May 24, 2026

From disbanding their colonial legislatures to taxing the colonists while denying them representation in Parliament, King George III’s oppression and tyrannical actions were Pharaoh-like. The Battles of Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill in 1775 had raised the stakes and increased the danger to their lives. Pondering his role, Adams wrote to Abigail: “Is it not a saying of Moses, who am I that I should go in and out before this great people?”

Pressing on Adams’s mind was his own burning bush triggered by musket fire.

“When I consider the great events which are passed, and those greater which are rapidly advancing, and that I may have been instrumental of touching some springs, and turning some small wheels … I feel an awe upon my mind, which is not easily described,” he wrote as he grasped the gravity of the situation in one hand and hope for liberty in the other.

“Great Britain has at last driven America, to the last step, a complete separation from her, a total absolute independence, not only of her Parliament but of her crown.” Adams added that there was something very “unnatural and odious” in a government that was “1,000 leagues” away.

US support for Taiwan is not a preference that could change with a US administration, nor is it a bargaining chip. Rather, it is thoroughly embedded in the machinery of American power—in congressional mandates, defense planning, semiconductor supply chains, state-level partnerships, and private-sector investment.

These ties make the relationship difficult for any US administration to unwind, and even more difficult for China’s government to weaken. The era when analysts parsed every presidential statement for clues about Taiwan policy is fading. High-level rhetoric still matters, but the durability of US-Taiwan ties now rests less on individual leaders than on institutional momentum.

Despite new presidents coming to power in both Taipei and Washington over the past two years—and despite unprecedented Chinese military pressure on Taiwan—the relationship has only deepened. Congressional delegations (most recently from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) regularly visit Taiwan, and arms sales have continued (so far)—with the Trump administration greenlighting the largest weapons packages in the relationship’s history. Trump has signed new legislation reinforcing bilateral ties, his National Security Strategy has emphasized deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, and a recently announced reciprocal trade framework has formalized a strategic economic partnership.

Private-sector developments have been especially transformative, mainly because Taiwan’s dominance in high-end semiconductors and AI infrastructure has transformed the island from a traditional geopolitical flashpoint into a pillar of the global economy. “Non-red” supply chains (trusted networks that are insulated from Chinese leverage) have moved from concept to practice, with Taiwan sitting at the center of this shift.

TSMC’s expanding campus in Arizona is only the most visible example of this broader trend. Taiwanese firms of all sizes are investing in US data centers, advanced materials, and electronics; and US technology companies are deepening their presence in Taiwan, particularly in AI and cloud computing. Meanwhile, both are reducing exposure to China.

For years, US policymakers talked abstractly about “decoupling” from China. Now markets and industry are making it real, with Taiwanese capital revitalizing US manufacturing, and US firms increasingly relying on Taiwan for next-generation innovation. Crucially, defense technology partnerships are linking private-sector advances to Taiwan’s asymmetric defense and the US military’s modernization.