Anglospherics

NO UNIVERSALISM, NO CIVILIZATION:

Civilizational States Against Universalism (Pranay Kumar Shome, April 29, 2026, Providence)

In his book The Rise of the Civilizational State, Christopher Coker, the late British political scientist at the London School of Economics, defines a civilizational state as a country that traces its identity to a distinct socio-cultural core dating back to time immemorial. In civilizational states, Coker argues, culture becomes the primary anchor of national identity not in a sense of shared citizenship within a common territory or through a constitutionally bound social contract; rather, it lies in the perception of commonalities derived from belonging to a common culture. The votaries of civilizational states consider the idea of a nation-state as a “Western import” that is ill-suited to the collective consciousness of non-Western societies with deep historical roots.

In this context, countries like Iran, China, Türkiye etc., invoke the “civilizational state” tag to justify their policies in opposition to Western influence around democracy, human rights, and anything else that would cause authoritarians consternation.

they’re mere cultures.

IT’S THE POINT OF DARWINISM:

What I Learned from Teaching Darwin (C. Brandon Ogbunu, 04.23.2026, undark)

On the first day of class, I joked with students that I would play the role of their politically conservative uncle. That is, there would be no trigger warnings and none of the cushioning that has become standard in college courses that include exposure to ideas and readings with offensive language or content. I told them that we would read Darwin’s books as they were written and try to understand them, and if they didn’t like that, to enroll in a different course. The larger lesson was simple: To study a complex world, you must read difficult material and learn to interpret it with rigor and empathy.

I was priming the class for Darwin’s views on race and gender, ideas that complicate many of our largely positive opinions of him (mine included). Some of my selective memory, which demotes his problematic takes, has support: There is a literature on how progressive he was compared to scientists like his cousin Francis Galton, who coined the term “eugenics” in 1883. But reading Darwin’s 1871 book “The Descent of Man” in a classroom with several young women from around the world softened my rigid stance that the right response to backward takes is to simply get over them. I still believe that refusing to read or interpret such work is unscholarly. But I also came to admit something I had been too eager to brush aside: Even when we consider historical context, there is still something painful about reading a giant of science describe human differences in the language of hierarchy, rank, and levels of civilization.

If his ideology did not place white men at the pinnacle, no one would ever have heard of him.

THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO DONALD BEING WORST EVER:

Woodrow Wilson Reconsidered (Christopher Cox, Spring 2026, American Heritage)

Although his years as university president coincided with the entrenchment of segregation throughout the South, segregation was in disrepute among the elite colleges of the Northeast, impelling him to warn his Princeton colleagues against the danger of any Black student entering. At the same time, the publication of his History of the American People in the year he became university president spread his disparagement of Reconstruction and his rationalizations of Ku Klux Klan violence far beyond the confines of the Princeton campus.


Wilson’s multivolume history was particularly well received by his longtime friend and classmate Thomas Dixon, who leaned on it heavily as source material for his romantic trilogy on the Klan. All three of Dixon’s volumes would be published during Wilson’s tenure as Princeton’s president. Sales of the second volume, The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, surpassed a million copies. The book dramatized (and grossly distorted) the Reconstruction period between 1865 and 1870, building on Wilson’s narrative.


When The Clansman was later adapted into the 1915 film The Birth of a Nation by Hollywood impresario D. W Griffith, direct quotations from Wilson’s History of the American People appeared as intertitles throughout the movie. A stage production, which followed less than a year after the book, drew sellout crowds, instigated riots, and inflamed theater reviewers throughout the country.

Even in the South, the racism was too much for some to take: the Chattanooga Daily Times called the play “a riot breeder,” designed “to excite rage and race hatred.” Alabama’s governor called it a “nightmare” and “disgusting beyond expression.” The Knoxville Journal and Tribune called Dixon, the playwright, “a servant of the devil.”

…DEEP BREATHS:

At Harvard Talk, Retired Supreme Court Justice Breyer Defends Shadow Docket (Lydialyle Gibson, Harvard Magazine)

“Every court has what you’re saying is a shadow docket, which we call an emergency docket,” he said, explaining that throughout most of the Supreme Court’s history the docket had been used primarily to issue stays of execution in death penalty cases. “Or sometimes,” he added, there would be a “very important case about an election or an election rule, and we might issue the stay.”

Tracing the increasing use of the shadow docket in part to the rash of legal challenges that sprang up in the wake of vaccine mandates and other restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, Breyer—who now serves as Byrne professor of administrative law at Harvard Law School and as a visiting judge for the First Circuit Court of Appeals—rejected the notion that “there’s some kind of plot involved within the Court to get this or that decided.”

Instead, he argued, the nature of cases reaching the court on an emergency basis has changed: rather than death penalty and election matters, many cases more often involve constitutional disputes about “the nature of the constitutional relationship” between Congress and the president and the separation of powers.”

DARWINISM IS THE LIFE OF FEAR:

Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences (Sahil Chinoy, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira, and Stefanie Stantcheva, 2026, American Economic Review)

We investigate the origins and implications of zero-sum thinking: the belief that gains for one individual or group tend to come at the cost of others. Using a new survey of 20,400 US residents, we measure zero-sum thinking, political preferences, policy views, and a rich array of ancestral information spanning four generations. We find that a more zero-sum mindset is strongly associated with more support for government redistribution, race- and gender-based affirmative action, and more restrictive immigration policies. Zero-sum thinking can be traced back to the experiences of both the individual and their ancestors, encompassing factors such as the degree of intergenerational upward mobility they experienced, whether they immigrated to the United States or lived in a location with more immigrants, and whether they were enslaved or lived in a location with more enslavement.

WHAT ANTI-WOKE SEEKS TO DENY:

Body-Worn Cameras, Prosecutors, and Racial Differences in Criminal Justice Outcomes (Jeffrey Miron, 4/28/26, Cat0)

How do body-worn cameras affect the actions of police and prosecutors? A recent study of data from North Carolina suggests that introduction of these cameras

reduced incarceration rates for black people by 10.5 percent .… Similar reductions in disparities occurred for other outcomes, including conviction rates and jail time. … These findings suggest that prosecutors had previously misinterpreted information from police, either because they held biased beliefs or treated police reports as definitive accounts.

DON’T BOTHER US WITH THE THEOLOGY:

Post-Christian Christianity: On the Conscription of Christian Language and Symbolism (Well-Tempered, Apr 28, 2026)

The term needs a little unpacking. For centuries, Western societies have been recasting ideas with distinctly Christian roots—for example, human dignity, care for the poor, the equality of all before God—as self-evident, universal truths. That process, described so well by Tom Holland in Dominion, was a kind of intellectual plagiarism: Christian convictions were reshaped, repurposed, and often detached from the doctrines that undergird them. If plagiarism is a form of flattery, then this has been a kind of backhanded tribute. Christian ideas endured because they couldn’t easily be discarded even by Christianity’s fiercest critics. In that sense, Western secularism has been defined in part by the ghosts of its Christian past.

Post-Christian Christianity moves in the opposite direction. It’s less concerned with Christian beliefs and doctrines than with the signs by which it is recognised. It understands the power of symbols and slogans in a crowded public square, and so it reaches for Christian language and imagery as instruments—useful, adaptable, and readily deployed in the service of political ends. Instead of Scripture shaping its vision of reality, a prior framework—often nationalist, or more loosely ideological—selects and selects and arranges Christian elements to support its own claims. Christianity, in this register, becomes primarily a branded resource to be exploited: less a faith to be lived than a rhetoric to be wielded.

liberalism requires the substance of Christianity; Post-Liberalism just the trappings.

FUKUYAMA WINS AGAIN:

Why postliberalism failed: Orbán’s warning to the Right (Samuel Mace, 4/20/26, CapX)


This result does not even spell the beginning of the end of our own populist moment, but the failure of Fidesz and the scandals which brought down Orbán’s illiberal regime represent an overdue reckoning with reality for the postliberal dream.

That dream imagines postliberalism as a new and more effective way to govern, delivering conservative priorities through state power and institutional and civic dominance. Fidesz exposed the practical limits of this vision in Hungary, but the problem is far more fundamental.

As Paul Kelly writes in ‘Against Postliberalism’, postliberalism operates as a negative ideological force fighting against the dominance of liberalism and liberal ideals. Even when it arrives in power, it is trapped by this focus into antagonistic political gestures lacking genuine innovation.

Despite the efforts of authors like Adrian Vermuele and Patrick Deneen, the postliberals have had little success imagining something new. Postliberalism remains just the latest intellectual reaction created by the success of liberal democracy, rather than a serious rival to replace it.

DONALD HAS RUBBED THEIR NOSES IN WHAT THEIR VOTES MEANT:

Why is the Maga project teetering? Because not even Trump supporters voted for this dysfunction (Moira Donegan, 4/21/26, The Guardian)

Trump’s victory in the 2024 presidential election was once seen as a definitive cultural shift, proof that his aggressive, domineering style of rightwing populism had found permanent purchase in US politics. Pundits hailed the triumph of conservatism; institutions scrambled to adjust to the new dominance of a regime with authoritarian aspirations. This was always a suspicious claim: was a narrow victory in one close presidential election really a sign of a broad and permanent cultural shift?

Less than 18 months later, that thesis has collapsed. Trump and his allies have delivered an era of backlash and cultural retrenchment from the executive branch: slashing grants for “woke” research; turning federal programmes meant to promote equality into engines for discrimination; stymying promotions for women and people of colour in the armed services in what critics say is an effort to resegregate the military; and pressuring athletic conferences from the National Collegiate Athletic Association to the International Olympic Committee to ban trans women athletes.

They have made their cultural values felt in pervasive and sadistic ways. Americans see ICE officers patrolling their airports and tanks on the streets of major cities; they see their neighbours being snatched away by immigration agents; and they see the costs of housing soaring out of reach as the construction industry workforce dwindles as a result. They see Trump and his friends posturing on television, complaining over and over again about issues that their side has already won. And they also see the signs posted at their local gas station, where the price has now soared from an average of $3.10 a gallon in 2025 to more than $4.

It’s all well and good to feel Identitarian, until you see the actions your feelings demand.

THE eND OF hISTORY IS UNDEFEATED:

The Rise And Fall Of ‘Petty Tyrants’: History shows that bad leaders can successfully undermine democracy — but the story always ends the same way. (Danny Hillis, April 23, 2026, NOEMA)

Once in power, every leader, good or bad, faces difficulties. The fork in the road is how they choose to handle unwelcome realities. For vain leaders, admitting difficulties would mean admitting personal failure. The psychological stakes of honest assessment are unbearable, so they take the path that avoids it.

Setbacks are blamed on the incompetence of subordinates. Those who insist on bringing up unpleasant truths are replaced with sycophants who reinforce petty tyrants’ exaggerated sense of genius. Eventually dissenters are frightened into silence.

To hide the truth from the outside world, petty tyrants must deceive and distract. Detachment from reality does not require stupidity, just the willingness to choose an appealing story over obstinate facts. So energies become focused on fabricating and supporting a convenient story and demonizing scapegoats. Institutions responsible for gathering objective information that might contradict the narrative are deliberately weakened. Critics are portrayed as traitors.

As the leaders and their associates concentrate their efforts on deceiving others, they begin to deceive themselves. To sustain the illusion, they must act as if they believe their own lies, as must those around them. Whether they actually believe becomes irrelevant. They are trapped in their own illusion.

As appearance replaces performance and loyalty replaces competence, the system begins to reward flattery rather than governance. Insiders learn to exploit the tyrant’s vanity, not only to stay in favor, but to advance their own agendas. Corruption becomes systemic. Extraction replaces stewardship and, as parts of the system become parasitic, the deterioration accelerates.

Once decisions are based on false premises, weaknesses are made invisible. But reality does not care. When Mussolini’s troops invaded in summer uniforms, winter still came.

As reality diverges from the fabricated narrative, the functional damages — the military defeats, the economic collapses, the institutional failures — create catastrophes that cannot be hidden. The spell is broken not by some moral awakening, but by these concrete disasters. Once a sufficient portion of the loyal supporters realize they have been duped, the leader will eventually fall.

The energy required to deceive is unsustainable. Reality is relentless. The tyrant who chooses to fight it is doomed.