Latin America

hISTORY eNDS EVERYWHERE:

Javier Milei’s Great Opportunity (José Papparelli, Nov 1, 2025, The European Conservative)

The overwhelming and unexpected electoral victory achieved by the ruling party unquestionably signalled renewed confidence from the electorate in the government project. The alliance La Libertad Avanza obtained almost 41% of the votes at the national level, surpassing Fuerza Patria by nine points: 9,337,665 libertarian votes against 7,276,429 of the Kirchnerist Peronism.

The extent of the victory is stunning: La Libertad Avanza has become the most voted-for force at the national level, and it won in 16 districts. Milei swept Peronism away, with hardly anybody foreseeing it. His movement managed to win even in the province of Buenos Aires, a historic Peronist bastion, today submerged in misery, corruption, and violence, with an absolute lack of public security that its citizens suffer daily.

At the polls the majority of Argentines have made clear what they do not want, what they categorically reject: to continue being governed by Kirchnerism. In the last twenty-two years, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), and Alberto Fernández (2019-2023) have passed through the Casa Rosada, the historic headquarters of Argentine presidents. These two decades of misgovernance have left the country mired in the most shameful poverty and geopolitically aligned with some of the most repugnant narco-dictatorships and tyrannies in the world.

One of the many possible readings of the election results is that, beyond the economic difficulties still faced by a large part of the Argentine people, thanks to the incipient and complex application of a political model defined as liberal-libertarian, the population has embraced the government’s plan. By contrast, all the opposition offered was to “unseat Milei” and put an end to the government “no matter what” by boycotting and permanently blocking any economic measure aimed at the capitalization of the economy, macroeconomic consolidation, and the end of the fiscal deficit, the adjustment of unnecessary spending, and the elimination of monetary issuance as a tool to cover the deficit and sustain inflation.

It is crucial to bear in mind that the government’s economic policies have been validated by the result.

FINALLY HAD ENOUGH PERONISM?:

Argentina’s Voters Hand Javier Milei a Crucial Victory in Midterm Election (Emma Bubola, Oct. 26, 2025, NY Times)

His party received over 40 percent of the vote, showing that despite pain inflicted by his austerity measures, many Argentines are still willing to back his libertarian experiment.

“Today we passed a turning point,” Mr. Milei told supporters on Sunday night, after coming onstage and singing a campaign song.

“Today begins the building of a great Argentina,” he said.

The victory gives Mr. Milei enough support in Congress to prevent his vetoes from being overridden, putting him in a strong position to further his ambitious agenda.

LIBERALISM WORKS:

Thanks to Milei, Argentina adds 7.7 million people to the middle class in one year (La Derecha Diario, 06/08/2025)


According to data from the consulting firm LCG based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) by INDEC, the middle class went from representing 23% of the population at the beginning of 2024 to reaching 39% in the first quarter of 2025. This is equivalent to 7.7 million people who managed to improve their family income and leave the vulnerability zone.

MSINOREP:

Milei’s Economic Miracle: How Argentina Slashed Inflation to 1.5% (Emmanuel Rincon, July 2, 2025, Daily economy)

Milei’s first step was balancing the budget. Through an aggressive program of public spending cuts, eliminating bureaucracy, and reducing public sector jobs, he erased Argentina’s massive fiscal deficit, paving the way for a historic economic recovery. Under his leadership, Argentina began taming inflation with rare fiscal discipline, not just regionally but globally. The latest data is astonishing: in May 2025, the consumer price index rose by just 1.5 percent, the lowest in five years. Remarkably, Milei achieved this without price controls but by liberalizing the economy, fostering market confidence, and slowing inflation. Annual inflation dropped from 211.4 percent in 2023 to 43.5 percent by mid-2025. Wholesale prices even fell by 0.3 percent in May, the best figure in 17 years. Poverty also declined sharply, from 52.9 percent in the first half of 2024 to 38.1 percent in the second, with UNICEF noting that 1.7 million children were lifted out of poverty since Milei took office.

These achievements were no fluke. They stemmed from a clear strategy: fiscal balance, reduced public spending, ending monetary expansion as a financing tool, and economic deregulation. The result? Greater stability, increased demand for the peso, falling inflation, and a rebound in employment and purchasing power.

That was easy enough.

BE MORE LIBERTARIAN:

From Anti-Communist Crusader to Authoritarian Copycat (John Mac Ghlionn, Jan 27, 2025, Discourse)


Only the most deluded of individuals could deny that the 54-year-old inherited an economy on the edge of ruin. In his first year, he implemented austerity measures and slashed government spending, cutting through Argentina’s bloated bureaucracy. His dollarization plan, while controversial, brought a semblance of stability to a currency afflicted with hyperinflation.

These are no small feats. His economic turnaround has earned him the respect of millions, both in Argentina and abroad. In a country where decades of corruption, reckless spending and mismanagement had left its people battered by runaway inflation and crippling debt, disillusionment ran deep. Successive leaders promised change but delivered little, as the gap between the rich and poor widened and basic essentials became luxuries for many. The economy was like the Titanic, already taking on water, and Milei stepped in just before it struck the iceberg. His bold, unorthodox approach seemed to offer a lifeline to a nation desperate for something—anything—different.

To stop the analysis there, however, would be intellectually dishonest. His success in economic reform does not absolve him of his deeply troubling authoritarian tendencies. […]

Just as Xi’s Great Firewall stifles dissent and controls information flow, Milei’s administration has rolled out measures designed to choke transparency and limit public access to critical information, with Decree 780/2024 standing out as a particularly egregious example. This decree grants the government sweeping oversight over media content under the guise of protecting public order and national security. It empowers authorities to monitor and penalize journalists for reporting that is deemed “subversive,” an ambiguously defined term that leaves ample room for subjective interpretation. Under the decree, headlines critical of the administration can be flagged as destabilizing or harmful, leading to fines, forced retractions or even criminal charges against journalists and media outlets.

ONE CUCKOO FLEW OVER:

Argentina Is Responding to Shock Therapy: He comes across like a madman, but Javier Milei is fast becoming the man of the moment. (Quico Toro, Dec 17, 2024, Persuasion)

Alongside a tax and cost-cutting spree, Javier Milei has gone on a kind of crusade against the thicket of regulatory nonsense that had colonized every bit of the Argentinian state. His economy minister launched a new mechanism to invite Argentinians to suggest useless rules to be done away with: in the first eight hours it was in operation, it received over 1,300 suggestions. The government deregulated everything from imports to labeling to apartment rentals. Its Deregulation Minister thundered at the mass of absurd regulations that meant importing, say, $30,000 dollars worth of toys required you to spend $10,000 on paperwork.

Argentinians may not have all turned into doctrinaire libertarians overnight, but they seem to have been catching on to the utility of the libertarian instinct. Faced with the mad mass of overbearing state interference in economic life, they seem to have accepted that you need a bit of a lunatic to cut through it: someone with the bombast and the pugnaciousness to fight the beast. In normal times, you’d surely prefer your president not to run around waving a chainsaw in the air like a madman, but Argentina left normal times so long ago the objection barely seems to even register.

Not, of course, that you can ever rest quite easy with a crazy person in charge of the government. Though he’s shown some signs of moderation in, for instance, restraining himself from calling Xi Jinping a murderous thug to his face, the way he used to, Javier Milei remains the edgelord he’s been all along: inveterately vituperative, revelling in insult, permanently itching for a fight. Treating bilateral relations with Spain the way a 14-year-old treats his first online fight, he called Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez “the torture poor Spaniards have to put up with.” His frustration-control, never strong, remains as flimsy as ever. As long as he stays in power, Argentina will always be one tweet-thread away from the next crisis.

But for the moment, Milei has had more successes than failures. He’s stabilized the currency, ended the deficit, tamed inflation, and made more progress in terms of structural reform than would’ve seemed imaginable a year ago. He’s managed to get enough support from a congress he doesn’t control to pass some important reforms, though he’s had to push much of his agenda through executive action. He’s pushing for a major new nuclear power plant building program to prepare Argentina for the AI future. Milei is a man with big plans, and it’s no longer obvious they will fail.

LIBERALISM IS UNDEFEATED:

Milei Has Tamed Inflation, but Argentina Still Isn’t Out of the Woods (Bruno Binetti, Dec 6, 2024, World Politics Review)


From the moment he took office last December, Milei wasted no time wielding his proverbial chainsaw, slashing public spending by nearly a third and erasing a fiscal deficit that had exceeded 5 percent of GDP. His reforms included halting budget transfers to provincial governments, dismissing over 30,000 public sector employees, cutting subsidies for public utilities, canceling most public works projects and reducing pensions by around 7 percent.

These drastic measures were effective at cutting public spending, but they came at a cost. A steep devaluation of the peso triggered short-term inflation, with prices surging by 25 percent in December 2023 alone. The economic fallout was severe: In the first six months of Milei’s presidency, an already deep recession worsened; wages lost significant purchasing power; funding for national universities plummeted by 30 percent; and poverty rose to 53 percent, up from 42 percent.

Despite these challenges, Milei’s approval rating remained remarkably stable, reflecting both the public’s disillusionment with traditional political elites and the gravity of the economic crisis he inherited. The chaotic Peronist administration of Milei’s predecessor, former President Alberto Fernandez, left the country teetering on the brink of hyperinflation and economic collapse. Many Argentines viewed Milei as their best hope for salvation, accepting the pain of his adjustment policies as a necessary cost to avoid catastrophe, even as they doubted his assurances that the burden would fall solely on the “political caste.”

In the end, their resilience appears to have been rewarded. Monthly inflation steadily fell from 20 percent in January to just 2.7 percent in October, a remarkable achievement for a nation long haunted by runaway prices. This newfound stability has fueled a modest recovery in real incomes and restored some ability for households and businesses to plan for the future. The gap between official and black-market exchange rates has also narrowed dramatically, from over 200 percent to less than 10 percent. With GDP projected to grow by 5 percent in 2025, Argentina is poised to rank among Latin America’s top-performing economies. Meanwhile, the government expects forthcoming data to confirm a significant drop in poverty, potentially bringing the rate well below 50 percent.

WHERE’S THE BEEF?:

Argentina’s reforms are more than economic: For most Argentines, cooperation among political rivals is a reason for patience amid economic reform (The Monitor’s Editorial Board, June 25, 2024, CS Monitor)

Mr. Milei’s biggest challenge may be in keeping a political consensus for his difficult reforms. He has brought key opposition figures into his Cabinet. And in a June 13 vote in the Senate, he won incremental changes that mix spending cuts with measures to strengthen cooperation between national and local officials.

In March, Mr. Milei asked ordinary citizens for their “patience and trust.” The reforms enacted so far have exacerbated hardships. The percentage of people living in poverty has reached the highest it’s been in 20 years (57.4% nationally). Yet two polls this month found that as many as 63% of citizens are willing to stay the course.


Their confidence may rest on a willingness of Argentina’s political leaders to work together with transparency. “It was crucial that he showed that he can work with the opposition to get something approved,” Eugenia Mitchelstein, a political analyst at the University of San Andrés in Buenos Aires, told The Wall Street Journal. “If everything is a conflict, and no negotiation, he won’t get anything done.”

Mr. Milei received similar advice this week during a brief visit with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. While Argentina makes far-reaching economic reforms, it is important to protect “social cohesion,” Mr. Scholz said. Greece won that key battle. Argentina seems ready to do the same.

THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT IS NOT BUSINESS:


Javier Milei takes a chainsaw to Argentina’s state companies(Ciara Nugent, 3/21/24, Financial Times)

“All of these companies . . . spend 20 per cent of their budgets on delivering their specific goals, and 80 per cent on management costs,” Guillermo Francos, Milei’s interior minister, told Argentine television network LN+ last month. “We must strive for efficiency.”

ASAP, a local NGO tracking government finances, found Milei had cut transfers to state companies to 456bn pesos, or $535mn at the official exchange rate, in February — a 61 per cent decline in inflation-adjusted terms from the same month in 2023.

The roughly 40 state-owned companies provide public services including passenger rail, sewerage and energy. Most operated at a loss under previous governments. Now Milei’s administration has appointed new management at many of them, with a mandate to slash staff numbers and revamp their strategies.

Juan Cruz Díaz, managing director of the Cefeidas political consultancy, said: “There’s a lot of space to cut costs, make things more efficient, improve management [in Argentina’s state companies]. But the government has an ambition to move much more intensely. This is a question of principles as much as costs.”

THANKS, GUS!:

Doug Irwin on the History and Political Economy of Trade Policy: Shruti chats with Doug Irwin about trade economists, trade in India, and globalization (Shruti Rajagopalan, 2/22/24, Mercatus Center)

SHRUTI RAJAGOPALAN: Welcome to Ideas of India, where we examine the academic ideas that can propel India forward. My name is Shruti Rajagopalan, and I am a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. […]

Today my guest is Douglas Irwin, who is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College. He is the author of dozens of books and papers, most recently, Clashing over Commerce, which is a magisterial history of US trade policy. We spoke about India’s liberalization moment in 1991, the five phases of globalization, British repeal of Corn laws, premature deindustrialization, the relevance of the WTO, absolute versus comparative advantage, the future Argentina, and much more.

RAJAGOPALAN: I think of this group of trade economists, especially the four of them, their ideas first percolated into the East and Southeast Asian countries. They had some impact on India for sure though not as much as one would like. And after 1990s, African countries started unilaterally liberalizing very much based on the Asian experience, but one group, which somehow never quite took their lessons and ran with it is the Latin American countries. Was it just a different set of problems or something was lost in translation? Because there was another group of economists who were the Chicago Monetarists who did have some penetration or impact in the Latin American countries. What’s going on there?

IRWIN: There’s a great deal of diversity across Latin America. Chile is an example where the reform stuck. Now, albeit they were introduced in the Pinochet dictatorship, but they survived the transition to democracy. The center-left governments that took over once Pinochet left, they had some appreciation for the economic model that they inherited. Chile had done pretty well with it towards the tail end of the Pinochet regime. Obviously, some big crises early on.

If you talk to Alejandro Foxley, who’s the first finance minister under democracy, he wanted to run fiscal surpluses to show markets that they were committed to not the excesses of the past. They reduced tariffs. They want to double down commit themselves to keeping the open economy model. Then the question is, why haven’t other countries in Latin America seen the benefits? Some have and some haven’t. Argentina, just to pick another big country has had cycles, and there’s a whole political dysfunction in Argentina

There’s been this pendulum swinging back and forth with Argentina. They were liberalizing in the ‘90s, then they closed up a little bit in the 2000s, and now maybe they’re moving in a different direction again. Peru’s an interesting case. Because once again, they opened up in around 1991.

RAJAGOPALAN: Had shock therapy.

IRWIN: Had shock therapy. That has stuck as well. Even though there’s continued political dysfunction in Peru, the economy’s done pretty well and the open economy model is pretty much entrenched. Colombia also a country that was never quite as closed as some of the others but opened up also in 1991. When I say opened up, getting realistic exchange rates, getting rid of quantitative restrictions on trade, getting rid of import licensing. Even if the tariffs are relatively high, getting rid of those other things really goes a long way to open up the economy. Columbia’s kept the open economy model. Then we can go to Brazil, another big country, which supposedly opened up in the early ‘90s, but there’s still a lot of non-tariff barriers and what have you.

RAJAGOPALAN: They’re like India.

IRWIN: A little bit.

RAJAGOPALAN: They opened up, but they still have lots of restrictions. We don’t quite get captured in the trade liberalization obvious model or laundry list.

IRWIN: That’s a great way of putting it because what you don’t see when they liberalize is you don’t see imports as a share of GDP going up a lot, whereas you do see that in some of the other countries. I’d say there was a Latin American reform moment early 1990s. Once again, not uniform, very imperfect, but they did try to move in a different direction and shed the Raúl Prebisch dependency theory import substitution policies that had really doubled down on in the 1950s and ‘60s and into the ‘70s.