End of History

WE ARE HUME’S CHILDREN, NOT LOCKE’S:

God, Liberty & Epicurus (Michael Lucchese, Feb 27, 2025, Athwart)

Zubia goes on to convincingly argue that this modern Epicureanism has consequences for Hume’s political thought. Although the Scotsman is commonly considered a critic of social contract theory and even a “prophet of counterrevolution,” his skepticism places him squarely within the liberal tradition founded by Thomas Hobbes. Whatever critiques he offered of the fanciful contractarianism of his day, Hume nonetheless conceived of society as a sort of contract to secure justice—and a particular kind of justice at that.

It is no exaggeration to say that Hume’s vision of justice is bound up with his sense of progress. “Political science, from Hume’s perspective, is tasked with locating and improving,” Zubia writes, “man-made social and political institutions that are responsible for moving human beings from barbarism to civilization, or, stated in slightly different terms, all of which convey his meaning, from partiality to impartiality, from savagery to humanity, from warfare to peace.” Hume was an ardent defender of the British constitution, then, because he saw it as a sort of “end to history,” a final answer to the problem of politics.

Specifically, Hume privileged utility over what Zubia calls “the classical tradition of moral and political theorizing” about the Beautiful. In Hume’s account, the British constitution, with its checks and balances and commercializing spirit, lowered the aims of government from virtue to security in a way that was simply more conducive to life by orienting it to the here and now rather than any vague religious concept of eternity. As Zubia describes it, “Hume’s political theory provides an institutional formula by which self-interest, in the form of avarice and ambition, might redirect and restrain itself.”

This account of Hume’s political theory may sound strikingly familiar to American ears. Does it not remind us of Publius’s maxim in Federalist 51 that “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”? Certainly in the rhetoric of The Federalist, we can trace the influence of Hume’s political thought.

OUT-AMERICANING THEIR OPPONENTS:

The Truth of a Love Supreme (Justin Giboney, Feb. 25th, 2025, Christianity Today)

Civil Rights was a movement that lived out the truth of the Negro spirituals that activists sang, an unabashedly Christian endeavor in philosophy and practice alike. The love that Christians in the Civil Rights Movement sought to embody was not self-interested or limited to affirmation. It was a love they hadn’t received from this nation but one they knew to be necessary and real. They knew a love truly supreme was possible in Christ because the Bible said so.

The Bible told them to love their enemies (Matt. 5:43–48), and they obeyed. That is the Christian love imperative. It’s possibly the most counterintuitive, otherworldly, and pride-shattering component of the gospel.

In a sense, it’s not complicated, but it’s hard. What I mean is the concept isn’t astrophysics, but in practice we find it extraordinarily difficult. It runs counter to our broken psychological and emotional reflexes: Why in the world would I love my enemy? By definition, this is someone who is worthy of my contempt. This is someone who doesn’t have my best interest in mind.

But what Jesus did in the Sermon on the Mount was establish a deliberately indiscriminate love that is not conditioned upon shared identity, shared interests, or even peaceful cohabitation. This love extends to those who’ve done nothing to deserve it—in fact, to those who’ve done everything to make themselves ineligible for it.

MET ONE IDEOLOGUE…:

Were the Nazis Left-Wing?: The parallels between Nazism and communism complicate the standard left–right divide. (Gerfried Ambrosch, 24 Feb 2025, Quillette)

Hitler himself, however, did consider Nazism a form of socialism. In a 1923 interview, he stated,

Socialism is an ancient Aryan, Germanic institution. Our German ancestors held certain lands in common. They cultivated the idea of the common weal. Marxism has no right to disguise itself as socialism. We are not internationalists. Our socialism is national. We demand the fulfillment of the just claims of the productive classes by the state on the basis of race solidarity. To us, state and race are one.


In other words, Hitler considered Marxian communism a socialist heresy. Yet his description of National Socialism as “socialism in evolution, a socialism in everlasting change” echoes the Marxist view of history as a process of dialectical change.

Although Hitler’s version of socialism did not, as he put it, “repudiate private property,” it shared with communism a strong emphasis on collectivism over individualism, with the state not only enforcing the supposed interests of the collective but claiming identity with it. In this regard, the two movements were less ideological enemies than competitors—with liberal democracy as their common enemy. To quote F.A. Hayek in The Road to Serfdom, “The communists and Nazis clashed more frequently with each other than with other parties simply because they competed for the same type of mind and reserved for each other the hatred of the heretic.”

This also helps explain the strikingly similar iconographies that emerged in the totalitarian regimes the Nazis and communists went on to establish. Both these popular movements conceived of history as being propelled by “revolutionary struggle” and sought to remake man in the image of their respective ideologies. Hitler commented, “There is more that unites us with than divides us from bolshevism … above all the genuine revolutionary mentality. I was always aware of this and I have given the order that one should admit former communists to the party immediately.” According to Hitler, “all these new means of the political struggle used by us are Marxist in origin.”

And the parallels run deeper than means and mentality alone.

YOU CAN’T HAVE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS WHEN THERE IS ONLY ONE:

Francis Fukuyama Was Right About Liberal Democracy (Michael A. Cohen, Feb. 18th, 2025, New Republic)

Still, his underlying point that no serious ideological competitor to liberal democracy would emerge stands strong. No non-democratic model, be it Russian kleptocracy, North Korean totalitarianism, Iranian or Saudi theocracy, or Chinese market-driven authoritarianism, has captured the world’s imagination. Few people are pining for a society where their self-worth is fundamentally denied.

YOU CAN’T ENGINEER HUMAN NATURE:

Edward C. Banfield and What Conservatism Used to Mean: Hard thinking on difficult and uncomfortable questions about how to keep everything from falling apart. (Joshua Tait, Feb 01, 2025, The Bulwark)

IN GOVERNMENT PROJECT, BANFIELD TELLS the story of Casa Grande from its genesis to dissolution. It was fundamentally a relief project, to give succor to the Depression poor. Administrators made the decision to establish Casa Grande as one of four FSA cooperative farms—or “collective” farms, to use a term more evocative of the Soviet Union—despite the ways this ran against the expectations of the settlers, their neighbors, the press, and Congress. (There were another eleven FSA farms that were partly, but not fully, operated cooperatively.)

The rationale for running Casa Grande on a cooperative basis arose from the understanding that a major transition was underway in American agriculture. Technology had changed the economics of farming, but culture had not kept up. Diesel tractors gave such an advantage to large-scale farmers that the small family homestead became all but obsolete. The climate and landscape of this part of Arizona further seemed to suggest the need for treating this farm differently. To make Casa Grande at all viable, it would have to be at scale, which, to maximize relief, meant it would be a cooperative. No one would own their “property as lord of the manor,” as Banfield recounted; they would “use it only in common with 59 others.”


Eventually, FSA signed off on the project, funding was appropriated, and the beginnings of a cooperative legally established. The settlers were a varied bunch. Some were Arizonans; a later batch were Okies fleeing the Dust Bowl. Casa Grande did not promise them wealth; it was relief. But for the vast majority, Casa Grande offered them housing, amenities, pay, and security superior to any they had ever experienced. It also, at least in theory, offered the sense of purpose and satisfaction that can come with work, and the sense of camaraderie that can come with being part of a team. The FSA hoped these benefits and shared experiences would hold the settlers together despite their lack of a common background and ethos.

Yet, as Banfield notes, an academic who spent a month at Casa Grande in early 1941 said that “the most striking fact about the Casa Grande project is that it seethes with dissatisfaction.” More than three quarters of the settlers were dissatisfied with the project. Why? In some respects, they were comparing their situation against an ideal. They did not like industrial-scale farming: The hours were less flexible and the roles less autonomous than on small farms. The settlers got little real training in the techniques of farming. There was little for teens or young adults to do. Their neighbors made fun of them for taking government aid. And they were still poor. But above all, the settlers simply did not like one another. Casa Grande—like most of FSA’s other collective projects—was riven with factionalism.

ALL THE NEW ENEMIES ARE THE OLD ENEMIES:

The Open Society and Its New Enemies: What Karl Popper’s classic can teach us about the threats facing democracies today. (Matt Johnson, 29 Jan 2025, Quillette)

“In his criticism of democracy, and in his story of the rise of the tyrant,” Popper wrote, “Plato raises implicitly the following question: What if it is the will of the people that they should not rule, but a tyrant instead?” Popper took this “paradox of freedom” seriously, and he didn’t have any illusions about democracy. He recognised that some democratically elected rulers will be demagogic, incompetent, and even authoritarian. In fact, he believed that this outcome ought to be expected in a democracy. This is why he presented a “theory of democratic control” to address this concern: “The theory I have in mind is one which does not proceed, as it were, from a doctrine of the intrinsic goodness or righteousness of a majority rule, but rather from the baseness of tyranny; or more precisely, it rests upon the decision, or upon the adoption of the proposal, to avoid and to resist tyranny.” He continued:

This principle does not imply that we can ever develop institutions of this kind which are faultless or foolproof, or which ensure that the policies adopted by a democratic government will be right or good or wise—or even necessarily better or wiser than the policies adopted by a benevolent tyrant. … What may be said, however, to be implied in the adoption of the democratic principle is the conviction that the acceptance of even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we can work for a peaceful change) is preferable to the submission to a tyranny, however wise or benevolent.


Popper argued that the first responsibility of a democratic system is avoiding bad outcomes—not engineering some prefabricated utopian future. Responsible leaders must confront the “greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.” According to Popper, the primary goal of democratic governments should be to “create, develop, and protect political institutions for the avoidance of tyranny.”

Popper argued that the “one really important thing about democracy” is the “restriction and balance of power.” He observed that democracy “provides an invaluable battleground for any reasonable reform, since it permits reform without violence.” Liberal democracy is a political “battleground” because it is explicitly unconcerned with ultimate ends—it doesn’t exist to lay the foundation for a utopian workers’ state, a racially pure nationalist ethnostate, or any other teleological fantasy. Nor does it exist to save citizens’ souls and shepherd them into some otherworldly utopia in the afterlife. Liberal democracy isn’t meant to give people’s lives meaning—it’s meant to create the conditions that allow diverse citizens to pursue lives of meaning as they see fit, as long as they don’t prevent others from doing so.

“Institutions are like fortresses,” Popper wrote. “They must be well designed and manned.” Democracy is always vulnerable because institutions are only as strong as the people who maintain them. And this maintenance doesn’t always come naturally, as leaders and citizens must set aside their tribal loyalties to respect impersonal rules and norms that privilege the health of democracy over their narrow parochial interests.

The objection of the ethnonationalists–like Donald, Bibi, Orban, Putin, Xi, etc.–is to republican liberty: the idea that every citizen should participate in governance and that every lawadopted should apply to all univeresally, which is the entirety of liberalism. Conservatism seeks to conserve liberalism.

CONSERVATISM SEEKS TO CONSERVE LIBERALISM:

When Scottish Sages Christened “Liberal” (Daniel Klein, 12/10/24, Law & Liberty)

Several Scotsmen, including George Turnbull, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson, had made pregnant remarks using “liberal”—remarks that may have suggested using the adjective to describe a political attitude. But the “liberal” christening was really kicked off by William Robertson in 1769, and in 1776, Adam Smith went all-in, in The Wealth of Nations. The political meaning was, essentially, a policy posture, premised on a stable, functional system of governmental authority. The policy posture is one of leaving people be, of “allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way,” within the bounds of commutative justice. The “liberal” christening took.

Hayek Was Right

In 1960, Hayek questioned the consensus view that “liberal” first obtained a political meaning after 1800 on the Continent, from which Britain then imported the term. Hayek suggested otherwise:

I am more inclined to believe that it derives from the use of the term by Adam Smith in such passages as W.o.N., II, 41: “the liberal system of free exportation and free importation” and p. 216: “allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice.”

Hayek’s view had had little hope of overturning the consensus. Before the digitization of millions of texts, mounting a case for Hayek’s view would mean spending years gathering a few score quotations. Tedious quotations, cherry-picked by one of those Hayek votaries with an axe to grind, from the vast uncharted forests of innumerable texts, could not get far. Such curiosa could easily be ignored and dismissed.

But, around 2012, the data came readily to hand, thanks to the Google Books Ngram Viewer.

LIBERALISM IS UNDEFEATED:

Milei Has Tamed Inflation, but Argentina Still Isn’t Out of the Woods (Bruno Binetti, Dec 6, 2024, World Politics Review)


From the moment he took office last December, Milei wasted no time wielding his proverbial chainsaw, slashing public spending by nearly a third and erasing a fiscal deficit that had exceeded 5 percent of GDP. His reforms included halting budget transfers to provincial governments, dismissing over 30,000 public sector employees, cutting subsidies for public utilities, canceling most public works projects and reducing pensions by around 7 percent.

These drastic measures were effective at cutting public spending, but they came at a cost. A steep devaluation of the peso triggered short-term inflation, with prices surging by 25 percent in December 2023 alone. The economic fallout was severe: In the first six months of Milei’s presidency, an already deep recession worsened; wages lost significant purchasing power; funding for national universities plummeted by 30 percent; and poverty rose to 53 percent, up from 42 percent.

Despite these challenges, Milei’s approval rating remained remarkably stable, reflecting both the public’s disillusionment with traditional political elites and the gravity of the economic crisis he inherited. The chaotic Peronist administration of Milei’s predecessor, former President Alberto Fernandez, left the country teetering on the brink of hyperinflation and economic collapse. Many Argentines viewed Milei as their best hope for salvation, accepting the pain of his adjustment policies as a necessary cost to avoid catastrophe, even as they doubted his assurances that the burden would fall solely on the “political caste.”

In the end, their resilience appears to have been rewarded. Monthly inflation steadily fell from 20 percent in January to just 2.7 percent in October, a remarkable achievement for a nation long haunted by runaway prices. This newfound stability has fueled a modest recovery in real incomes and restored some ability for households and businesses to plan for the future. The gap between official and black-market exchange rates has also narrowed dramatically, from over 200 percent to less than 10 percent. With GDP projected to grow by 5 percent in 2025, Argentina is poised to rank among Latin America’s top-performing economies. Meanwhile, the government expects forthcoming data to confirm a significant drop in poverty, potentially bringing the rate well below 50 percent.

DONALD’S BLACK BART STRATEGY:

America Is Not an Economic Island (Desmond Lachman, November 27, 2024, AEIdeas)

Much as Trump might want America to go it alone behind high tariff walls, the fact of the matter is that the US economy is highly integrated in the world economy. As such, if Trump’s high tariff policy has the effect of tipping the European and Chinese economies into recession and of inviting trade retaliation, those economies troubles might come back to adversely impact both our economy and our financial markets. That could cause serious political trouble for Trump in the 2026 mid-term Congressional election.

One indication of how integrated we are with the rest of the world economy is the fact that exports currently constitute around 11 percent of our economy and a multiple of that number in the agricultural, aerospace, and pharmaceutical industries. Any marked slowing in the global economy or the resort by our foreign trade partners to retaliatory tariffs would be sorely felt in those industries.

Other indications of how interlinked we are with the rest of the world’s economy are the high percentage of the total earnings that our companies derive from abroad and the massive exposure of our financial system to foreign lending. It is estimated that foreign revenues comprise almost 30 percent of the S&P 500’s total revenues. Meanwhile, our banking system has literally trillions of dollars of foreign loans on its books. One only has to recall the shockwaves that the Asian, Russian, and the Eurozone economic crises caused to our financial system to recognize the importance of a healthy world economy for our banking system.

As we were painfully reminded during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, our economy is deeply intertwined with the global supply chain. We rely on imports of key raw materials like rare earth metals for electronics, renewable energy, and defense technologies. In addition, many consumer products, including automobiles, depend on components coming from abroad. This makes our economy highly vulnerable to retaliation by our trade partners in general and China in particular should they choose to withhold key materials or components needed for our production process.

IT’S A LIBERAL WORLD, THE ILLIBERAL JUST LIVE IN IT:

Neoliberalism didn’t Fail and isn’t Dead, Yet (Zachary Karabell, Nov 27, 2024, The Edgy Optimist)

[I]n 1999, when those protestors violently railed against globalization in Seattle, the value of global trade in merchandise was just over $5 trillion dollars. That was on a global GDP of about $30 trillion so trade was about one-sixth of that. In 2023, trade in merchandise was about $24 trillion on a global GDP of just over $100 trillion, making trade about a quarter that. Trade in services, which is hard to measure, is another $6-7 trillion at least, whereas in 1999, services trade was much more modest. While trade has dipped slightly in the past two years, it is now a far greater share of global economic activity than ever before.

Trade patterns are also morphing. It is no longer resource-rich countries selling oil, minerals, and commodities to the developed nations of the West and East Asia. It is now everyone selling something to everyone and everyone buying stuff from everywhere. The arrows used to be simple, with the developed world sending raw materials and the industrial powerhouses, and the U.S. most of all, selling finished goods to the world. Now the lines go from Africa to Asia, from Asia to Latin America, from Latin America to Africa, and Africa to Europe, and Europe to the United States, and the United States to everywhere. Hundreds of lines now link nations, peoples, and companies in unprecedented ways.

In the process of that explosion of commerce, the world became vastly richer, and average incomes across the world rose from about $5000 per person to about $17,000 per person in constant dollars (meaning inflation-adjusted). That tripling of income is directly correlated to trade, and hence to the very neoliberalism currently derided.