Academia

ALL COMEDY IS CONSERVATIVE:

In Fighting for Every Black Child, Did I Betray My Own?: A decade ago, I made a decision about my daughter’s education that I hoped would challenge New York City’s separate and unequal school system. Now 16, she thinks I made the wrong choice. (Nikole Hannah-Jones, Sept. 20, 2026, NY Times Magazine)

We thought by sending Najya to a mostly low-income and Black school, we could help improve it for all the children there. From my past reporting, I knew that P.T.A.s at poor schools often can raise only a few thousand dollars, but Faraji and I could write checks that exceeded the annual P.T.A. budget. I witnessed how dismissive school officials could be to lower-income parents who lodged complaints or made demands for resources and how deferential they were to wealthy ones. I believed Faraji and I could bring some of that power with us. We had connections and time and status that should not matter, but that we all know do. And more than that, we believed strongly that if families like ours went into schools like this one, it would challenge other families with similar values to do the same.

After much internal debate in our household, in 2015, we enrolled Najya in pre-K at Public School 307, a segregated, high-poverty school across from the Farragut housing projects in Brooklyn. […]

In the outside world, my choice had earned me valor. And yet that day, under the withering glare of my daughter, the words that I was formulating sounded hollow to my ears even before they passed my lips.

“Your school is not bad,” I told her, modulating my voice. “What are you talking about?”

Najya grew agitated. “You know what I am talking about. We looked up our school! We saw the test scores. We saw the ratings.” She ticked off the school’s below-state average reading and math scores, and that it ranked poorly on a popular school-rating website. I said I was aware of her school’s academic rankings, but that test scores alone do not define a school.

Glancing between her and the road, I told her everything that I had said a hundred times on stages, in interviews, in discussions since I had made her a symbol of how the choices we make can help sustain — or dismantle — educational inequality. I talked about the deep inequality in New York’s schools and how, like those Black families who came before us, we had an obligation to be part of the struggle of our larger community. Even if her schools were not academically the strongest, I explained, her father and I knew that we could provide for her tutoring and any other assistance to make up for what her school may have lacked.

But my child just shook her head, her face a mask of disbelief, and something else: betrayal.

“So you had money to send me to one of the best schools, and you chose not to?” she said, hurling her words. “Because other kids are disadvantaged, you didn’t want to put me in a great school?”

WHAT IF INEQUALITY IS EXACERBATED…:

Conservatives Don’t Like Sociology. Some Sociologists Don’t Either. (Vimal Patel, Aug. 14, 2026, NY Times)

A report released over the weekend about the state of scholarly standards in the field said it had been compromised by politics that influenced the discipline’s values and priorities.

The report was produced by a commission led by Vanderbilt University and Washington University in St. Louis, where leaders have argued that higher education is in need of reforms. The commission found that scholarship in the humanities and social sciences was sometimes in the service of political goals.

“Some topics cannot be studied or cannot be studied in an honest way,” said Jukka Savolainen, a Wayne State University criminologist and sociologist who is not part of the commission.

For scholars studying incarceration, he said, “the only research that’s rewarded and allowed and encouraged is to find the umpteenth way in which incarceration is harmful.” […]

Student interest in sociology has dramatically dropped in recent decades. One analysis found that since 2013, completions of undergraduate sociology degrees fell by 25 percent.

Sociologists cite factors like a broader societal shift toward degrees that are perceived as prioritizing trade skills. […]

The overall numbers mask that sociology is thriving in some liberal places, especially California. An analysis by Michel Estefan, a sociologist at the University of California, San Diego, found that two out of every five sociology bachelor’s degrees were earned in California.

The majority of them are students of color.

…by steering students of color towards useless degrees?

HEAD IN THE CLOUDS:

Elusive Longer-Run Impacts of Head Start: Replications Within and Across Cohorts
(Remy J.-C. Pages, Dylan J. Lukes, Drew H. Bailey, Greg J. Duncan, Arxiv)


Using an additional decade of CNLSY data, this study replicated and extended Deming’s (2009) evaluation of Head Start’s life-cycle skill formation impacts in three ways. Extending the measurement interval for Deming’s adulthood outcomes, we found no statistically significant impacts on earnings and mixed evidence of impacts on other adult outcomes. Applying Deming’s sibling comparison framework to more recent birth cohorts born to CNLSY mothers revealed mostly negative Head Start impacts. Combining all cohorts shows generally null impacts on school-age and early adulthood outcomes.

THE lEFT IS THE rIGHT (profanity alert):

Why I Quit the Tenure Track: The insufferable hypocrisy of elite academia (Tyler Austin Harper, September 2026, The Atlantic)

As I got to know Ava, I was surprised to discover that she viewed central Maine as a Stephen King–esque hell, a place where ancient prejudices and violence lay just beneath the friendly college-town facade. She regaled my wife and me with stories of alleged racial offenses, both major and minor, and generally made it clear that she thought Lewiston—an island of diversity in an otherwise famously homogenous, if not notably reactionary, state—was a hub of white supremacy. One evening, Ava confessed to me that when she drove through town and spied the local “crackers” sitting on their porches (not unlike the very porch we were sitting on), she sometimes thought to herself that these townies would probably like to kill her.

I didn’t know what to make of Ava’s views. I won’t pretend that my sensibilities were inflamed by the word cracker, but the epithet also didn’t seem like one that a college administrator should be using—especially at a school that admits a not-insignificant number of white, working-class Mainers. I also had a difficult time taking seriously the idea that I had moved to a place with would-be Klansmen around every corner. I grew up outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania—another deindustrialized, permanently revitalizing urban center—and Lewiston felt familiar to me. The people I met were nice, hardworking; they minded their own business. I don’t think it ever occurred to Ava that I could have come from a similar place and similar people.

But although I sometimes found the things she said classist and even offensive, I also genuinely liked Ava. She had a fast wit and a quick laugh. She watered our tomato plants when we traveled to Boston to visit family. We traded texts about the baby fox that scampered through the neighborhood’s yards in the morning and the oversize groundhog that pestered the dogs. I left freshly baked sourdough baguettes on her porch; we commiserated during power outages. Ava struck me as perhaps a touch paranoid, but she was also obviously smart. More important, she was a well-credentialed authority on racism, and I took such people seriously. Why wouldn’t I?

I’d never had great enthusiasm for identity politics; I’d been a socialist since my early 20s, and it had generally been my experience that liberals were as eager to talk about race as they were uneager to talk about class. Yet I also assumed that conservative complaints about “wokeness,” a term just coming into vogue as a pejorative, were essentially Fox News hysteria. Until I got to Bates, I had little reason to suspect that they held any merit.

At Haverford, the campus politics were of the earthy, stoner, peacenik variety—more focused on “late capitalism” and President Obama’s drone warfare than flamboyant identitarianism. At NYU, the students and faculty seemed more interested in enjoying the hedonistic riches of the city than anything that might reasonably be called “woke.” The new political correctness that was spreading on many elite campuses felt mostly like background noise, and seemed harmless besides.

That’s why, when Ava gave me anti-racist reading recommendations that first summer in Maine, I read them with an open mind. And when I found them disquietingly flimsy, politically bizarre, and, in their naked essentializing, even sort of racist, I assumed that I must be the problem. As a light-skinned Black guy who doesn’t speak African American English, I had rarely been subjected to acute prejudice in my life. I thought that perhaps I simply wasn’t Black enough—“authentically” Black enough—to understand the kind of racial pessimism that had become so mainstream.

Ava was hardly the only pessimist among my new co-workers. Around the start of the semester, I attended an informal orientation event for early-career Black faculty, where I assumed we would talk about our research interests or simply get to know one another. Instead, the gathering felt more like a combined therapy session and HR seminar. At one point, someone casually rattled off a series of local establishments to steer clear of, vaguely implying that they were filled with bigots. Alarmed by the notion that race relations were so bad in Lewiston that there were places I should avoid eating, I asked why one restaurant in particular had earned a reputation for intolerance. My colleague said that a student of color had worked there and not liked it very much.

The source of the most intense racial monomania on campus, I came to realize, was senior leadership. In one of my first encounters with the man who was then dean of the faculty, I mentioned how excited I was to be joining one of the few American colleges founded by abolitionists. At this, the dean—a white biologist who was an expert on sponges—frowned, as though my rosy view of the school’s antislavery history physically pained him. He conceded that, sure, it had been founded by the abolitionist minister Oren Burbank Cheney, but he pointed out that Benjamin Bates, the textile tycoon who had funded the college, had processed slave-picked cotton in his mills. I had come into Bates rather smitten with the idea that I was a Black academic joining the ranks of a faculty whose predecessors had agitated for Black freedom, but the dean seemed to feel that this was actually something to be faintly embarrassed of, a history that was best mentioned, if at all, only after layering on an array of caveats.

I found this kind of endemic self-flagellation to be eye-roll-worthy. But the charged atmosphere at Bates didn’t feel out of step with that of the country as a whole, at least initially. Yes, the college sponsored overearnest discussions of books such as White Fragility and How to Be an Antiracist. Yes, the president of the college bragged that 67 percent of new faculty hires that fall were “BIPOC-identified,” and, sure, it seemed likely that some racial-discrimination laws had been ignored to get that number so high. Yes, college leadership was constantly adding new letters to the sexuality acronym—LGBTQ became LGBTQAIP2+. And, yes, many of us in academia tacked pronouns onto our email signature with the righteous zeal of Martin Luther hammering his 95 theses to the church door. I certainly did. But none of this seemed all that unusual. Bates was weird in 2020. But America was weird in 2020.

That first year, I kept my head down and let the small oddities I noticed pass by without much reflection. Between teaching, grading, student advising, Zoom faculty meetings, twice-weekly COVID testing, wrangling a hyperactive rescue puppy, and trying to survive the Maine winter, I didn’t have much time to think about the college’s (or the country’s) cultural eccentricities. Ironically, that pandemic year turned out to be the sanest one I would experience at Bates.

The request came a couple of weeks into June 2021: Would I co-chair the task force that organized the college’s annual Martin Luther King Jr. Day celebration?

DISMISSING THE ANCIENT GREEKS SEEMS HOMOPHOBIC:

The interview that exposed academia’s cluelessness (Megan McArdle, July 19, 2026, Washinton Post)

Carolyn Rouse, the president of the American Anthropological Association, was not one to stay silent while outsiders claimed that her field had abandoned rigorous argument in favor of social justice orthodoxy. No, sir. Instead, she opened her mouth and proved it.

Her interview with the Chronicle of Higher Education has to be read to be believed. No, strike that, I’ve read it three times, and I am still struggling to convince myself that it’s real.

“They used AI,” said the Princeton anthropology professor, apparently unaware that using artificial intelligence to survey large bodies of text is an increasingly common method in many social science fields. She rambled about a couple of passing references to Socrates as if this somehow discredited the report. (Did you know the ancient Greeks had enslaved people?) She asserted that teaching there are two sexes would be “the equivalent of turning an astronomy department into an astrology department.”

When the interviewer pushes back on that last point, she tries to dodge and weave, but has no idea what an effective dodge would be. So we end up watching an unintentional comedian take repeated pratfalls, such as suggesting that people who believe sex is binary maybe “want to kill babies that aren’t just XX presenting XX or XY presenting XY,” and that teaching that sex is binary is as inappropriate in a classroom as debating the pros and cons of interning Japanese people. Perhaps this sounds more coherent if you are fluent in Anthropologese, but to those outside the tribe? Woof.

All comedy is conservative.

ALL COMEDY IS CONSERVATIVE:

Freud’s Greatest Critic: The Legacy of Frederick Crews (Carlos Orsi, May/June 2026, Skeptical Inquirer)

During a very productive life of more than nine decades, Crews—literary critic and professor emeritus of the University of California Berkeley—became famous twice. The first round, between 1963 and 1965, came after the publication of The Pooh Perplex, an erudite satire that became an unexpected bestseller. The second time, from 1993 onward, came after his explosive article “The Unknown Freud,” which appeared in The New York Review of Books, igniting the so-called Memory Wars and opening up the debate about the true cultural, social, and scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytic movement.

As far as psychological science and neurology went, when Crews’s explosive article came out, Freudianism had been reduced, at least in the United States, to a kind of historical landmark in the field, much like the miasma theory of disease in medicine. But in certain branches of the humanities, such as literary criticism, and several “critical theory” models in sociology and political philosophy, it was still taken quite seriously. Being part of that world, Crews was acutely aware of that fact and of the need for correction.

Separated by thirty years, The Pooh Perplex and “The Unknown Freud” are animated by the same skeptical and critical spirit. This spirit is manifested in a relaxed and playful way in The Pooh Perplex and in an acutely and decidedly serious manner in “The Unknown Freud.” The Pooh Perplex is a satire, a series of alleged academic analyses of the adventures of Winnie-the-Pooh, each of them written by Crews as a parody of the dominant style in some branch of the humanities: Marxist, Freudian, existentialist, etc. The Marxist sees in Piglet the revolutionary potential of the proletariat; the Freudian finds sinister Oedipal implications in the fact that none of the stuffed animals in Christopher Robin’s collection has a dad.

The collection of parodies, signed by a then newly minted PhD (Crews had obtained the degree at Princeton in 1958), already pointed to what would become one of the dominant concerns of the mature author: the fatal attraction of the humanities to farfetched, logically circular theoretical schemes that lose themselves in doctrinal labyrinths and generate texts that confuse rhetoric with rigor, leaving behind any contact with empirical, verifiable reality.

We got a lovely note from the late Professor Crews when we reviewed his Postmodern Pooh. He’d taken so many slings and arrows he was gratified to find fans.

CONSERVING THE CENTER:

Can Danielle Allen Save Academe From Itself?: The Harvard political theorist is the sector’s most interesting reformer. (Charlie Tyson, March 20, 2026, Chronicle Review)

Was it a pep talk or a provocation? Allen’s response, in October, to the Trump administration’s “Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education” had elements of both.

The proffered “compact” marked a grim phase in the Trump administration’s dealings with elite universities. The letter from the U.S. Department of Education, sent to nine leading universities, offered a leg up in federal funding to universities willing to accept a broad range of conditions — including “abolishing institutional units” that “belittle” conservative ideas, defining “male” and “female” “according to reproductive function and biological processes,” and ensuring that foreign students “are introduced to, and supportive of, American and Western values.” Such demands left many on campus feeling a bleaker-than-usual sense of persecution. In one characteristic opinion essay, Lisa Fazio and Brendan Nyhan, professors at Vanderbilt University and Dartmouth College, respectively, called the deal a “devil’s bargain,” warning that “any institution that yields to these broad and intrusive demands would give up its legal rights and forever be subservient to the whims of the government.”

Allen’s reply went against the prevailing mood. In an essay titled “Why I’m Excited About the White House’s Proposal for a Higher Ed Compact,” published on her Substack before appearing in these pages, she framed the compact as an opportunity for universities to work in concert to develop a package of higher-ed reforms. While urging university leaders to reject the compact as written, she insisted that universities needed “to talk to each other” to arrive at some deal that would address the sector’s problems. (Rules intended to prevent collusion on tuition, she told me, have hampered cross-institutional collaboration.)

“By allowing civic education to erode, by abandoning a commitment to pluralism that includes viewpoint diversity, and by failing to achieve approaches to admissions and credentialing that are broadly experienced as fair,” she wrote, “universities have failed to contribute as they might” to the health of American democracy.

In staking out this position, Allen was elaborating upon an essay she’d published some months before in The Atlantic. That essay proposed several concrete reforms through which universities might begin to establish “a new social contract” with the American people. Elite institutions, Allen argued, should move toward lottery admissions so that students who clear a certain merit threshold are selected by geographic or socioeconomic criteria. (In addition to fostering “cultural cohesion,” she told me, a lottery would curb the “meritocratic arrogance that is a feature of our current system.”) Selective universities, she suggested, should increase the size of their undergraduate-student bodies. They should experiment with three-year degrees as a way of controlling tuition costs. And they should support “viewpoint diversity” through faculty recruitment and perhaps by establishing two-year visiting professorships for scholars in right-leaning think tanks.

For decades, higher-ed policy has, via investments in STEM education, focused on national security and economic productivity. We have, Allen warned, neglected the university’s deeper purpose, which is the maintenance and fortification of civic strength.

To many observers of higher education, such ideas seem reasonable and overdue. Aspects of Allen’s agenda, however, might seem to align suspiciously well with emerging trends that many scholars view as noxious. In recent years, a spate of civics institutes and Great Books programs has arisen across the nation. Many of these programs are conspicuously conservative. Gov. Bill Lee, a Republican of Tennessee, announced a $6-million civics institute at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville as a way of fighting “anti-American thought”; the University of Florida’s Hamilton School for Classical and Civic Education was conceived, by a shadowy nonprofit called the Council on Public University Reform, as a countermove against “cancel culture and uniformity of opinion on campus.” Tens of millions of dollars in grants awarded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, in January, went to support professorships in programs in civic leadership and Western civilization — programs some faculty regard as affirmative action for right-leaning scholars at a time when jobs in the humanities are punishingly scarce.

Allen believes, Ober told me, that the new civics institutes, even those mandated by legislators with an “ideological agenda,” could play a role in strengthening democracy. “Danielle is saying, let’s work and try to make them part of the solution rather than marginalizing them and saying they’re impure.” (Ober is a co-director of the Stanford Civics Initiative.)

While Allen singled out UT-Knoxville’s civics program for praise, she was cautiously measured in describing the curricular battles that have engulfed the humanities. “Some of the critiques that conservatives have made about college curricula are sound,” she told me. “We haven’t taught enough bread-and-butter basics of U.S. history, constitutionalism, and the like. Some of the critiques from Black studies, which require us to expand our horizon of what voices matter, are also sound.”

Is this fairmindedness simply — centrism? For some of Allen’s collaborators and admirers, the appeal of her higher-ed reformism lies in its promise to reorient academic discourse around the center. Paul Carrese, director of Arizona State University’s Center for American Civics, sees Allen’s project as “rebuilding a broad middle” in higher education. He hopes that Allen-style civic education might help alleviate the angry polarization that characterizes contemporary American political life. “More critical, radical views farther to the left, farther to the right — in a way, these views might be too prominent right now,” Carrese told me. “The focus should be on expanding the center and a healthy culture of Socratic dialogue across center-left and center-right.”

MAGA JUST WANTS SOMEONE TO BLAME FOR THEIR OWN FAILURES:

The ‘Boy Crisis’ Is Overblown (Jessica Grose, 7/23/25, NY Times)


Let’s start with what Peterson says about the “radically left” political leanings of female teachers. In 2021, the Heritage Foundation, hardly a liberal bastion, found that “a nationally representative survey of K-12 teachers does not support the idea that America’s public schoolteachers are radical activists.” And further, “Teachers may very well be allies, not opponents, in the pushback against the application of critical race theory and other divisive ideologies in the classroom.”

But what about the fact that the majority of American teachers are now women? The teaching force in the United States has been majority female for over 100 years. Reeves notes that the current teaching force is 23 percent male — which is roughly what it was between 1920 and 1940. The number of male teachers ticked up a bit after World War II, but peaked at around 30 percent.

It’s not like our public schools are bereft of male leadership, either. While women make up the majority of elementary school principals, men dominate middle school and high school administrations. Only a quarter of superintendents, who are in charge of multiple public schools or districts, are women.


What’s more, the evidence that students do better with same-gender teachers is mixed at best. For example, a 2021 study using seven years of data looked at students in Indiana from grades three through eight and found that “female teachers are better at increasing both male and female students’ achievement than their male counterparts in elementary and middle schools,” and “contrary to popular speculation, boys do not exhibit higher academic achievement when they are assigned to male teachers.” (The biggest positive effect was for girls when they had female math teachers.)

All that said, the research that really surprised me was a meta analysis from 2014 by Daniel and Susan D. Voyer that showed that girls have been outperforming boys in school since 1914.

SELF-INDULGENCE:

Red Pill, Blue Pill: The Crisis in Political Theory (Joshua Mitchell, May 06, 2025, Cluny Journal)

The altered landscape of graduate education over the past four decades is partly to blame for the current state of affairs. First, there is now what could be called the intellectual ecosystem problem, by which I mean the ever-diminishing presence of what makes the “uni” in “university” possible, namely, a rough canon of books with which all of its members must engage, however coarsely. The abolition of the Dead-White-Man-Canon has deprived graduate students of a set of governing questions and provisional answers, and this loss has meant there is no reality-check on scholarship. In a healthy intellectual ecosystem, weeds do not grow. They proliferate only in disturbed habitats. Eventually, it is impossible to discern what the native growth even is. Second, the push to complete a Ph.D. in four or five years and to reduce attrition along the way has effectively ruled out bold and ambitious thinking among graduate students. This would be a less formidable problem if it were understood that they should aim higher later in their career. The unfortunate fact is that once the habit of thinking-writ-small takes hold, it is not easily broken. Moreover, when the announced intention of a graduate program is to get everyone through, scarce faculty time that might have been otherwise devoted to helping a lone super-star advance must be directed in some measure to students who in an earlier age would have been asked to leave the program. Third, there is a growing “ethos” problem. The simple and perhaps overstated way to put this is that courage and risk have been supplanted by an admixture of fear and empathy. Visiting lectures and job talks at our best universities four decades ago were academic versions of Celebrity Death Match. It was expected that one of the two warriors in the arena would be bloodied or slain. Anything akin to that is unthinkable today. Our graduate students are taught, above all else, fear and empathy: fear that they will not get a job if they aim too high, or that they will not get a job no matter where they aim; and empathy for the struggles, obstacles, and suffering they, their fellow-graduate students, and the world’s innocent victims daily endure. The secret that few want to acknowledge is that faculty advising has increasingly drifted into psychological counseling. Those who refuse to transform their offices into intake clinics are seen as callous and insensitive to graduate student “needs.” The solitary scholar of old has been replaced. Because that path today is too lonely, too risky, too frightening, we now have “collaborative learning.” It takes a village. Once faculty told graduate students that the ideas in their essays were wrong; now seminars throughout the academic year are dedicated to helping graduate students improve their writing. Because their ideas are considered to be unassailable, only further clarification of their tender ideas is required. The vicious cycle of cause and effect this pandering and handholding produces is unsurprising: those disposed to the ethos of fear and empathy increasingly populate our graduate programs and faculty rosters; those inclined to courage and risk do not apply, or leave early. Soon, the entire profession is transformed. Fourth, there is the “who says” problem. Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America3 that citizens of the future will only trust in the authority of their own experience. A century-and-a-half later, Christopher Lasch saw the pathological culmination of this development in Culture of Narcissism4. When we abandon textual deference altogether, we do not get responsible critique and brilliant breakthroughs; instead we get Selfie Political Theory, in which seminal authors from the political theory canon serve as a backdrop for Me-Me-Me. In the 1980s, any job talk that began with, “I want to argue that . . .” would have been met with howls of laughter and derision, because the first task of political theory was understood to be textual exposition, not personal confession. By the early 2000s, that had changed entirely, and theorists were told—and came to believe—that four years of dabbling in a Ph.D. program justified wandering through the grocery aisle of ideas, gathering whatever they found there to make a meal of their own devising, and then forcing others to eat it at no-exit APSA Panels or at mandatory job talks.

Incredibly few have anything to add: they should learn what is known.

IF YOU AREN’T TEACHING THEM AI YOU AREN’T EDUCATING:

Former Cornell president Martha Pollack ’79 urges universities to embrace artificial intelligence (Sohum Desai, April 25, 2025, The Dartmouth)

Pollack offered a three-part framework for introducing AI to pedagogy: AI literacy, integrating AI into classroom practices and increasing institutional efficiency.

“We need to teach students how to use AI well, but also when not to use it,” she said. “Changing pedagogy is really hard but necessary.”

Pollack gave examples of how faculty across disciplines are experimenting with AI, from law professors prompting chatbots to simulate jury reactions to using large language models for feedback generation. She emphasized that while automation may reduce some faculty workload, the student-professor relationship remains central.

“We’re social animals,” Pollack said. “You don’t go to Red Hawk for the beer — you go for the people. What’s true at the bar is true on campus.”

Pollack also expressed concern over the rising cost of higher education and declining public trust in universities, noting that AI might offer tools to help institutions remain accessible and relevant.

“If the AI education costs 50 cents, and the Dartmouth education costs $50, we risk pricing ourselves out of the market,” she said.