Republican Liberty

IT IS THE UNIVERSALISM INHERENT IN LIBERTY…:

Making the case for liberalism: Wooldridge’s polemic draws together the disparate traditions of liberal thought and action (Daniel Johnson, 3/31/26, The Critic)

Yet “liberty”, in the sense of political freedom or a civil right, emerged in the crucible of the 17th century battles between king and parliament. The late Larry Siedentop showed that medieval canon lawyers had already developed the prerequisites of liberalism: the apotheosis of the individual (“Renaissance man”), equality before the law and representative government.

Wooldridge singles out Erasmus, Hobbes and Montesquieu as key figures in the transition to liberalism as a coherent political philosophy. One might hazard the view that Erasmus teaches us to beware of polarisation and intolerance, Hobbes to enforce our implicit contract with the sovereign against both anarchy and tyranny, whilst Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers guards against the usurpation of the state by an overmighty executive branch, or what Lord Hailsham called “elective dictatorship”.

…that distinguishes the liberal from the Left/Right.

SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION:

How the U.S. Constitution protects liberty from the powerful’s dark impulses: In this excerpt from Separation of Powers, Cass Sunstein explains how the U.S. Constitution prevents such a concentration of authority from turning democracy into despotism. (Cass Sunstein, March 5, 2026, Big Think)

On its face, the Constitution aims to forbid the accumulation of all powers in the same hands. Of course, the idea of a king was foremost in the minds of those who fought the American Revolution and devised the founding document. But the separation of powers extends far beyond the rejection of the idea of kings.

Article I, section 1 of the Constitution says this: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Article II, section 1 of the Constitution says this: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Article III, section 1 of the Constitution says this: “The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

These provisions establish the separation of powers. (So much for Carl Schmidt.) We might want to emphasize the word all in Article I and the word the in Articles II and III. The Constitution seems to contemplate that there is something called the executive power and another called the judicial power, and that they are vested in particular institutions. And if all legislative powers are vested in Congress, then they would seem to be vested nowhere else.

The separation of powers, it is called, but we should immediately be able to see that the term is too broad and undifferentiated. In a way, it is a misnomer. The separation of powers is a they, not an it. It is an umbrella concept, and it seems to include six separations of powers:

The legislature may not exercise the executive power.
The legislature may not exercise the judicial power.
The executive may not exercise the legislative power.
The executive may not exercise the judicial power.
The judiciary may not exercise the legislative power.
The judiciary may not exercise the executive power.


The six separations can be taken to include three sets of prohibitions. There are two things that the legislature cannot do, two things that the executive branch cannot do, and two things that the judiciary cannot do.

SIMPLE GIFTS:

Catholicism and the Gift of Liberty: Catholicism baptized common law, professed liberty through the Magna Carta, advanced Natural Law and Natural Rights through the Jesuits, helped inspire the Declaration of Independence, and gave us a truly great American patriot, Charles Carroll of Carrollton (Bradley J. Birzer, 3/20/26, The Dispatch)

Here are three critical ways in which Carroll could support both Catholicism and the history of liberty.

First: Though Common Law—or at least some of its strains and manifestations—is actually rooted in ancient and pagan Anglo-Saxon Germanic culture, Catholic evangelists adopted and baptized it immediately after encountering it. These laws emerged from the experience of the people and from the ground up, rather than being imposed by the top down. They are, to be sure, some of the greatest safeguards against tyranny—the right to a trial by jury, the right to Habeas Corpus, and the right to be innocent until proven guilty, all fundamental to our liberties. […]

Second: One can also turn to that most Medieval of Medieval documents, England’s Magna Carta of 1215. In it, as the nobles and clergy of England restrained the renegade King John, they insisted, first and foremost, that the English (that is, Roman Catholic) Church remain completely and utterly free from the political sphere. “By this present charter [we] have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.” Further, each town, city, village, and association shall enjoy its protected rights. Further still, the rights of Englishmen applied not only to the English but to all who entered within the borders of England. Finally, in addition to once again reminding the king that the English church was free of all political interference, it reminded its hearers that all classes of men must honor the rights of those below them. While this isn’t as perfect as the universal claims of the Declaration, it’s a mighty step in the right direction.

Third: Though many of Catholicism’s greatest achievements came through the Anglo-Saxon and English traditions, there is also the incredibly tolerant and insightful tradition of the Thomists, the early seventeenth-century Jesuits—Robert Bellarmine, Francisco Suarez, and Juan de Mariana—who discussed not only Natural Law and hypothesized a state of nature, but who also formulated a concept of Natural Rights. Fighting the trends of their day, they denied the Divine Right of Kings and the growing absolutism of monarchy. For these men, the will of the people was critical, itself a manifestation of God’s will. They also envisioned ways in which the people might resist unjust government and governance and even excessive taxation.

DELEGATION IS ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL:

The Role of Delegation Theories in Deforming the Constitution (Tom Merrill | 3.4.2026, reason)

The case against delegation rests on the proposition that the Constitution, in the first sentence of Article I, gives “[a]ll legislative Powers” to Congress. One would therefore assume that sensitivity to delegation would be at its height when the President or some regulatory agency claims the power to issue so-called “legislative rules”—regulations that have a force and effect similar to that of a statute. At one time, the courts were very cautious about such delegations, and said they would refuse to recognize agency rules having the force of law unless they were explicitly authorized by Congress.

More recently, however, the Court has adopted something of the opposite presumption: that any statute that mentions “rules” or “regulations”—even if this could plausibly mean housekeeping or procedural rules—also includes the authority to issue legislative regulations, that is, rules that are functionally equivalent to mini-statutes. This newer presumption, which has never been justified by the Court in any considered decision, has the effect of permitting the transfer of lawmaking authority from Congress (whether this was intended or not) to administrative actors and the President.

As should be obvious, the unstated assumption that any reference to rules means authority to make binding legislative regulations has resulted in an enormous transfer of legal authority from Congress to the Executive.

RESTORING SEPARATION:

LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., et al., PETITIONERS (February 20, 2026)


Justice Gorsuch, concurring.

For those who think it important for the Nation to impose more tariffs, I understand that today’s decision will be disappointing. All I can offer them is that most major decisions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the American people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes, legislating can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one faction or man. There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws must earn such broad support to survive the legislative process, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Nation’s future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come when those disappointed by today’s result will appreciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.

DEEP STATE RISING:

The Spirit of Liberty—Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture (Jameel Jaffer, February 14, 2026, Just Security)

Meanwhile, the costs to the institutions that settled—not to mention the costs to our democracy—have been profound, even if they’ve been difficult to measure. CBS was once the most respected news organization in America thanks, ironically, to its fearless coverage of McCarthyism; now it’s a punchline on the late-night talk shows. The law firms that capitulated to Trump have lost not only their credibility as advocates but also some of their clients, partners, and associates. The leaders of these institutions were absolutely right to conclude that litigation would be risky, costly, and insufficient. But we know now that litigation, for all of its drawbacks, was preferable to the alternative.

Third, some institutions settled with Trump because they were sympathetic to his administration’s agenda, or to parts of it. Some university leaders were sympathetic to the Trump administration’s criticisms of affirmative action and DEI, and they shared the view that elite universities had become hostile to conservative viewpoints and to white men. Some university trustees and alumni thought the arrests of foreign students who had participated in pro-Palestinian protests were not just justified but overdue. Some trustees, administrators, faculty, and advocacy groups saw in the Trump administration’s hostility to higher education an opportunity to institute changes that they themselves had been advocating for many years. I said earlier that universities had capitulated to the Trump administration but in some cases the dynamic was more collaboration than capitulation.

I think we’ve already seen that this strategy was short-sighted, too. The Trump administration has seized on concerns relating to antisemitism and DEI to justify a much broader and still-expanding attack on higher education. Judge Allison Burroughs, who presided over the case in which Harvard successfully challenged the cancellation of its grants, wrote that the Trump administration has used antisemitism as “a smokescreen” for its own unrelated policy agenda. That assessment seems exactly right to me. The Trump administration is similarly using “free speech” as a smokescreen for all kinds of censorship. For example, in the name of free speech it’s revoking the visas of researchers who study misinformation, investigating news organizations for exercising editorial judgment, and (as I mentioned already) demanding that universities abolish departments that belittle conservative ideas. Those who have tried to make common cause with the administration on issues relating to equality and free speech have been used.

Finally, some institutional leaders just thought it would be better if other institutions did the fighting. This is always the dynamic with bullies, of course. There’s always the hope that, if one keeps one’s head down, the bully will focus his attention on someone else. And there’s always the hope that someone else will do the difficult work of putting the bully in his place. Courage is a public good, and so it’s undersupplied.

In describing the atmosphere in the United States in the years immediately after the Second World War, Norman Mailer wrote that “a stench of fear ha[d] come out of every pore of American life”—that the nation was suffering from “a collective failure of nerve.” He lamented that “the only courage, with rare exceptions, that we have been witness to, has been the isolated courage of isolated people.”

The landscape in the United States now is similar, and for similar reasons. Most of the leaders of the United States’ elite universities, news organizations, law firms, and cultural institutions understand very well that Trump poses an extraordinary threat to the democratic freedoms and values that are essential to their own institutions’ thriving and indeed survival. But there is a collective failure of nerve. The leaders of the United States’ elite institutions haven’t been willing to use the tools that the constitution, the laws, and the courts afford them. They seem also to lack the political structures and human relationships that would allow them to organize a coordinated, collective response to the threat that Trump poses.

Judge Hand delivered his “Spirit of Liberty” speech on May 21, which at that time was known as “I Am an American Day.” It was a naturalization ceremony, a celebration of immigrants and of all they contribute to American life—the kind of celebration that Mohsin Mahdawi, the Columbia student, might have attended had he not been arrested when he arrived for his naturalization interview. The speech is about courage. Hand celebrates immigrants who had “courage to break from the past and brave the dangers and the loneliness of a strange land.” He wonders, “what was the object that nerved us, or those that went before us, to this choice”? And then when he asks them to pledge their faith in “the glorious destiny of our beloved country,” he tells them that the America of their aspirations will never come into being except as “the conscience and courage of Americans create it.” So leaving one’s home requires courage, but creating the nation of one’s aspirations, and defending it—those tasks require courage, too. He pays tribute to the “young men who are at this moment fighting and dying” for an America that has not yet come into being.

The spirit of liberty is still easy to find in the United States, but you have to look beyond the leadership of elite institutions. Among ordinary citizens, there’s no scarcity of civic courage. The No Kings Day rallies over the summer drew around 5 million Americans to demonstrations in 2000 cities and towns across the country. Thousands of Americans protested President Trump’s deployment of the national guard in Portland, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington. Government lawyers have resigned rather than participate in corrupt investigations and prosecutions. You’ve all seen the footage of Americans around the country trying to protect their immigrant neighbors from ICE, even as ICE raids have become increasingly violent and Vice President Vance has assured ICE agents, falsely, that they enjoy “absolute immunity” for actions taken in connection with their duties. The tens of thousands of American students who participated in peaceful demonstrations and encampments meant to assert the humanity of Palestinians—those students also exhibited an admirable civic fortitude, a willingness to pay a personal price for the defense of human rights.

One of the people who testified in the case I mentioned earlier—the case in which the AAUP and MESA are challenging the arrests of student protesters—is a guy called Bernard Nickel. He had come to the United States as a student from Germany three decades earlier, and then stayed on to teach philosophy, first at Tufts and then at Harvard. When the trial began, he’d just completed a three-year term as chair of Harvard’s philosophy department. Professor Nickel is a green card holder, not a U.S. citizen, but until very recently he felt that he and his family were secure in the United States, and he didn’t hesitate to speak out publicly on controversial political issues. He assumed that the First Amendment protected him. The arrests of foreign students in the spring of 2024 made him suddenly aware of his own vulnerability. Watching the video of masked ICE agents arresting Rumeysa Ozturk, the Tufts student, was a particular shock. He testified at trial that he decided, after he saw that video, that he would “keep my head down completely. I would not go to protests. I would not write, I would not sign on to public letters, and any other potential forms of publicity I would just avoid.”

On cross-examination, a government lawyer asked Professor Nickel why, if he was really so afraid of government retaliation, he’d agreed to testify in a case which ICE was a defendant. If he’d resolved not to sign on to public letters and engage in public advocacy, why was he here in court testifying against the government? This is what he said in response:

You know, anybody can sign on to an open letter. Anybody can go to a protest. My sense was that, in this trial, somebody in my specific situation, somebody who is a senior scholar with a secure position at Harvard . . . , I don’t know that there are that many people who could have done this. So I thought this is something that’s worth it. . . . This is . . . where I live, and I want this to be a country and a nation of laws, not of men. . . . I believe in these kinds of processes and procedures. . . . [T]his is me doing my part.

Other faculty, from universities around the country, offered similar testimony. They were fearful that their participation in the lawsuit would provoke government retaliation, but they participated nonetheless out of a sense of obligation—to their American families and friends, their students, and to the democracy they had made their own. They did their part.

If the United States is going to return from the brink of this abyss, it will be because ordinary people—citizens and non-citizens alike—still care deeply about their democracy even if so many elites have shown themselves unprepared to defend it.

FATHER:

The Man Who Would Not Be King (David Boaz, 2/20/26, Cato)

What values did Washington’s character express? He was a farmer, a businessman, an enthusiast for commerce. As a man of the Enlightenment, he was deeply interested in scientific farming. His letters on running Mount Vernon are longer than letters on running the government. (Of course, in 1795 more people worked at Mount Vernon than in the entire executive branch of the federal government.)

He was also a liberal and tolerant man. In a famous letter to the Jewish congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, he hailed the “liberal policy” of the United States on religious freedom as worthy of emulation by other countries. He explained, “It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens.”

And most notably, he held “republican” values – that is, he believed in a republic of free citizens, with a government based on consent and established to protect the rights of life, liberty, and property.

From his republican values Washington derived his abhorrence of kingship, even for himself. The writer Garry Wills called him “a virtuoso of resignations.” He gave up power not once but twice – at the end of the revolutionary war, when he resigned his military commission and returned to Mount Vernon, and again at the end of his second term as president, when he refused entreaties to seek a third term. In doing so, he set a standard for American presidents that lasted until the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose taste for power was stronger than the 150 years of precedent set by Washington.

PEOPLE OF THE ARC:

Is Grit the American Virtue? (Phillip M. Pinell, 2/12/26, Ford Forum Observer)

For Mattie, grit means follow-through. It is the ability to do one’s job—however brutal—without flinching. Rooster’s violence is not admirable to her in itself, but it is evidence that he will persevere. Even this God-fearing young Presbyterian, no friend of vice, concludes that moral squeamishness is not a prerequisite for justice. Her father has been murdered. Justice requires the murderer be caught and hanged. Nothing more, nothing less. This is an Old Testament conception of justice, not as mercy to one’s enemy, but as measure-for-measure.

Yet as the story unfolds, it becomes clear that Mattie possesses more grit than the man she hires. Despite Rooster’s attempts to leave her behind, she follows him into dangerous, unfamiliar terrain. She eats little, sleeps less, and refuses every opportunity to give up. Unlike Rooster, who is motivated by money, Mattie is animated by a righteous sense of duty. Her upbringing has made her the opposite of Rooster: law-abiding, methodical, stubbornly principled. And yet she, not Rooster, ultimately kills Chaney with her father’s own rifle.

This tension—between the lawless grit of Rooster and the principled grit of Mattie—captures something fundamental about the American character as imagined in our national mythology. If America is shaped by the dispositions of those who came before, Mattie embodies the perseverance of early American settlers and frontier families, the relentless Protestant insistence that injustice must be confronted directly, that one must not shrink from doing hard things oneself. Her world is set fifty years after Tocqueville’s travels, yet she would not look out of place in his account of the determined, self-reliant Americans of Jacksonian America.

The Western endures because it dramatizes this dual nature of American grit. Sometimes it manifests as admirable perseverance, sometimes as dangerous vigilante hardness. But it is unmistakably American in its insistence that adversity is not an excuse to retreat.

IT’S A PURITAN NATION:

REVIEW: Righteous Strife By Richard Carwardine (Tom Peebles, February 1, 2026, Washington Independent Review of Books)

As a rising political star and presidential candidate in the newly formed Republican Party, Lincoln appeared to entertain a broad and bland view of God as the creative presence behind the universe but not an entity actively involved in human affairs — a perspective at odds with most religious nationalists on both sides. As wartime president, however, his theological perspective took what Carwardine terms a “providentialist turn,” in which he acknowledged a “God who intervened in the life of the nation for his own mysterious purposes.” This shift brought Lincoln ever closer to the “historic Calvinism that colored much of Northern Protestantism,” and thus into broad theological alignment with both anti-slavery and conservative religious nationalists.

But Lincoln’s spiritual metamorphosis was intertwined with his evolution regarding the slavery question. The pre-presidential Lincoln had advocated for the containment of slavery in locations where it already existed. Yet as war president, his anti-slavery convictions deepened. A “more capacious moral framework,” Carwardine argues, led Lincoln to “embrace emancipation…and equality of civic opportunity for both black and white.” As the war progressed, Lincoln’s thinking on these intertwined issues came to align with anti-slavery religious nationalists, although for a remarkably long period, he was able maintain the support of both sides.

Lincoln did not lose substantial support among conservative religious nationalists until, fortified by a series of battlefield successes, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation on New Year’s Day 1863, the “most important presidential edict since the foundation of the republic” in Carwardine’s words.

NOT A VENN DIAGRAM:

The Basic Decency of Republican Self-Government (Greg Weiner, Law & Liberty)

Carey shows, against the Progressive reading that Federalist 10 is anti-democratic, that it actually reflects a commitment to deliberate republicanism. Nowhere in the essay, he observes, does Madison raise a constitutional barrier to majorities, relying instead solely on the empirical conditions that naturally occur in an extended republic. There is particularly no reference to the Supreme Court as a barrier against abusive majorities. Instead, by the end of the essay Madison pronounces the disease of factions cured without any resort to constitutional mechanisms: The theory should hold in any extensive republic regardless of its particular constitutional forms.

“Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics” similarly seeks to exculpate Madison from accusations of anti-democratic heresy. The misconstructions he dismantles continue to haunt American thought in the form of an assumption that the separation of powers is designed to inhibit majorities, with political fault lines merely forming around the question of whether that is a salutary feature of the system.

Instead, and this is Carey’s central and, I think, irrefutable premise, Madison explicitly distinguishes between two problems: the abuse of minorities by majorities, which he calls the problem of “faction” and solves wholly within the confines of Federalist 10, and “tyranny,” the exposure of the people to the arbitrary rule of the government, which he defines in Federalist 47 and solves in Federalist 51 through the separation of powers. He writes:

We may say, then, that the chief end sought through separation of powers was avoidance of capricious and arbitrary government. The end, however, can be stated more precisely and positively. Article XXX of the Massachusetts Convention of 1780, in which we find the injunction that no branch shall exercise the functions of another, concludes “to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”

The import of the distinction between majority oppression and governmental tyranny is not merely theoretical. Without it, the separation of powers, perhaps the cornerstone of Madisonian republicanism, is rendered duplicative and therefore undemocratic.