CONSERVATISM SEEKS TO CONSERVE LIBERALISM:

Humanely Conservative: a review of The Wisdom of Our Ancestors: Conservative Humanism and the Western Tradition By Graham James McAleer and Alexander S. Rosenthal-Pubul. (Reviewed by Lee Trepanier, 7/07/24, University Bookman)

Conservatism represents a middle ground between a cosmopolitan liberalism and a tribal nationalism. Within this middle ground, particularist loyalties to the family and nation exist but within a Christian framework where all human beings are ultimately valued and accepted.

The second part of “conservative humanism” is an educational movement that is classical and Christian, but not modern. Classical humanism is from the Greek and Roman world of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic formation, while Christian humanism recognizes that every person has an intrinsic and transcendent dignity since humans are created in the image of God. The classical and Christian combination of humanism stands in stark contrast to its modern counterpart which starts from the Enlightenment and reduces human nature to materialism, whether biological or technological. For McAleer and Rosenthal-Pubul, the “humanism” in conservative humanism is the cultivation of the individual in the Greek, Roman, and Christian sense where the person “affirms an obedience to a moral order transcending our will.” By recognizing a moral order outside of the individual, the conservative humanist accepts the limitations of the human condition and attempts to live a flourishing life within them.

This understanding of conservative humanism is the thread that connects the chapters in McAleer’s and Rosenthal-Pubul’s book, which, the authors admit, are a commentary on the themes found in Roger Scruton’s The Meaning of Conservatism. These themes include humanism, conservatism, the establishment, natural law, free enterprise, and freedom. In the first two chapters about conservatism, McAleer and Rosenthal-Pubul emphasize its associational aspects—the family, the church, and private schools—as well as the value of humanism which is “the master idea of our civilization.” According to the authors, conservatives are to defend humanism, the transcendent dignity of the individual person, against the ideologies of totalitarianism, tribal nationalism, and transhumanism.

LET’S MAKE A DEAL:

PODCAST:

Pluralist Points: Democracy as a Civic Bargain: Josiah Ober talks with Ben Klutsey about how democracy arose in history and how we can help it endure today (BEN KLUTSEY, JUN 28, 2024, Discourse)

OBER: Our basic idea in the book, or the idea we start with, anyway, is that democracy should be defined as “no boss”—or at least no boss other than one another. The impulse toward democracy is the resistance to having some external power (a king, an oligarchy) tell you what to do. We then suggest that the real only alternative to being told what to do by some ultimate boss is to figure out how to organize the political sphere, organize what we are going to do together ourselves.

That really is the beginning of democracy: is a bunch of people somewhere saying, “We’ve had enough of being bossed around, and we won’t have it anymore.” This can be an evolutionary process in which people become increasingly fed up and do things that slowly move the boss into a more and more minor position. That’s sort of the theory or at least one way of explaining what happens in the United Kingdom. Or you can have a revolution that just kicks the tyrant out, and then you’ve got to figure out what to do in the aftermath. That’s what happens, for example, at Athens or at Rome.

You can have—as the case in the United States, you become fed up with an external boss that you feel is not doing what the boss was supposed to do in terms of providing you with basic liberties. Then you say, “We’re done. We’re not going to be ruled by the king any longer. We’re going to run things ourselves.”

I think it’s always this conception that we don’t want somebody telling us what to do who isn’t us.


KLUTSEY: Right. Now, when you look around and you observe the situation with democracies across the board, what problem are you seeing? What issues are you seeing?

Obviously, there’s quite a bit written about in terms of—the democratic backsliding is what oftentimes people refer to. What are some of the core problems that led you to say, “Hey, we need to write something to get people to understand what this democratic project is all about”?

OBER: Yes. Our core idea in the book is that democracy really is a bargain. It’s got to be a bargain that is made within a pluralistic society. We assume that the people who decide “we don’t want a boss” are not just a homogenous mass of people who agree on everything else. Yes, they agree we don’t want a boss, but they don’t necessarily agree on what the marginal tax rate should be once we have to raise some funds to deal with, for example, foreign policy, national security and so on.

We say that it is imperative to recognize that not having a boss means that you have to learn to negotiate with your fellow citizens over matters on which you disagree. We can try to limit the degree of disagreement. We can try to make arguments to each other and say, “It would be better to have the marginal tax rate as this. Don’t you see how right I am?” But at a certain point, you’re going to say, “No, actually, I don’t agree.” Then we’re going to have to have some method to say, “All right, we’re going to come to the best deal we can.”

The whole purpose of basically making these deals is to be able to go on together without a boss, running our own affairs as best we can. We want to say that as soon as the idea of negotiating with, bargaining with, coming to the best agreement you can find with your fellow citizens is rejected—when that’s rejected and we say, “I don’t want to make a negotiation with them. I want to force them to do things my way. I reject the idea that those people really are even my fellow citizens, if they don’t believe what I believe.”

That kind of strong polarization, value polarization, is what we really see as a big threat to democracy, because it makes people convinced that democracy is about getting pure justice or getting exactly what you think is the right way, as opposed to recognize that democracy is always an imperfect bargain, imperfect from the point of view of anybody’s—any individual or any individual group’s—idea of what would be absolutely best.

No one’s going to get what they think is best, because we’re in a pluralistic society in which people’s interests are not identical. So that’s our key thing, is to try to say that democracy really is about compromise. It has to be. Because it’s about compromise, it will always be—the solutions will always be imperfect from everybody’s point of view. That’s just intrinsic to the system. As soon as you start demanding perfection, you’re basically rejecting the very idea of democracy.

LIBERALIZING IS COMPLEX:

Speculation Is Rife About the Future of Kuwait’s Parliament (Omar Alabdali & Luai Allarkia, June 27, 2024, New/Lines)

Kuwait has long been an object of perplexed interest for Arab political observers. The country’s political system, essentially a constitutional monarchy with a combative parliament, is rare in a region filled with autocrats, police states masquerading as secular republics, and other types of dictatorships.

Its intricate parliamentary politicking is unusual, as is the sight of assembly members aggressively questioning members of the royal family in a Gulf sheikhdom where reverence for emirs and princes is an obligatory part of the political etiquette. The complexities of the emirate’s political shenanigans and the rise and fall of governments and elected assemblies can often seem Byzantine and incomprehensible to political observers in the region.

But Kuwait’s experiment with a form of democracy, however flawed, is worth chronicling. The evolution of its political system, spurred along by the traumatic invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, is unique in the region. But it is also worth examining as a cautionary tale that highlights the limits of political maneuvering in a region where a retreat to one-man rule in the name of stability is easy, and where proponents of democracy must fight time and again to preserve their right to challenge those in power.

LIBERALISM WORKS:

Only Economic Freedom Pulls People Out of Poverty (Vincent Geloso, June 20, 2024, AIER)

In an article recently accepted at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, James Dean and I argue that the potency of markets in alleviating poverty is deeply underestimated. As such, we shift the focus to the benefits of economic freedom — the alleviation of taxation, the shrinking of government, the reduction of labor market regulations, and the protection of property rights.

Four mechanisms connect greater economic freedom to poverty alleviation. The first is enhanced economic growth and job creation. A freer economy attracts more businesses and investments. Fewer regulations and lower taxes reduce the cost and complexity of starting and operating businesses, which encourages entrepreneurship and leads to job creation and economic growth. This means more opportunities for the poor to climb out of poverty. Second, lower taxes allow for greater rewards to effort, enhancing motivation. Third, the absence of regulation means that many regulatory barriers — such as costly occupational licences or business permits — are eliminated, which allow for new pathways out of poverty to emerge. Fourth, economic freedom flattens barriers to geographic mobility, such that people can move to places of greater opportunity. A contemporary example of this mechanism is land-use regulations in cities which restrict the supply of housing. By increasing the price of housing, these regulations make cities inaccessible to the poor, even if they are hubs of economic opportunities. As such, people are stuck in areas with limited economic opportunities. The removal of these barriers also complements the effect of lower taxes, as factors that demotivate people from trying new pathways are removed. As such, their removal acts as motivator.

Together, these four mechanisms produce an environment where the poor are given the necessary room to exert agency and improve their lives through their own efforts. The repeated result is sustainable poverty reduction. Notice that nowhere does this negate the possibility of some targeted redistribution — think of Milton Friedman’s basic income proposal or school vouchers — that help pull out the poor out of poverty. In other words, these mechanisms mean that we stop pushing the poor down!

BEFORE THE FLOOD:

Is This the Man Who Could Topple Viktor Orbán? (H. DAVID BAER, JUN 20, 2024, The Bulwark)

Still, Magyar has learned a few things from the old man about mass communication. He has been brilliant at reappropriating Hungary’s national symbols—something the liberal opposition could never do—in a way that stabs at the heart of Orbán’s image. And in at least one respect, Magyar has outperformed the master. Unlike Orbán, whose appreciation for Hungarian cultural achievements appears to end with Ferenc Puskás and the 1954 World Cup, Péter Magyar loves poetry.

And poetry, much more than soccer, plays an important role in Hungarian national identity. The language Hungarians speak is not Indo-European in origin, which separates it from every other European language but Finnish and Estonian. To cultivate Hungarian identity is to cultivate the Hungarian language, and poets are the best cultivators of all. Hungary’s great poets are national icons.

When Magyar first entered politics, he formed an organization named after a verse from a poem by Sándor Petőfi, who died in battle fighting for Hungarian freedom in the Revolution of 1848. Magyar later linked his organization to the political party that abbreviates its name as TISZA. Tisza is also the name of a major river in eastern Hungary, about which Petőfi wrote another poem. The Tisza river flows slowly along a low gradient, making it prone to flooding. In Petőfi’s hands, the Tisza became a metaphor for the Hungarian people, who can be misunderstood as pliant and passive.


Watching the sun set over the still river, the poet notices the light’s amber rays striking the trees, as if they “were burning and flowing with blood.” Turning to the river, he asks, “Ah poor Tisza, why do they mistreat you / and speak of you harshly / you are the gentlest river on earth.” When he’s awakened by the pealing of alarm bells a few days later, the narrator exclaims: “Here comes the flood! / And wherever I looked I saw a sea / breaking its banks in a rage …. Ready to swallow the world.” The Hungarian people, Petőfi suggests, are like the Tisza river, silent and long-suffering, until, mistreated enough, they rise up in rage like a flooding river.

That Magyar thought to link his party to Petőfi’s poem was a communications masterstroke. It captures perfectly the mood in Hungary. Despite his electoral dominance, Orbán is not well-loved. He draws a sizable portion of support from the perception that his regime is inevitable. This has led to political apathy and a feeling of resignation, an attitude not all that different from what existed in the later decades of communism. If a viable political alternative ever emerged in Hungary, it could profoundly alter the feeling in the country. If people start to believe they really can be freed of Orbán, they might indeed rise up like a raging river.

At Tisza party rallies, alongside a sea of Hungarian flags and the sound of folk songs, the crowds chant, “The Tisza is flooding” (Árad a Tisza), which rings nicely in Hungarian. Indeed, “Árad a Tisza” could be well on the way to becoming a nationwide slogan of political resistance.

The Tisza (English)

When in the dusk a summer day had died,
I stopped by winding Tisza’s river-side,
just where the little Túr flows in to rest,
a weary child that seeks its mother’s breast.
Most smooth of surface, with most gentle force,
the river wandered down its bankless course,
lest the faint sunset-rays, so close to home,
should stumble in its lacery of foam.
On its smooth mirror, sunbeams lingered yet,
dancing like fairies in a minuet;
one almost heard the tinkle of their feet,
like tiny spurs in music’s ringing beat.
Low flats of yellow shingle spread away,
from where I stood, to meat the meadow hay
where the long shadows in the after-glow
like lines upon a page lay row on row.
Beyond the meadow in mute dignity
the forest towered o’er the darkening lea,
but sunset rested on its leafy spires
like embers red as blood and fierce with fires.
Elsewhere, along the Tisza’s farther bank,
the motley broom and hazels, rank on rank,
crowded, but for one cleft, through which was shown
the distant steeple of the tiny town.
Small, rosy clouds lay floating in the sky
in memory-pictures of the hours gone by.
Far in the distance, lost in reverie,
the misty mountain-summits gazed at me.
The air was still. Across the solemn hush
fell but the fitful vespers of a thrush.
Even the murmur of the far-off mill
seemed faint as a mosquito humming shrill.
To the far bank before me, within hail,
a peasant-woman came to fill her pale;
she, as she brimmed it, wondered at my stay,
and with a glance went hastily away.
But I stood there in stillness absolute
as though my very feet had taken root.
My heart was dizzy with the rapturous sight
of Nature’s deathless beauty in the night.
O Nature, glorious Nature, who would dare
with reckless tongue to match your wondrous fare?
How great you are! And the more still you grow,
the lovelier are the things you have to show!
Late, very late, I came back to the farm
and supped upon fresh fruit that made me warm,
and talked with comrades far into the night,
while brushwood flames beside us flickered bright.
Then, among other topics, I exclaimed:
“Why is the Tisza here so harshly blamed?
You wrong it greatly and belie its worth:
surely, it’s the mildest river on the earth!”
Startled, a few days later in those dells
I heard the frantic pealing of the bells:
“The flood, the flood is coming!” they resound.
And gazing out, I saw a sea around.
There, like a maniac just freed from chains,
the Tisza rushed in rage across the plains;
roaring and howling through the dyke it swirled,
greedy to swallow up the whole wide world.

hISTORY eNDS EVERYWHERE:

Hope and Optimism on the Planet of the Apes (Tyler Hummel, 5/17/24, Voegelin View)

As a story told from the apes’ perspective, it is a strangely optimistic trilogy. The ape’s near-literal exodus from confinement to the promised land creates one of the strangest Moses allegories in contemporary fiction, while still being about humorous talking monkeys. The human characters that form the ensemble never return between movies, due to being implicitly killed off. Caesar, Maurice, and Koba are the most empathetic and consistent characters of the trilogy, and the story of apes seeking their freedom—united by brotherhood and loyalty—is the lone spot of hope in a franchise where the only possible ending is the end of the world and the fated end of mankind.

They’re endowed by their Creator with the right to self-determination.

“FOR YOUR FREEDOM AND OURS”:

Winning for democracy: In Poland, Donald Tusk shows how to reach voters tempted by authoritarians (JOHN AUSTIN, LUCAS KREUZER AND KAMIL LUNGU 15 MAY 2024, Inside Story)

In the United States, Europe and beyond, there is a lot of unease about the future of democracy. Will Donald Trump regain the White House? Will the Republican congressional minority, enthralled by Trump, imperil democratic Europe and possibly NATO itself, despite a recent vote for Ukraine aid? Will France or Germany fall to ethnonationalists and fascists?

Against this backdrop, Poland’s parliamentary elections and the selection of Donald Tusk as prime minister last October offered a hopeful counterpoint. Voters embraced Europe and the world to rebuild democratic institutions torn apart by ten years of right-wing populist rule under Jarosław Kaczyński and his Polish Law and Justice Party.

A new analysis offers encouraging details. A larger-than-normal turnout, driven partly by a motivated cohort of younger voters, was a triumph for democracy. The analysis comes from two of the authors of this piece, Lucas Kreuzer and Kamil Lungu, graduates of Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Affairs. The Polish election recommitted the country to tolerance, democracy and Europe after a decade of right-wing, populist rule that had sought to dismantle democratic institutions and stigmatise marginalised communities.

PITY THE POOR MALTHUSIANS:

More People, More Prosperity: The Simon Abundance Index: The Simon Abundance Index 2024 finds Earth’s resources 509% more plentiful than in 1980. (Marian L. Tupy, 22 Apr 2024, Quillette)

Between 1980 and 2023, the average time price of the 50 basic commodities fell by 70.4 percent. For the time required to earn the money to buy one unit of this commodity basket in 1980, you would get 3.38 units in 2023. In other words, your resource abundance increased by 238 percent. Moreover, during this 43-year period, the world’s population grew by 3.6 billion, from 4.4 billion to over 8 billion: an 80.2 percent increase. Given that personal resource abundance grew by 238 percent ((3.38 – 1) x 100) and the population grew by 80.2 percent, we can say that the population-level resource abundance rose by 509.4 percent ((3.38 x 1.802) x 100 – 100). Population-level resource abundance grew at a compound annual rate of 4.3 percent and every 1-percentage-point increase in population corresponded to a 6.35-percentage-point increase in population-level resource abundance (509.4 ÷ 80.2 = 6.35).

SHOULD HAVE QUIT AT OXYMORON:

Republicans Are More United on Foreign Policy Than It Seems (Matthew Kroenig, APRIL 13, 2024, Foreign Policy)

Some observers might object that a Trump-Reagan fusion is an oxymoron, given that the leaders’ world views and personalities are so different, but they have much in common. Both were outsiders to Washington. Both were Democrats and entertainers before they became Republican politicians, and both were castigated as unserious and even reckless. Nevertheless, they became the most influential Republican presidents in recent decades, and one cannot make sense of Republican policy today without understanding them both.

Conservatives and progressives have fundamentally different beliefs about the nature of the international system and the role the U.S. government should play in world affairs. As conservatives, members of both wings of today’s Republican Party agree that it is the duty of the U.S. government to secure American interests in a dangerous world. By contrast, progressives tend to prioritize cooperation with other nations to address shared global challenges, such as climate change and public health.

On defense policy, conservatives share a broader commitment to the United States showing enough strength that no adversary dare challenge it—to attain the goal of peace. In this view, force should be used sparingly and decisively. Today’s Republicans support a strong national defense and oppose both what they perceive as the Biden administration’s excessive caution, such as overwrought fears of escalation in ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East, and neo-conservatives’ extended military interventions.

Actually, conservatives/liberals are irreconcilable with the Left/Right precisely over the notion of American interests. We believe with the Declaration that all men are entitled to self-determination while the Identitarians care only for themselves.

LIVING AT THE eND OF hISTORY:

Dawkins and ‘cultural Christianity’: what does it all mean? (Heather Tomlinson, 05 April 2024, Christianity Today)

However it could be said that Dawkins hasn’t really contributed that much to the decline. The poor arguments of his ilk have in some people prompted a move towards faith, and caused other positive effects such as sharpening the Church’s intellectual capabilities. The deterioration of Christian belief in the UK has been gradual and a long time coming: writers CS Lewis and GK Chesterton, for example, predicted the trajectory many decades ago. Dawkins’ personal contribution has been minimal.

What is also new is a more widespread questioning of the dogma of progressivism – the relentless pursuit of improvement while sidelining or completely rejecting tradition, which in practice has often included Christian belief. This momentum is perceived as a good thing by most people today, unaware that it is a fairly new idea: previous generations were more respectful of their history. Attempts to re-engineer an imaginary “better world” often lead to unforeseen consequences, as Dawkins seems to be learning as he mourns the loss of Christian culture while rejecting the tenets that had created and sustained it.

Esme Partridge in Unherd slammed Dawkins comments as “naivety”. She argued his attitude is similar to another huge social change: his generation’s stance on the sexual revolution. They personally benefitted from the old morals, yet at the same time put the future availability of such positive effects in question by attacking their foundations.

“Dawkins’s belief that it is possible to reap the cultural benefits of Christianity while publicly undermining its legitimacy is perhaps an expression of this generational mentality,” she wrote. This was also the attitude of Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Montesquieu, who believed that liberal values would be upheld without Christianity. Partridge points out that this has been shown to be false too, as they have mutated into “anarchic systems of self-interest which undermine the virtues upon which liberalism was originally premised.”

She adds her voice to the calls for a renewal. “Like any organism, Christianity must recover its roots, or it will die — a fact of life which, as an evolutionary biologist, Dawkins ought to appreciate,” she said.

Everyone is culturally Christian. You can’t have a Clash of Civilizations when there is only one.