One Economy to Rule Them All

NEOLIBERALISM OR BUST…LITERALLY:

Jamaica’s IMF Success Story (Catherine Osborn, Aug. 30th, 2024, Foreign Policy)

For the IMF, Jamaica is a success story—a country that carried out strict pro-market reforms and saw key social indicators improve along the way.

The IMF programs that led to Jamaica’s turnaround date back to 2013; continued buy-in from successive governments helped make them effective. Clarke has been the IMF’s main counterpart in Jamaica since 2016. He “stewarded his country’s economy to a stronger and more sustainable position,” Georgieva said on Monday.

Jamaica’s openness to reform came after a moment that Clarke has described as “rock bottom.” In 2012, the country’s national debt was ballooning as the government struggled to get a bailout. Jamaican economists and officials wracked their brains for possible ways to turn the country around.

They even called in Donald Harris, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris’s Jamaican father, an economics professor emeritus of Stanford University, for policy planning help. He recommended steps that included instituting a corporate land registry and reducing taxes on certain businesses, according to the Washington Post. […]

Jamaica agreed to strict targets to reduce its deficit—and it stuck with them. In an unusual step, the country established a committee to monitor and report regularly on its economic performance that included representatives from private businesses and civil society.

That committee “reports publicly to the people, literally on the street corner, [at] the rum shop, on a quarterly basis; also on social media,” economist Marla Dukharan told The LatinNews Podcast. “Nobody else in the Caribbean holds itself to account publicly for what it says it’s going to do.”

In addition to reducing its national debt, Jamaica also gave its central bank more independence, overhauled its pension system, and privatized several government agencies, among other changes.

IT’S IMPOSSIBLE TO OVERSTATE DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES:

How to Best Prepare for the AI Jobs Apocalypse: Companies are turning to AI to boost profits – and it’s working (Luke Lango, 8/28/InvestorPlace)

This quarter, on average, companies across the S&P 500 reported nearly 10% earnings growth.

That is one of the best earnings growth rates the S&P 500 has reported since the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in 2020.

At the same time, unemployment rates are rising sharply. Indeed, earlier this year, the national unemployment rate stood at 3.7%. Since then, it has spiked to 4.3%. Most folks expect it to keep rising.

In other words, right now… unemployment is rising… while corporate profits are also soaring.

That’s unusual. And it tells us that companies are using AI to replace human labor and productivity – and boost profits.

NEVERMIND HOW LITTLE WE SPEND AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES:

Food Profit Margins Shrink, But Harris Blames Them for Rising Grocery Bills (Joel Griffith, August 29, 2024, AIER )

What about industry-wide? Profit margins are shrinking as food manufacturing costs rose 28.4 percent since January 2020, exceeding the 26.3 percent retail price hikes on food items. Grocery store profit margins sank to 1.6 percent in 2023, the third consecutive year of decline after peaking at 3.0 percent in 2020.

In other words, grocer profit on $100 of sales is just $1.60. Profit margins contracted as overall food inflation totaled 20.6 percent in those three years. The biggest grocers have experienced this margin crunch. The Kroger Co. — the nation’s largest traditional supermarket — eked out an operating margin of 1.93 percent this past year, a margin lower now than it was pre-pandemic. These trends are the opposite of gouging.

History provides endless proof that prices set by governments under the market price results in shortages. Demand expands as supply shrinks. What good is a lower price if the shelves become empty?

THE CONTINENT VS THE ANGLOSPHERE:

When Keynes Killed Laissez-Faire (Samuel Gregg, 8/26/24, Law & Liberty)

As if, however, he recognizes the inescapability of some type of intellectual framework to order our decision-making about what governments should and should not do, Keynes distinguishes between “those services which are technically social from those which are technically individual.”

The “technically social,” Keynes says, are those “decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make them.” While that sounds like a public goods argument, Keynes’s “technically social” turns out to involve not only an incipit embrace of state macro-management of the economy but also full-blown corporatism.

Keynes the Corporatist

One of market liberalism’s failures, Keynes claimed in his lecture, was its inability to address problems generated by the prevalence of “risk, uncertainty, and ignorance” in the economy. These, he stated, produced “great inequalities of wealth” and “are also the cause of the unemployment of labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business expectations, and of the impairment of efficiency and production.”

Keynes deemed it possible to minimize these difficulties through “deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution.” Another of Keynes’s “technically social” policies involved state agencies collecting and disseminating “on a great scale” all “data relating to the business situation, including the full publicity, by law if necessary, of all business facts which it is useful to know.”

How we distinguish useful from non-useful facts is not specified. But such information, Keynes insists, must be collated so that “society” can exercise “directive intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over many of the inner intricacies of private business.”

This, Keynes hastens to add, “would leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered.” Keynes, however, does not elucidate why this is the case—perhaps because he cannot. Indeed, one reason why Keynes underscores the need for a government agency to assemble business facts is his belief that:

some coordinated act of intelligent judgement is required as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign investments, and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgement and private profits, as they are at present.

In other words, Keynes does want to hinder the workings of private initiative and enterprise by means of “the community as a whole” making decisions about the aggregate distribution of savings between domestic and foreign investments.

Things get even more complicated once we discern what Keynes means by “society” and “the community.” In some cases, this functions as Keynesian shorthand for direct state intervention. In other instances, Keynes holds that “many big undertakings, particularly public utility enterprises and other business requiring a large fixed capital … need to be semi-socialized.”

By “semi-socialism,” Keynes has in mind something akin to “medieval conceptions of separate autonomies.” In general, he comments, we should “prefer semi-autonomous corporations to organs of the central government for which ministers of State are directly responsible.” As examples, Keynes suggests institutions like universities, the Bank of England, and railway companies, all of which operated at one or more removes from the state but whose legal status was not that of a strictly private association. “In Germany,” Keynes observes in a casual aside, “there are doubtless analogous instances.”

That reference indicates Keynes’s awareness of corporatism’s influence throughout the early-twentieth-century German-speaking world. Nor should we forget that corporatism had become official government policy in Italy following Mussolini’s seizure of power just two years before Keynes’s laissez-faire lecture. In short, corporatist ideas that posited the corralling of individuals into state-supervised groups and promoted the public-private amalgams envisaged by Keynes were “in the air”—and the Cambridge don had breathed deeply.

The Left is the Right.

UNIVERSAL BASIC INVESTMENT:

11 Charts Showing Why You Should Invest Today: Why start investing now? Because the stock market rewards the faithful. (Coryanne Hicks, 8/26/24, US News)

An investor who put $15 a day into the stock market could grow their portfolio to more than $1.2 million in 40 years. If they kept investing $15 a day for 50 years, they could amass almost $2.5 million. It makes you realize how early frugality in life can really set yourself up for comfort in your later years.

Do it for people starting at birth.

THE rIGHT IS THE lEFT:

Markets for the People (Glenn Hubbard, Summer 2024, National Affairs)

The advent of “Bidenomics” has resurrected decades-old debates about the merits of markets versus industrial policy. When President Joe Biden announced his eponymous strategy in June 2023, he blasted what he described as “40 years of Republican trickle-down economics” and insisted that he would seek instead to build “an economy from the middle out and the bottom up, not the top down.” He would achieve this through “targeted investments” in technologies like semiconductors, batteries, and electric cars — all of which featured heavily in initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Yet despite the president’s professed support for a “middle out” economics, Bidenomics has thus far proven to be less of an intellectual framework than a set of well-intended yet ill-fated industrial-policy interventions implemented from the top down.

Some conservatives have joined Biden in embracing industrial policy. Writing recently in these pages, Republican senator Marco Rubio of Florida asserted that while it is difficult to “get industrial policy right, conservatives can and must take ownership of this space to keep the American economy strong and free.” Former president Donald Trump, for his part, staunchly advocates heavy tariffs to promote domestic manufacturing.

Conservatives who adopt their own version of protectionist tinkering with markets are missing an important opportunity. As mercantilism’s decline did for classical liberalism in the 19th century and Keynesianism’s misadventures did for neoliberalism in the 20th, Bidenomics’ failures offer an opening for the right to champion a new type of economics — one that puts opportunity for the people ahead of the economic rules of the game.

We’re far enough into human history that folks should long ago have given up on the idea they can outwit markets.

NO ONE HAS IT HARDER THAN THEIR FATHER DID:

The great wealth wave (Daniel Waldenström, 8/16/24, Aeon)


Recent decades have seen private wealth multiply around the Western world, making us richer than ever before. A hasty glance at the soaring number of billionaires – some doubling as international celebrities – prompts the question: are we also living in a time of unparalleled wealth inequality? Influential scholars have argued that indeed we are. Their narrative of a new gilded age paints wealth as an instrument of power and inequality. The 19th-century era with low taxes and minimal market regulation allowed for unchecked capital accumulation and then, in the 20th century, the two world wars and progressive taxation policies diminished the fortunes of the wealthy and reduced wealth gaps. Since 1980, the orthodoxy continues, a wave of market-friendly policies reversed this equalising historical trend, boosting capital values and sending wealth inequality back towards historic highs.

The trouble with the powerful new orthodoxy that tries to explain the history of wealth is that it doesn’t fully square with reality. New research studies, and more careful inspection of the previous historical data, paint a picture where the main catalysts for wealth equalisation are neither the devastations of war nor progressive tax regimes. War and progressive taxation have had influence, but they cannot count as the main forces that led to wealth inequality falling dramatically over the past century. The real influences are instead the expansion from below of asset ownership among everyday citizens, constituted by the rise of homeownership and pension savings. This popular ownership movement was made possible by institutional changes, most important democracy, and followed suit by educational reforms and labour laws, and the technological advancements lifting everyone’s income. As a result, workers became more productive and better paid, which allowed them to get mortgages to purchase their own homes; homeownership rates soared in the West from the middle of the century. As standards of living improved, life spans increased so that people started saving for retirement, accumulating another important popular asset.

TAX WHAT YOU DON’T WANT, DON’T SUBSIDIZE WHAT YOU THINK YOU DO:

The Case for a Carbon Tax: My Long-Read Q&A with Kyle & Shuting Pomerleau (James Pethokoukis | Kyle Pomerleau | Shuting Pomerleau, August 06, 2024, AEIdeas)

Why do economists get excited about the notion of a carbon tax? Why is that a policy that always comes up as an efficient policy if you’re concerned about climate change? What is the selling point, the elevator pitch, for a carbon tax, generally?

Shuting: That’s an excellent question, I think generally economists are very supportive of a carbon tax as a quote-unquote “stick approach,” as opposed to a carrot, like the expensive provisions, clean energy credits in the Inflation Reduction Act [IRA].

Right now we’re all carrot. We seem to be doing a lot of carrots.

Shuting: Yes, a lot of it, and I think one major reason that stands out is the efficiency argument, that it’s efficiently incentivizing consumers and businesses to find the most flexible and least-costly ways to decarbonize. You just have to determine the price per ton of emissions and you’re pricing emissions directly. It’s up to the businesses to find the easiest and least costly way to decarbonize, as opposed to the clean energy tax credits, in the Inflation Reduction Act. A lot of work needs to be done on the regulator side. It might need to be done sector by sector, the technology types that are used to requalify for certain tax credits, or to look at the performance standards that would incentivize businesses to improve their decarbonizaion efforts. So it’s much more direct than tax credits, than carrots. Also, it can move really fast economy-wide. Compared to the tax credits, you really have to do it sector by sector and be very prescriptive.

With the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, a lot of time was spent figuring out which technologies, are they going to favor these technologies, is this tax credit going to be technology-neutral, which lends it to the criticism that, ultimately, you’re having legislators, and staffers, and bureaucrats figuring out which are the “good” technologies, which are the “bad” technologies, where, under this system, it’s “may the most efficient technological fix win.”

Shuting: You hit a really, really important point, Jim. The technology-neutral is a key part of why a lot of economists are so fond of a carbon tax, as opposed to tax credits, because when you’re pricing per ton of emissions directly, regardless of the way—it could be hydrogen, it could carbon capture, it could nuclear, as long as you get there, it makes sense for businesses’ long-term investment plan, you can do it; versus the tax credits, it’s basically regulators cherry picking winners and losers, deciding, “Oh, this technology, we think it’s more promising than the other ones.

NO ONE WILL MISS CHEVRON:

Cutting Red Tape To Spur Economic Growth: U.S. states that have implemented policies such as regulatory budgets that cut red tape tend to grow faster than states that have maintained the status quo (Patrick McLaughlin, Aug 01, 2024, Discourse)

[S}everal U.S. states have reformed their regulatory process in some way over the past few years. The movement was arguably inspired by the Canadian province of British Columbia, which in 2001 recognized a need to cut some of the regulatory red tape that had built up over time. British Columbia’s groundbreaking red tape reduction initiative succeeded in reducing the quantity of regulations on its books by about 40% within three years. Moreover, the red tape reduction caused the province’s economic growth rate to increase by more than one percentage point, thereby converting British Columbia from economic laggard to leader in just a few years.

Now that some U.S. states have taken steps toward cutting accumulated red tape as well, we can start to answer some basic questions about these policy innovations: How well are they working in terms of cutting red tape? And are reform states seeing increased economic growth as a result, like British Columbia experienced? The positive effect of reforming the regulatory process and cutting red tape should not be ignored: Seemingly, any jurisdiction that proactively avoids unnecessary accumulation and cuts red tape might be able to boost its economy as British Columbia did.

BRING BACK W’S PERSONAL ACCOUNTS:

The Biggest Winners in the Stock Market (Ben Carlson, 7/21/24, A Wealth of Common Sense)

The stock market is hard to beat because picking the winning stocks is hard. Index funds own them regardless.

Winners > losers. Index funds also own the losers, of which there are many.

But the winners more than make up for the losers.

That’s the beauty of the stock market.

Compounding over decade-long periods is like magic. There are no stocks for the long run with crazy 20% or 30% annual returns over 8-9 decades.

From 1926-2023 the S&P 500 was up 10.3% per year so it’s not like the best-performing survivors crushed the market by leaps and bounds.

But those above-average returns compounded over 98 years added up to incredible growth over that time.

That compounding has been magic for the stock market.