morally, tribalistic ideologies impede individuals’ moral reasoning primarily by representing politics as a zero-sum struggle of life and death on which one’s existence and identity depend (52-53). By representing politics as a condition of high-stakes group conflict, such ideologies are supposed to motivate transgression of what would otherwise be seen as moral norms in one’s behavior toward those that one views as Other.

Cognitively, tribalistic ideologies undermine our ability to reason about and with persons perceived as Other because such ideologies represent the other in terms of rigid stereotypes which obscure differences among persons falling within that category (36-37), impede one’s ability to take the perspective of persons deemed Other (45-47), and impede uptake of testimony from persons regarded as Other (80-81). Tribalistic ideologies’ effects on our moral reasoning compound with those cognitive effects, transforming what should be truth-seeking discourse into interactions aimed at defensive scorekeeping against opposition criticism (rather than fair consideration of and response to such criticism) and exercises in signaling one’s group affiliation and sorting one’s interactions to take place with one’s group (62-5).

Tribalism, then, is that way of thinking and feeling, of seeing and desiring and reacting, that is the driving force behind the antagonism observed in contemporary politics.

CONTESTING VICTIMHOOD:

Anti-Woke, or Just Wounded? A Typology of Two Types of Anti-Woke Intellectuals (Scott Barry Kaufman, June 1, 2026, Skeptic)

When we hear “narcissism,” we picture the grandiose type: the swaggering, self-promoting, attention-hungry performer. But in a study with Joshua Miller, W. Keith Campbell, and Brandon Weiss, my colleagues and I mapped how narcissism actually breaks apart into different faces. There’s grandiose narcissism: antagonistic, dominant, status-seeking. And there’s vulnerable narcissism: neurotic, hypersensitive, easily wounded, perpetually aggrieved, convinced the world has failed to grant the recognition it owes. The antagonism is the thread the two share.

Both feed the second anti-woke intellectual, but in different ways. Grandiose narcissism builds the brand: the crusader who discovers that being The Person Who Fights This Thing brings a following, a revenue stream, a standing ovation, and who needs the enemy to stay enormous because the enemy is now load-bearing for the self. Vulnerable narcissismsupplies the wound: the person who was genuinely humiliated—fired, mobbed, exiled, betrayed—and for whom the critique is no longer about the world at all but about settling a score that never closes. A real injury becomes a permanent organizing principle. The crusade is the bandage that never comes off because the cut is never allowed to heal.

And when this goes collective, it gets its own engine. The work of Agnieszka Golec de Zavala on collective narcissism describes groups built around the belief that we are exceptional, that we are not sufficiently recognized, and shows that such groups reliably turn hostile toward whoever they cast as the threat to the in-group’s image. An anti-woke movement organized around shared grievance, rather than shared inquiry, will behave exactly this way: ever-vigilant, ever-aggrieved, retaliating against perceived insults to its own greatness. The truth-seeking recedes; the score-settling takes over.

That’s the distinction I’d draw, and I’d put it as a question anyone in this fight can ask themselves: Am I doing this to make society better, or to repair a narcissistic injury? The two can look identical from the outside. They have very different effects on the world.


And here is the part I find mega-ironic: the second camp talks, almost without exception, from a place of pure victim mindset. The very thing they are most likely to mock in their opponents (the grievance gang, the victimhood culture, the perpetual woundedness group, the “everyone is out to get us” cohort) is the thing they have most thoroughly become. Their accusation becomes a mirror of themselves.

This is the root of the Right’s obsession with manliness: they lack iot.

THERE IS NO BEAR IN THE WOODS:

Thanks largely to robots, Ukraine is now talking about winning, not just surviving: Uncrewed and autonomous systems—and the willingness to adapt to them—have neutered Russian advantages. (Patrick Tucker | June 2, 2026, Defense One)

A small but growing number of European officials and analysts are saying what four years ago was unthinkable: Ukraine isn’t just surviving its grueling war with Russia, it is in some ways thriving and may even be on a path to victory.

This isn’t yet captured in headlines—for example, about last weekend’s barrage of Russian drones and missiles around Ukraine—but in the details, like how some 90 percent were intercepted.

Several long-term trends have shifted in Ukraine’s favor, and the core reason is its fierce focus on AI and robotics.

In the crucible of war, Ukraine has developed drones and ground robots that can hold territory—even take it back.

DONALD WHO?:

Taiwan’s more relaxed than most of us about Trumpian deal-making (Bill Emmott, May 31, 2026, Asia Times)

So it is worth asking why Taiwan itself seems comparatively relaxed about the potential implications of the Trump-Xi summits. This may help us separate the noise that inevitably surrounds these summits from the true strategic signals that both sides are conveying.

One reason why Taiwan is less concerned than others is a simple one: it has had to learn to live with its geopolitically anomalous status for nearly 80 years now. If it got nervous every time the Chinese and American leaders talked, even ones like Xi and Trump, it would soon have a nervous breakdown.


Moreover, while certainly the People’s Republic of China has become vastly stronger in economic, military and political terms, especially over the past two decades, so has Taiwan. The Taiwanese know that they could not defeat China in a head-on conflict but they also know that they are strong enough to impose huge costs and pose high risks for China.

Ukraine’s success in resisting Russia’s invasion since February 2022 serves as an inspiration for Taiwan but most of all as a warning to China.

What matters to Taiwan is that it can keep on strengthening its defenses sufficiently to help deter an invasion.

Taiwan actually could win a head on conflict.

CHOKING ON THEIR BILE:

How Right-Wing Politics Make You Physically Ill (Kristen French, May 29, 2026, Nautilus)

A team of scientists found that conservative Americans got measurably less healthy than liberal Americans over the course of the 2010s. By the early 2020s they were dying at significantly higher rates, even setting aside COVID-19 deaths. They also ran a separate large survey, in 2024, of more than 21,000 people and found that right-leaning Americans—especially Republicans and Trump voters—are less likely to trust their doctors, follow medical advice, and seek care when they probably should.

It isn’t just about COVID vaccines. It extends to medications for chronic conditions like diabetes and hypertension, and to willingness to go to the doctor for chest pain.

THE DRAGON HAS NO TEETH:

Ten China falsehoods exposed by the Trump-Xi summit (Miles Yu, May 25, 2026, Washington Times)

  1. The myth of the “Thucydides Trap”

The Beijing summit revived the tired mythology of the “Thucydides Trap,” the claim that conflict between the United States and China is inevitable because a rising China is displacing a declining America. This theory is not only intellectually bankrupt, but also historically erroneous, because the rising power was defeated in the Peloponnesian war that Thucydides masterfully documented.

Xi Jinping himself is trapped not by geopolitical reality, but by Marxist-Leninist dogma, which insists capitalism is collapsing and communist victory triumphantly inexorable. The CCP mistakes dogma and propaganda for reality. America remains the world’s leading military, technological and financial power, the global hub of innovation and inspiration, the only superpower capable of shaping global security, trade and alliance environments.

China, meanwhile, faces demographic collapse, economic stagnation, mass unemployment, popular disenchantment and elite political instability. More importantly, the real divide is not “China versus America,” but communist China versus the entire free world.

THE rIGHT IS THE lEFT:

Dear conservatives, industrial policy is a dead end (Samuel Gregg, 26 May 2026, CapX)

Industrial policy is in fact already widespread in Western societies. State subsidies, special tax write-offs, outright capital grants and joint public-private enterprises are rife in developed economies. The differences are really about scale and form.

One reason why many governments have often been reluctant to acknowledge the degree to which they promote such practices are the well-documented economic and political problems associated with industrial policy.

Among other things, these include: 1) the fact that governments cannot know everything they would need to know if they were to design successful industrial policies; 2) the massive opportunity costs associated with diverting scarce resources to less productive economic sectors; 3) industrial policy’s inherently political nature and its consequent susceptibility to political machinations and rampant cronyism.

Then there is the reality that the world’s economies are littered with powerful examples of industrial policy failure. Japan was once considered the poster child for industrial policy success. In the 1980s, many American commentators insisted that unless the US imitated Japan’s extensive use of industrial policy, it risked being supplanted by Japan as the world’s economic superpower.

The irony is that from the early-1990s onwards, Japan started slipping into its ‘Lost Decades’ of stagnation, and there is little doubt that industrial policy played a leading part in facilitating that decline. Indeed, one of the most comprehensive studies of industrial policy’s long-term impact upon Japan concluded that it produced ‘little, if any positive impact on productivity, growth, or welfare’.

This track record should cause conservatives to be more wary of industrial policy, including the current Chinese variety.

BREAKING OUT OF THE BANTUSTANS:

The Voting Rights Act Is Dead. Here’s a New Model for Black Politics. (Jake Grumbach, Perry Bacon, May 25, 2026, New Republic)

It’s worth explaining when and how Black politics lost its effectiveness. There has never been a singular Black political movement or African American ideology. Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois famously quarreled. Du Bois’s own views shifted over the course of his life. The reality of the civil rights activism of the 1950s and ’60s was more complicated and messy than beautiful Martin Luther King speeches and smartly organized boycotts.

But after the civil rights victories of the 1960s, a clear Black politics emerged and predominated for five decades. Aspiring Black leaders, who had earlier led from the pulpit or protests, sought and won political office, most commonly becoming either mayor or member of Congress in heavily Black areas. A network of Black organizations, such as the National Urban League and the NAACP, focused less on the mass protests of the civil rights era and more on behind-the-scenes lobbying and collaborating with those Black officials in office.

Though they varied considerably, these organizations often became synonymous with a single famous leader, such as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. And these leaders were often treated by the media and politicians as spokespeople for the entire Black population. These politicians, groups, and leaders aligned tightly with the Democratic Party, viewing it as the only vehicle to advance Black political goals.

The results of this approach have been uneven. On the one hand, African American politicians became increasingly powerful within the Democratic Party, gaining committee chairmanships, the mayor’s office in some of America’s largest cities, Cabinet and judicial appointments, and finally, in Barack Obama, the party’s presidential nomination. These elected officials delivered major policy victories to Black Americans and the country as a whole, from local economic empowerment of Black communities to the Affordable Care Act. On the other hand, African Americans became a “captured minority,” the term invoked by Princeton political scientist Paul Frymer. Democratic Party officials knew that Black voters would back them no matter what, so they had little incentive to push hard for policies and programs that would help African Americans in particular. Electoral pressures led the Democratic Party to set an agenda that would appeal to swing voters in swing states—a very non-Black constituency.

As the Democratic Party became increasingly concerned that advancing Black concerns turned off white voters, Black Democratic politicians and prominent activists faced a choice: advance in the party by downplaying and sidelining Black concerns, or advocate Black interests at the expense of their careers. Many chose the former. Contrary to conservative pundits who claim that he stoked racial conflict, Obama actually spoke far less about racial issues than his Democratic predecessors. Prominent activists shifted from pressuring Democratic politicians to being very defensive of them. Sharpton and others negotiated with mayors, presidents, and corporations, but grew unaccountable to Black America at large—operating more like celebrities than community activists. Over time it became difficult to distinguish the policies of Black and white mayors, as both were beholden to the police and corporations in their cities and thereby unwilling (and often lacking any real power) to advance policies to help rank-and-file Black Americans.

The Congressional Black Caucus for a time earned its self-given moniker, the “Conscience of the Congress,” pushing the U.S. in radical directions, whether on enforcing civil rights or in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. But gradually, members of the CBC became advocates for Democratic donors and big business as much as for Black activists and voters. Above all, they advocated for their own careers. Many CBC members are among the cohort of congressional Democrats in their upper seventies and eighties who insist on running for reelection despite growing concerns of a gerontocracy.

TO NOT KNOW IS TO HATE?:

The Smugness of Anti-Empathy Politics: Gad Saad spells out his ‘own the libs, scorn the weak’ ethos: a review of Suicidal Empathy: Dying to Be Kind by Gad Saad (Cathy Young, May 22, 2026, The Bulwark)

Quillette ran a scathing review by conservative British writer Ben Sixsmith titled “Playing Gad,” critiquing it as simplistic and intellectually self-absorbed. The reviewer in another “heterodox” outlet, Unherd, panned the book for dressing up a catchy concept in a lot of incoherent and “vibes-based” arguments, political vitriol, and lame humor.

The thing is, Saad’s concept—empathy is a good and necessary trait, but can be bad and self-damaging when taken too far—is one few people would dispute. Obvious examples include being trapped in an abusive relationship or a toxic friendship because you’re afraid to hurt the other person by ending it, a concern exploitative people can easily manipulate. On a larger scale, it is self-evidently true that empathy alone is usually not a reliable guide to policy or collective action: refusing, on compassionate grounds, to forcibly hospitalize people experiencing certain acute mental health crises can result in grave harm not only to other people but to the patients themselves.

Indeed, other people have critiqued the overreliance on empathy—at least in the literal “I feel your pain” sense which distinguishes empathy from the related concepts of sympathy and compassion, even if many people use the words interchangeably. Yale psychology professor Paul Bloom wrote a generally well-received book titled Against Empathy in 2016, proposing “Rational Compassion” instead. Bloom argued, among other things, that the emotional component of empathy leads us to focus too much on highly visible cases of suffering (a little child who falls down a well becomes more important than a lot of little children whose lives are quietly wrecked by poverty). Ironically—given that Saad spends a lot of time excoriating liberals for being too afraid to seem racist—Bloom also argued that empathy-based morality can easily become de facto racist and tribalist, since we tend to empathize more with people like ourselves: hence the disproportionate media focus on young white women who go missing.

For Saad, though, “suicidal empathy” is strictly a culture-war concept. In his framework, the term refers to ostensibly compassionate political views he considers misguided: support for migrants and refugees, Muslim immigrants in particular; excessive concern with the rights and well-being of criminals and/or homeless people; high taxes to pay for social programs; defense of transgender identities; an #IBelieveHer stance toward women who accuse men of sexual misconduct. (Unless, of course, the alleged perps are migrants or Muslims or both, in which case insufficient support for the victims is a sign of suicidal empathy for those groups.)

Gaad has just dressed up Identitarianism. By definition empathy is a personal concept, not one you apply to entire groups (whose personal experiences you can not even pretend to know, as advocates of empathy do).

HOW LOSERS “WIN”:

Actually, Democracy Dies in H.R. (Amanda Taub, May 18, 2026, NY Times)

New research, drawing on an extraordinary data set from Argentina’s Dirty War in the 1970s and ’80s, suggests a very different explanation. It turns out that the kinds of career pressures familiar to employees everywhere — the desire to revive a stalled career or obtain a minor promotion — can be enough to incentivize lower- and midlevel officials to violate professional obligations, fundamental norms and even basic morality. The people who make those decisions, the research suggests, are neither extremists nor victims. They are often just middling workers looking for a way to get ahead.

“Making a Career in Dictatorship,” a new book by two German political scientists, Adam Scharpf and Christian Glassel, reads like what you might get if you crossed Hannah Arendt’s ideas about the “banality of evil” with a business school guide on how to get the most out of low performers.

Their in-depth study of Argentina’s military during that country’s era of coups and forced disappearances found that low performers — whom they refer to as “career-pressured” individuals — filled the ranks of the secret police. That service allowed them to “detour” around the ordinary military hierarchy, the book shows, achieving promotions and career success they could never have managed otherwise.

It turns out that would-be authoritarians don’t need to staff their regimes with ideological true believers, offer extreme enticements or impose draconian punishments in order to make successful power grabs. They just need to figure out how to target their ideal labor pool: the frustrated and mediocre.