Identitarianism

MAGA IS UNAMERICAN:

The Grand Budapest Cartel (James M. Patterso,n April 15, 2026, Providence)

When Vice President JD Vance was campaigning for Viktor Orbán earlier this month, he was also campaigning to preserve the Hungarian funding for the New Right organizations that would support his own future political ambitions. With Orbán defeated, that money is gone. The Hungarians, in their own way, helped decide the future of American conservatism.

How is that possible? How did this happen?

The answer is the ‘Grand Budapest Cartel.’ Orbán has spent the past decade engaging in a concerted influence campaign on American conservatism. The purpose of his efforts is not merely to familiarize conservative policymakers and think-tankers with Hungarian interests. Orbán wanted to remake American conservatism from the top down into an ideological movement that moves it away from limited government, religious pluralism, and a robust foreign presence, and toward right-wing social engineering, postliberalism, and an American retreat from foreign affairs. Orbán’s ambition is not his alone but also that of Orbán’s close friends in Russia and China. In short, the meaning of the future of American conservatism was also on the ballot in the recent Hungarian elections.

TIME TO JETTISON THE DARWINIST RIGHT:

Knowing What Time It Is: What will our politics look like after Christianity? A tour of the post-religious right. (John Ehrett, March 23, 2026, Plough)

Ample evidence now suggests that post-religious conservatism is producing its own “successor ideology.” It manifests in divergent forms – from a technological maximalism that demands ever-greater transcendence of the body, to a primitivism fixated on physical strength, various imputed statistical differences between races, and (not quite ironically) phrenology. Its metrics are sets and reps, per capita statistics, and the marks on calipers. Its trajectories are complementary: they are grounded in a dawning conviction that human politics and society are fundamentally defined by biology and its resultant hierarchies. Rebelling against the body’s limits, or fixating upon them, both treat the body – rather than the immortal soul – as the primordial political term. And these moves follow organically from the dechristianization of the right.

The post-religious right will have its own creeds, however implicit. And it will inevitably find itself at odds with the Christian humanist tradition whose mantle it still claims.

By world-historical standards, American conservatism has been strikingly egalitarian in character. To many, that claim may sound outrageous, given America’s history of chattel slavery and mistreatment of Native American tribes. But by the standards of the left-right binary first formulated around the time of the French Revolution – with “left” meaning a taste for equality, and “right” an affinity for hierarchy – the American conservative experience looks decidedly nonhierarchical.

America imported no rigid system of social class from Europe. Its leaders did not, as in France, justify their rule by recourse to a sacred bloodline. Its founding authorities did not enshrine a metaphysical caste principle, along the lines of India’s ancient Laws of Manu. But Americans who claim the mantle of “conservative” – a term of preservation and stewardship – cannot escape the reality that the American tradition they conserve is bound up with the Declaration of Independence’s searing maxim: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

Just who are all these men who are created equal? For many in the founding generation, black Americans, Native Americans, and others didn’t qualify. But attempts to enforce biopolitical hierarchies were always profoundly unstable. Whether consciously or not, slave owners were trapped in a paradox, committed to asserting the subhumanity of their slaves as the justification for their oppression while simultaneously living in perpetual fear of a freedom-seeking revolt – the very act of human self-determination epitomized by the Revolution itself. In time, and after much bloodshed, the logic of the Declaration won out. Those originally excluded from the American project of self-government on racial grounds proved entirely capable of being due, demanding, and receiving the rights enumerated in it.

COPING:

Cognitive dissonance helps explain why Trump supporters remain loyal, new research suggests (Eric W. Dolan, April 11, 2026, PsyPost)

A third study took place in October 2022, just after Trump was arraigned for his involvement in the January 6 Capitol attack. The scientists recruited 187 participants who had voted for Trump in the 2020 election. These individuals read an article summarizing the public hearings regarding the events of January 6.

After reading the summary, participants answered questions about how accurate they felt the information was and whether it made them feel bothered or uncomfortable. This step allowed the researchers to measure the actual emotional discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance. Participants then wrote open-ended responses explaining how they reconciled their support with reports of illegal election interference.

The results from the third study echoed the earlier findings, though participants relied even more heavily on disbelief. Over 60 percent of the respondents claimed the accusations regarding election interference and the Capitol attack were false. A small minority of participants, about 13 percent, noted that they had supported Trump in the past but no longer did so after learning about his actions.

The researchers found a positive association between feeling bothered by the news article and expressing disbelief in the allegations. Participants who experienced higher levels of mental discomfort were more likely to claim the accusations were fabricated. This suggests that the denial is not just a calm rejection of information, but rather a direct response to the psychological distress of cognitive dissonance.

From a psychological perspective, these responses represent novel ways to reduce mental friction. For instance, arguing that a politician’s personal life does not matter is a way of conceptually separating, or compartmentalizing, conflicting pieces of information. By making the personal misconduct seem completely irrelevant to political leadership, individuals can successfully eliminate their mental tension.

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?:

The Multipolarity Trap: How a KGB talking point became a staple of American right-wing discourse (Park MacDougald, April 07, 2026, Tablet)

At the time, this struck us as a strange argument to make at a nominally “America First” conference. Multipolarity, after all, was originally conceived by the Russian intelligence services as a tool to weaken the West. It was first formulated by Yevgeny Primakov, a KGB Arabist who served as foreign minister under Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and has since been popularized internationally by the state-backed Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin. In essence, multipolarity opposes “unipolar” U.S. dominance in favor of an arrangement in which Russia and its allies, China and Iran, are granted freedom of action in their respective “spheres of influence.” Over time, the idea has worked its way into the propaganda of China and Iran and the arguments of their Western sympathizers.

While phrased as an essentially defensive arrangement against American “globalism,” multipolarity is, in practice, a strategy for Communist-Islamist world domination. U.S. grand strategy since World War II is premised on the idea of “forward defense” in the Eurasian rimland, which runs from continental Europe to the Middle East and on to coastal Asia, and which is home to most of the world’s people and economic activity. Without control of the rimland, presently secured by the combination of U.S. naval power and Washington’s system of alliances, the United States would become a second-tier “hemispheric” power. For elements of the isolationist right, the appeal of being a “hemispheric” power in a “multipolar” world is no doubt that it would rule out further U.S. military entanglements in far-flung locations while allowing us to shed the costs of maintaining our “empire.” But exchanging lucrative economic and defense partnerships with Europe, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel for stronger relations with El Salvador and Peru is hardly a recipe for increasing American military power or national wealth. Instead, it would be the greatest self-own in the history of geopolitics—a recipe for making America radically poorer and less secure, and therefore subject to the dictates of more powerful countries like China. Which one suspects is the point.

In reality, it’s an ever more unipolar world.

THE RIGHT’S “METOO!”:

Identity Politics Is a Problem for Conservative Christians Too (George Yancey, 4/12/26, The Dispatch)_

Progressive identity politics led to the rise of movements such as MeToo and Black Lives Matter, which were more successful political endeavors than outright Marxism. Conservative political activists became aware of this relative success; consequently, it was unsurprising that Republicans such as Donald Trump tapped into some dynamics of progressive political identity to create their own form of identity politics. Whereas the left had defined racial minorities, sexual minorities, and women as oppressed groups for those promoting progressive identity politics, the right defined whites, men, and Christians as oppressed groups for those promoting conservative identity politics.

Now we have the rise of Christian identity politics. While conservative Christian activism erupted in the 1970s and has remained active, the early version of Christian identity politics did not focus on the notion of Christians as victims. Instead, it focused on implementing Christian values in the issues of abortion and sexuality. But more recently, some conservative Christians have focused on the idea of Christians as an oppressed group. Though it may seem counterintuitive, conservative Christians are not especially likely to be politically active. Indeed, they tend to lag behind the nonreligious and progressive Christians in the degree to which they participate in political activity. But some of those who have become very politically active have tapped into their own version of identity politics to motivate their political activism.

PROJECT 2026:

How to Defeat a Very Trumpy Authoritarian Leader: “Hungarians would vote for a goat…if it was running against Orbán.” (Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, April 10, 2026, Mother Jones)

But why the outsized attention to an election in a Central European country of fewer than 10 million people? Well, because Orbán’s singular brand of pugnacious Christian nationalism and the implications of his rule have extended far beyond the fate of this nation and its 62-year-old leader. Orban is one of the most successful populist strongmen of the 21st century. He has successfully curried favor with both President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has antagonized the EU by systematically undermining civil society in Hungary, channelling some of its generous largesse to enrich himself and his cronies, and blocking essential funding for Ukraine. With no evidence whatsoever, he insists that “Brussels is pushing us into war,” accusing the EU and anyone within earshot of attempting to drag Hungary into the conflict in Ukraine and, perforce, with Russia.

Whatever the geopolitical ramifications—or implications for right-wing populism and America’s MAGA movement—for Hungarians, this election is existential, and exhausting. A pervasive sense of anxiety permeates conversations in social media and within families, and even casual interactions are charged. Hungarians have faced the complete Fidesz takeover of traditional media channels, and turned to Facebook and alternative media channels, which are abuzz with conversation, debate, and sharing of insights—or the latest Fidesz outrage. A friend in Budapest hinted darkly at a national curfew after the election, and one of my Hungarian cousins said her hairstylist was so spent that he planned to take Monday off to recover—as did her husband.

For many Americans, of course, Orbán’s Hungary is a miniature version of Trump’s US—indeed, in some ways, it may have served as a role model for MAGA in its crusade to dismantle democratic institutions and crucial elements of civil society. When Trump first ran for election in 2016, Orbán had already “built the wall”—in his case, an electrified razor wire fence constructed by prisoners—on Hungary’s southern border, attempting to staunch the flow of Syrian refugees who, to be sure, were more likely to use Hungary as a transit point than a final destination. This also allowed Orbán to declare a “state of emergency,” which has not been lifted since. Sound familiar?

In quashing dissent, extravagantly rewarding his allies, enriching himself and his family, despairing over the dilution of the purity of the Hungarian blood line, marginalizing and oppressing the LGBTQ community—well, it’s all there really. The Orbán playbook is channeled in various ways by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, the right-wing blueprint for Trump’s second term. So understanding how the Fidesz machine might be defeated could hold some lessons for MAGA’s foes.

Depending, of course, on what happens on Sunday. Because this election might conceivably serve as a blueprint for tampering with a free and fair balloting process, or how an autocrat will challenge its results. Election laws have been altered by Fidesz to gerrymander voting districts and reduce Parliamentary seats, all in their favor. (Sound familiar?)

In cities like Budapest, or even college towns, the level of engagement and rejection of Fidesz is unambivalent, but less-educated and provincial Hungarians in the eastern part of the country remain rock solid on team Orbán. I asked Csaba Pleh, a professor of cognitive science at the Central European University, if he was concerned about election meddling. “I do not agree with those voices that claim that Orbán will create disturbances or postpone the elections,” he said. “To be cynical, I feel that his entourage is too busy securing their money. They do not have the strength or the time to try to disrupt the elections.”

FA HATES ANTIFA:

The Real Antifa (Livia Gershon April 2, 2026, Jstor Daily)

Copsey and Merrill note that the term “antifa,” short for anti-fascist, comes from the 1930s German Antifaschistische Aktion. But, unlike that Communist Party-sponsored organization, Antifa groups in the U.S. today are autonomous, ad hoc groups that exist for the narrow purpose of confronting white supremacists and other fascists.

Copsey and Merrill focus particularly on Rose City Antifa (RCA), one of the more high-profile local groups. They note that its members are typically between 25 and 35 years old, mostly white, and split fairly evenly by gender, with LGBTQ+ people well represented. Becoming an RCA member is a six-month process designed to ensure that members share values and are willing and able to work together.

Copsey and Merrill find that, in practice, RCA and similar groups tend to view violence as a poor choice.
While RCA and other Antifa groups are often connected with larger webs of activists engaged in different kinds of action, they themselves are essentially a defensive force rather than one focused on winning elections, fomenting revolution, or any other forward-looking goals. Their tactics often involve putting their “bodies on the line” to stop fascists from promoting their ideology, rather than relying on political or legal action.

WHAT THEY MEAN BY aNTI-wOKE:

The Heritage of American Terror (Charles M. Blow, October 8, 2025, Bitter Southerner)

Peter H. Wood, a history professor at the University of Colorado Boulder, says that what he finds striking is the “longevity” and “gestational period” of America’s appetite and tolerance for the forcible control of bodies — then Black, now brown — and “a lot of the things we’re seeing now resonate with that [pre-Civil War period.]”

Out of this period came the slave patrol, official local law enforcement, and slave catchers, bounty hunters often prowling the streets of cities in non-slave states or monitoring known routes to freedom.

The lust for control didn’t end with slavery. In a way, it was amplified. As Wood put it, during Reconstruction the Ku Klux Klan picked up on the tradition of slave patrols and night riders, “but they intensified it partly because they had lost control, you know, that the country had become woke.”

That battle against liberalism and multi-racialism, a form of wokeness, keeps resurfacing and has now done so again in the Trump era.

THE REVOLUTION EATS ITSELF:

The Historical Irony of Feminism’s Silencing of Women (Abigail Favale, November 30, 2021, Church Life Journal)

When I was in graduate school, I remember reading an essay in which Jacques Derrida purports to “write as a woman.” I was in a gender studies program in a highly secular context, and we had a lively seminar on Derrida’s essay, eventually reaching the consensus that no, Jacques, you can’t simply step into a woman’s identity like you might step into a set of trousers. This was the mid-2000s, a different era, when the word “woman” still had some fleeting connection, however tenuous, to female embodiment.

Now, fifteen years later, we have reached a juncture where appropriating the identity of women is considered laudatory, liberating, the next frontier of civil rights—and raising cautions or questions is blasphemous. Increasingly, defining a woman as an adult human female is considered hate speech.