Religion

A REVOLUTION BETRAYED:

We Are Finally Free From Khamenei’s Suffocating Gaze (Azadeh Moaveni, 3/04/26, NY Times)

Those who challenged him often died in mysterious and awful ways. Dissidents were hacked to death by assailants with machetes. In June 2009 his great political rival and fellow revolutionary Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned the supreme leader in a personal letter that he must accept change or “volcanoes fueled from burning hearts will emerge in society.” Mr. Rafsanjani quoted the 13th-century Persian poet Saadi at the letter’s end: “A stream of water can be diverted with a small shovel, but once it grows, even an elephant cannot stop its flow.”

The same month, believing the result of the presidential election to be fraudulent, a million Iranians poured into the streets. Many young protesters were arrested and taken to a detention center south of Tehran called Kahrizak, where many were tortured and some allegedly raped. Less than 10 years later, Mr. Rafsanjani was found floating in a pool, said to have suffered a heart attack while swimming. His bodyguards had apparently been away, and security cameras had been turned off.

His most despised adversaries — intellectuals and political rivals — bore his specific, spiteful rage. But thousands of people were killed in protests or imprisoned over the years, and just last month he oversaw the fastest, largest mass slaughter in modern Iranian history.

CHILDREN OF FAITH:

My Conversion to Skeptical Belief (Christopher Beha, 2/10/26, NY Times)

To many, this will sound like a bit of a paradox, since skepticism and belief are understood to be in serious tension, if not outright opposition. We are all skeptical at certain times about certain things, but when we refer to someone more generally as a “skeptic,” we tend to mean that this person bases beliefs about the world entirely on the rational examination of objective evidence. More pointedly, we almost always mean that this person does not believe in God. But this is not at all the term’s historical meaning.

The Greek philosopher Pyrrho of Elis is often counted as the first philosophical skeptic. His complete doubt about the possibility of any human knowledge extended so far that, according to an ancient, possibly apocryphal account, he refused even to accept the evidence of his senses while walking down the street, “taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not.” (His less skeptical friends followed behind to keep him out of trouble.)

Pyrrho’s first great modern disciple, the French essayist Michel de Montaigne, would not even say that he knew nothing, which seemed to express too much certainty. He preferred to put the matter as a question: “What do I know?” Yet Montaigne’s essays contain countless expressions of Christian piety. Precisely because we can’t have knowledge about even the most basic points, he argued, we must inevitably take certain things on faith — at least, if we don’t have friends kind enough to spend their lives guiding us around dogs and carts.


It’s possible to understand the entire modern philosophical tradition as an effort to grapple with the extreme skepticism that Montaigne reintroduced to Western culture without falling, as Montaigne did, back on faith. Four hundred and fifty years later, that project has brought us to a strange point.

The strangeness resides in the fact that reason disproves the foundations of Reason and demonstrates that all is faith.

HAUNTED:

Long-term emotional distress persists for women decades after abortion, studies suggest (Obianuju Mbah, 1/31/26, Christianity Today)

Nearly half of women experienced moderate to high levels of abortion emotional distress after an abortion. Around a quarter (24.1%) reported high levels of distress. These included persistent feelings of grief, sadness, intrusive thoughts, or emotional disruption affecting work and relationships.

The study estimates that that would translate to approximately 7.5 million women nationwide, with nearly half of that group (3.4 million) experiencing multiple symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress.

Notably, the research found no clear evidence that distress diminishes with time, suggesting that for some women emotional effects may remain unresolved long-term.

WOULDN’T SAY, “NO”:

A century in the Siberian wilderness: the Old Believers who time forgot: In 1978, Soviet scientists stumbled upon a family living in a remote part of Russia. They hadn’t interacted with outsiders for decades. Almost half a century later, one of them is still there (Sophie Pinkham, 1/22/26, The Guardian)

None of the Lykov children had ever seen bread. But when the geologists offered them a loaf and some jam, they refused. “We are not allowed that,” they said, in a refrain that would become familiar to all their visitors. Natalia and Agafia were hard to understand, not only because of their archaic vocabulary but also because of an odd, chanting cadence that one geologist described as “a slow, blurred cooing”.

The Lykovs were Old Believers, members of the Orthodox Christian schismatic sect whose history is deeply bound up with that of the forest and the countryside. The Old Believers emerged in the mid-17th century after Patriarch Nikon, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, amended the liturgy to bring it into harmony with the Greek Orthodox version. The reforms altered the spelling of “Jesus” – at a time when letters were understood as something close to the literal flesh of God – and changed the number of fingers to be raised when making the sign of the cross from two to three.

Those who rejected these innovations became known as Old Believers. To the rebels, who soon broke into many different branches, Nikon’s reforms were a betrayal of the true Christianity. Their anger fed on broader social injustices of the era and was further stoked by the notorious lack of respect for Russian Orthodoxy shown by Peter the Great. A self-consciously westernising tsar, Peter preferred the gods Bacchus and Mars.

In the early days of the schism, Old Believers were burned alive, tortured and imprisoned for their faith. Many were cast into pits in the ground. They believed that they bore a tremendous burden – the preservation of the true words of God – and their extreme ways of living reflected this sense of responsibility. As the whole world fell into sin, they maintained their purity. While they awaited the end of the world, they maintained strict rules about diet (for the Lykovs, no bread or jam), clothing, everyday practices and the adoption of new technology. Some Old Believers and other religious dissidents resorted to self-immolation. Whole communities locked themselves in their village churches and set them aflame.

Others took refuge in the forest, the safest place to hide from the authorities and preserve their way of life without risk of contamination by the outside world. Many branches of Old Believers were “priestless”, meaning that a family could worship without the help of a professional man of God. For the most radical Old Believers, holiness was directly correlated to isolation. The highest holiness was the life of the hermit. In the Bible hermits retreated to the desert; in Russia they retreated to the forest. But they called the forest a desert, deriving the names for hermits and for monasteries from the same word. The forest was the wasteland of holiness, the emptiness of God.

IT’S A PURITAN NATION:

Calvin Coolidge’s “Hebraic Mortar”: Henry Ford sought to mainstream anti-Jewish sentiment in the United States. In a 1925 address, Coolidge decisively broke with Ford’s movement. (Devorah Goldman, 12/22/25, Public Discourse)

But he argues that the colonial character was nonetheless marked by a common religious liberalism: “From its beginnings, the new continent had seemed destined to be the home of religious tolerance.” This, he suggests, is because of the Bible, “the work of literature that was common to all of them.” Scripture was everywhere in the colonies. Citing “the historian Lecky”—presumably the nineteenth-century Irishman William Lecky—Coolidge contends that “Hebraic mortar cemented the foundations of American democracy.”

For the “sturdy old divines of those days,” the Bible served as a patriotic rallying cry:

They knew the Book. They were profoundly familiar with it, and eminently capable in the exposition of all its justifications for rebellion. To them, the record of the exodus from Egypt was indeed an inspired precedent. They knew what arguments from holy writ would most powerfully influence their people. It required no great stretch of logical processes to demonstrate that the children of Israel, making bricks without straw in Egypt, had their modern counterpart in the people of the colonies, enduring the imposition of taxation without representation!

The idea of America as a kind of Israel, an “almost chosen nation,” in Abraham Lincoln’s words some generations earlier, was not new. William Bradford, founder of the Plymouth colony in 1620, compared his personal study of Hebrew to Moses seeing the Promised Land, yet not being permitted to enter. John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton, founders of the New Haven colony in 1637, were expert Hebrew scholars; around half of the dozens of statutes in the New Haven code of 1655 contained references to Hebrew scripture. Davenport ensured that the first public school in New Haven included Hebrew in the core curriculum and encouraged broad engagement with, as Coolidge puts it, the “great figures of Hebrew history, with Joshua, Samuel, Moses, Joseph, David, Solomon, Gideon, Elisha.” The United States is peppered with place names sourced from the Bible: Salem, Sharon, Jericho, Bethlehem, Goshen, Shiloh, and Hebron are just a few examples.

George Washington famously sent warm greetings to Jewish congregations, most notably to a synagogue in Newport, Rhode Island, where he offered a blessing inspired by Hebrew prophets: “May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants—while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree and there shall be none to make him afraid.”

This biblical rootedness, Coolidge suggests, remains vital to maintaining a cohesive polity. A shared attachment to the Bible bolstered the patriot cause, drawing together scattered sympathies and interests and “divergencies of religious faith.” It is no wonder, he notes, that Jews—who first arrived on America’s shores in the 1650s—formed an integral part of the Revolutionary War effort, giving ample blood and treasure.

CIVILIZATION IS ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMAGO DEI:

Western Civilization: Rooted in Dignity & Love (Bradley J. Birzer|, December 17th, 2025, The Imaginative Conservative)

We can trace the desire to understand the universal quality and dignity of the human person as far back as our very origin as a Western people. While someone might justly quibble with me on the exact moment of Western genesis, I happily and confidently turn to the development of philosophy and ethics in the Greek-Persian town of Miletus. There, a number of men gathered and debated the origins of humanity.

They asked two fundamental questions, each trying to get at the nature of our diversity within our universality. First, they asked: Are we and our essence earth, water, wind, or fire? That is, is there an “Urstoff—that is a primary substance that holds us all together? Second, though, and equally important: Are we trapped in the cycles of the world: life, middle age, and death; or spring, summer, fall, winter? And, if a God exists, does he share in the Urstoff with us, and can He help us escape the cycles of the world? While the Greeks didn’t find answers to any of these profound questions, Heraclitus’ definition of our Urstoff—”fire”—became a universal way of understanding the human person. The word Heraclitus employed was LOGOS, a Greek word that meant fire, spirit, Word, reason, and imagination. Throughout the Hellenic and, especially, the Hellenistic periods, many of the Greeks—Zeno, Cleanthnes, and the Stoics especially—adopted the LOGOS as their own. To them, it bridged the world between the God and all men. Each person, it seems, was a singular manifestation of the universal principle. As such, each person was connected to every other person through the God.

Virgil, Cicero, and the Romans took this to its logical conclusion. Virgil, in Eclogue 4, written roughly a half-century before the birth of Christ, predicted that the God would marry a Virgin, and she would conceive a child who would usher in golden age and, through the merits of the father, erase sin from the world. Just as seriously, Cicero, in On the Laws, proclaimed Reason as the link between all men and the God. What is there, he asked, more divine than Reason? As such, all good men and the God live in the cosmopolis, the city of the universal.

Let’s take this argument even farther. We can immerse ourselves in the ancient texts of Western civilization—the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aeneid—and look for proof of racism (that is, judging another person by the color of his skin), and our search will be totally in vain. Judging a person by the color of one’s skin—a grave sin, to be sure—simply did not exist in the ancient West. It is a modern phenomenon, an accident of history, not something rooted in the Western tradition. As horrific as it is, it came with modernity, not with the West.

THE REFORMATION ROLLS ON:

The Jews’ time of miracles (Samuel Rubinstein, 12/19/25, Englesberg Ideas)

It is not hard to see why non-Protestant Christians thought 1 and 2 Maccabees bore the mark of revelation: the martyrdoms (including the elephant-slayer Eleazar’s) prefigured Christ on the Cross, and the wars gave them succour in their own battles with heathen enemies, whether Saracen, Magyar, or Dane. For Jews, however, the story posed a problem. It was difficult to celebrate the ancient recovery of a homeland when that homeland had since been lost, or the consecration of a temple that the Romans were later to destroy. Hanukkah was a celebration of Jewish cultural and national independence: it did not fit the needs and realities of a scattered people. The festival in diaspora had to be rethought and redefined. The Talmud made popular a story that does not appear in the books of Maccabees: the miracle of the oil, which Jews commemorate by lighting the Hanukkiah. There was a shift in the meaning of Hanukkah, as Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks put it, from a celebration of ‘military power’ to one of ‘spiritual strength’.

But the more martial themes of the Maccabees story resurfaced in Jewish thought, much as they once had been put to use by Ælfric.

THE IRRITANT:

The Judaism of George Steiner (J. J. Kimche, December 1, 2020, First Things)

Steiner’s portrayal of Judaism is unusual for a modern secularist, in that it defends an essentialist view of Jewishness, arguing that certain immutable qualities define and anchor Jewishness across its historical and cultural permutations. Yet Steiner dismisses the usual hallmarks posited by other essentialist Jewish thinkers: claims of racial, religious, ethical, or national uniqueness. His brilliant and disturbing essay on the subject, “Our Homeland, The Text” (1985), argues that the Jew, like the biblical patriarchs, lives a life of self-exclusion. Spurning society, nature, and passion, the Jew seeks closeness with a transcendent God, which translates practically into a withdrawal from all social and temporal spaces. The Jew has no earthly home; alienation, wandering, self-isolation, and retreat into a vortex of exponentially expanding texts are the essence of Jewishness. The textual canon is the true home of every Jew, and every commentary is a return. This textual Judaism repudiates all attempts to place political, nationalistic, ritualistic, or racial components at its core. The Kingdom of David, the Bar-Kochba Revolt, and Zionism are dismissed as antithetical to true Judaism, whose textual nature underpins its migratory, multilingual, and cosmopolitan attributes.

This view of Judaism lends itself to an ethically based exceptionalism. The Jew, in Steiner’s eyes, is always a stranger, ceaselessly migrating through countries, cultures, and languages, always—and this is the central metaphor—a guest in another’s home. The eternally exiled nation exemplifies Geworfenheit (“thrownness,” a Heideggerian term for the existential disposition of being thrust into an environment of neither one’s fashioning nor one’s choosing), thus teaching the rest of humanity the value of living as “guests of life and truth.” It is this aspect of their existence, this disposition forced on them by the vicissitudes of history, that lends the Jews their ethical ­superiority. The oppressed, bookish, unworldly Jews are superior, contends Steiner, because they have never subjugated another people, never soiled themselves with national realpolitik, never subjected their enemies to the rack or the firing squad. A Jew is one who treads lightly in every circumstance, who treats all with the deference due to a host, whose presence jolts all societies from the pursuit of ethnic or cultural homogeneity. The Jew is the world’s moral irritant, the exemplar of suffering and otherness that gives the human conscience no rest. Through this eternal restlessness, both physical and moral, the Jews actualize their mission unto humanity—a role Steiner terms “an honor beyond honors.”

This paradigm motivates Steiner’s non-Zionism. If the mission of the Jews is bound up with their eternal role as guest, if their moral purity is acquired at the price of rootlessness and displacement, then any attempt to settle is a repudiation of Jewishness. Nationalism is thus an impoverishment of the Jewish spirit, a betrayal of the principles that fueled all prior spiritual and intellectual accomplishments. Zionism can never be forgiven for normalizing the Jew, for introducing political expediency, racial discrimination, and territoriality into Jewish history. Nothing could be more degrading for the people of Isaiah and Spinoza than to sink to the level of Jezebel and Herod, exchanging parchment and pedagogy for ministers and missiles. Despite his grudging admission that Israel has proven necessary for the physical protection of the Jews (a “sad miracle”), disappointment over the Jews’ turn from itinerant scribes to nation-building settlers pervades Steiner’s writings. Like the Hebraic prophets of old, Steiner castigates his fellow Jews for reneging on their historical mission and betraying their raison d’être.

BELIEF IN MORALITY IS MONOTHEISM:

Evidence of Objective Morality Is Hidden in Plain Sight: A new book finds this evidence in rational arguments. And in something those arguments can’t capture. (Noah M. Peterson, 9/24/25, Christianity Today)

Moral realism is the philosophical term for the view that objective morality exists. The authors’ definition has four distinct features. First, moral judgments are “truth-apt” (meaning that statements like “Murder is wrong” are capable of being true or false). Second, some moral judgments are true (murder is wrong). Third, the truth of these judgments does not depend on human attitudes (murder is wrong even if people think it’s not). And fourth, at least some clear moral truths are known.

Without this foundation, moral arguments for God’s existence can’t get off the ground. But how do we know whether moral realism is true? We can’t run lab tests on justice. Nor can we dissect the human brain and find “goodness” inside. We need a different set of tools.

Secular philosophers Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau, and John Bengson have approached the question by identifying moral “data” in need of explanation and suggesting we let the best theory win. For example, one’s moral theory should be able to explain why there is both widespread agreement about some moral issues and widespread disagreement about others. It should be able to explain why moral judgments are thought to motivate or direct our actions. And it should be able to explain why moral demands apply regardless of what we think or feel.

Baggett and Walls agree with these criteria. They argue that moral realism, unlike its competitors, makes the best sense of what we actually experience. But as they remind us, “Moral theory is hard … and no single volume will clear everything up.” Though progress is possible, don’t expect knockout blows.

This intellectual humility is consonant with their previous books. They don’t overpromise. They don’t feign certainty. Their conclusions are modest, and their tone is winsome. They respect other thinkers and take their arguments seriously. It’s clear their goal is not to win but to woo.

The term “objective morality” is redundant. Were it subjective it would not be morality just personal preference.