Long War

PARAMETERS OF THE LONG WAR:

Western Civilization: The Problem of Political Freedom (Frank S. Meyer, Spring 1968, Modern Age)

At the heights of the philosophical and Prophetic endeavors, in a Plato or a proto-Isaiah, as occasionally among their predecessors and followers, the vision cleared and a simple confrontation between individual men and transcendence stood for a moment sharply limned. But at these heights of understanding another problem arose, one I have referred to above when discussing the Hellenic experience and have called the problem of Utopianism. A clear vision of the naked confrontation of individual men with transcendence created a yawning gap in human consciousness. It was something of the effect of eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. On the one hand stood the perfection of transcendence, and on the other the imperfection of human existence. The temptation was enormous to close that intolerable gap, to grasp that understood transcendent perfection and by sheer human will to make it live on earth, to impose it on other human beings – by persuasion if possible, by force if necessary.

The same temptation beset the Hellenic philosophers at their highest reach of vision. The effect of this temptation was portentous for the future, because of its continuing impact upon both the Hellenic and the Judaic traditions, the twin sources from which our Western civilization derives so much of its content. Its effects can be perceived in the most diverse areas: in the effect on Western thought of the concepts of moulding human life implicit in the Utopian society of Plato’s Republic or in the dictatorial powers of the Nocturnal Council in his somewhat less rigid Laws; or in the actual political absolutism, derived from the Judaic tradition, of such polities as Calvin’s Geneva or Spain of the Inquisition or Cromwell’s England. Secularized with the passage of time, the Utopian desire to impose a pattern of what the imposers considered perfection becomes ever more rigid, total, and terrible, as in the allpowerful Nation of the French Revolution or the Dictatorship of the Proletariat of the Communists.

The Utopian temptation arises out of the very clarity of vision that tore asunder the cosmological world-view. Released from the comforting, if smothering, certainties of identifica tion with the cosmic order, men became aware of their freedom to shape their destiny-but with that freedom came an awesome sense of responsibility. For the same leap forward that made them fully conscious of their own identity and their own freedom made them conscious also of the infinite majesty and beauty of transcendence and of the criterion of existence that perfection puts before human beings, who in their imperfection possess the freedom to strive to emulate perfection. A yawning gulf was opened between infinity and finity.

There are two possible human reactions to the recognition of this reality.

On the one hand, it can be accepted in humility and pride – humility before the majesty of transcendence and pride in the freedom of the human person. That acceptance requires willingness to live life on this earth at high tension, a tension of men conscious simultaneously of their imperfection and of their freedom and their duty to move towards perfection. The acceptance of this tension is the distinguishing characteristic of the Western civilization of which we are a part, a characteristic shared by no other civilization in the world’s history.

On the other hand, the hard and glorious challenge of reality can be rejected. The tension between perfection and imperfection can be denied. Men conscious of the vision of perfection, but forgetting that their vision is distorted by their own imperfection, can seek refuge from tension by trying to impose their own limited vision of perfection upon the world. This is the Utopian temptation. It degrades transcendence by tr ying to set up as perfect what is by the nature of reality imperfect. And it destroys the freedom of the individual person by forcing upon him conformity to someone else’s limited human vision, robbing him of freedom to move towards perfection in the tension of his imperfection. It is in form a return to the womb of the cosmological civilization, in which the tension of life at the higher level of freedom was not required of men, in which they could fulfill their duties in uncomplicated accep tance of the rhythms of the cosmos, without the pain or the glory of individuation. But Utopianism is only similar to cosmological civilizations in form; in essence it is something different, because cosmological civilization was, as it were, a state of innocence, while Utopianism comes after the eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of the persons of God and men. It is a deliberate rejection of the high level at which it is now possible for men to live, and as such it distorts and oppresses the human spirit. Yet it has remained, ever since the Hellenic and Judaic break through the cosmological crust, an everprevalent historical factor. In particular, as Western civilization is the civilization that accepts and lives with the tension of spirit, Utopianism has been a constantly recurring destructive force within it.

Indeed, the history of Western civilization is the history of the struggle to carry forward its insight of tension, both against the remaining inherited traumas of the cosmological attitude in its social structure and in its intellectual outlook and against the continuing recrudescence of Utopianism.

We should never be surprised that some people are willing to reject the uncertainty and risk that freedom affords in favor of the security of Utopian conformity.

INCOMPETENCE IS THE SOURCE:

Identity Politics as Ersatz Religion: a review of American Awakening: Identity Politics and Other Afflictions of Our Time By Joshua Mitchell ( Jeffrey Folks, 12/24/23, University Bookman)

As Mitchell sees it, there is only one path back from the “debilitating pathology” of identity politics. It is for a community of thoughtful individuals to build, or rebuild, a society of honest “face-to-face” relationships and a “politics of competence,” and thereby restore a society in which individuals are judged on virtue, merit, and conduct rather than affiliation with one or more distinct identity groups. In this view, the rehabilitation of society depends on the actions of well-intentioned individuals to oppose identity politics in the public space…

The author probes deeply into the pseudo-religious origins of identity politics, and he demonstrates convincingly how widely this new ideology has spread across American society and Western society in general. An important point in Mitchell’s argument is that identity politics exists only in those societies that were once Christian but where Christian belief has lapsed, thus demonstrating that identity politics is in fact an ersatz form of religious scapegoating. Also important is the insight that, unlike Christianity, in which believers achieve forgiveness of sin through the intercession of the scapegoat figure, in identity politics the grievances of self-proclaimed victims can never be resolved. The model of Civil Rights protest has been hijacked and applied to a seemingly endless series of complaints, all of which obtain relief at the expense of some other group, only in time to be scapegoated by some other complainant. It goes without saying that the endgame of identity politics is an authoritarian society in which each identity group competes for recognition and relief, and in which the social cohesion that Tocqueville once highlighted as a crucial element of American democracy is replaced by distrust, isolation, and competition.

It is precisely the failure of personal “virtue, merit, and conduct” that drives such folk to submerge themselves in group Identity and victimization.

AND RUNNING OUT OF PEOPLE:

China’s Economic Engine Is Running Out of Fuel (YI FUXIAN, 12/22/23, Project Syndicate)

[H]owever appealing to China’s leaders Lin’s economic forecasts may be, they have proved wildly wrong, not least because they fail to account for China’s bleak demographic outlook. Both a higher median age and a higher proportion of people over 64 are negatively correlated with growth, and on both points, China is doing far worse than the three countries to which Lin compares it.

When Germany’s GDP per capita was equivalent to 22.6% that of the US, its median age was 34. In Japan and South Korea, the median age was just 24. After those 16 subsequent years of strong growth, the median age in the three countries stood at 35, 30, and 32, respectively. Contrast that with China, where the median age was 41 in 2019, and will reach 49 in 2035.

Likewise, at the beginning of the 16-year period to which Lin refers, the proportion of people over 64 in Germany, Japan, and South Korea was 8%, 5%, and 4%, respectively; at the end, it stood at 12%, 7%, and 7%. In China, that proportion was 13% in 2019 and will be 25% in 2035. In the 16 years after the proportion of people over 64 reached 13% in Germany (in 1966) and Japan (in 1991), these economies’ average annual growth was only 2.9% and 1.1%, respectively.

Moreover, in Germany, Japan, and South Korea, the labor force (aged 15-59) began to decline in the 12th, 38th, and 31st years after their per capita GDP equaled 22.6% that of the US. China’s began to decline in 2012.

If one imagines China’s economy as an airplane, the 1978 launch of the policy of reform and opening up would have been what ignited the fuel – the young workers – that enabled the economy to take off and fly at high speeds for three decades. But, in 2012, the fuel began to run low, causing the plane to decelerate.

Instead of adjusting to their new reality, the Chinese authorities – heeding the advice of economists like Lin – continued to lean on the throttle by investing heavily in real estate, thereby creating a massive property bubble.

YOU WOULD BE TOO IF AMERICA WERE ILLIBERAL:

Why are so many young Chinese depressed? (Nancy Qian, 12/21/23, the Strategist)

China’s high youth unemployment rate and increasingly disillusioned young people—many of whom are ‘giving up’ on work—have attracted much attention from global media outlets and Chinese policymakers. The standard narrative is to associate the problem with the country’s recent growth slowdown. In fact, the issue goes much deeper.

The rise of youth depression has been decades in the making, and owes much to China’s rigid education system, past fertility policies and tight migration restrictions.

THERE IS NO BEAR IN THE WOODS:

The Russian Air Force Is Dying a Slow and Painful Death in Ukraine (Peter Suciu, 12/18/23, National Interest)

Russia saw two of its jets lost in just 24 hours over the past weekend, including one that was reported to have been shot down by its own forces in the skies over Ukraine.

Since launching its unprovoked war against Ukraine nearly two years ago, the Russian military has seen a significant number of combat aircraft lost in the fighting. The most recent aircraft destroyed included a Sukhoi Su-34 fighter bomber that was targeted on the ground at a Russian air base in an early morning raid on Sunday. Later that same day, a Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jet was shot down over the Zaporizhia region in eastern Ukraine on Sunday per Business Insider.

Kyiv claimed it wasn’t responsible for the downing of the latter aircraft.

“I can confidently state that it was not the Ukrainian air defense that shot down the Russian Su-25 attack aircraft! These were clearly the coordinated actions of Russian anti-aircraft troops, for which the entire Ukrainian people sends them great thanks!,” Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said in a post on the social messaging app Telegram.

XI IN THE BOX:

Japan cuts big deals with ASEAN — with one eye on Beijing (Matthew Kendrick, 12/17/23, GZero)

Tokyo committed to an implementation plan for over 130 projects with ASEAN, covering everything from the green economy transformation to cybersecurity to arms technology and equipment transfers.

The joint leaders statement also contained language regarding “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity” and the “renunciation of the threat or use of force” — clear references to China’s activities in the South China Sea.

In a separate bilateral deal, Indonesia will get $63.7 million to bolster its maritime security and a Japanese-built patrol boat to boot.

Similarly, Malaysia will get $2.8 million for “warning and surveillance” gear as part of a Japanese program to bolster law enforcement and security in friendly countries.

The Philippines’ coast guard agreed to cooperate more closely with Japan’s. Manila also received advanced Japanese radars last month and is in talks with Tokyo over a formal military pact that could allow mutual troop deployments and training.


Also last month, Japan and Vietnam elevated their mutual relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and are discussing a potential military deal.

FEAR OF CHINA IS JUST RESIDUAL YELLOW MENACE HYSTERIA:


The country should stimulate consumption with spending on education, healthcare and public housing (CHETAN AHYA, 12/11/23, Financial Times)

Its gross domestic product deflator — the broadest measure of prices, taking in all goods and services of a country — is at minus 1.4 per cent and has contracted for two consecutive quarters. Consequently, China’s nominal GDP growth was just 3.5 per cent in the third quarter, much lower than the 6.4 per cent of the US.

A deflationary backdrop poses a few challenges. First, real rates after taking into account deflation will rise, increasing the burden on debtors. Second, even as debt growth slows, it will probably remain higher than nominal GDP growth. And so debt-to-GDP ratios will continue to climb. More crucially, a weaker GDP deflator negatively affects the trends in corporate revenues and profits. If deflation continues to eat into these, companies will cut wage growth, creating a vicious “loop” of even weaker aggregate demand and deflationary pressures.

These issues are particularly challenging in China’s context, considering that it is also facing elevated debt ratios and weakening demographic trends. Along with deflation, these factors combine to present a challenge to China we term the “3 Ds”.

The deflationary pressures in China stem from the deleveraging of the balance sheets of the property sector and local governments. When you consider that the combined debt on these balance sheets accounts for about 100 per cent of GDP, it is hardly a surprise that demand and price pressures are as weak as they have been.

CAIN LIVED, ABEL DIED:

Reading Rousseau: The Social Contract, Part I (Paul Krause, December 15, 2023, Minerva Wisdom)

Rousseau opens his famous work on political philosophy by stating that “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” Again, this is because in the state of nature man is free and equal, but in society he is enslaved and not free and not equal. “How did this transformation come about?” he asks. “I do not know,” he replies. This is the greatest sleight of hand in philosophical history. Whereas, say, Aristotle saw “natural inequality” as explained it metaphysically: That nature itself is not equal, Rousseau sidesteps the question. Instead, he wishes to discuss how a society can be made to be legitimate. For illegitimate society is the society in which man, having been born free, remains in his chains. This also means, very importantly, that Rousseau begins his political treatise with the understanding that political society is illegitimate.

Once you’ve miscast human nature there’s no way back to common sense for the Continent.

THE eND OF hISTORY ALWAYS WINS:

It’s starting to look like China regrets its private-enterprise crackdown (Huileng Tan, Dec 14, 2023, Business Insider)


A document released after the conference set the agenda for China’s economy — the second-largest economy in the world — for the next year. Strikingly, this year’s readout acknowledged that China needed to prioritize economic development.

“Next year, we must persist in seeking progress while maintaining stability, promote stability through growth, and establish the new before breaking the old,” the meeting’s official readout said.

Rory Green, the chief China economist at GlobalData.TS Lombard, wrote in a note on Wednesday that the wording in this document suggested “hints of remorse at overzealous growth-negative policy implementation.”

“The emphasis on the economy was followed by ‘prioritizing development before addressing problems,’ alongside rhetoric that linked national security to maintaining a stable growth rate,” Green wrote. He added that this suggested official recognition of the difficulties facing the country.

hISTORY eNDS EVERYWHERE:

The Billion-Dollar Question: When Will China’s Local Debt Explode?: Unless the CCP embraces capitalist innovation and public accountability, which is unlikely, China’s local debt could cause the central bank to collapse by 2030. (Jennifer Zeng, 12/13/23, Japan Now)

The only feasible solution to China’s financial trouble seems to be the central bank’s printing money. Suppose China’s central bank prints ¥10 trillion CNY ($1.41 trillion USD) of base money annually to assist local governments with debt repayment. With only a 4× money multiplier, this would result in over ¥40 trillion CNY ($5.63 trillion USD) of circulating money.

As of the end of September 2023, China’s total money supply, M2, stood at only ¥290 trillion CNY ($40.75 trillion USD). Injecting more than ¥40 trillion CNY into this money pool within a year would have big consequences. Within less than two years, the renminbi could face destruction by the central bank itself due to rampant inflation caused by reckless money-printing.

Through meticulous calculations by Lao Man, the conclusion is that without urban investment bonds, China might struggle through the next three years. It would be a bare survival level, though, with China limping along on money printed from thin air. This situation could potentially last until 2030, which is viewed as the ultimate deadline for collapse.

‘No Hope of Rescue’ However, the dilemma posed by urban investment bonds is like a noose around the Chinese economy’s neck, capable of asphyxiating the system at any moment. No matter what the central bank does, 2024 looms as the most probable year for collapse.

Lao Man suggests some solutions.

Elevating private enterprises to the same status as state-owned enterprises is one. He also suggests empowering the public to participate in and oversee government actions. But neither of these scenarios is likely to occur. If the Chinese Communist Party were to open the door to either capitalist innovation or public accountability, its very reason for existence would evaporate. All that remains, it would seem, therefore, is to quietly await the inevitable.

Lao Man’s final conclusion was stark: “Fortunately, the wait won’t be long. Local government debt will definitely explode within the next year, with no hope of rescue.”