2025

MAGA ROOTS FOR THE RED SKULL:

Superman vs. the KKK: Hear the 1946 Superman Radio Show That Weakened the Klan (Open Culture, March 28th, 2025)

The year is 1946. World War II has come to an end. And now membership in the Ku Klux Klan starts to rise again. Enter Stetson Kennedy, a human rights activist, who manages to infiltrate the KKK and then figures out an ingenious way to take them down. He contacts the producers of the popular Adventures of Superman radio show, and pitches them on a new storyline: Superman meets and defeats the KKK. Needing a new enemy to vanquish, the producers greenlight the idea.

The 16-episode series, “The Clan of the Fiery Cross,” aired in June 1946 and effectively chipped away at the Klan’s mystique, gradually revealing their secret codewords and rituals. Listen to the episodes above.

I’M OLD ENOUGH…:

US students to 3D print hypersonic vehicles with Mach 5 speed for military might (Prabhat Ranjan Mishra, 3/26/25, Interesting Engineering)

The U.S. Army has approved a fresh $3.1 million funding to make hypersonic vehicles faster and more affordable.

A team at the University of Arizona College of Engineering is exploring the use of multiple metallic alloys and additive manufacturing to enable fabrication of Mach-X – pronounced mock-ex – aerospace technologies as part of a federal governmental push.

The team, led by Sammy Tin, revealed that the Mach-X vehicles will travel at speeds faster than Mach 5, which is five times the speed of sound and the hypersonic threshold.

…to remember when we’d only ever be able to print shower curtain rings…

THE WHOLE POINT OF DARWINISM…:

In Genetics, a Tense Coexistence of Mainstream and Fringe Views (Ashley Smart, 03.26.2025, UnDark)


In the summer of 2022, Abdel Abdellaoui was set to give a keynote at the annual conference of the International Society for Intelligence Research. But when he learned he’d be sharing a speaker roster with Emil Kirkegaard, Abdellaoui announced on Twitter that he was cancelling his lecture.

Kirkegaard is perhaps best known for his provocative writing on genetics and race. On his blog, he has asserted that Black Americans are less honest and less intelligent than their White counterparts; that affirmative action produces Black and Hispanic doctors who kill people with their incompetence; that Africans are excessively predisposed to violence; and that the hereditarian hypothesis of intelligence — roughly, the idea that races or ancestry groups differ in average intelligence in ways that are substantially attributable to genetics — is “almost certainly true.”

UNLEASHED
Living in the Age of Risky Science: An Undark Special Series.

At the time of the 2022 conference, “this guy was having a bad influence with the crap he was spreading, and the way he behaved online, and he was giving our scientific field a bad name,” recalled Abdellaoui, a geneticist working in the Department of Psychiatry at Amsterdam University Medical Center whose research interests include the genetics of intelligence. Abdellaoui noted in a post on Medium that Kirkegaard had never been part of any credible research program or Ph.D. program, and had a reputation for publishing sloppy scientific work in dubious journals. “I just didn’t want to be associated with that, and I wanted to have that be clear — that he’s not on my team and I’m not on his.” (Kirkegaard did not respond to multiple email requests for an interview for this story.)

Shortly after Abdellaoui announced his withdrawal, he learned that Kirkegaard was scratched from the speaker lineup, and Abdellaoui decided to give the keynote after all. Yet just two years later, Kirkegaard would be back at the ISIR conference podium — a podium that has served as a platform for Kirkegaard and other proponents of the hereditarian hypothesis since long before Abdellaoui’s threatened boycott. Their presence at ISIR, alongside psychologists and geneticists from many of the world’s top research institutions, underscores a complicated reality in this fraught field of study: When it comes to the genetics of intelligence, the line between mainstream and fringe can be hard to pin down, and the work of the former can intertwine with that of the latter in ways that are difficult to disentangle.

…was to justify the Empire by showing “others” inferior.

THE ANGLOSPHERIC DIFFERENCE:

David Hume’s Stark Warning: Reason Serves Passion (Barry Brownstein, March 25, 2025, The Daily Economy)

For those who believe reason governs them, further consideration of Hume’s philosophy exposes their arrogance.

“Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life,” Hume wrote in his Treatise, than to claim the “pre-eminence of reason above passion.”

By passions, Hume means our predispositions, charged thinking, and emotions generated by beliefs of which we are often unaware. Hume argues, “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition.” He adds, “I infer, that the same faculty [reason] is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion.”

Hume argues our “passions” come first, and then we use “reason” to justify what our emotions have decided. We think reason drives our decision-making bus, but reason is often only a passenger.

The notion of Reason is a conceit.

COLLEGES ARE HOTBEDS OF CONSERVATISM (profanity alert):

The Corporate Raid on Campus: Finance industry recruiters are starving critical fields of talent and steering an entire generation into soulless jobs. (Zach Marcus, March 23, 2025, Washington Monthly)


Like many incoming freshmen, Audrey arrived at Middlebury College without a clear plan for her future. “I knew pretty much nothing about finance,” she admitted. “I watched Succession.” But she was certain about one thing: securing a successful, well-paying career during college was nonnegotiable. After attending a high school with an “extreme amount of wealth” and now navigating a similarly privileged environment at Middlebury as a student on financial aid, she felt constantly reminded, “S[***], I need to make money.”

Although she had previously explored opportunities in public law—volunteering at a free legal center where she simplified legal documents to make them accessible for young people and interning at a court—at college it was hard to resist the pull of the finance recruiting machine. Jokingly dubbed the “Middlebury Mafia,” the school’s finance network is vast and the on-campus recruiting is intensive: newsletters, information sessions, networking breakfasts, and even curated trips to New York City, where students meet Middlebury finance alumni and get a taste of their world (parties included). “I signed up for all the career center materials, but finance was the only thing I saw,” Audrey told me.

One side effect of the high cost of elite schools is that the kids come from elite families so they’re focussed on a high paying career, not activism.

DITTO PLANETS:

Between Subjectivity and Science: Rethinking Objectivity in Wine Tasting (Dwight Furrow, March 23, 2025, 3Quarks)

The notion of objectivity, as it was forged in the smithy of modern science, is a curious thing. It assumes the world is composed only of discrete entities endowed with properties that exist independently of how they are observed. This account of objectivity works reasonably well when applied to the movement of planets or an analysis of the chemical constituents of wine but falters with phenomena whose existence depends on being perceived. The taste or smell of a wine is not given in isolation but unfolds as an interplay between the liquid, our sensory mechanisms, and the mind.

When we taste wine, we don’t taste attributes that are patiently waiting to be discovered. We participate in a process in which a wine’s latent capacities are coaxed into sensory actualizations. To capture this process, we need an ontology not of discrete entities but of dispositions that exist in the wine, in the taster, and within the environment in which tasting takes place.

A disposition is a capacity or tendency for something to behave in a certain way under specific conditions. Dispositions are unlike categorical properties, which describe what something is like independently of any conditions. Unlike static entities, dispositions exist in a state of readiness, awaiting the right conditions for them to be revealed. A glass is fragile even as it sits safely on the table. A good Pinot Noir is aromatic even as it rests in the unopened bottle. Acidity is not simply a measurement of ph; it’s a latent tendency to soften or sharpen depending on such factors as temperature, aeration, or the molecular interplay with the taster’s saliva. Tannins in a wine can be objectively measured. But that is only one dimension of them. They are relational potentials that can be described as astringent only when proteins and polyphenols interact in the mouth. A dispositional ontology grants that wine has real objective properties but also asserts that among those real properties are relational, dispositional properties that are actualized only when particular environmental, physiological, and cultural conditions converge.

It’s dispositions all the way down.

IDEOLOGY UBER ALLES:

The “Nietzsche Thesis”: Why we don’t really care about truth (Jonny Thomson, 3/22/25, Big Think)

There are two strands to the argument for epistemic vigilance. The first is that adults are constantly calibrating how reliable we consider others to be. We tend to be a “truth default” species, which means we assume most people at least start out as being honest. Over time, if someone tells a lie or gets something wrong, we calibrate our epistemic vigilance. We say, “Okay, Alex clearly knows nothing about soccer, so I’m not going to ask him again.”

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The second observation is that children learn very early whom to trust or not trust. The psychologist Pascal Boyer observed that infants “seem to be sensitive to the difference between expert and novice agents. Later, toddlers use cues of competence to judge different individuals’ utterances, and mistrust those who have been wrong in previous instances, or those who seem determined to exploit others.”

The argument therefore goes that humans are born with a certain skill or vigilance for seeking truth over falsity. We have epistemic vigilance. […]

So, we are left with two facts. We are vigilant about what people are saying, but our vigilance is not based on epistemic grounds. So, what kind of vigilance is it?

For that, Shieber coined the expression “The Nietzsche Thesis.” He argues that “our goal in conversation is not primarily to acquire truthful information… [but] self-presentation.” In other words, we accept or reject statements based on utilitarian goals, not on their truthfulness. In Nietzsche’s words, we will accept and look for truth only when it has “pleasant, life-preserving consequences.” Conversely, we are hostile “to potentially harmful and destructive truths.” We do not have epistemic vigilance, but a Machiavellian one.

There is one important observation about modern society that might lend credence to Shiber’s ideas: the popularity of conspiracy theories and echo-chamber nonsense. If epistemic vigilance were true, we would all be fact-checking and dismissing conspiracists all the time. But we don’t.

The heck with truth, just confirm my prejudices!

A RACE OR A RELIGION?:

Kahane’s ghost: how a long-dead extremist rabbi continues to haunt Israel’s politics (Joshua Leifer, 20 Mar 2025, The Guardian

Kahane’s political career was marked by failure. Throughout his life he appeared to most Israelis to be a grotesque US import. His relentless demagogic campaign to expel the Palestinians won him notoriety and a small cadre of fanatical followers. Yet he never enjoyed the mainstream acceptance that he believed he had been promised by providence. Since childhood he had dreamed of becoming Israel’s prime minister. Instead he became the leader of a movement shunned across the political spectrum. In his multiple attempts to enter the Knesset, he succeeded only once, in 1984, before Kach was barred from electoral politics. At the time he was assassinated, his movement was on the verge of collapse, starved for funds, beset by infighting and hounded by authorities in the US. Kahane and Kahanism, the ideology to which he gave his name, seemed destined for historical obscurity.

But Kahanism did not die. It survived – not in its fully fledged theocratic form, but as an ultranationalist vision of a land and body politic purged of a non-Jewish presence. The germ of Kahanism persisted because the conditions that produced it did not go away. To the contrary, they grew more dire. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza became ever more entrenched, its maintenance more brutal and deadly. In the 1970s and 80s, Kahane had drawn much of his support from the disfranchised, predominantly Mizrahi working class and portrayed his movement as a populist revolt against Israel’s secular, progressive Ashkenazi elite. In the 21st century, as the uneven gains of capitalist globalisation and the country’s hi-tech boom deepened inequality, Kahanism reemerged to provide the grammar for a reinvigorated rightwing class war. In the wake of the suicide bombings of the second intifada, Kahanism was also buoyed up by an increasingly widespread radical pessimism: that Israel is doomed to war, that this war is zero sum, and that it can end only through a total, eschatological victory – that ultimately, as Kahane was fond of saying: “It is either they or we.”

For more than 30 years, Israel’s political system maintained a cordon sanitaire that largely succeeded in excluding Kahanist parties from mainstream politics and parliament. But in the late 2010s, this cordon sanitaire fell. Against the backdrop of successive wars in Gaza, veteran Kahanist militants with thick criminal rap sheets began to appear on primetime television. Ideas that were once taboo became commonplace. Vulgar anti-Arab racism became an easy way to generate attention on TV and social media. Support for the expulsion of Palestinians ceased to be a fringe proposal and became a routine part of political debate. By 2022, thanks to the intervention of the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, parties that had until recently been deemed too dangerous to participate in elections now formed part of the coalition government. Itamar Ben-Gvir, a lifelong Kahanist agitator and convicted criminal, became national security minister, responsible for overseeing the police.

Since 7 October 2023, Kahanism has become mainstream. It is the political style that relishes the dehumanisation of Palestinians. It is the ethos according to which Jewish lives are seen as more valuable than all others. It is the ideology behind the normalisation of population transfer and ethnic cleansing. Netanyahu’s Likud has undergone a process of near total Kahanisation, to say nothing of the settler right.

In a January 2025 op-ed for the liberal daily Haaretz, the veteran Israeli journalist Gideon Levy described what had ensued since 7 October as the country’s first Kahanist war. “Almost everything about it was meant to appease the fascist, racist, population-transferist far right,” Levy wrote. “The spirit of Kahanism seized control over its goals and content.” Indeed, over the past year and a half it has often seemed as if Kahane’s malignant, vengeful ghost had been suddenly reanimated, manifest in the chorus calling to wipe Gaza off the map; in the images of grinning troops standing over white-hooded detainees, kneeling, hands zip-tied behind their backs; in the videos of uniformed men dancing with flags and Torah scrolls in the cratered landscape of the strip; in the line “Kahane was right” graffitied above scorched doorways.

Thirty years ago, Kahane was the name of a man who most thought would be forgotten. Today, Kahanism is the governing coalition’s operational ideology.

The same specter haunts Christian andf Hindu Nationalists.

IT WAS NEVER MORE THAN A CULT:

The Social Turn: Psychoanalysis at an inflection point (Maggie Doherty, April 2025, Harpers)

[I] was in New York mainly to investigate rumors I’d heard about major changes afoot in the American psychoanalytic community. Psychoanalysis, I’d heard, was modernizing. APsA was opening up to the broader world. There was a push to bring in new members, as well as a rising tide of psychoanalytic work that sought to make analysis more accessible to and effective for people of different stripes. I wanted to understand what these changes meant for clinicians and patients and whether they were being resisted. What would it take for psychoanalysis to change?

APsA may have an iron hold on the profession, but it has a small fist, I thought, as I counted the people milling about on the hotel’s second floor. It was Thursday, the convention’s third day but only the first with a full slate of panels and discussions, and there were perhaps fifty people present before the afternoon sessions. The crowd seemed old, strikingly so; I saw a lot of gray hair and sensible shoes and the kind of funky jewelry worn by women of a certain age. According to their name tags, many attendees hailed from a few coastal cities: Boston, San Francisco, New York. Almost every person I saw was white. There was a small book exhibit next to a poster display that reminded me of a high school science fair. Representatives from the mental-health treatment center Austen Riggs, advertising in-patient treatment in the Berkshires (more than $70,000 for six weeks), had set up shop just a few steps away.

The sleepy atmosphere, the sparse crowd: it was hard to believe that psychoanalysis had once been central to American culture. From the aftermath of World War II through the mid-Sixties, analysis was seen as a reliable treatment for mental illness. Psychoanalysts sat on the boards of medical schools and chaired departments of psychiatry. Psychoanalytic researchers received government funding. A rosy portrait of the psychoanalyst appeared in the press; journalists themselves entered treatment. The historian Nathan G. Hale Jr. calls this time the golden age of psychoanalysis.

But the golden age didn’t last. In the Sixties, psychoanalysis came under attack from feminists, as well as from advocates of community mental-health services who derided the practice as a luxury for the well-off. Meanwhile, a new generation of physicians and psychiatrists were turning away from psychoanalysis—particularly with the development of what would later be called cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), which was evidence-based and promised concrete results within a set time frame. By the late Seventies and early Eighties, insurance companies largely excluded psychoanalytic treatment on the grounds that it wasn’t evidence-based, and the majority of analysands had to pay out-of-pocket. In 1980, the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders purged its pages of psychoanalytic theory, explicitly bringing American psychiatry into a post-psychoanalytic era that was more focused on “biological” explanations and cures, like drugs. Soon pharmaceutical companies began promising patients that their depression or anxiety could be treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and by the end of the century, mainstream American psychoanalysis could be said to be on the decline—and in crisis.