Orrin Judd

COPING:

Cognitive dissonance helps explain why Trump supporters remain loyal, new research suggests (Eric W. Dolan, April 11, 2026, PsyPost)

A third study took place in October 2022, just after Trump was arraigned for his involvement in the January 6 Capitol attack. The scientists recruited 187 participants who had voted for Trump in the 2020 election. These individuals read an article summarizing the public hearings regarding the events of January 6.

After reading the summary, participants answered questions about how accurate they felt the information was and whether it made them feel bothered or uncomfortable. This step allowed the researchers to measure the actual emotional discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance. Participants then wrote open-ended responses explaining how they reconciled their support with reports of illegal election interference.

The results from the third study echoed the earlier findings, though participants relied even more heavily on disbelief. Over 60 percent of the respondents claimed the accusations regarding election interference and the Capitol attack were false. A small minority of participants, about 13 percent, noted that they had supported Trump in the past but no longer did so after learning about his actions.

The researchers found a positive association between feeling bothered by the news article and expressing disbelief in the allegations. Participants who experienced higher levels of mental discomfort were more likely to claim the accusations were fabricated. This suggests that the denial is not just a calm rejection of information, but rather a direct response to the psychological distress of cognitive dissonance.

From a psychological perspective, these responses represent novel ways to reduce mental friction. For instance, arguing that a politician’s personal life does not matter is a way of conceptually separating, or compartmentalizing, conflicting pieces of information. By making the personal misconduct seem completely irrelevant to political leadership, individuals can successfully eliminate their mental tension.

AT THE CENTER OF THE eND OF hISTORY:

PODCAST: Recovering the lost genius of liberalism, with Adrian Wooldridge (Geoff Kabaservice, 4/13/26, The Vital Center)

Adrian Wooldridge:

I think the primary thing that really defines liberalism is three things: one, individualism; second, tolerance; and three, a skepticism and worry about power. By individualism, I mean that the world starts with the individual and works upwards to the collective — the opposite of high Tory views and the opposite of socialist views. And by “the individual,” I don’t mean the notion of just allowing people the freedom to go shopping and to choose whatever they want in a free market. I think liberal individualism is a much richer and more profound philosophy than that. It’s about being our best selves. It’s about self-improvement, self-control, self-development. The essence of liberalism was to do with self-help, self-improvement, self-education. It’s a very questing, striving sort of notion of individualism.

Secondly, tolerance, that you must be tolerant of other people’s opinions. And the reason for that… It might sound like a nice thing to be, but the reason for that is a philosophy of knowledge: that we don’t know what is true, and we definitely don’t have the right to impose our theological views on other people. So the right thing to do is to be tolerant, is to be skeptical, is to be pluralistic about different knowledge claims.

And thirdly, and in some ways most importantly, is worry about power. If you’re a liberal, you’re saying that power is in itself a dangerous thing. It needs to be constrained, it needs to be disciplined, it needs to be governed by rules.

And so I think those are the three things. So you can have big state government; you can have a big-state liberalism, small-state liberalism. You can have nice liberalism, you can have tough liberalism. But you can’t have a liberalism that believes in strongmen, that believes in imposing religious beliefs on other people, and that believes that collectives matter more than individual self-development.

The genius though, is the way liberalism vindicates these concerns via republican liberty: so long as laws/rules are adopted in particapatory fashion and apply universally, we are all equally tolerated/free.

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?:

The Multipolarity Trap: How a KGB talking point became a staple of American right-wing discourse (Park MacDougald, April 07, 2026, Tablet)

At the time, this struck us as a strange argument to make at a nominally “America First” conference. Multipolarity, after all, was originally conceived by the Russian intelligence services as a tool to weaken the West. It was first formulated by Yevgeny Primakov, a KGB Arabist who served as foreign minister under Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and has since been popularized internationally by the state-backed Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin. In essence, multipolarity opposes “unipolar” U.S. dominance in favor of an arrangement in which Russia and its allies, China and Iran, are granted freedom of action in their respective “spheres of influence.” Over time, the idea has worked its way into the propaganda of China and Iran and the arguments of their Western sympathizers.


While phrased as an essentially defensive arrangement against American “globalism,” multipolarity is, in practice, a strategy for Communist-Islamist world domination. U.S. grand strategy since World War II is premised on the idea of “forward defense” in the Eurasian rimland, which runs from continental Europe to the Middle East and on to coastal Asia, and which is home to most of the world’s people and economic activity. Without control of the rimland, presently secured by the combination of U.S. naval power and Washington’s system of alliances, the United States would become a second-tier “hemispheric” power. For elements of the isolationist right, the appeal of being a “hemispheric” power in a “multipolar” world is no doubt that it would rule out further U.S. military entanglements in far-flung locations while allowing us to shed the costs of maintaining our “empire.” But exchanging lucrative economic and defense partnerships with Europe, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel for stronger relations with El Salvador and Peru is hardly a recipe for increasing American military power or national wealth. Instead, it would be the greatest self-own in the history of geopolitics—a recipe for making America radically poorer and less secure, and therefore subject to the dictates of more powerful countries like China. Which one suspects is the point.

In reality, it’s an ever more unipolar world.

THE RIGHT’S “METOO!”:

Identity Politics Is a Problem for Conservative Christians Too (George Yancey, 4/12/26, The Dispatch)_

Progressive identity politics led to the rise of movements such as MeToo and Black Lives Matter, which were more successful political endeavors than outright Marxism. Conservative political activists became aware of this relative success; consequently, it was unsurprising that Republicans such as Donald Trump tapped into some dynamics of progressive political identity to create their own form of identity politics. Whereas the left had defined racial minorities, sexual minorities, and women as oppressed groups for those promoting progressive identity politics, the right defined whites, men, and Christians as oppressed groups for those promoting conservative identity politics.

Now we have the rise of Christian identity politics. While conservative Christian activism erupted in the 1970s and has remained active, the early version of Christian identity politics did not focus on the notion of Christians as victims. Instead, it focused on implementing Christian values in the issues of abortion and sexuality. But more recently, some conservative Christians have focused on the idea of Christians as an oppressed group. Though it may seem counterintuitive, conservative Christians are not especially likely to be politically active. Indeed, they tend to lag behind the nonreligious and progressive Christians in the degree to which they participate in political activity. But some of those who have become very politically active have tapped into their own version of identity politics to motivate their political activism.

THE FUTURE ALWAYS HAPPENS FASTER THAN EXPECTED:

Quantum computers to break our codes faster than expected (Craig Costello, April 13, 2026, Asia Times)


The changes are coming on two fronts. On one, tech giants such as IBM and Google are racing to build ever-larger quantum computers: IBM hopes to achieve a genuine advantage over classical computers in some special cases this year, and an even more powerful “fault-tolerant” system by 2029.

On the other front, theorists are refining quantum algorithms: recent work shows the resources needed to break today’s cryptography may be far lower than earlier estimates.

The net result? The day quantum computers can break widely used cryptography – portentously dubbed “Q Day” – may be approaching faster than expected.

NO IMAGO DEI? NO LIBERALISM:

Democratic Divinity: Perhaps the most important image in American literature (Aidan Fitzsimons, Dec 24, 2025, The Renovator)

In this moment, Walt reinvents the core image of all Western art— the classic golden halo around holy Christian figures like Jesus, Mary, and the saints. But now, instead of a static halo, it’s a changing, dynamic, modernistic halo. And now, instead of a halo reserved for saints, this dynamic halo diverges “from any one’s head.” It’s the ultimate image of the inherent divinity of all individuals. This is a liberal-democratic divinity: liberal because it celebrates the single individual as a sacred, essential center of freely divergent creation; democratic because that divinity emanates from any one’s head.

PROJECT 2026:

How to Defeat a Very Trumpy Authoritarian Leader: “Hungarians would vote for a goat…if it was running against Orbán.” (Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, April 10, 2026, Mother Jones)

But why the outsized attention to an election in a Central European country of fewer than 10 million people? Well, because Orbán’s singular brand of pugnacious Christian nationalism and the implications of his rule have extended far beyond the fate of this nation and its 62-year-old leader. Orban is one of the most successful populist strongmen of the 21st century. He has successfully curried favor with both President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has antagonized the EU by systematically undermining civil society in Hungary, channelling some of its generous largesse to enrich himself and his cronies, and blocking essential funding for Ukraine. With no evidence whatsoever, he insists that “Brussels is pushing us into war,” accusing the EU and anyone within earshot of attempting to drag Hungary into the conflict in Ukraine and, perforce, with Russia.

Whatever the geopolitical ramifications—or implications for right-wing populism and America’s MAGA movement—for Hungarians, this election is existential, and exhausting. A pervasive sense of anxiety permeates conversations in social media and within families, and even casual interactions are charged. Hungarians have faced the complete Fidesz takeover of traditional media channels, and turned to Facebook and alternative media channels, which are abuzz with conversation, debate, and sharing of insights—or the latest Fidesz outrage. A friend in Budapest hinted darkly at a national curfew after the election, and one of my Hungarian cousins said her hairstylist was so spent that he planned to take Monday off to recover—as did her husband.

For many Americans, of course, Orbán’s Hungary is a miniature version of Trump’s US—indeed, in some ways, it may have served as a role model for MAGA in its crusade to dismantle democratic institutions and crucial elements of civil society. When Trump first ran for election in 2016, Orbán had already “built the wall”—in his case, an electrified razor wire fence constructed by prisoners—on Hungary’s southern border, attempting to staunch the flow of Syrian refugees who, to be sure, were more likely to use Hungary as a transit point than a final destination. This also allowed Orbán to declare a “state of emergency,” which has not been lifted since. Sound familiar?

In quashing dissent, extravagantly rewarding his allies, enriching himself and his family, despairing over the dilution of the purity of the Hungarian blood line, marginalizing and oppressing the LGBTQ community—well, it’s all there really. The Orbán playbook is channeled in various ways by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, the right-wing blueprint for Trump’s second term. So understanding how the Fidesz machine might be defeated could hold some lessons for MAGA’s foes.

Depending, of course, on what happens on Sunday. Because this election might conceivably serve as a blueprint for tampering with a free and fair balloting process, or how an autocrat will challenge its results. Election laws have been altered by Fidesz to gerrymander voting districts and reduce Parliamentary seats, all in their favor. (Sound familiar?)

In cities like Budapest, or even college towns, the level of engagement and rejection of Fidesz is unambivalent, but less-educated and provincial Hungarians in the eastern part of the country remain rock solid on team Orbán. I asked Csaba Pleh, a professor of cognitive science at the Central European University, if he was concerned about election meddling. “I do not agree with those voices that claim that Orbán will create disturbances or postpone the elections,” he said. “To be cynical, I feel that his entourage is too busy securing their money. They do not have the strength or the time to try to disrupt the elections.”

LIES OUR TEACHERS TOLD US:

When Baseball Threw Physics a Curve: Sports, science, and collective delusion. (Brad Bolman, 10.22.25, Pioneer Works)


The first curveball is generally credited to William Arthur Cummings, a star of mid-nineteenth-century baseball, who earned the nickname “Candy” for his sweet mastery of the craft. Using an underhanded motion, Cummings twisted his hand as he released the ball, producing an initially straight pitch that curved away to the side as it reached home plate. He claimed his inspiration was the spiraling motion of tossed clamshells. In September 1875, his “peculiar inside-curving ball” was noted in coverage of a game between the professional squad from Hartford, Connecticut, that Cummings played for and an amateur team from Ludlow, Massachusetts. (The amateurs still won the game, the early equivalent of a local rec team defeating the Yankees.)

As other pitchers began to integrate Candy’s technique, newspaper discussion of “curved ball” pitching spread across the eastern U.S. In 1877, the Evansville Daily Courier of Indiana hailed a new local hurler who pitched “the popular ‘curved’ ball so swiftly that no one in the club was able to strike the balls.” After years of batters’ domination, curving balls rebalanced the scales back in the pitchers’ favor. Within a decade, the curveball was heralded as a revolution—“the greatest change ever introduced into the game,” according to an account from 1883, around the same time that Candy considered retiring to become a house painter.

How the curve worked, however, was initially a mystery. “Please tell me what a curved ball is in playing base-ball,” asked one Cincinnati Enquirer reader in May 1876. That August, another inquired, “What is meant by a curved ball—is it a pitch or an underhand throw, how does it curve, and can you explain how it is done, how the ball is held, etc.?” The curveball was, in the first place, a tactical curiosity for passionate fans and aspiring players. With many men eager to make a nickel on the new national pastime, mastering the pitch promised upward mobility. Yet as the Enquirer’s answers made clear, its exact mechanics were elusive: “A curved ball is one which leaves the hand in a straight line and just before it reaches the home plate suddenly curves out toward the end of the bat…. by a twist or twirl of the ball that can not well be described.” Commonality did not initially mean common understanding.

Originally an art to be mastered, the great curveballers were labeled “artists” for decades. But over time, the pragmatic matter of how to throw a curveball became a scientific problem: Was it even possible to do so? Spectators, after all, had witnessed balls that appeared to contradict the laws of motion. That all this might simply be trickery of the eye accorded with a widespread wariness in the late nineteenth century about fraud and deception. Newspapers of the era abounded with accounts of sleight-of-hand subterfuge: “Pepper’s ghost,” for instance, in which reflective glass panes made an off-stage ghost appear to float before theater audiences, wowed crowds from London to New Orleans. Magic was often just a trick of the eye.

“Why does a ball ‘curve?’” asked Columbus Ohio’s Dispatch in July 1876. Here was a question “our scientific heads can spend a deal of brain power in solution of.” While it was widely accepted that the “laws of motion” made a curving pitch impossible, the Dispatch conceded “it is a fact … that there is such a thing as curved balls. Every base-ballist knows it.” The everyday know-how of players seemed to trump the public understanding of science. Could it be, as one popular theory proposed, that the force of air against the ball slowed one rotating side more than the other and produced a curving motion? The Dispatch granted that “the thinking men among us may ferret out something more probable.” Debates continued: In July 1877, “several young men” wrote the Minneapolis Tribune that they were fully divided on whether it was possible to throw a curving ball. In September, a writer asked the Chicago Inter-Ocean to “Explain the philosophy that governs the curved ball as thrown by some of the professional baseball players of the United States, or as curved on a billiard table by scientific players.” People wanted not just to behold or even throw the curve themselves, but to understand how it could be possible in the first place.

Wildlife trade increases transmission of pathogens to humans by 50%: Study: Researchers analyzed the wildlife import-export data along with a compilation of host-pathogen relationships. (Maria Mocerino, Apr 12, 2026, Interesting Engineering)

Researchers from Yale, the University of Maryland, and Idaho investigated host-pathogen relationships and found, stunningly, that wild mammals are 1.5 times more likely to share infectious agents with humans. Illegal dealings even increase these adverse interactions.

“It is important to understand that the probability of being infected by playing a piano with ivory keys or wearing fur is almost nonexistent,” explains Jérôme Gippet, first author of the study. “The problem lies at the beginning of the chain: someone had to hunt the animal, skin it, transport it…”

Belief in the lab leak is just Sinophobia.

TRUMPISM IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO LIBERALISM:

Hungary: Orban’s ouster heralds thaw in EU ties (Timothy Jones, 4/13/26, AP, AFP, Reuters)


Hungarian voters turned out in force on Sunday to deliver a landslide victory to pro-European candidate Peter Magyar, who has pledged to turn the country away from its far-right, authoritarian course under Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Magyar’s center-right Tisza party is set to gain 138 seats in Hungary’s 199-seat parliament, giving it five seats more than the two-thirds needed to push through the reforms the 45-year-old former Orban loyalist promised on the campaign trail.