Anglospherics

I HURT MYSELF TODAY, TO SEE IF I STILL FEEL:

The Fire of Stupidity Cannot Be Contained (David French, 5/31/26, NY Times)

[M]illions upon millions of people are enduring democracy as “the worst form of government” without the necessary balanced understanding (that citizens in the mid-20th century had gained through firsthand observation) of “except all those other forms that have been tried.”

So even fascism and communism — for some people, at least — are no longer avatars of atrocity, but dynamic alternatives to a sclerotic present. In their frustration, all too many people are attracted to the theoretical benefits of authoritarianism, and they don’t have the experience or the education to understand its actual and inevitable defects.

They do not understand the link between their fashionable and transgressive ideologies and the oceans of blood that fascism and communism spilled across the globe.

In this ahistorical context, even political violence can seem justified — perhaps even a bit daring and romantic — unless you’ve lived through, say, the riots that swept American cities in the 1960s, a cataclysm that was far more violent, deadly and prolonged than anything that happened in the United States in 2020.

The compromises and restraints of diplomacy, which can often mean granting painful concessions to terrible regimes, can seem like a fool’s errand, unless you’ve witnessed the indescribable horrors of world wars.

The problem is rather different than Mr. French describes: it is the atavism of the Last Men. Life is so affluent and boring, thanks to the triumph of liberalism, that these people are willing to embrace violence just to make their lives more exciting.

CHOKING ON THEIR BILE:

How Right-Wing Politics Make You Physically Ill (Kristen French, May 29, 2026, Nautilus)

A team of scientists found that conservative Americans got measurably less healthy than liberal Americans over the course of the 2010s. By the early 2020s they were dying at significantly higher rates, even setting aside COVID-19 deaths. They also ran a separate large survey, in 2024, of more than 21,000 people and found that right-leaning Americans—especially Republicans and Trump voters—are less likely to trust their doctors, follow medical advice, and seek care when they probably should.

It isn’t just about COVID vaccines. It extends to medications for chronic conditions like diabetes and hypertension, and to willingness to go to the doctor for chest pain.

WHITE PRIVILEGE:

How to Sell a Genocide exposes the double standards of reporting on Gaza (Jeff Sparrow, May 28, 2026, The Conversation)

The International Association of Genocide Scholars describes the Israeli war on Gaza as meeting the legal definition of genocide. The association’s position came after a vote, so we know it reflects the judgement of 86% of its members.

Almost all the major human rights organisations and NGOs agree, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, B’Tselem, the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, Genocide Watch, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, the Middle East Studies Association, Oxfam and Physicians for Human Rights Israel.

Yet most liberal news outlets still do not use the word “genocide” in relation to Gaza.

Johnson shows how such lexical scruples do not apply elsewhere. “Even though the destruction of Gaza, by all objective metrics, has been magnitudes more brutal and deadly than that of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine,” he observes, “the totalising moral labels of ‘war crime’ and ‘genocide’ were used on CNN and MSNBC 17.2 times more often in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine than Israel’s action in Gaza.”

His review of the first 30 days of the two conflicts found that, on CNN and MSNBC, Ukrainians were described on air as victims of genocide or war crimes 1,790 times: 1,515 for war crimes and 275 for genocide. When the victims were Palestinian, the terms were used 104 times: 92 for war crimes and 12 for genocide.

“Ostensibly non-opinionated reporters and ‘analysts’ on both MSNBC and CNN,” writes Johnson, “often asserted, as a matter of fact, that Russia was committing war crimes against Ukrainians, without this being seen as violating their neutrality.”

The only existential threat to Israel is the way it has degraded its culture.

THE DRAGON HAS NO TEETH:

Ten China falsehoods exposed by the Trump-Xi summit (Miles Yu, May 25, 2026, Washington Times)

  1. The myth of the “Thucydides Trap”

The Beijing summit revived the tired mythology of the “Thucydides Trap,” the claim that conflict between the United States and China is inevitable because a rising China is displacing a declining America. This theory is not only intellectually bankrupt, but also historically erroneous, because the rising power was defeated in the Peloponnesian war that Thucydides masterfully documented.

Xi Jinping himself is trapped not by geopolitical reality, but by Marxist-Leninist dogma, which insists capitalism is collapsing and communist victory triumphantly inexorable. The CCP mistakes dogma and propaganda for reality. America remains the world’s leading military, technological and financial power, the global hub of innovation and inspiration, the only superpower capable of shaping global security, trade and alliance environments.

China, meanwhile, faces demographic collapse, economic stagnation, mass unemployment, popular disenchantment and elite political instability. More importantly, the real divide is not “China versus America,” but communist China versus the entire free world.

CONTINENTALS:

Our Straussian Techocracy (Hirsh Chitkara, May 2026, Liberties)

The Silicon Valley elites funding the New Right believe it is much more difficult to be cynically correct than idealistically wrong. This is central to the worldview of figures such as Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, and Marc Andreessen. They believe it is their lot in life to possess superior judgement that enables them to pierce through conventional thought. […]

The tech oligarchs therefore see themselves as having undertaken a heroic but thankless task. […] All three men imagine themselves as lonely Atlasses holding a perpetually ungrateful world on their shoulders.

The fundamental divide between the Anglosphere and Europe runs along this line. The English-Speaking World, at least since Hume, happily accepts that we can never see beyond the cave. The Rationalists are gnostics, who are convinced they’ve escaped. It’s just self-flattery.

THE rIGHT IS THE lEFT:

Dear conservatives, industrial policy is a dead end (Samuel Gregg, 26 May 2026, CapX)

Industrial policy is in fact already widespread in Western societies. State subsidies, special tax write-offs, outright capital grants and joint public-private enterprises are rife in developed economies. The differences are really about scale and form.

One reason why many governments have often been reluctant to acknowledge the degree to which they promote such practices are the well-documented economic and political problems associated with industrial policy.

Among other things, these include: 1) the fact that governments cannot know everything they would need to know if they were to design successful industrial policies; 2) the massive opportunity costs associated with diverting scarce resources to less productive economic sectors; 3) industrial policy’s inherently political nature and its consequent susceptibility to political machinations and rampant cronyism.

Then there is the reality that the world’s economies are littered with powerful examples of industrial policy failure. Japan was once considered the poster child for industrial policy success. In the 1980s, many American commentators insisted that unless the US imitated Japan’s extensive use of industrial policy, it risked being supplanted by Japan as the world’s economic superpower.

The irony is that from the early-1990s onwards, Japan started slipping into its ‘Lost Decades’ of stagnation, and there is little doubt that industrial policy played a leading part in facilitating that decline. Indeed, one of the most comprehensive studies of industrial policy’s long-term impact upon Japan concluded that it produced ‘little, if any positive impact on productivity, growth, or welfare’.

This track record should cause conservatives to be more wary of industrial policy, including the current Chinese variety.

BREAKING OUT OF THE BANTUSTANS:

The Voting Rights Act Is Dead. Here’s a New Model for Black Politics. (Jake Grumbach, Perry Bacon, May 25, 2026, New Republic)

It’s worth explaining when and how Black politics lost its effectiveness. There has never been a singular Black political movement or African American ideology. Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois famously quarreled. Du Bois’s own views shifted over the course of his life. The reality of the civil rights activism of the 1950s and ’60s was more complicated and messy than beautiful Martin Luther King speeches and smartly organized boycotts.

But after the civil rights victories of the 1960s, a clear Black politics emerged and predominated for five decades. Aspiring Black leaders, who had earlier led from the pulpit or protests, sought and won political office, most commonly becoming either mayor or member of Congress in heavily Black areas. A network of Black organizations, such as the National Urban League and the NAACP, focused less on the mass protests of the civil rights era and more on behind-the-scenes lobbying and collaborating with those Black officials in office.

Though they varied considerably, these organizations often became synonymous with a single famous leader, such as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. And these leaders were often treated by the media and politicians as spokespeople for the entire Black population. These politicians, groups, and leaders aligned tightly with the Democratic Party, viewing it as the only vehicle to advance Black political goals.

The results of this approach have been uneven. On the one hand, African American politicians became increasingly powerful within the Democratic Party, gaining committee chairmanships, the mayor’s office in some of America’s largest cities, Cabinet and judicial appointments, and finally, in Barack Obama, the party’s presidential nomination. These elected officials delivered major policy victories to Black Americans and the country as a whole, from local economic empowerment of Black communities to the Affordable Care Act. On the other hand, African Americans became a “captured minority,” the term invoked by Princeton political scientist Paul Frymer. Democratic Party officials knew that Black voters would back them no matter what, so they had little incentive to push hard for policies and programs that would help African Americans in particular. Electoral pressures led the Democratic Party to set an agenda that would appeal to swing voters in swing states—a very non-Black constituency.

As the Democratic Party became increasingly concerned that advancing Black concerns turned off white voters, Black Democratic politicians and prominent activists faced a choice: advance in the party by downplaying and sidelining Black concerns, or advocate Black interests at the expense of their careers. Many chose the former. Contrary to conservative pundits who claim that he stoked racial conflict, Obama actually spoke far less about racial issues than his Democratic predecessors. Prominent activists shifted from pressuring Democratic politicians to being very defensive of them. Sharpton and others negotiated with mayors, presidents, and corporations, but grew unaccountable to Black America at large—operating more like celebrities than community activists. Over time it became difficult to distinguish the policies of Black and white mayors, as both were beholden to the police and corporations in their cities and thereby unwilling (and often lacking any real power) to advance policies to help rank-and-file Black Americans.

The Congressional Black Caucus for a time earned its self-given moniker, the “Conscience of the Congress,” pushing the U.S. in radical directions, whether on enforcing civil rights or in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. But gradually, members of the CBC became advocates for Democratic donors and big business as much as for Black activists and voters. Above all, they advocated for their own careers. Many CBC members are among the cohort of congressional Democrats in their upper seventies and eighties who insist on running for reelection despite growing concerns of a gerontocracy.

IF GEORGE HAD GIVEN US OUR OWN PARLIAMENT WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE WHOLE LESS:

John Adams’s Providential Moses Moment (Jane Cook, May 21, 2026, Providence)

From disbanding their colonial legislatures to taxing the colonists while denying them representation in Parliament, King George III’s oppression and tyrannical actions were Pharaoh-like. The Battles of Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill in 1775 had raised the stakes and increased the danger to their lives. Pondering his role, Adams wrote to Abigail: “Is it not a saying of Moses, who am I that I should go in and out before this great people?”

Pressing on Adams’s mind was his own burning bush triggered by musket fire.

“When I consider the great events which are passed, and those greater which are rapidly advancing, and that I may have been instrumental of touching some springs, and turning some small wheels … I feel an awe upon my mind, which is not easily described,” he wrote as he grasped the gravity of the situation in one hand and hope for liberty in the other.

“Great Britain has at last driven America, to the last step, a complete separation from her, a total absolute independence, not only of her Parliament but of her crown.” Adams added that there was something very “unnatural and odious” in a government that was “1,000 leagues” away.

DONALD WHO?:

Has Taiwan Made Itself Immune to American Betrayal? (Channing Lee, 5/20/26, Project Syndicate)

US support for Taiwan is not a preference that could change with a US administration, nor is it a bargaining chip. Rather, it is thoroughly embedded in the machinery of American power—in congressional mandates, defense planning, semiconductor supply chains, state-level partnerships, and private-sector investment.

These ties make the relationship difficult for any US administration to unwind, and even more difficult for China’s government to weaken. The era when analysts parsed every presidential statement for clues about Taiwan policy is fading. High-level rhetoric still matters, but the durability of US-Taiwan ties now rests less on individual leaders than on institutional momentum.

Despite new presidents coming to power in both Taipei and Washington over the past two years—and despite unprecedented Chinese military pressure on Taiwan—the relationship has only deepened. Congressional delegations (most recently from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) regularly visit Taiwan, and arms sales have continued (so far)—with the Trump administration greenlighting the largest weapons packages in the relationship’s history. Trump has signed new legislation reinforcing bilateral ties, his National Security Strategy has emphasized deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, and a recently announced reciprocal trade framework has formalized a strategic economic partnership.


Private-sector developments have been especially transformative, mainly because Taiwan’s dominance in high-end semiconductors and AI infrastructure has transformed the island from a traditional geopolitical flashpoint into a pillar of the global economy. “Non-red” supply chains (trusted networks that are insulated from Chinese leverage) have moved from concept to practice, with Taiwan sitting at the center of this shift.

TSMC’s expanding campus in Arizona is only the most visible example of this broader trend. Taiwanese firms of all sizes are investing in US data centers, advanced materials, and electronics; and US technology companies are deepening their presence in Taiwan, particularly in AI and cloud computing. Meanwhile, both are reducing exposure to China.

For years, US policymakers talked abstractly about “decoupling” from China. Now markets and industry are making it real, with Taiwanese capital revitalizing US manufacturing, and US firms increasingly relying on Taiwan for next-generation innovation. Crucially, defense technology partnerships are linking private-sector advances to Taiwan’s asymmetric defense and the US military’s modernization.

HUMAN EXISTENCE IS THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SECURITY AND FREEDOM:

The Future of Dynamism with Virginia Postrel (hosted by G. Patrick Lynch, Law & Liberty Podcast)

Virginia Postrel :
[T]he basic distinction is between dynamism, which is open-ended discovery and progress that is driven by bottom-up problem solving, bottom-up problem defining, innovation, and feedback, also. So not every new idea is a good idea, not every idea of how to solve a problem actually solves the problem. And there is this constant process of discontent also, because whatever you have, you see what could be better about it. And that’s one reason that this progress is open-ended, but it’s very much an idea of discovery, sort of a liberalism that centers discovery and curiosity and learning. “Learning” is what I say in the book. On the other side, you have what I call stasis and I talk about two different forms. One, which is the easier to understand, is people who really center stability. Their ideal society is one that doesn’t change and often they have an ideal located somewhere in the past.

It could be the Middle Ages, it could be the 1950s, it could be before the agricultural revolution. There are many different forms of that type of stasis, which I call reactionary in the book. The other form of stasis is more subtle, and much more pervasive, which is the idea of, no, we like change, we like progress, we like discovery, but we want it to look exactly the way we want it to look. And this is what I call technocracy. So this is a form of stasis that is about control. So it’s not about “nothing changes,” it’s about very directed change. And since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, technocracy has dominated liberal democracies. There was a rise of thinking that, “Wow, look at all these great things that railroads and steel mills, all these corporations that have to plan these giant enterprises, we should plan the economy the same way.”

And obviously looking back on it and especially through the lens of some of Hayek’s work, this seems obviously wrong, especially in the forms that you find it in the early twentieth century or late nineteenth century where it really is like every single bit of the economy would be planned, but it wasn’t stupid. It wasn’t stupid people saying this. It was people drawing the wrong lessons from the world that they were living in. And so I see this continuing struggle between ideals of an open-ended discovery-oriented society that is very bottom up also. So no one is in charge, no one is in control. It doesn’t mean you have no rules. You need rules, but they need to be very general and you need to be able to have nested levels of rules so that McDonald’s can say every menu has to be the same, and somebody’s one-off restaurant can have different food every night depending on what’s fresh in the market.

The genius of liberalism is republican liberty, which allows us to balance the two by granting exactly as much freedom to others as leaves us secure ourselves.