End of History

WHEN YOU FINALLY HAVE A FUTURE:

Milei Hunts for Over $250 Billion That Argentines Have Hidden in Secret Stashes (Samantha Pearson and Silvina Frydlewsky, Feb. 3, 2026, WSJ)

Along the leafy boulevards of Buenos Aires, optimism is rising as the government softens financial controls, encouraging Argentines to plow previously undeclared cash into everything from cars to real estate.

“Customers are getting bolder, there is less need to hide things,” said Fabian Luciani, a car salesman in the city for the past 25 years. More than half of his clients pay in cash, he said, sometimes with dollars that families say have been buried in their backyards for years.

The color of the notes is usually a dead giveaway.

“They’ve got yellowish, brownish stains—you know, from humidity,” Luciani said, musing about how many dollars now sitting in the U.S. Treasury bear the stains of Argentine soil.

NEVER RETURN TO HISTORY:

Three Lessons from Venezuela’s Economic Collapse: Policy choices turned an oil-rich democracy into a petrostate, then into an authoritarian economy where repression followed redistribution. (Matthew D. Mitchell, January 23, 2026, Daily Economy)

Oil was not the only explanation for Venezuela’s 1970s prosperity. The government spent and taxed modestly. It left most industry in private hands. Inflation was low. And international trade was almost entirely free of tariffs and regulatory barriers to trade.

In 1970, Venezuela scored a little less than 7 on the Fraser Institute’s 10-point Economic Freedom of the World index, making it the 13th most economically free country in the world, just ahead of Japan.

But as the rest of the world liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, Venezuela went in the opposite direction.

GLOBALIZATION IS AMERICANIZATION:

Why Labeling Muslim Brotherhood “Chapters” as Terrorist Groups Is Problematic (Emile Nakhleh, 1/14/26, The Cipher Brief)

In the early 1990s, the Egyptian MB rejected political violence and declared its support for peaceful gradual political change through elections, and in fact participated in several national elections. While Islamic Sunni parties in different countries adopted the basic theological organizing principles of the MB on the role of Islam in society, they were not “chapters” of the MB.

They are free standing Islamic political groups and movements, legally registered in their countries, which often focus on economic, health, and social issues of concern to their communities. They are not tied to the MB in command, control, or operations.

Examples of these Sunni Islamic political parties include the AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Justice and Development in Morocco, al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, the Islamic Movement (RA’AM) in Israel, PAS in Malaysia, PKS in Indonesia, the Islamic Party in Kenya, and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

During my government career, my analysts and I spent years in conversations with representatives of these parties with an eye toward helping them moderate their political positions and encouraging them to enter the mainstream political process through elections. In fact, most of them did just that. They won some elections and lost others, and in the process, they were able to recruit thousands of young members.

Based on these conversations, we concluded that these groups were pragmatic, mainstream, and committed to the dictum that electoral politics was a process, and not “one man, one vote, one time.” Because they believed in the efficacy and value of gradual peaceful political change, they were able to convince their fellow Muslims that a winning strategy at the polls was to focus on bread-and-butter issues, including health, education, and welfare, that were of concern to their own societies. They projected to their members a moderate vision of Islam.

DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, PROTESTANTISM:

The Other Revolution of ’76 (William H. Peterson, Fall 1973, Modern Age)

For in 1776, between the appearance of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in January and the Declaration in July, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith was published. A most remarkable book. This one book reconstituted the industrial revolution and launched the capitalist revolution, at least intellectually. Walter Bagehot said that because of this one book “the life of almost everyone in England—perhaps of everyone—is different and better. . .”1 William Pitt in introducing the budget to Parliament in 1792, echoed Edmund Burke and said this one book furnishes “the best solution to every question connected with the history of commerce, or with the systems of political economy.”2 Henry Thomas Buckle in his History of Civilization in England said:

This solitary Scotchman has by the publication of one single work, contributed more to the happiness of man than has been effected by the united abilities of all the statesmen and legislators of whom history has presented an authentic record.3

Be that as it may, the two revolutions of 1776—American and capitalist—were more than coincidence. Both represented reactions against mercantilism, a system of political economy characterized by aggressive nationalism, central direction and closed economies. Both represented grand endeavors to advance the cause of a free society through the establishment of limited government, although one was mainly political in scope while the other was mainly economic. Both sought, each in its own way, a system of checks and balances, of separation of powers, of freeing the individual—with the ultimate sovereignity of the one residing in the citizen, and with the ultimate sovereignity of the other residing in the consumer. In this article, some of the origins and implications of the capitalist revolution on both sides of the Atlantic are examined, with Smith’s Wealth of Nations as a guide.

THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH AMERICA THAT ELECTING A LIBERAL WOULDN’T FIX:

Let’s Not Grant the Postliberal Critique of Market Liberalism: Discontents with liberal modernity are perennial and a spiritual awakening won’t cure them (Jonathan Rauch, Dec 21, 2025, The UnPopulist)

Nineteen-seventy was a banner year for American cultural criticism. Blockbusters like Charles A. Reich’s The Greening of America and Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock heralded a decade of introspection. Another bestseller, now largely forgotten, was by the American sociologist Philip Slater: The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point. (You can read the 1970 edition here.)

Why, Slater asked, is America so prosperous, yet so unhappy? “Scarcity is now shown to be an unnecessary condition,” he wrote. Americans enjoyed an unprecedented bounty of choice—a bounty not only of consumer goods but also of lifestyles. Yet prices were high, services were deteriorating, the environment was suffering. Worse, “there is an uneasy, anesthetized feeling about this kind of life,” Slater wrote. “We … feel bored with the orderly chrome and porcelain vacuum of our lives, from which so much of life has been removed.” The blame, he charged, lay with an “old culture” which “has been unable to keep any of the promises that have sustained it” and “is less and less able to hide its fundamental antipathy to human life and human satisfaction.”

Revised in 1975 to reflect the end of the Vietnam war, Slater’s book made its way, by and by, into the hands of a certain teenager living in the suburbs of Phoenix, Arizona. At 16, I thought the book was brilliant. I wasn’t alone. The Pursuit of Loneliness fed into a stream of national self-doubt that culminated in President Carter’s “malaise” speech of 1979. The country, said Carter, faced a

crisis of confidence … that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation.

In 1979, his diagnosis seemed right to me and a lot of other Americans.


And then … Reagan. Morning in America.

THE PLIGHT OF THE LAST MAN:

What Happens if You Refuse to Recognize That We Are in a Death Spiral (David French, 12/14/25, NY Times)

While we talked about a number of issues, one theme was dominant — I refused to recognize that America was in a death spiral. The country was in crisis, and I needed to open my eyes, steel my spine and take the necessary, sometimes authoritarian, steps to pull it from the brink.

The core of their complaint was embodied by a quote from a novelist named G. Michael Hopf who wrote in his book “Those Who Remain”: “Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.” […]

Americans live longer, enjoy higher median wages, live in larger and more luxurious homes, and enjoy more civil liberties and greater access to justice than even the recent past. The starter homes of the 1950s — tiny places that often lacked central air and other modern utilities — would be considered poverty-level accommodations now.

Violent crime is much lower than in decades past, the divorce rate has decreased from its highs in the early 1980s, and the abortion rate (despite recent increases) is far below its early 1980s peaks.

Let’s face it, folks have trouble making themselves the hero of their stories when we live such affluent lives in such easy times. Thus, they imagine apocalyptic dramas.

A FASCIST INTERLUDE CAN SAVE YOU, BUT THEN YOU NEED TO LIBERALIZE FULLY:

Exploring The Chile Project (J.P. Bastos, 12/11/25, EconLib)

The government of Salvador Allende is also the subject of many misconceptions. Edwards recognizes that part of the confusion stems from the fact that Allende was from the Socialist (and not from the Communist) Party, which led authors to mistakenly portray him as a relatively moderate candidate even though, in Chile, the Socialists were much more to the left and had close ties with Cuba and North Korea.2

The book offers a detailed overview of Allende’s economic policies. For instance, Edwards reveals that the government’s grasp over the economy went significantly beyond the well-known nationalization of U.S.-owned copper mines. It also nationalized the banking sector and enforced its right to take control, for an undetermined period, of hundreds of factories producing goods “in short supply.” This short supply was often staged by unions stopping the factory floor and creating artificial shortages. He notes that every import required a license, with some tariffs reaching 250 percent. He also describes how perverse and arbitrary mechanisms were used to set price controls, which led to confiscation of goods, often imposed huge fines, and, sometimes, sent “speculators” to prison. […]

Recurring in Edwards’ narrative in the third and final part of the book is that, despite the breadth of the reforms implemented during the regime, much else was also done after the return to democracy to deepen and extend the reforms. This continuation was often undertaken by center-left politicians. This insight invites reflection on the role Chicago Boys. On the one hand, their ideas undoubtedly charted the path to greater economic freedom, much needed in Chile after Allende’s populist policies.

On the other hand, Chile’s experience highlights the limitations to economic growth and prosperity under a dictatorship. Recent empirical research has analyzed this issue in Pinochet’s Chile from two different sides. Escalante (2022) shows that the Chilean GDP per capita underperformed for at least the first 15 years following the coup. Arenas, Toni, and Paniagua (2024) also question the timing of the “Chilean miracle”, arguing that it only really developed following the return to democracy. Indeed, other Latin American development “miracles” (in Uruguay and Costa Rica) occurred without a similar story of a liberalizing autocrat.

CONSERVATISM SEEKS TO CONSERVE LIBERALISM:

Liberalism, conservatism, and America’s vocabulary problem (Donald Bryson, November 18, 2025, Freedom Focus)

The word “liberal” comes from the Latin līber, meaning “free.” The original meaning of “liberal” was tied directly to liberty, not bureaucracy, and to the condition of free people, not to the expansion of state power. In forgetting this, we also forgot that many of the principles we cherish on the Right — individual rights, free speech, limited government, religious liberty, the rule of law — are not merely conservative impulses, but the core commitments of the liberal tradition from which our nation was born.

As James Madison argued in Federalist No. 51, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. … In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” The Founders understood that liberty requires both empowerment and restraint. Government must be strong enough to secure rights, yet limited enough to prevent domination. That insight sits at the heart of the classical liberal tradition: freedom protected by constitutional structure, not granted by the good will of rulers.

American political discourse suffers from a deep conceptual confusion that distorts debates and obscures the true stakes of our moment. The terms “liberal” and “conservative,” which should help us understand philosophical commitments and political tendencies, have instead become rhetorical weapons and tribal markers. These distinctions matter profoundly for any serious effort to articulate our first principles.