Anglospherics

THE ANGLOSPHERIC DIFFERENCE:

Deirdre McCloskey Wants Old Liberalism Back: ‘Equality of Permission’: In ‘Equality of Permission,’ McCloskey returns to familiar ground: free markets, individual dignity, and the dangers of statism. What makes it distinctive is the force and flair of her argument. (Joakim Book, October 13, 2026, Daily Economy)

My book argues for a substantial restoration of this first, Scottish, Smithian, and individual liberty. Alone. It argues against a state-directed, collectivist, and faux-predictable pursuit of an unattainable utopia, a top-down social engineering advocated widely in the French Enlightenment, which promises, through what it calls its numerous nice-sounding but coerced ‘policies,’ to serve a general will.

OUR RIGHTS AS ENGLISHMEN:

The British Radical Who Used the American Revolution to Curb the Crown: Danielle Allen’s valuable history of Charles Lennox shows the two sides weren’t foes but allies for popular sovereignty against tyranny (Andy Craig, 10/12/26, The UnPopulist)

In the spring of 1778, with the war in America going badly, a member of the House of Lords proposed that Britain withdraw its forces and recognize American independence. Charles Lennox, the third Duke of Richmond, was a great-grandson of King Charles II, one of the wealthiest men in the country, and about as well-placed in the British establishment as anyone could be. He was also, for 15 years, its most persistent critic.

Richmond is not a name most Americans would recognize. Danielle Allen’s Radical Duke makes a good case that he ought to be. […]

The central argument of the book, and its most valuable contribution, is that the reformers in London and the rebels in America were reacting to the same problem, and that the problem was not taxation as such. It was that Parliament had stopped functioning as an independent check on the Crown.

THUS DID hISTORY eND:

America Became Rich Because of Liberalism (Peter J. Boettke, October 12, 2026, ProMarket)

The great historian of the American Revolution, Gordon Wood, argued in The Radicalism of the American Revolution that what is most overlooked in discussions is the radical transformation of society that resulted. Colonial America was a society of status, of privileges, of station. Patronage and personal favoritism by those with power played a major role in social mobility—to the extent that it existed. This social system would all be transformed by the Revolution. One prominent example of the legal transformation was the abolition state by state of the practice of primogeniture between 1777 to 1798. Not only did this change the laws of inheritance, but transformed the meaning and use of property, encouraged entrepreneurship, credit markets and social and geographic mobility. Legal distinctions based on rank disappeared, and economic opportunities were based in interest, aptitude and talent rather than birth. Certainly not perfectly, it must be acknowledged. But in a far more sweeping nature than anywhere else in the world, ordinary individuals were enabled to “give it a go,” as the historian Deirdre McCloskey likes to stress about the ascendancy of the Bourgeois Era. Almost overnight, Wood argues, Americans became “the most liberal, most democratic, most commercially minds, and most modern people in the world.”

As a result, America became the richest country in history over the next 250 years. It did so without an aristocracy, and without central planning or a comprehensive blueprint by the governmental authorities. The Revolution succeeded because it created the institutional conditions for commercial civilization. It unleashed the creative powers of a free people to a greater degree than had ever been experienced before. As Hayek would stress, the transformation for a society of status to one of contract is critical to experiencing modern economic growth. And this is only possible if the governing system seeks to eliminate privileges and instead binds itself to the rule of law.

The American Constitution, democratic self-governance, geographic advantages, and abundance of resources all played a role, but it was the transformation of society that drove progress. The system of social hierarchy, deference, patronage, and inherited privileges was transformed into a system of equality before the law, civil society consisting of voluntary association, social mobility, entrepreneurship and dignity and respect for ordinary work. Commercial activity ceased being morally suspect and the marketplace was characterized by entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and independent participants rather than clients dependent on the good graces of the privileged and powerful elite.

The tragedy of Joe Biden was his disinterest in restoring the free movemnent of goods and people.

MARCO IS IRREDEEMABLE:

Thymos and American Foreign Policy: Marco Rubio seems to have quoted my work on recognition. He doesn’t understand it. (Francis Fukuyama, 10/12/26, Persuasion)

Secretary Rubio’s desire to stay on his boss’ good side leads him to twist reality like a pretzel. He speaks about an alliance between the United States and Europe based on shared values, gliding over a president who clearly admires Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping far more than those of other democratic countries. He talks about the wonders of science and technology created by Western civilization, even as his administration is cutting funding for scientific research across the board. He celebrates the agreement over Greenland, without mentioning his desire to grab it away from Denmark.

Secretary Rubio praises thymos without regard to the ends to which it is directed. He would do well to remember that it was an excess of megalothymia that led Alcibiades and the Athenians into the disastrous Sicilian Expedition, which Thucydides explains was the beginning of their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. The Secretary should also focus a bit on the lines from the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal.” It is this principle of human equality, and not the celebration of great individuals, that has underlined a lot of American foreign policy over the decades.

MAGA IS THE DEMAND OF STATUS FOR WHITE MEN…:

Law and Violence (IAN MITCHELL, 10/08/26, Country Life)

Status is the basis of all primitive “law”. The prehistorical paterfamilias ruled his roost by fist and club. Law amounted to the memory of past practice as carried in the memory of the head of the tribe. Decisions or commands going beyond tradition represented pure power, which was therefore not law in any acceptable modern sense. That was the ancient version of autocracy, or traditional kingship.

Whereas status depends on fist and club, contract depends on the voluntary agreement of two or more parties who, at the moment of signature, are juridical equals. That is a functional legal fiction which works because there is a greater power, the state, which will enforce the law which makes agreement possible in the first place. The principle behind all that is engraved above the entrance to the US Supreme Court: “Equal justice under law”.

Status imposes hierarchy; contract is based on voluntary agreement. The two principles represent, respectively, the vertical and the horizontal axes on the graph of all human power relations.

Though status is the basis of all physical power, even in the animal kingdom, contract has other sources of strength. Since the invention of writing, and the ability to store agreed texts (on clay tablets to begin with), legally enforceable agreements have been the insurgent power in human affairs. At first this was largely private, but soon the principle was applied to public affairs too.

From the point of view of Western political culture today, the effective starting point of organised resistance to status unbound was the sealing of the Magna Carta in 1215.

…by those who think themselves incapable of competing as equals.

SCRATCH A POST-LIBERAL FIND A RACIST:

A Catholic Theologian Signs Up for Mass Cruelty: Yet another thinker puts his faith in the service of monstrous deportation policies (Gabriel Schoenfeld, 10/03/26, The UnPopulist)

A lesson from the 20th century is that intellectuals sometimes choose to serve monsters. Hitler, Stalin, and Mao all found thinkers willing to sing their praise even as they murdered millions. On the spectrum of evil and death, Donald Trump, a crass, ignorant would-be authoritarian, is not in their league. And yet already, under Trump’s rule, people have died—and already lives are being ruined by the tens of thousands. As all this happens, crankish right-wing intellectuals have been drawn to Trump’s scepter as moths to a flame.

A case in point, not exactly a household name but not entirely unimportant, is Chad Pecknold. […]

What is the chief source of this threat? You guessed it: Immigration!

America, Pecknold tells us, “is not an idea, it is a PEOPLE.” With the unchecked influx of strangers, that “PEOPLE” is facing disintegration. The migration crisis, he writes, has “thrown the very concept of American citizenship itself into doubt.” In its rejection of America as a creedal nation in favor of one defined by heritage and inheritance, postliberalism slides inexorably into nativism.

The source of the trouble, in Pecknold’s view, is that “American Christians, Protestant and Catholic alike, have been so captivated and captured by the implicit open borders theology of liberalism that too many have forgotten how to think like Christians—and like Americans.” Contrary to the precepts of liberalism, statesmen have a “sacred duty,” he says, to restrict who may remain in a country. Accordingly, he maintains, we must reject the constitutional precept of birthright citizenship under which anyone born here, including to parents lacking documentation, is automatically a citizen. At stake is nothing less than whether “our laws permit Americans to have a country or not.”

MEN ARE FROM MARR, MAGA IS FROM MORRISSEY:

The meaning of Johnny Marr: And of not talking about Morrissey (William Davies, Sep 27, 2026)

Now aged 67, Morrissey is in the demographic sweet-spot of Reform sympathisers (the over-70s have not abandoned the Tories in such high numbers). Violence against children was not merely a topic he turned to as he was running out of ideas from the 1990s onwards, it was one of the first things he wanted to vent when he was granted a public platform in 1983. Those who grew up in the 1960s and 70s experienced the final flush of institutionalised sadism against children, and the complete absence of systematic child protection against sexual abuse, which teachers, scout leaders, vicars, sports coaches and Radio One DJs exploited to the full. They have since watched as society progressively and systematically drove violence out of schools and parental norms, which is of course not to say that abuse does not persist in the shadows and the margins. ‘Progress’ came just too late for them, no doubt leaving many in a state of profound ambivalence regarding its desirability. The insult posed by ‘woke’ (for which read the reactionary depiction of it) is that someone might feel violated and harmed by nothing more than words.

As many have observed, on learning that Far Right riots frequently feature men in their 50s and 60s, some of the violence returning to Britain’s streets is due to men who developed a taste and skill for it over forty years ago, on football terraces, nights out and perhaps at the hands of family members. These same men are also more likely to dish it out in the home (where Barbarism Begins). Psychoanalysts must have things to say about the heightened significance of sexual violence against white girls in the imaginary of the contemporary Far Right, that speaks of more than just hypocrisy (though there is undoubtedly plenty of that).

The Morrissey that depicted a world of normalised sadism and abuse was not ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ but he was honest and disturbing, perhaps more than we’re entirely comfortable with. This is not to suggest that we must all ‘hug-a-racist’, as Cameron once suggested of ‘hoodies’. But if we’re looking for a national story, with working class Manchester and indie music at its heart, the current Johnny Marr/Andy Burnham cultural love-in only tells one side of it. The blend of sixties and nineties nostalgia that Burnham and Marr have come to express is a feel-good one, especially for my generation (Gen X) and some younger. It’s canny politics to lean into this as a vision of community and conviviality, allowing ideas of ‘working class identity’, ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ to become owned by decent, generous, quietly liberal people.

There is, however, a national id that has been repeatedly pushed down, but which was blasted out of the radio by Morrissey’s unique voice circa 1983-84. It now forces its way out through the corrupt grinning neo-fascism of Farageism, which promises a restoration of violence at the borders, at sea, in the welfare system and – who knows – even within the education system. Marr is now on the opposite side of the culture war from Morrissey

THE ANGLOSPHERIC DIFFERENCE:

The Allure of Eden on Earth: Three books ponder the never-ending search for utopia (Jessa Crispin , September 25, 2026, American Scholar)

Near the end of Journey to Nowhere, Naipaul attends a discussion led by Buckminster Fuller, a utopian architect who believed that one could design a better world with the right ideas, the right architecture, the right urban planning—and the right billionaires converted to the cause. At this particular event, Fuller holds the audience in a state of rapture as he talks about how they can all turn the world into a paradise. “I felt I was working shoulder to shoulder with a chosen few,” Fuller tells the crowd, “a handful of people who were really willing to put their lives out for something beyond themselves.”

“The people here had not come to learn anything,” Naipaul writes. “They had come in search of revelation; they had come to discover how they might save themselves, save mankind, save the world.” And yet here we all still are, half a century on, having the same arguments about the people committed to saving us.

Our Humeian skepticism about Reason has blessedly insulated us from Utopianism.

LIKE A GAME OF PSYCHOSOMATIC BINGO:

How to Destroy a Lesbian Bar: The scourge of COVID led to drive-by whinings disguised as activism. (Helen Lewis, September 25, 2026, The Atlantic)

My experience pales beside that of Jackie Matellian, the 26-year-old proprietor of the Last Ditch, who, according to the Globe, had run up $50,000 in debt and had been sleeping in her truck as a result of the business’s troubles. She tried to do everything right: The bar was declared to be a safe space for the unhoused, and a no-go zone for police. She and her former co-owners (one of whom uses it/its pronouns) waived the cover charge for anyone who couldn’t pay; more and more patrons took advantage. After the backlash to the change in the mask policy, the bar apologized, explaining that the mask-optional night would help members of the queer community who needed to lip-read. None of this appeased the critics, one of whom felt the bar was insufficiently devoted to “revolutionary praxis,” which is like normal praxis but the discussions you have about it go around and around forever. “How are we supposed to be ‘connected in the revolution’ if we are spreading disease to one another? Nah,” Soe Noire posted.

At this point, Matellian should have realized that you can’t negotiate with terrorists, even ones with long COVID. Instead, though, she optimistically subjected herself to a struggle session—sorry, a mediation-and-accountability process—so that everyone could air their grievances.

The podcast Blocked and Reported, which broke the story of the Last Ditch earlier this month, obtained audio recordings of this meeting, in which pronoun declarations were required. As Katie Herzog, a co-host of the podcast, observed, the participants included “two people named after plants” (Sage and Moss; a third was named Yams). Those attending on Zoom were relentlessly hostile, demanding to know the mediator’s race and whether they would be institutionalized for disclosing any mental-health conditions to her. One of the Last Ditch volunteers told the meeting that the bar was $3,900 in debt and needed to pay within days, but Soe Noire—a self-declared lesbian using he/him pronouns—changed the subject to how the policy change made him feel unsafe. The Last Ditch had failed to uphold “COVID-cautious principles, anti-racism, or revolution,” Noire said. (Reminder: This is a bar. You know, the place where you go to drink beer.)

Most people might be surprised that arguments over masking are still so febrile years after even cautious blue-state schools resumed in-person teaching. But across the United States, some small subcultures live as though it’s still April 2020. That’s because pandemic protections and mitigations quickly became left-coded, to the extent that Donald Trump now has to pretend he didn’t oversee the successful vaccine program. In this context, perma-masking is every bit as much a political symbol as wearing a MAGA hat or a keffiyeh.

Anxiety and depression rates spiked during the pandemic, and some vulnerable people have never really recovered from the effects of physical isolation and the sense of oppressive dread they felt during months when thousands of Americans died. On the right, these emotions drive people toward conspiracism about Chinese bioweapons and false flags and “mass formation psychosis,” the idea that gullible populations were hypnotized into accepting shutdown measures. On the left, these anxieties coincide with a political critique—that Americans and their predatory private-health-care system do not care about disabled people. Masking is a visible symbol of resistance to this injustice, as well as a practical measure against the spread of disease. Notably, too, self-reported long COVID is disproportionately high among trans and bi Americans. Unless science uncovers measurable respiratory differences between bisexuals and the rest of the population, one explanation is that more LGBTQ Americans live in social contexts in which vague, unpleasant symptoms such as brain fog are interpreted as long COVID.

THE DARWINIST RIGHT IS SO FRENCH:

Demographic Fears and Far-Right Fantasies: Alexandra Minna Stern explores the eugenic fantasies and enduring legacy of Jean Raspail’s 1973 novel ‘The Camp of the Saints.’ (Alexandra Minna Stern, September 26, 2026, LA Review of Books)

The French New Right was led by thinkers such as Alain de Benoist, who founded the Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (Group for Research and Study of European Civilization, or GRECE), which promoted anti-egalitarianism and the veneration of authentic European identity. Purportedly inspired by the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of cultural hegemony and “war of position,” the French New Right incubated ethnonationalism and identitarianism in scholarly and cultural niches. It emphasized themes such as authenticity, borders, patriarchy, and the threat of immigration to national identity. It also contested changing gender norms and the rise of a worldwide liberal order allegedly masterminded by global organizations such as the United Nations, with its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The New Right decried policies that loosened immigration restrictions and promoted the social inclusion of minorities and women in education, the workplace, and politics.

Across the Atlantic, The Camp of the Saints was embraced by ideologues like Wilmot Robertson, who spearheaded proposals for a white ethnostate and published the antisemitic journal Instauration from 1975 to 2000. Instauration’s inaugural issue in December 1975 featured a review of Camp of the Saints as a “cautionary anti-epic” that is a “brilliant inquest of the West, the fictional climax of a racial inundation that started long ago,” and “leaves the reader reeling with doom.” As historian of ecofascism Miroslava Chávez-García has shown, the American white nationalist Garrett Hardin, who popularized the term “the tragedy of the commons,” praised Camp of the Saints and its exhortation to “save” Western society. Twenty years after its initial release, at a time when anti-Mexican racism pervaded California and on the heels of the passage of anti-immigrant Proposition 187, Hardin cited the novel to a Los Angeles Times reporter, carping about immigrants and opining that “things look much closer to that book than they did 10 years ago.”

The Camp of the Saints has been accreting influence for five decades. From the perspective of the United States, it gestures to early 20th-century tales about the Jukes and the Kallikaks, in which one bad seed turned an entire family line dysgenic, and generated an “army of idiots and imbeciles” that defiled society. Additionally, the book sits downstream from The Passing of the Great Race: Or, The Racial Basis of European History by Madison Grant. Published in 1916, this treatise of demographic downfall foretold the demise of the United States under waves of immigration from Southern Europe, Asia, and other parts of the globe. The Passing of the Great Race served as a repository of (flawed) data and a nativist justification for the passage, in 1924, of the draconian Johnson-Reed Act, which placed strict quotas on immigrants from countries outside of Western Europe. Like Camp of the Saints, Grant’s tract has been reissued by far-right publishers, most notably in a 2016 centennial edition. It has been referenced by Stephen Miller and other MAGA extremists as inspiration for policies of so-called remigration, forced removal, and an end to birthright citizenship.

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Literary scholar Corina Stan aptly describes how the themes of Camp of the Saints have congealed into a “a political myth about migration.” Over the day in which the story unfolds, scores of immigrant others, crowded by the thousands onto ships, determinedly set out to make landfall on France’s southern shores. This plot, writes Stan, “draws on a well-established archive: the tradition of invasion novels, replacement theories, and other texts by far-right intellectuals and violent revolutionaries.” Rather than represent the arrivals as French-speaking immigrants from North Africa, which might have hit too close to home given France’s violent repression in Algeria (1954–62) and the massacre of Algerian protesters in Paris in 1961, Raspail anonymizes them into a featureless Indian multitude. This lack of historical specificity and reliance on a generically “Brown,” bloodthirsty trespasser has made the novel’s invasion sequence readily transferable to a range of geopolitical and ideological scenarios.

The construction of this racial myth has harmonized not only with traditional ultranationalist politics but also with the more recently formed Reconquête!, an Islamophobic ethnonationalist party organized by politician and author Éric Zemmour, who declared on the presidential campaign trail in 2022 that “the French people are being replaced by another civilization. This wounds me, this destroys me. I come before the French people to say, let’s together stop this evolution.” Drawing on Achille Mbembe’s observation that literary dehumanization frequently deploys a “lack of figuration,” Stan underlines Camp of the Saints’ endless descriptions of Brown migrants, portrayed as deformed, defective, and diseased. The metaphors fractionate and recoalesce into a carnivalesque parade of shapeless bodies and body parts, nameless, throbbing, and overflowing, and described in animalistic terms as groveling packs of desperate creatures. Toward the end of the novel, when the multitudinous bodies disembark from the ships, flooding French soil, they are like “grotesque little beggars,” “basset hounds,” and “a herd of clumsy seals.”