Islam

ADHERENTS:

Growing Up Alawite in Assad’s Syria: Loubna Mrie Explores the Intersections of Family, Faith and National History Under Authoritarianism (Loubna Mrie, March 4, 2026, LitHub)

The Alawi faith is a branch of Shi’a Islam that traces its origins to the early Islamic period and the teachings of Ibn Nusayr, a Shi’a scholar who lived and worked in what is now northern Iraq during the late eighth and early ninth centuries. The term “Alawi” means “those who adhere to the teachings of Ali.”

Alawite theology is syncretic, incorporating elements from Islamic, Christian, and Jewish traditions, as well as influences from Persian, Indian, and Greek (Neoplatonic) philosophies. Alawism emphasizes the importance of esoteric or hidden knowledge, which the faith holds was revealed by God to the imams, the Prophet Muhammad’s successors.

This manifests in the form of rituals that are often more private and secretive than those of mainstream Shi’a Islam, scriptures in addition to the Quran, and the belief in tajyeel—reincarnation. Our deeds in one life determine how we are reborn in the next, allowing us to rise upward until we reach the highest levels of heaven. We can be reborn as holy figures, our dead bodies enshrined, our mausoleums sites of pilgrimage and worship, where we come for prayer and spiritual blessings. Local cultural practices and historical contexts also influence dress, another sign of the sect’s broader divergence from mainstream Islamic practices: Unlike many Shi’a and Sunni Muslim women, Alawite women do not cover themselves with the hijab.

A religious minority in Syria, Alawites faced persecution for centuries under various ruling powers. Growing up, I felt proud listening to my grandmother as she explained how Zaman Awal, our ancestors, survived under the Ottomans—Osmanli—who ruled Syria from 1516 to 1918. Every time she cooked rice, she would tell me and my older sister, Alia, that we should be grateful; most of Zaman Awal lived and died without ever tasting it. “Why, Grandma?” I would ask, though I knew the answer.

She would pause over the steaming pot. “Burghul—bulgur—was all they had. Rice, in Ottoman Syria, was for city dwellers only: Christians and Sunnis. You and I, we were not allowed in cities. The Ottomans hated us.”

The Ottoman Empire was the seat of the Sunni caliphate, and viewed Alawites as mysterious and suspicious because of their distinct religious beliefs and practices. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Alawites do not pray in mosques but instead have their own places of worship; in addition to not requiring women to wear the hijab, the Alawite sect also does not have any dietary restrictions and does not prohibit alcohol. These differences contributed to the distrust and disdain the Ottomans held toward the Alawite community, highlighting broader sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shi’a groups within the Ottoman Empire.

A REVOLUTION BETRAYED:

We Are Finally Free From Khamenei’s Suffocating Gaze (Azadeh Moaveni, 3/04/26, NY Times)

Those who challenged him often died in mysterious and awful ways. Dissidents were hacked to death by assailants with machetes. In June 2009 his great political rival and fellow revolutionary Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned the supreme leader in a personal letter that he must accept change or “volcanoes fueled from burning hearts will emerge in society.” Mr. Rafsanjani quoted the 13th-century Persian poet Saadi at the letter’s end: “A stream of water can be diverted with a small shovel, but once it grows, even an elephant cannot stop its flow.”

The same month, believing the result of the presidential election to be fraudulent, a million Iranians poured into the streets. Many young protesters were arrested and taken to a detention center south of Tehran called Kahrizak, where many were tortured and some allegedly raped. Less than 10 years later, Mr. Rafsanjani was found floating in a pool, said to have suffered a heart attack while swimming. His bodyguards had apparently been away, and security cameras had been turned off.

His most despised adversaries — intellectuals and political rivals — bore his specific, spiteful rage. But thousands of people were killed in protests or imprisoned over the years, and just last month he oversaw the fastest, largest mass slaughter in modern Iranian history.

DISCOURAGING TURNOUT SERVES THE HARDLINERS:

Reformist, ultraconservative qualify for Iran runoff election (Ramin KHANIZADEH and Payam DOOST MOHAMADI, June 29, 2024, AFP)

Pezeshkian got more than 10,400,000 votes and Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator, has more than 9,400,000, said Mohsen Eslami, spokesman of Iran’s election authority. […]

Out of around 61 million eligible voters, some 24,500,000 voters headed to the polls, he added, with a turnout of around 40 percent — the lowest yet in the history of the Islamic republic.

THE REFORMATION ROLLS ON:

REVIEW: On Muslim Democracy: Essays and Dialogue by Andrew F March and Rached Ghannouchi (Usman Butt, 3/11/24, MEMO)

Ghannouchi makes a critical shift in his political thinking from Islamism to Muslim democracy. He no longer seeks to create the ideal Islamic state. Instead, he is looking at core principles in light of democratic, pragmatic and pluralist Tunisia with all its virtues and flaws. March describes meeting Ghannouchi as being with a great living historical thinker, and insists that he should be considered in wider conversations about Muslims and democracy.

“Ghannouchi’s political theory was noteworthy for the role he imagined for an active, engaged, and deliberative democratic populus,” explains March, who argues that Ghannouchi breaks with dominant Western philosophical approaches to democracy. “Unlike Montesquieuian and Madisonian theories of the separation of powers and institutional pluralism as the ultimate check against tyranny, Ghannouchi had long stressed public virtue and public opinion.”

However, Ghannouchi also breaks with Islamic theorists. “Unlike traditional Islamic theories that placed custodianship of the law in the hands of jurists exclusively, Ghannouchi imagined the realisation of Islamic law as largely a public deliberative process involving not only experts but also ordinary citizens-believers.”

The latter idea has undergone an evolution with Ghannouchi seeing elected parliamentary members as being the check on authoritarianism. In my view, though, the “citizens-believers” bestow authority on the members of parliament, who then carryout this function, and so Ghannouchi’s current line of thinking is not a million miles away from his original line. Ghannouchi insisted on the popular will as part of the process of realising Shariah and being essential for governance, which puts him at odds with a number of Islamist thinkers.

Accepting the imperfectability of the Ummah is the whole magilla.