HE’S LUCKY HE HAD THE FED:

Voters blamed Biden and Harris for rising costs. Was that fair? We asked economists. (Daniel de Visé, 11/15/24, USA TODAY)

The pandemic shut down much of the global economy in 2020. When the world reopened, consumers found many products running short. Demand outstripped supply, the classic formula for inflation.

“The COVID shutdowns were the biggest, sharpest economic collapse in modern history,” said Joshua Gotbaum, scholar in residence at the center-left Brookings Institution. “And it was followed by the biggest inflation in 40 years.”

In March 2021, President Biden signed a $1.9 trillion stimulus bill, directing payments of up to $1,400 to pandemic-stricken Americans. The Trump administration had already sent two rounds of stimulus checks, in March and December of 2020.

Some economists pilloried Biden at the time, saying the third round of stimulus relief was unnecessary, excessive and likely to overheat the economy. Many more economists say that now.

IT WAS THE BIDEN/HARRIS INFLATION…:

The Threat Trump Poses Is Real, but Democrats Must Learn Through Defeat (Danny Postel, November 6, 2024, New/Lines)

The Democratic Party was in a structurally bad position in 2024. Very bad. As the political scientist John Sides, who has been called “probably the leading authority on campaigns in the United States,” recently pointed out on our podcast, The Lede, “If you were imagining a year in which the Democrats were fighting into some headwinds in terms of [President Joe] Biden’s low popularity, the shadow that inflation may continue to cast in people’s assessments of the economy, it’s easy to see this as a year that would be a comfortable win for the Republicans.” The election was a toss-up only because of Donald Trump’s huge negatives, Sides noted.

..and they nominated Joe and then Kamala.

WELL, THAT’S BORING…:

One election victory does not make a new era in American politics − here’s what history shows (Philip Klinkner, November 14, 2024 , NH Bulletin)

Despite the lessons of this history, a new round of doomsayers are ready to write the Democrats’ obituary in 2024. According to one journalist, “Democrats are a lost party. Come January, they’ll have scant power in the federal government, and shriveling clout in the courts and states.”

The Washington Post reports, “More broadly, many Democrats view their defeat – with Trump making inroads with Latinos, first-time voters, and lower- and middle-income households, according to preliminary exit polls – not just as a series of tactical campaign blunders, but as evidence of a shattered party with a brand in shambles.”

I believe – as the author of a book about how political parties respond to election defeats, and as the example of 2004 shows – it’s easy to overstate the enduring impact of an election. Unforeseen events arise that alter the political landscape in unpredictable ways. The party in power often makes mistakes. New candidates emerge to energize and inspire the defeated party.

Zigging and zagging


The parties themselves are often incapable of figuring out the best way forward.

Following Mitt Romney’s loss in the 2012 presidential election, the Republican National Committee commissioned what it called an “autopsy” to determine how the party should move forward. The report urged Republicans to become more inclusive to women, young people, Asians, Latinos, and gay Americans by softening their tone on immigration and social issues. The report was a thoughtful and thorough examination of the problems confronting the GOP.

Nonetheless, in 2016 Donald Trump took the party in exactly the opposite direction and ended up winning anyway.

I’d be the last person to try to predict the 2028 election, but there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of doom and gloom scenarios for the Democratic Party.

AFPI V. HERITAGE

Trump Loves Her. His Allies Don’t Trust Her. (Ian Ward, 10/25/24, POLITICO)

Among the nationalist-populist wing of the GOP, Rollins and her allies at AFPI are viewed as the rump faction of the old Republican establishment, dedicated to preserving the pre-Trump political orthodoxy that prioritizes free trade, deregulation, business-friendly economic policies and an expansive role for the U.S. on the global stage. During her stint in the Trump White House — which Rollins joined in 2018 as director of the little-known Office of American Innovation before becoming acting director of the Domestic Policy Council in 2020 — Rollins allied herself with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who was widely viewed as the leader of the White House’s more centrist and corporatist faction. With Kushner’s support, Rollins elevated criminal justice reform as a major issue within the Trump White House, putting her at odds with Trump’s more hardline advisers.

“She is a Bush conservative,” said a former Trump administration official, who was granted anonymity to discuss their experience working with Rollins. “She’s an unrepentant H.W. [Bush], Rick Perry [conservative] — that’s her ideology.”

This report is based on information from an extensive review of Rollins’ public statements, dozens of conversations with insiders and a half dozen interviews with people who have worked directly with Rollins — including some of her closest allies — most of whom agreed to be interviewed as long as they were not identified by name because of Rollins’ growing influence. In a written statement, a spokesperson for AFPI declined to comment directly on whether she would accept the chief of staff position and emphasized Rollins’ loyalty to Trump, writing, “In an administration where the weakly committed did not last, Brooke was on the team until the very end of term one.” A spokesperson for the Trump transition responded to a set of questions about Rollins’ role with a generic statement saying that “formal discussions about who will serve in a second Trump Administration is [sic] premature.”

To a degree, AFPI’s plans for a second Trump administration reflect Rollins’ more conventional orientation. Although the group’s policy agenda flicks at Trump-y issues like restricting immigration and “draining the swamp,” the bulk of its policy plans are devoted to traditional Republican priorities like slashing government regulation, extending business-friendly tax cuts and pursuing a foreign policy based around the Reaganite mandate of “peace through strength.” AFPI’s roster of staffers and advisers also reflects Rollins’ more pre-Trump leanings: Kudlow is a self-avowed proponent of free trade who has expressed skepticism about Trump’s more aggressive trade and tariff policies, and Chad Wolf, executive director of AFPI and the former acting director of the Department of Homeland Security under Trump, is viewed by some conservatives as a less effective advocate for immigration restriction than hardline Trump aides like Stephen Miller.

WHAT COMES NEXT?:

PODCAST: Trump’s Triumph (w/ Ian Ward) (Know Your Enemy)

As the reality of Donald Trump’s decisive victory sets in, we wanted to talk to Politico’s Ian Ward, who’s done some of the very best reporting on post-liberal intellectuals, JD Vance, and MAGA-world, in addition to spending time on the campaign trail this fall. After breaking down the results of the presidential election, we discuss Vance’s role in the campaign, his standing with Trump, and friendship with Don Jr.; how the Trump transition is taking shape and who’s likely to influence his decisions at the start of his second term; whether Project 2025 will actually be implemented; if the Republican Party will actually govern in a pro-worker way; and much more!

Really interesting look at the election from the Left, because honest and self-reflective. Some features are a look at how infighting will cripple the Administration again and whether Democrats are destined to become the conservative party because the base is educated, affluent and owns property.

WHEN JOE STEPPED ASIDE THEY NEEDED TO NOMINATE A GOVERNOR:

It’s the economy, stupid: The US election was another reminder of people’s biggest political priority (Elliot Keck, 8 November, 2024, The Critic)

.The Trump campaign placed the Biden-Harris administration’s failed economic record at the centre of its messaging, but looking around the world and indeed looking at home, this approach was far from unique.

This is something that Pat McFadden, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and effectively Starmer’s number two, picked up on in his broadcast round on Thursday morning. When asked for his analysis about the US election, McFadden drew on his own experience as part of the project to “change” the Labour party post-2019 and ultimately win power. As he put it “we had a real focus on living standards and how people felt, and the question ‘are you better off than you were four years ago’… was actually one that we posed during the election.”

That relentless focus on what Labour dubbed a “Tory cost of living crisis” and “Tory tax rises” certainly delivered a decisive victory. And while Conservatives may not want to hear this, the Labour opposition arguably had a more sophisticated and holistic understanding of what a cost of living crisis feels like than the Sunak government.

Whereas Rishi Sunak and Jeremy Hunt twice pulled the lever of tax cuts on pay slips through the two 2p cuts on national insurance and waited for gratitude that never arrived, Labour recognised that actually it wasn’t just in payslips where people felt the impact. It was mortgage costs driven by higher interest rates, rental costs due to the failure to build, inflation driven by the covid spending binge and more, all compounded by the perception of significant government waste and failing public services. Most barely noticed the national insurance cuts.

DONALD GOT TO BE GUS GRISSOM:

The global anti-incumbent backlash doomed Kamala Harris: Tragically, the beneficiary happened to be Donald Trump (Noah Berlatsky, Nov 07, 2024, Public Notice)

Trump’s victory doesn’t seem to have been caused by Democratic ideological divisions, nor by Democratic candidate quality. So what led to these nightmarish results?

In a recent op-ed for the New York Times, Matthew Yglesias pointed out that this has been a brutal time for all incumbent parties across the world. Japan’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party had one of its worst elections in its very long career on October 27. Austria’s People’s Party lost 20 of 71 seats in Parliament in late September. Over the summer, Britain’s Tories were crushed by Labour in an unprecedented landslide, while France’s centrist coalition scrambled as it lost a third of its seats. The Canadian incumbent Liberal party looks in serious trouble for elections next year, too.

As Yglesias says, there’s no one ideological throughline here; parties of the left, right, and center alike have struggled as voters blame them for the dislocations caused by covid. These included shutdowns and recession initially, but lingered with supply chain issues and a global spike in inflation.

Biden’s economic stewardship was among the best in the world; the US has had 27 consecutive months of inflation below four percent, and inflation is currently at its lowest in years. But the anger at inflation and economic dislocation post-covid lingers. In exit polls, 72 percent of respondents said they were angry or dissatisfied with the country’s direction.

Those are brutal numbers — so brutal that you’d usually expect them to result in a landslide victory for the out party. Instead, Democrats almost fought to a draw in the presidency, hung on to many close seats despite a brutal Senate map, and may even have picked up seats in the House.

The pooch was unscrewable.

AT LEAST PRETEND THERE’S A STRUGGLE…:

The Fox vs. the Hedgehog (Jonah Goldberg, November 1, 2024, The Dispatch)

A quick refresher: The basic gist of Fukuyama’s argument is that liberal democracy is the best and final answer to both the “social question” and the “political question” as 19th century thinkers put it (lengthy explainer here). The long dialectal, often bloody, contest over various forms of government—monarchy, authoritarianism, fascism, communism, liberal democracy, etc.—has been settled, and liberal democracy won. Fukuyama used the term “history” in a very specialized, Hegel-drenched, way. He didn’t argue that the clock would stop and events would no longer happen. From the Hegelian perspective, the “end of history,” Fukuyama explained, “did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end, that important events would no longer happen, or that newspapers reporting them would cease to be published. It meant, rather, that there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled.” For Marx—the quintessential hedgehog—history would end with the withering away of the state and everyone living in perfect communism. For Hegel, it would be the liberal state. […]

Anyway, one of the great, prescient insights in The End of History is that liberal democracy cultivates a kind of “boredom” that causes people to want to overthrow it. “Experience suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause because that just cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle against the just cause,” Fukuyama wrote. “They will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in other words, out of a certain boredom: for they cannot imagine living in a world without struggle. And if the greater part of the world in which they live is characterized by peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle against that peace and prosperity, and against democracy.”

And there you have all the explanation you need for the post-liberal, neoreactionary, “Do you know what time it is?” right. Ditto all of the post-liberal, anti-Enlightenment, critical theorists and neo-Marxists of the left. And let’s not forget the deracinated and alienated goobers who signed up to join ISIS or the trustafarian jabroneys and grad students who simp for Hamas. It’s not monocausal, of course. But, you get my point. As I’ve said before, boredom kills.

But where does the boredom come from? “Tocqueville explained that when the differences between social classes or groups are great and supported by long-standing tradition, people become resigned or accepting of them,” Fukuyama wrote. “But when society is mobile and groups pull closer to one another, people become more acutely aware and resentful of the remaining differences.”

The narcissism of small differences is one of the great drivers of human conflict. From college faculty fights to intramural libertarian fights, to the Russia-Ukraine war, groups that are very similar often have the nastiest conflicts. There’s something about people sharing most of the same cultural, religious, and political assumptions that makes the remaining disagreements seem wildly more important than they should be. Huge differences between cultures don’t bother people the same way as small ones because the big differences aren’t threatening. European Catholics weren’t all that outraged by Confucianism, Hinduism, or Shintoism, but man, Protestants got under their skin. Why? Because Protestantism was a threat to the way Catholics defined themselves, and vice versa. You fight enemies, you hate traitors. You try to convert pagans, you punish or exterminate apostates and heretics (vast swaths of antisemitism in various eras can be chalked up to this dynamic). You see this everywhere in politics. The hard left hates “neoliberal” moderates far more than they hate conservatives, even though they agree on so much more. If the Trumpified corners of the Christian right hates anybody more than they hate David French—pro-life, devout, Christian, David French—I don’t know who that person is.

Given that a President Kamala would likely be constrained by a GOP Congress, she should offer two fake existential crises that they could work on together: establishing control over the border and the budget. Summon all Americans with a vision of sacrifice to get the government’s economic house in order and make believe we’ll be enduring major sacrifices. Recall that when Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich managed it both sides were able to take credit and government t seemed to be working.

DISTAFF OBAMA:

What the Right Gets Wrong About Kamala Harris (Jill Lawrence, Oct 08, 2024, The Bulwark)

No one can predict exactly what kind of president Harris would be, but she has shown many signs that it would be nothing like what these prematurely disappointed conservatives anticipate. Their judgments about her seem based largely on geography (she’s from San Francisco) and on her first run for the presidency five years ago—a ten-month presidential primary campaign in a field of nearly thirty major candidates.

When Harris entered the 2020 race on Martin Luther King Day, January 21, 2019, the New York Times reported that liberals were skeptical about her. She ended her bid in December of that year. “Sen. Kamala Harris of California never settled on an overarching narrative and rationale for her candidacy that encompassed her life, her record and her plans. And she mismanaged her campaign,” I wrote in a March 2020 assessment of the many dropouts.

As a career prosecutor, gun owner and “top cop” of the nation’s largest state, Harris could have tried to carve out a moderate lane. Instead, she competed for progressive votes against a crush of progressive hopefuls, including Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, former Reps. Beto O’Rourke and Tulsi Gabbard, then-Washington Gov. Jay Inslee, and former housing secretary Julián Castro.

Fair or unfair, both the right and the left judge her by the climate, energy, and health care positions she took in 2019—positions she left behind a few months later when she became Joe Biden’s running mate. Since then, she’s been what I’d call a solidly center-left politician, by all appearances very much like Biden in her policy preferences and her openness to bipartisan compromise.

Is she a socialist, or even a progressive? Not even close. She calls herself a capitalist, she’s courting Wall Street, and she would increase the $5,000 tax deduction for business startups to $50,000. She has welcomed support from Republicans like Liz Cheney and Dick Cheney, the former defense secretary and vice president, and has said she’d put a Republican in her cabinet. Harris has also pledged to make sure that “America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world” (a convention speech line that some in her family did not appear to love).