Sovereignty

PATTANI IS A NATION:

Thai Colonialism in the Malay World : A spate of deadly shootings in Thailand is just the latest episode in a centuries-long struggle between Thais and Malays. (Imran Said, 30 Apr 2025, Quillette)

The absorption of Pattani into Thailand is part of a centuries-long expansion of Thai Buddhist power down the Malay Peninsula and into the northern reaches of the Malay-Muslim world. These cultural borderlands have been transformed by centuries of Thai subjugation, Malay-Muslim resistance, British colonialism, the formation of modern nation-states, and the rise of ethno-religious nationalism in a multiethnic setting. Siamese colonialism in the northern Malay Peninsula has left deep marks both in the Deep South of Thailand, where one of Southeast Asia’s deadliest insurgencies shows no signs of abating, as well as in the northern regions of contemporary Malaysia.

Thai intrusion into the Malay world began in the thirteenth century, when Thai princely leaders and their followers began moving through the Kra Isthmus (the narrowest part of southern Thailand) into the northern regions of the Malay Peninsula, then populated by Malay-speaking peoples. By the mid-fourteenth century, many of the northern Malay polities had become vassals of the Ayutthaya Kingdom, the precursor to modern Thailand. Siamese control of the northern Malay states was contested by the Malacca Sultanate, a once prosperous entrepôt located in the modern Malaysian state of Melaka and the progenitor of much of modern Malay-Muslim culture. The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511 opened the door to the imposition of Siamese rule over the northern peninsula.

For the northern Malay sultanates, vassalage to the Siamese became particularly associated with the triennial tribute of the bunga mas dan perak (the “gold and silver flowers”)—small models of trees, meticulously fashioned from gold and silver, each about a metre high. Every three years, the bunga mas tribute to the Ayutthaya King was accompanied by other costly gifts, weapons, textiles, and slaves. The necessary funds were raised through a poll tax on the villagers, which often engendered deep resentment. Furthermore, to demonstrate their loyalty, Malay rulers were expected to requisition the Thai armies with men, food, and weapons during campaigns.

Model of a bunga mas sent by one of the northern Malay states to the Siamese court. Collection of Muzium Negara, Kuala Lumpur. Source: Chainwit/Wikimedia Commons.
For the Siamese, the bunga mas symbolised Malay submission to the overlordship of the Thai ruler. For the Malays, however, the bunga mas was a token of friendship. These mutual misunderstandings not only point to differing interpretations of what vassalage meant but are also indicative of the cultural tensions between the geopolitical worldviews of the Thais and Malays. The former inhabited a hierarchical, centralised, and unequal system in which vassals were obliged to fulfil certain obligations in return for patronage and protection—and Malays were close to the bottom of that hierarchy. The Malays, by contrast, inhabited a slightly more meritocratic and egalitarian world, in which relationships were expressed through kinship and leaders competed for followers. These tensions became more pronounced towards the end of the sixteenth century, when changes in the etiquette of the Ayutthaya court obliged Thai nobles to demonstrate their subservience to the king by prostrating themselves in his presence—even European envoys were compelled to crawl into the audience hall. Shortly afterwards, the Thai court began to demand that Malay rulers also make personal obeisance before the king.

Over the course of the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, the degree of control the Siamese tributary system imposed over the northern Malay states waxed and waned. For the most part, Malay rulers chafed under the increasingly onerous and humiliating demands made by the Thais. Malays still recall the legendary warrior Hang Tuah, hero of the Malay epic Hikayat Hang Tuah (History of Hang Tuah), who refused to grovel before the Ayutthaya King as beneath the dignity of a Malay subject. The northern Malay rulers sought to defend themselves against Siamese dominance by forming alliances with other Malay states, as well as with European powers like the Portuguese, Dutch, and British who were starting to make their presence felt in the region.

But the risk of Thai retaliations against such moves was ever present. Following the establishment of the Chakri dynasty (the current reigning house of Thailand) in Bangkok in 1782, the ruler of Patani flatly refused to make personal obeisance to the new monarchs. In retaliation, in 1785–86, a Siamese army razed Patani to the ground. It was said that “all the men, children and old women … were tied and thrown upon the ground and then trampled to death by elephants.” Four thousand Malays were taken to Bangkok in chains, along with two huge Patani siege guns called Sri Negara and Sri Patani. (Sri Patani can now be found outside the Thai Ministry of Defence in Bangkok). And acquiescing to Siamese dominance brought benefits, too, both economic—access to Siam’s international trading ports—and political—support from Bangkok against any rival claimants to the throne at home.

Siamese overlordship and the deprivations of the Thai armies helped sharpen the northern Malays’ sense of separateness from their Thai Buddhist overlords. One historical Malay text describes the Siamese king as a ‘infidel [who] does not know correct behaviour.” This feeling was mutual. The Thai King Rama III commented that the Thais and Malays were so different in culture and worldview that they resembled oil and water, “which cannot be made into one.” The Islamic faith was also mobilised in resistance to the Thais. In 1821, during a Siamese campaign against the rebellious Malay state of Kedah, the Malays described the conflict as a holy war (jihad) against an infidel (kafir) regime. These narratives were influenced by the then-emergent Islamic sect of Wahhabism, which originated in the Middle East in the early 19th century and quickly spread far and wide. Its austere and militant teachings were disseminated throughout the region’s Islamic pondok (hut) schools.

SOVEREIGNTY REDEFINED:

Liberal Nationalism, Abraham Lincoln, and the Unification of Italy (Miles Smith, July 15, 2024, Providence)

American liberals in the nineteenth century weren’t libertarians, nor were they agnostic on the relationship between the state, order, and liberty. But they did believe the state should be limited, and that it could not and should not exercise coercive authority on matters of conscience. Nations were good, so long as they gave their people true freedom.

Only liberal regimes are legitimately sovereign.

YOU SAY YOU WANT A DEVOLUTION…:

The Evolution of Empire (JOHN ANDREWS, 6/21/24, Project Syndicate)

The trite answer to the question of why empires fall is that they become victims of their own success, growing too large, too corrupt, too exhausted to fend off energetic newcomers. As the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun argued in the fourteenth century, empires are like living organisms: they grow, mature, and die. […]

Almost a half-century ago, John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Jordanian army from 1939 until 1956, published a book entitled The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. His thesis was essentially the same as Ibn Khaldun’s, only with the added claim that almost all empires rise and fall over a period of roughly 250 years. Putting aside the obvious flaws in Glubb’s arithmetic (the Ottoman Empire certainly did not “end” in 1570), the core idea should not be dismissed too casually. After all, historians now give the Qing Dynasty a lifespan of 267 years, and the Mughal Empire of Das’s book began to lose territory after only two centuries.

A pessimist might point out that today’s China began with the Communist victory in 1949, and that America’s quasi-imperial power began 201 years ago with the Monroe Doctrine. Time may not be on the side of those who place their trust in America to protect democracy and “liberal Western values.”

What makes America unique is that our “Empire” has never expanded outward much–the Philipines and Cuba, Germany and Japan, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc were all turned back to their people in short order. Instead, we have become too large to be governed effectively entirely within our own borders. We exceed optimal state size by orders of magnitude. It’s why we will devolve into a series of smaller nations though likely still bound together in a British-style commonwealth.

TRANSNATIONALISM WAS ALWAYS DOOMED:

The EU is turning into a Remainer nightmare: In a cruel twist of fate, Brussels has shed its progressive skin (Thomas Fazi, MAY 9, 2024, UnHerd)

All this clashes with the Remainers’ rainbow-tinted view of the European Union. But their vision was always predicated on a fantasy: everything that is happening across the Channel is not a betrayal of “EU values”, as they are probably telling themselves — it is an inevitable consequence of the EU’s architecture itself. Even though Remainers have always tended to view the EU as a bastion of social and workers’ rights, the reality is that the Rightward drift across the EU has its roots in the Brussels-driven assault on the post-war European social and economic model following the 2008 financial crisis. High unemployment rates, stagnant wages and austerity measures implemented in response to the crash exacerbated existing inequalities, fuelling resentment towards the political establishment. To make things worse, the EU attempted to prevent any democratic backlash to these policies by restricting the scope of democratic decision-making by democratically elected governments, focusing instead on quasi-automatic technocratic rules imposed by undemocratic bodies. The European Union effectively became a sovereign power with the authority to impose budgetary rules and structural reforms on member states — not exactly what you’d expect from the “bastion of democracy” often portrayed by Remainers.

The main geopolitical force in the world, as regards sovereignty, is centrifugal, not centripetal.

WHILE WE WHINGE ABOUT ANYTHING THEY DO:

Let’s Face It: Sanctions Are Warfare by Another Name (ASSAL RAD, MARCH 19, 2024, Inkstick)

At first glance, sanctions may appear like a useful alternative to war. Proponents of sanctions will argue that they avoid putting boots on the ground, thus protecting American servicemembers, they have the power to alter the behavior of targeted states, and prevent the devastation to innocent civilians caused by conventional warfare. But a deeper analysis of sanctions shows a starkly different picture.

Though there has certainly been evidence and literature that shows the limited efficacy of sanctions and their humanitarian costs on civilians, those findings are not always accessible to the broader public and tend to have a narrower focus.

And while many may recall the horror stories of how US sanctions hurt Iraqi children and civilians in the 1990s — especially the now infamous remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stating that the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children were “worth it” — sanctions policy is still not part of a wider political debate among the American public.

This discrepancy is due in part to the fact that sanctions are a silent killer. They do not draw the same media attention as bombs, dead bodies, and images of cities and homes turned to rubble — as we are seeing in Gaza now. To be clear, the enormous destruction and loss of life at such a rapid pace in Gaza should be the headline of every news outlet. But while sanctions can profoundly damage an entire society, the slow death they produce often goes unnoticed.

THERE IS NO MYANMAR:

Rebel offensive taking toll on Myanmar military’s cohesion, soldiers say (Rebecca Tan, Yan Naing and Andrew Nachemson, February 14, 2024, Washington Post)

Accounts from Myanmar army soldiers who have surrendered or defected over the past three months reveal that the military is suffering from plunging morale and overstretched logistics amid a rebel offensive that has prompted mass surrenders. […]

Myanmar’s military seized power in 2021 after ousting the democratically elected government. When protests erupted across the country, the military responded with force, and thousands of its opponents turned to armed resistance, in some cases making common cause with ethnic rebel groups. The military has sought to crush opposition with methods so brutal and indiscriminate that U.N. investigators say they are likely war crimes.

But last year, the rebels pushed the military into its weakest position in decades by capturing towns on the edges of the country and driving the junta’s forces toward the middle, analysts say.

Investigators at Myanmar Witness, an independent nongovernmental group that verifies developments in the Myanmar war, said they used open-source information to geolocate footage of five mass surrenders and weapon seizures since October. The investigators said that their efforts have only just begun and that their findings represent “the tip of the iceberg of the military’s losses.”

Researchers at the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar, a Myanmar-based think tank, are also working to verify surrenders, and Executive Director Min Zin said it is already apparent that the scale is unprecedented in the military’s history. Myanmar analysts from four other independent research institutions agreed.

“It speaks volumes about the military’s capacities that they had to accept this kind of situation,” said Richard Horsey, a senior adviser on Myanmar for the International Crisis Group.