Exploring The Chile Project (J.P. Bastos, 12/11/25, EconLib)
The government of Salvador Allende is also the subject of many misconceptions. Edwards recognizes that part of the confusion stems from the fact that Allende was from the Socialist (and not from the Communist) Party, which led authors to mistakenly portray him as a relatively moderate candidate even though, in Chile, the Socialists were much more to the left and had close ties with Cuba and North Korea.2
The book offers a detailed overview of Allende’s economic policies. For instance, Edwards reveals that the government’s grasp over the economy went significantly beyond the well-known nationalization of U.S.-owned copper mines. It also nationalized the banking sector and enforced its right to take control, for an undetermined period, of hundreds of factories producing goods “in short supply.” This short supply was often staged by unions stopping the factory floor and creating artificial shortages. He notes that every import required a license, with some tariffs reaching 250 percent. He also describes how perverse and arbitrary mechanisms were used to set price controls, which led to confiscation of goods, often imposed huge fines, and, sometimes, sent “speculators” to prison. […]
Recurring in Edwards’ narrative in the third and final part of the book is that, despite the breadth of the reforms implemented during the regime, much else was also done after the return to democracy to deepen and extend the reforms. This continuation was often undertaken by center-left politicians. This insight invites reflection on the role Chicago Boys. On the one hand, their ideas undoubtedly charted the path to greater economic freedom, much needed in Chile after Allende’s populist policies.
On the other hand, Chile’s experience highlights the limitations to economic growth and prosperity under a dictatorship. Recent empirical research has analyzed this issue in Pinochet’s Chile from two different sides. Escalante (2022) shows that the Chilean GDP per capita underperformed for at least the first 15 years following the coup. Arenas, Toni, and Paniagua (2024) also question the timing of the “Chilean miracle”, arguing that it only really developed following the return to democracy. Indeed, other Latin American development “miracles” (in Uruguay and Costa Rica) occurred without a similar story of a liberalizing autocrat.
