Anglospherics

IF GEORGE HAD GIVEN US OUR OWN PARLIAMENT WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE WHOLE LESS:

John Adams’s Providential Moses Moment (Jane Cook, May 21, 2026, Providence)

From disbanding their colonial legislatures to taxing the colonists while denying them representation in Parliament, King George III’s oppression and tyrannical actions were Pharaoh-like. The Battles of Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill in 1775 had raised the stakes and increased the danger to their lives. Pondering his role, Adams wrote to Abigail: “Is it not a saying of Moses, who am I that I should go in and out before this great people?”

Pressing on Adams’s mind was his own burning bush triggered by musket fire.

“When I consider the great events which are passed, and those greater which are rapidly advancing, and that I may have been instrumental of touching some springs, and turning some small wheels … I feel an awe upon my mind, which is not easily described,” he wrote as he grasped the gravity of the situation in one hand and hope for liberty in the other.

“Great Britain has at last driven America, to the last step, a complete separation from her, a total absolute independence, not only of her Parliament but of her crown.” Adams added that there was something very “unnatural and odious” in a government that was “1,000 leagues” away.

DONALD WHO?:

Has Taiwan Made Itself Immune to American Betrayal? (Channing Lee, 5/20/26, Project Syndicate)

US support for Taiwan is not a preference that could change with a US administration, nor is it a bargaining chip. Rather, it is thoroughly embedded in the machinery of American power—in congressional mandates, defense planning, semiconductor supply chains, state-level partnerships, and private-sector investment.

These ties make the relationship difficult for any US administration to unwind, and even more difficult for China’s government to weaken. The era when analysts parsed every presidential statement for clues about Taiwan policy is fading. High-level rhetoric still matters, but the durability of US-Taiwan ties now rests less on individual leaders than on institutional momentum.

Despite new presidents coming to power in both Taipei and Washington over the past two years—and despite unprecedented Chinese military pressure on Taiwan—the relationship has only deepened. Congressional delegations (most recently from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) regularly visit Taiwan, and arms sales have continued (so far)—with the Trump administration greenlighting the largest weapons packages in the relationship’s history. Trump has signed new legislation reinforcing bilateral ties, his National Security Strategy has emphasized deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, and a recently announced reciprocal trade framework has formalized a strategic economic partnership.


Private-sector developments have been especially transformative, mainly because Taiwan’s dominance in high-end semiconductors and AI infrastructure has transformed the island from a traditional geopolitical flashpoint into a pillar of the global economy. “Non-red” supply chains (trusted networks that are insulated from Chinese leverage) have moved from concept to practice, with Taiwan sitting at the center of this shift.

TSMC’s expanding campus in Arizona is only the most visible example of this broader trend. Taiwanese firms of all sizes are investing in US data centers, advanced materials, and electronics; and US technology companies are deepening their presence in Taiwan, particularly in AI and cloud computing. Meanwhile, both are reducing exposure to China.

For years, US policymakers talked abstractly about “decoupling” from China. Now markets and industry are making it real, with Taiwanese capital revitalizing US manufacturing, and US firms increasingly relying on Taiwan for next-generation innovation. Crucially, defense technology partnerships are linking private-sector advances to Taiwan’s asymmetric defense and the US military’s modernization.

HUMAN EXISTENCE IS THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SECURITY AND FREEDOM:

The Future of Dynamism with Virginia Postrel (hosted by G. Patrick Lynch, Law & Liberty Podcast)

Virginia Postrel :
[T]he basic distinction is between dynamism, which is open-ended discovery and progress that is driven by bottom-up problem solving, bottom-up problem defining, innovation, and feedback, also. So not every new idea is a good idea, not every idea of how to solve a problem actually solves the problem. And there is this constant process of discontent also, because whatever you have, you see what could be better about it. And that’s one reason that this progress is open-ended, but it’s very much an idea of discovery, sort of a liberalism that centers discovery and curiosity and learning. “Learning” is what I say in the book. On the other side, you have what I call stasis and I talk about two different forms. One, which is the easier to understand, is people who really center stability. Their ideal society is one that doesn’t change and often they have an ideal located somewhere in the past.

It could be the Middle Ages, it could be the 1950s, it could be before the agricultural revolution. There are many different forms of that type of stasis, which I call reactionary in the book. The other form of stasis is more subtle, and much more pervasive, which is the idea of, no, we like change, we like progress, we like discovery, but we want it to look exactly the way we want it to look. And this is what I call technocracy. So this is a form of stasis that is about control. So it’s not about “nothing changes,” it’s about very directed change. And since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, technocracy has dominated liberal democracies. There was a rise of thinking that, “Wow, look at all these great things that railroads and steel mills, all these corporations that have to plan these giant enterprises, we should plan the economy the same way.”

And obviously looking back on it and especially through the lens of some of Hayek’s work, this seems obviously wrong, especially in the forms that you find it in the early twentieth century or late nineteenth century where it really is like every single bit of the economy would be planned, but it wasn’t stupid. It wasn’t stupid people saying this. It was people drawing the wrong lessons from the world that they were living in. And so I see this continuing struggle between ideals of an open-ended discovery-oriented society that is very bottom up also. So no one is in charge, no one is in control. It doesn’t mean you have no rules. You need rules, but they need to be very general and you need to be able to have nested levels of rules so that McDonald’s can say every menu has to be the same, and somebody’s one-off restaurant can have different food every night depending on what’s fresh in the market.

The genius of liberalism is republican liberty, which allows us to balance the two by granting exactly as much freedom to others as leaves us secure ourselves.

INFORMATION WANTS TO BE FREE:

The ‘warrior ethos’ promises victory — history says it leads to defeat (John Broich, May 21, 2026, The Conversation)

Democracies don’t necessarily fight clean wars. During World War II, the Allies firebombed cities, created internment camps and dropped atomic bombs.

What distinguishes fascist powers from democracies is their contempt for rules based on their sense of superiority. In 1933, Adolf Hitler’s propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels announced that the Nazis would claim the absolute right to override democratic constraints. “This contemptible parliamentarianism … is gone,” he said.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini said it more bluntly in 1936: “We do not argue with those who disagree with us, we destroy them.”

But rules of engagement function as a control system that ties tactical decisions to strategy, law and the risk of escalation. Discarding them tends to produce the atrocities and strategic blowback that lose wars.

Democratic procedure does similar work: Political scientists who studied 197 conflicts from 1816 to 1987 found that democracies won about 76% of their conflicts and non-democracies 46%, in large part because accountable leaders and public access to information force a government to notice when a plan isn’t working.

A fascist regime that treats democratic constraints as obstacles is likely to decide inconvenient information is an obstacle too. Because of this, in fascist governments, loyalists rank higher than experts. Fascist systems don’t remove people for being wrong; they remove them for insufficient loyalty. The man who tells the leader what he wants to hear rises. The man whose report contradicts the leader’s views endangers himself.

Maybe the silliest trope of the 60s/70s was that democracies had inherent disadvantages in fighting totalitarian regimes when the exact opposite was true. It has always led folks to wildly overestimate the strength of our opponents, as witness in Iraq, Ukraine, etc. Disastrously, it led to a prolonged Cold War rather than simply settling the USSR’s hash immediately.

ALL COMEDY IS CONSERVATIVE:

India has a new political superstar – a cockroach (Zoya Mateen, 5/21/26, BBC)

A satirical collective that takes inspiration from the insect – stubborn, reviled and considered indestructible – has attracted millions of online followers and mainstream media attention in less than a week, making even veteran politicians sit up and take notice.

The cockroach was thrust into the spotlight last week after controversial comments made by India’s Chief Justice Surya Kant. During a hearing, he allegedly compared unemployed young people drifting towards journalism and activism with cockroaches and parasites.

He later clarified that he was referring specifically to people with “fake and bogus degrees”, not India’s youth more broadly.

But by then the comments had already spread widely online, triggering outrage, jokes – and a humorous political idea called the Cockroach Janta Party (Cockroach People’s Party), or CJP. The name is a parody of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been in power since 2014. Critics and rights groups have alleged that press freedom and civil liberties have declined since then, which the BJP denies.

The CJP is not a formal political party but an online movement built around political satire. Its tongue-in-cheek membership criteria include being unemployed, lazy, chronically online and having “the ability to rant professionally”.

It was created by Abhijeet Dipke, a political communications strategist and student at Boston University. He says the idea came as a joke.

Nationalism being humorless, mockery is a terrible threat.

TO NOT KNOW IS TO HATE?:

The Smugness of Anti-Empathy Politics: Gad Saad spells out his ‘own the libs, scorn the weak’ ethos: a review of Suicidal Empathy: Dying to Be Kind by Gad Saad (Cathy Young, May 22, 2026, The Bulwark)

Quillette ran a scathing review by conservative British writer Ben Sixsmith titled “Playing Gad,” critiquing it as simplistic and intellectually self-absorbed. The reviewer in another “heterodox” outlet, Unherd, panned the book for dressing up a catchy concept in a lot of incoherent and “vibes-based” arguments, political vitriol, and lame humor.

The thing is, Saad’s concept—empathy is a good and necessary trait, but can be bad and self-damaging when taken too far—is one few people would dispute. Obvious examples include being trapped in an abusive relationship or a toxic friendship because you’re afraid to hurt the other person by ending it, a concern exploitative people can easily manipulate. On a larger scale, it is self-evidently true that empathy alone is usually not a reliable guide to policy or collective action: refusing, on compassionate grounds, to forcibly hospitalize people experiencing certain acute mental health crises can result in grave harm not only to other people but to the patients themselves.

Indeed, other people have critiqued the overreliance on empathy—at least in the literal “I feel your pain” sense which distinguishes empathy from the related concepts of sympathy and compassion, even if many people use the words interchangeably. Yale psychology professor Paul Bloom wrote a generally well-received book titled Against Empathy in 2016, proposing “Rational Compassion” instead. Bloom argued, among other things, that the emotional component of empathy leads us to focus too much on highly visible cases of suffering (a little child who falls down a well becomes more important than a lot of little children whose lives are quietly wrecked by poverty). Ironically—given that Saad spends a lot of time excoriating liberals for being too afraid to seem racist—Bloom also argued that empathy-based morality can easily become de facto racist and tribalist, since we tend to empathize more with people like ourselves: hence the disproportionate media focus on young white women who go missing.

For Saad, though, “suicidal empathy” is strictly a culture-war concept. In his framework, the term refers to ostensibly compassionate political views he considers misguided: support for migrants and refugees, Muslim immigrants in particular; excessive concern with the rights and well-being of criminals and/or homeless people; high taxes to pay for social programs; defense of transgender identities; an #IBelieveHer stance toward women who accuse men of sexual misconduct. (Unless, of course, the alleged perps are migrants or Muslims or both, in which case insufficient support for the victims is a sign of suicidal empathy for those groups.)

Gaad has just dressed up Identitarianism. By definition empathy is a personal concept, not one you apply to entire groups (whose personal experiences you can not even pretend to know, as advocates of empathy do).

HOW LOSERS “WIN”:

Actually, Democracy Dies in H.R. (Amanda Taub, May 18, 2026, NY Times)

New research, drawing on an extraordinary data set from Argentina’s Dirty War in the 1970s and ’80s, suggests a very different explanation. It turns out that the kinds of career pressures familiar to employees everywhere — the desire to revive a stalled career or obtain a minor promotion — can be enough to incentivize lower- and midlevel officials to violate professional obligations, fundamental norms and even basic morality. The people who make those decisions, the research suggests, are neither extremists nor victims. They are often just middling workers looking for a way to get ahead.

“Making a Career in Dictatorship,” a new book by two German political scientists, Adam Scharpf and Christian Glassel, reads like what you might get if you crossed Hannah Arendt’s ideas about the “banality of evil” with a business school guide on how to get the most out of low performers.

Their in-depth study of Argentina’s military during that country’s era of coups and forced disappearances found that low performers — whom they refer to as “career-pressured” individuals — filled the ranks of the secret police. That service allowed them to “detour” around the ordinary military hierarchy, the book shows, achieving promotions and career success they could never have managed otherwise.

It turns out that would-be authoritarians don’t need to staff their regimes with ideological true believers, offer extreme enticements or impose draconian punishments in order to make successful power grabs. They just need to figure out how to target their ideal labor pool: the frustrated and mediocre.

MITCH AND THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY PICKED CONSERVATIVES, NOT TRUMPISTS:

The Hard Right Hates Neil Gorsuch: How the freakout over Gorsuch’s comments reveals a deeper rift between constitutionalists and nativists. (Daniel Ruggles, May 18, 2026, The Bulwark)

During a media blitz this month to promote his new children’s book, Heroes of 1776: The Story of the Declaration of Independence, Gorsuch repeated the same message over and over: The United States is a “creedal” nation—that is, a nation unified by common belief in rights, liberties, and democratic institutions. Yes, he explained, we are a people with a singular “heritage,” but it’s one of ideals, not ethnicity. Being an American requires not lineage, but belief.

It was a gentle rebuke of nationalism—and it drove the hard right nuts.

Americans largely agree with Gorsuch that, when it comes to citizenship, belief in American ideas trumps genealogy. In an earlier dispensation, his comments would have been taken as an innocuous, even saccharine, idealism about the nation’s founding and self-rule—totally typical for a conservative jurist.

But we are not in that earlier dispensation. Gorsuch’s repeated references to “creed” exposed a stark divide between far-right ideologues (with their nativist America First agenda) and the conservative originalist old guard. For decades, the right has campaigned to fill courtrooms with self-professing originalists. Now, that old guard—personified by Gorsuch, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, and Chief Justice John Roberts—is something of a wild card on the Supreme Court. And it’s causing tension, especially as the court gets ready to rule on birthright citizenship.

THERE IS NO BEAR IN THE WOODS:

I’m the Foreign Minister of Sweden. Russia’s Economy Is More Fragile Than It Seems. ( Maria Malmer Stenergard, 5/20/26, NY Times)

Russia has claimed that its economy grew by around 13 percent between 2020 and 2024, but by measuring nighttime luminosity, an established way of assessing economic activity in countries where official statistics are not available or cannot be trusted, we have estimated that the economy actually contracted by around 8 percent during this period.

We also believe inflation is substantially understated. In 2024, when inflation in Russia was reportedly around 10 percent, the central bank raised the benchmark interest rate to 21 percent, suggesting that inflation was higher. And Sweden’s Military Intelligence and Security Service believes that it is higher than the current official forecast of around 5 percent. This would mean Russia is overstating its purchasing power, and that its military spending capacity is weaker than it appears.

OPEN THE BORDERS UNILATERALLY:

Does Britain really want to rejoin the EU? (Julian Jessop, 19 May 2026, CapX)

For example, one recent poll by More in Common found that most people are keen that the UK and EU should be able to trade more freely with each other (why would anyone not be?). However, only a minority want to ‘align more closely with EU laws and regulations’. The UK would, of course, be obliged to adopt all ‘EU laws and regulations’ automatically if Britain rejoined the bloc.

Similarly, YouGov polling has suggested that 80% of Labour voters want a ‘customs union’ with the EU. But more sophisticated polling by the same company (for Queen Mary University London) has found that only 9% of Labour voters think that UK tariff policy should be decided by someone other than the UK government. Again, this is exactly what a customs union with the EU would entail.