End of History

THANKFULLY, HE eNDED hISTORY:

We Live Like Royalty and Don’t Know It (Charles C. Mann, Winter 2025, New Atlantis)


Jefferson was one of the richest men in the new United States. He had a 5,000-acre plantation worked by hundreds of slaves, a splendid mansion in Virginia that he had designed himself, one of the biggest wine collections in America, and one of the greatest private libraries in the world — it became the foundation of the Library of Congress. But despite his wealth and status his home was so cold in winter that the ink in his pen sometimes froze, making it difficult for him to write to complain about the chill.

Jefferson was rich and sophisticated, but his life was closer to the lives of people in the Iron Age than it was to ours. This is true literally, in that modern forms of steel and other metal alloys hadn’t been invented. But it is most true in the staggering fact that everyone at the rehearsal dinner was born and raised in luxury unimaginable in Jefferson’s time.

The young people at my table were anxious about money: starter-job salaries, high rents, student loans. But they never worried about freezing in their home. They could go to the sink and get a glass of clean water without fear of getting sick. Most of all, they were alive. In 1800, when Jefferson was elected president, more than one out of four children died before the age of five. Today, it is a shocking tragedy if a child dies. To Jefferson, these circumstances would have represented wealth and power beyond the dreams of avarice. The young people at my table had debts, but they were the debts of kings.

Jefferson lived in a world of horse-drawn carriages, blazing fireplaces, and yellow fever. But what most separates our day from his is not our automobiles, airplanes, and high-rise apartments — it is that today vast systems provide abundant food, water, energy, and health to most people, including everyone at the rehearsal dinner. In Jefferson’s time, not even the president of the United States had what we have. But few of us are aware of that, or of what it means.

DEEP STATE RISING:

The Spirit of Liberty—Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture (Jameel Jaffer, February 14, 2026, Just Security)

Meanwhile, the costs to the institutions that settled—not to mention the costs to our democracy—have been profound, even if they’ve been difficult to measure. CBS was once the most respected news organization in America thanks, ironically, to its fearless coverage of McCarthyism; now it’s a punchline on the late-night talk shows. The law firms that capitulated to Trump have lost not only their credibility as advocates but also some of their clients, partners, and associates. The leaders of these institutions were absolutely right to conclude that litigation would be risky, costly, and insufficient. But we know now that litigation, for all of its drawbacks, was preferable to the alternative.

Third, some institutions settled with Trump because they were sympathetic to his administration’s agenda, or to parts of it. Some university leaders were sympathetic to the Trump administration’s criticisms of affirmative action and DEI, and they shared the view that elite universities had become hostile to conservative viewpoints and to white men. Some university trustees and alumni thought the arrests of foreign students who had participated in pro-Palestinian protests were not just justified but overdue. Some trustees, administrators, faculty, and advocacy groups saw in the Trump administration’s hostility to higher education an opportunity to institute changes that they themselves had been advocating for many years. I said earlier that universities had capitulated to the Trump administration but in some cases the dynamic was more collaboration than capitulation.

I think we’ve already seen that this strategy was short-sighted, too. The Trump administration has seized on concerns relating to antisemitism and DEI to justify a much broader and still-expanding attack on higher education. Judge Allison Burroughs, who presided over the case in which Harvard successfully challenged the cancellation of its grants, wrote that the Trump administration has used antisemitism as “a smokescreen” for its own unrelated policy agenda. That assessment seems exactly right to me. The Trump administration is similarly using “free speech” as a smokescreen for all kinds of censorship. For example, in the name of free speech it’s revoking the visas of researchers who study misinformation, investigating news organizations for exercising editorial judgment, and (as I mentioned already) demanding that universities abolish departments that belittle conservative ideas. Those who have tried to make common cause with the administration on issues relating to equality and free speech have been used.

Finally, some institutional leaders just thought it would be better if other institutions did the fighting. This is always the dynamic with bullies, of course. There’s always the hope that, if one keeps one’s head down, the bully will focus his attention on someone else. And there’s always the hope that someone else will do the difficult work of putting the bully in his place. Courage is a public good, and so it’s undersupplied.

In describing the atmosphere in the United States in the years immediately after the Second World War, Norman Mailer wrote that “a stench of fear ha[d] come out of every pore of American life”—that the nation was suffering from “a collective failure of nerve.” He lamented that “the only courage, with rare exceptions, that we have been witness to, has been the isolated courage of isolated people.”

The landscape in the United States now is similar, and for similar reasons. Most of the leaders of the United States’ elite universities, news organizations, law firms, and cultural institutions understand very well that Trump poses an extraordinary threat to the democratic freedoms and values that are essential to their own institutions’ thriving and indeed survival. But there is a collective failure of nerve. The leaders of the United States’ elite institutions haven’t been willing to use the tools that the constitution, the laws, and the courts afford them. They seem also to lack the political structures and human relationships that would allow them to organize a coordinated, collective response to the threat that Trump poses.

Judge Hand delivered his “Spirit of Liberty” speech on May 21, which at that time was known as “I Am an American Day.” It was a naturalization ceremony, a celebration of immigrants and of all they contribute to American life—the kind of celebration that Mohsin Mahdawi, the Columbia student, might have attended had he not been arrested when he arrived for his naturalization interview. The speech is about courage. Hand celebrates immigrants who had “courage to break from the past and brave the dangers and the loneliness of a strange land.” He wonders, “what was the object that nerved us, or those that went before us, to this choice”? And then when he asks them to pledge their faith in “the glorious destiny of our beloved country,” he tells them that the America of their aspirations will never come into being except as “the conscience and courage of Americans create it.” So leaving one’s home requires courage, but creating the nation of one’s aspirations, and defending it—those tasks require courage, too. He pays tribute to the “young men who are at this moment fighting and dying” for an America that has not yet come into being.

The spirit of liberty is still easy to find in the United States, but you have to look beyond the leadership of elite institutions. Among ordinary citizens, there’s no scarcity of civic courage. The No Kings Day rallies over the summer drew around 5 million Americans to demonstrations in 2000 cities and towns across the country. Thousands of Americans protested President Trump’s deployment of the national guard in Portland, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington. Government lawyers have resigned rather than participate in corrupt investigations and prosecutions. You’ve all seen the footage of Americans around the country trying to protect their immigrant neighbors from ICE, even as ICE raids have become increasingly violent and Vice President Vance has assured ICE agents, falsely, that they enjoy “absolute immunity” for actions taken in connection with their duties. The tens of thousands of American students who participated in peaceful demonstrations and encampments meant to assert the humanity of Palestinians—those students also exhibited an admirable civic fortitude, a willingness to pay a personal price for the defense of human rights.

One of the people who testified in the case I mentioned earlier—the case in which the AAUP and MESA are challenging the arrests of student protesters—is a guy called Bernard Nickel. He had come to the United States as a student from Germany three decades earlier, and then stayed on to teach philosophy, first at Tufts and then at Harvard. When the trial began, he’d just completed a three-year term as chair of Harvard’s philosophy department. Professor Nickel is a green card holder, not a U.S. citizen, but until very recently he felt that he and his family were secure in the United States, and he didn’t hesitate to speak out publicly on controversial political issues. He assumed that the First Amendment protected him. The arrests of foreign students in the spring of 2024 made him suddenly aware of his own vulnerability. Watching the video of masked ICE agents arresting Rumeysa Ozturk, the Tufts student, was a particular shock. He testified at trial that he decided, after he saw that video, that he would “keep my head down completely. I would not go to protests. I would not write, I would not sign on to public letters, and any other potential forms of publicity I would just avoid.”

On cross-examination, a government lawyer asked Professor Nickel why, if he was really so afraid of government retaliation, he’d agreed to testify in a case which ICE was a defendant. If he’d resolved not to sign on to public letters and engage in public advocacy, why was he here in court testifying against the government? This is what he said in response:

You know, anybody can sign on to an open letter. Anybody can go to a protest. My sense was that, in this trial, somebody in my specific situation, somebody who is a senior scholar with a secure position at Harvard . . . , I don’t know that there are that many people who could have done this. So I thought this is something that’s worth it. . . . This is . . . where I live, and I want this to be a country and a nation of laws, not of men. . . . I believe in these kinds of processes and procedures. . . . [T]his is me doing my part.

Other faculty, from universities around the country, offered similar testimony. They were fearful that their participation in the lawsuit would provoke government retaliation, but they participated nonetheless out of a sense of obligation—to their American families and friends, their students, and to the democracy they had made their own. They did their part.

If the United States is going to return from the brink of this abyss, it will be because ordinary people—citizens and non-citizens alike—still care deeply about their democracy even if so many elites have shown themselves unprepared to defend it.

WHEN YOU FINALLY HAVE A FUTURE:

Milei Hunts for Over $250 Billion That Argentines Have Hidden in Secret Stashes (Samantha Pearson and Silvina Frydlewsky, Feb. 3, 2026, WSJ)

Along the leafy boulevards of Buenos Aires, optimism is rising as the government softens financial controls, encouraging Argentines to plow previously undeclared cash into everything from cars to real estate.

“Customers are getting bolder, there is less need to hide things,” said Fabian Luciani, a car salesman in the city for the past 25 years. More than half of his clients pay in cash, he said, sometimes with dollars that families say have been buried in their backyards for years.

The color of the notes is usually a dead giveaway.

“They’ve got yellowish, brownish stains—you know, from humidity,” Luciani said, musing about how many dollars now sitting in the U.S. Treasury bear the stains of Argentine soil.

NEVER RETURN TO HISTORY:

Three Lessons from Venezuela’s Economic Collapse: Policy choices turned an oil-rich democracy into a petrostate, then into an authoritarian economy where repression followed redistribution. (Matthew D. Mitchell, January 23, 2026, Daily Economy)

Oil was not the only explanation for Venezuela’s 1970s prosperity. The government spent and taxed modestly. It left most industry in private hands. Inflation was low. And international trade was almost entirely free of tariffs and regulatory barriers to trade.

In 1970, Venezuela scored a little less than 7 on the Fraser Institute’s 10-point Economic Freedom of the World index, making it the 13th most economically free country in the world, just ahead of Japan.

But as the rest of the world liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, Venezuela went in the opposite direction.

GLOBALIZATION IS AMERICANIZATION:

Why Labeling Muslim Brotherhood “Chapters” as Terrorist Groups Is Problematic (Emile Nakhleh, 1/14/26, The Cipher Brief)

In the early 1990s, the Egyptian MB rejected political violence and declared its support for peaceful gradual political change through elections, and in fact participated in several national elections. While Islamic Sunni parties in different countries adopted the basic theological organizing principles of the MB on the role of Islam in society, they were not “chapters” of the MB.

They are free standing Islamic political groups and movements, legally registered in their countries, which often focus on economic, health, and social issues of concern to their communities. They are not tied to the MB in command, control, or operations.

Examples of these Sunni Islamic political parties include the AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Justice and Development in Morocco, al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, the Islamic Movement (RA’AM) in Israel, PAS in Malaysia, PKS in Indonesia, the Islamic Party in Kenya, and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

During my government career, my analysts and I spent years in conversations with representatives of these parties with an eye toward helping them moderate their political positions and encouraging them to enter the mainstream political process through elections. In fact, most of them did just that. They won some elections and lost others, and in the process, they were able to recruit thousands of young members.

Based on these conversations, we concluded that these groups were pragmatic, mainstream, and committed to the dictum that electoral politics was a process, and not “one man, one vote, one time.” Because they believed in the efficacy and value of gradual peaceful political change, they were able to convince their fellow Muslims that a winning strategy at the polls was to focus on bread-and-butter issues, including health, education, and welfare, that were of concern to their own societies. They projected to their members a moderate vision of Islam.

DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, PROTESTANTISM:

The Other Revolution of ’76 (William H. Peterson, Fall 1973, Modern Age)

For in 1776, between the appearance of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in January and the Declaration in July, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith was published. A most remarkable book. This one book reconstituted the industrial revolution and launched the capitalist revolution, at least intellectually. Walter Bagehot said that because of this one book “the life of almost everyone in England—perhaps of everyone—is different and better. . .”1 William Pitt in introducing the budget to Parliament in 1792, echoed Edmund Burke and said this one book furnishes “the best solution to every question connected with the history of commerce, or with the systems of political economy.”2 Henry Thomas Buckle in his History of Civilization in England said:

This solitary Scotchman has by the publication of one single work, contributed more to the happiness of man than has been effected by the united abilities of all the statesmen and legislators of whom history has presented an authentic record.3

Be that as it may, the two revolutions of 1776—American and capitalist—were more than coincidence. Both represented reactions against mercantilism, a system of political economy characterized by aggressive nationalism, central direction and closed economies. Both represented grand endeavors to advance the cause of a free society through the establishment of limited government, although one was mainly political in scope while the other was mainly economic. Both sought, each in its own way, a system of checks and balances, of separation of powers, of freeing the individual—with the ultimate sovereignity of the one residing in the citizen, and with the ultimate sovereignity of the other residing in the consumer. In this article, some of the origins and implications of the capitalist revolution on both sides of the Atlantic are examined, with Smith’s Wealth of Nations as a guide.

THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH AMERICA THAT ELECTING A LIBERAL WOULDN’T FIX:

Let’s Not Grant the Postliberal Critique of Market Liberalism: Discontents with liberal modernity are perennial and a spiritual awakening won’t cure them (Jonathan Rauch, Dec 21, 2025, The UnPopulist)

Nineteen-seventy was a banner year for American cultural criticism. Blockbusters like Charles A. Reich’s The Greening of America and Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock heralded a decade of introspection. Another bestseller, now largely forgotten, was by the American sociologist Philip Slater: The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point. (You can read the 1970 edition here.)

Why, Slater asked, is America so prosperous, yet so unhappy? “Scarcity is now shown to be an unnecessary condition,” he wrote. Americans enjoyed an unprecedented bounty of choice—a bounty not only of consumer goods but also of lifestyles. Yet prices were high, services were deteriorating, the environment was suffering. Worse, “there is an uneasy, anesthetized feeling about this kind of life,” Slater wrote. “We … feel bored with the orderly chrome and porcelain vacuum of our lives, from which so much of life has been removed.” The blame, he charged, lay with an “old culture” which “has been unable to keep any of the promises that have sustained it” and “is less and less able to hide its fundamental antipathy to human life and human satisfaction.”

Revised in 1975 to reflect the end of the Vietnam war, Slater’s book made its way, by and by, into the hands of a certain teenager living in the suburbs of Phoenix, Arizona. At 16, I thought the book was brilliant. I wasn’t alone. The Pursuit of Loneliness fed into a stream of national self-doubt that culminated in President Carter’s “malaise” speech of 1979. The country, said Carter, faced a

crisis of confidence … that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation.

In 1979, his diagnosis seemed right to me and a lot of other Americans.


And then … Reagan. Morning in America.

THE PLIGHT OF THE LAST MAN:

What Happens if You Refuse to Recognize That We Are in a Death Spiral (David French, 12/14/25, NY Times)

While we talked about a number of issues, one theme was dominant — I refused to recognize that America was in a death spiral. The country was in crisis, and I needed to open my eyes, steel my spine and take the necessary, sometimes authoritarian, steps to pull it from the brink.

The core of their complaint was embodied by a quote from a novelist named G. Michael Hopf who wrote in his book “Those Who Remain”: “Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.” […]

Americans live longer, enjoy higher median wages, live in larger and more luxurious homes, and enjoy more civil liberties and greater access to justice than even the recent past. The starter homes of the 1950s — tiny places that often lacked central air and other modern utilities — would be considered poverty-level accommodations now.

Violent crime is much lower than in decades past, the divorce rate has decreased from its highs in the early 1980s, and the abortion rate (despite recent increases) is far below its early 1980s peaks.

Let’s face it, folks have trouble making themselves the hero of their stories when we live such affluent lives in such easy times. Thus, they imagine apocalyptic dramas.

A FASCIST INTERLUDE CAN SAVE YOU, BUT THEN YOU NEED TO LIBERALIZE FULLY:

Exploring The Chile Project (J.P. Bastos, 12/11/25, EconLib)

The government of Salvador Allende is also the subject of many misconceptions. Edwards recognizes that part of the confusion stems from the fact that Allende was from the Socialist (and not from the Communist) Party, which led authors to mistakenly portray him as a relatively moderate candidate even though, in Chile, the Socialists were much more to the left and had close ties with Cuba and North Korea.2

The book offers a detailed overview of Allende’s economic policies. For instance, Edwards reveals that the government’s grasp over the economy went significantly beyond the well-known nationalization of U.S.-owned copper mines. It also nationalized the banking sector and enforced its right to take control, for an undetermined period, of hundreds of factories producing goods “in short supply.” This short supply was often staged by unions stopping the factory floor and creating artificial shortages. He notes that every import required a license, with some tariffs reaching 250 percent. He also describes how perverse and arbitrary mechanisms were used to set price controls, which led to confiscation of goods, often imposed huge fines, and, sometimes, sent “speculators” to prison. […]

Recurring in Edwards’ narrative in the third and final part of the book is that, despite the breadth of the reforms implemented during the regime, much else was also done after the return to democracy to deepen and extend the reforms. This continuation was often undertaken by center-left politicians. This insight invites reflection on the role Chicago Boys. On the one hand, their ideas undoubtedly charted the path to greater economic freedom, much needed in Chile after Allende’s populist policies.

On the other hand, Chile’s experience highlights the limitations to economic growth and prosperity under a dictatorship. Recent empirical research has analyzed this issue in Pinochet’s Chile from two different sides. Escalante (2022) shows that the Chilean GDP per capita underperformed for at least the first 15 years following the coup. Arenas, Toni, and Paniagua (2024) also question the timing of the “Chilean miracle”, arguing that it only really developed following the return to democracy. Indeed, other Latin American development “miracles” (in Uruguay and Costa Rica) occurred without a similar story of a liberalizing autocrat.

CONSERVATISM SEEKS TO CONSERVE LIBERALISM:

Liberalism, conservatism, and America’s vocabulary problem (Donald Bryson, November 18, 2025, Freedom Focus)

The word “liberal” comes from the Latin līber, meaning “free.” The original meaning of “liberal” was tied directly to liberty, not bureaucracy, and to the condition of free people, not to the expansion of state power. In forgetting this, we also forgot that many of the principles we cherish on the Right — individual rights, free speech, limited government, religious liberty, the rule of law — are not merely conservative impulses, but the core commitments of the liberal tradition from which our nation was born.

As James Madison argued in Federalist No. 51, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. … In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” The Founders understood that liberty requires both empowerment and restraint. Government must be strong enough to secure rights, yet limited enough to prevent domination. That insight sits at the heart of the classical liberal tradition: freedom protected by constitutional structure, not granted by the good will of rulers.

American political discourse suffers from a deep conceptual confusion that distorts debates and obscures the true stakes of our moment. The terms “liberal” and “conservative,” which should help us understand philosophical commitments and political tendencies, have instead become rhetorical weapons and tribal markers. These distinctions matter profoundly for any serious effort to articulate our first principles.