The assassination that changed Israel forever (Yossi Melman, 2 November 2025, The Spectator)
After the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, right-wing circles – especially among Jewish settlers – launched a public campaign that grew increasingly aggressive. What began as verbal incitement soon escalated into physical violence and criminal acts.
Itamar Ben-Gvir – today Israel’s minister of national security – was then a young disciple of the extremist rabbi Meir Kahane, who preached Jewish supremacy. Ben-Gvir infamously tore the Cadillac emblem off Rabin’s car and declared before television cameras: ‘We got to the symbol – and we’ll get to him too.’ At several demonstrations, protesters came dangerously close to physically attacking Rabin.
Riding that wave of incitement were senior opposition figures from the Likud party, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was among the most prominent voices fanning the flames. He marched at the head of a demonstration where protesters carried a coffin bearing Rabin’s name.
At a major rally in Jerusalem’s Zion Square, weeks before the assassination, Likud leaders stood on a balcony – among them Netanyahu, who delivered a fiery speech; Ariel Sharon, and others. When posters depicting Rabin in an SS uniform began circulating in the crowd, some Likud leaders, including future prime minister Ehud Olmert, realised the rally was spiraling out of control and left the scene. Netanyahu stayed.
After the assassination, Ami Ayalon was appointed head of the Shin Bet, replacing the failed Carmi Gillon. Ayalon told me last week bluntly that the politicians on the balcony may not have intended Rabin’s death, but their presence – without condemning the sights and chants of the rally – granted legitimacy to extremists. ‘It’s always the minority that acts,’ he observed.
The justice system also failed to act. Although 340 cases of incitement and violence were opened, prosecutors and judges dragged their feet – even after Rabin himself appealed to Supreme Court President Aharon Barak to intervene. ‘Our approach,’ admitted then–Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair, ‘was to show tolerance toward free speech and the right to protest. In retrospect, that was a mistake.’
Ironically, there was a brief time when they could have escaped their spiral out of the West, when Sharon was in power and realized Israel was best served by Palestinian statehood. His stroke was the real disaster.
