Israel/Palestine

PRETEND POGROM (profanity alert):

Racism in Israeli football did not kick off with Gaza genocide. It has always been in its initial formation (Sebastian Shehadi, 27 March, 2025, The New Arab)


Anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia are a normalised part of Israeli football though over the last 16 months of the genocide in Gaza, it has only grown worse and spread to Western capitals, most recently Amsterdam.

Racism in Israeli football, however, is nothing new. “Let the IDF win and f**k the Arabs. Why is school out [in Gaza]? There are no children left there,” goes a popular chant from one of Israel’s biggest football clubs, Maccabi Tel Aviv FC.

Violent songs such as the above gained international attention in November, following clashes in Amsterdam between locals and Maccabi FC away fans, who were in the city for a UEFA Europa League match against Ajax.

Casually exporting their bigoted antics from Israel to the Dutch capital, much as they have to other cities across Europe over the years, Maccabi’s fans were seen tearing down Palestinian flags hung from peoples’ homes the day before the match. That same afternoon, they toured central Amsterdam yelling racist and violent chants, such as “F**k Arabs…Death to Arabs”, and “we will win, let the IDF win” – while several taxi drivers of Moroccan and Arab descent were harassed, threatened and beaten.

Outraged, groups of Dutch locals attacked Maccabi’s fans the following day, leading to scenes that were abruptly called “antisemitic pogroms” by the Israeli government and Amsterdam’s mayor, Femke Halsema. As the facts of Maccabi’s aforementioned racist provocations became clear, Helsema soon retracted and apologised for her sweeping characterisation.

A RACE OR A RELIGION?:

Kahane’s ghost: how a long-dead extremist rabbi continues to haunt Israel’s politics (Joshua Leifer, 20 Mar 2025, The Guardian

Kahane’s political career was marked by failure. Throughout his life he appeared to most Israelis to be a grotesque US import. His relentless demagogic campaign to expel the Palestinians won him notoriety and a small cadre of fanatical followers. Yet he never enjoyed the mainstream acceptance that he believed he had been promised by providence. Since childhood he had dreamed of becoming Israel’s prime minister. Instead he became the leader of a movement shunned across the political spectrum. In his multiple attempts to enter the Knesset, he succeeded only once, in 1984, before Kach was barred from electoral politics. At the time he was assassinated, his movement was on the verge of collapse, starved for funds, beset by infighting and hounded by authorities in the US. Kahane and Kahanism, the ideology to which he gave his name, seemed destined for historical obscurity.

But Kahanism did not die. It survived – not in its fully fledged theocratic form, but as an ultranationalist vision of a land and body politic purged of a non-Jewish presence. The germ of Kahanism persisted because the conditions that produced it did not go away. To the contrary, they grew more dire. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza became ever more entrenched, its maintenance more brutal and deadly. In the 1970s and 80s, Kahane had drawn much of his support from the disfranchised, predominantly Mizrahi working class and portrayed his movement as a populist revolt against Israel’s secular, progressive Ashkenazi elite. In the 21st century, as the uneven gains of capitalist globalisation and the country’s hi-tech boom deepened inequality, Kahanism reemerged to provide the grammar for a reinvigorated rightwing class war. In the wake of the suicide bombings of the second intifada, Kahanism was also buoyed up by an increasingly widespread radical pessimism: that Israel is doomed to war, that this war is zero sum, and that it can end only through a total, eschatological victory – that ultimately, as Kahane was fond of saying: “It is either they or we.”

For more than 30 years, Israel’s political system maintained a cordon sanitaire that largely succeeded in excluding Kahanist parties from mainstream politics and parliament. But in the late 2010s, this cordon sanitaire fell. Against the backdrop of successive wars in Gaza, veteran Kahanist militants with thick criminal rap sheets began to appear on primetime television. Ideas that were once taboo became commonplace. Vulgar anti-Arab racism became an easy way to generate attention on TV and social media. Support for the expulsion of Palestinians ceased to be a fringe proposal and became a routine part of political debate. By 2022, thanks to the intervention of the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, parties that had until recently been deemed too dangerous to participate in elections now formed part of the coalition government. Itamar Ben-Gvir, a lifelong Kahanist agitator and convicted criminal, became national security minister, responsible for overseeing the police.

Since 7 October 2023, Kahanism has become mainstream. It is the political style that relishes the dehumanisation of Palestinians. It is the ethos according to which Jewish lives are seen as more valuable than all others. It is the ideology behind the normalisation of population transfer and ethnic cleansing. Netanyahu’s Likud has undergone a process of near total Kahanisation, to say nothing of the settler right.

In a January 2025 op-ed for the liberal daily Haaretz, the veteran Israeli journalist Gideon Levy described what had ensued since 7 October as the country’s first Kahanist war. “Almost everything about it was meant to appease the fascist, racist, population-transferist far right,” Levy wrote. “The spirit of Kahanism seized control over its goals and content.” Indeed, over the past year and a half it has often seemed as if Kahane’s malignant, vengeful ghost had been suddenly reanimated, manifest in the chorus calling to wipe Gaza off the map; in the images of grinning troops standing over white-hooded detainees, kneeling, hands zip-tied behind their backs; in the videos of uniformed men dancing with flags and Torah scrolls in the cratered landscape of the strip; in the line “Kahane was right” graffitied above scorched doorways.

Thirty years ago, Kahane was the name of a man who most thought would be forgotten. Today, Kahanism is the governing coalition’s operational ideology.

The same specter haunts Christian andf Hindu Nationalists.

SUICIDE BOMBING:

What has the IDF done to Gaza — and to itself? (John Ware, 1/15/25, The Article)

15 months later, his ex-defence minister Moshe Ya’alon, also once IDF Chief of Staff, said that Israel no longer had “the most moral army in the world.” Claiming to speak “on behalf of commanders who serve in northern Gaza” Ya’alon said: “War crimes are being committed here.”

The IDF denied this. What the IDF has, however acknowledged is that from the start of the war, it changed its rules of engagement.

As a consequence, one of the deadliest wars for children in the history of modern warfare was unleashed.

A recent New York Times investigation says that in the war’s first seven weeks, the IDF fired 30,000 munitions into Gaza. At 1 p.m. on Oct. 7, standard rules minimising civilian deaths were loosened.

By 30 November the Gaza Media Office said some 6150 children had been killed. The GMO is, of course, Hamas run. Even so, that estimate may turn out to have been conservative.

Based on a sample of 8119 deaths over five months which the UN claims to have independently audited, 44% were found to be children, with those aged 5 to 9 representing the single biggest age category. By that metric, it’s possible that some 6600 children were killed in the first seven weeks.

Amongst soldiers and officials quoted by the New York Times were those involved in the targeting. They told the paper that loosening the IDF’s rules to minimise collateral deaths meant a doubling of the allowable civilian to target death ratio: from a maximum of ten civilian deaths per target, to 20; for high value targets, up to 100 civilian deaths per strike. Even then, the paper said, the method to calculate the risks were “simplistic.”

IDF critics argue a target ratio of 100 to 1 would never have been contemplated by NATO forces in the 9/11 wars.

EXPECTATION BIGOTRY:

Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: If you insist that the Jewish state is the only one that should not be allowed to defend itself against terrorist attacks, you are probably an antisemite. (David Benatar, 30 Jul 2024, Quillette)


The fact that anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel are not necessarily antisemitic does not mean that they are never antisemitic. Similarly, the fact that anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel are sometimes antisemitic, does not imply that they always are. Determining when anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel are antisemitism requires argument. There will be cases in which the answer is clear, and other cases in which there is scope for reasonable disagreement. In what follows, I will try to unpick the most important factors at stake in determining this.

The first step is to clarify what we mean by “anti-Zionism” and “antisemitism.” […]

I propose the following definition:

Antisemitism is wrongful discrimination against Jews as Jews.
This definition parallels similar definitions of racism and sexism:

Racism is wrongful discrimination against (or in favour of) some people as members of a particular racial group.

Sexism is wrongful discrimination against (or in favour of) some people as members of a particular sex.
These are not uncontroversial definitions. For example, there are those who think that we need to add the condition that the discrimination is systematic. I reject that addition, for reasons I have explained elsewhere—but in any case, antisemitism has deep historical roots and is often systematic. My proposed definition encompasses attitudinal and systemic, intentional and unwitting antisemitism. My proposed definition makes no reference to Jewish institutions or collectives, because by implication, one way of being antisemitic is to wrongfully discriminate against Jews by targeting their institutions or collectives on account of their being Jewish.

On the other hand: If you insist that the Jewish state is the only one that should be allowed to treat certain citizens differently on the basis of Identity, you are probably an antisemite.

WHY COLONIZATION IS ILLEGITIMATE:

Zionism of the Founding Fathers: Israel’s creation matches the principles of statesmen who established our republic. (Joseph Prud’homme, June 27, 2024, Modern Age)

[A] significant number of founders held that religion should be integrated into the fabric of law and society, specifically at a regional or local level. They held that the people are entitled to create a religious state, with “religion” understood either in a general sense or as one specific denomination—as long as the substance of that religion was conducive to recognizing and protecting the rights of all, with the state ensuring everyone’s freedom of religious belief and practice.


Such a state must be a politically representative one and exercise authority only over a geographically compact community. These conditions, they believed, would produce a government more responsive to the concerns of all the citizenry.

Christianity, of course, was seen as especially conducive to the protection of individual rights, including the right of religious liberty. Thus Christianity was something the state could protect and promote by law without compelling individuals in ways that would violate individual conscience.

The pamphlet Worcestriensis, for example—which was written anonymously in 1776 in Massachusetts and remained influential in New England for decades—supports at once the establishment of a specific faith and the support by law of religious liberty. Even in the presence of extensive denominational diversity, this work suggests, establishment works best in compact areas due to the ease with which citizens can petition government should abuses occur, as well as the reality that living amidst difference tends to form habits that bolster support for the legal protections of religious liberty for all within the community. And indeed, in most New England states the religious establishment was at the town level.

The Constitution expressly sought to avoid any measure that could undermine state-level solicitude toward religion. All ratifiers of the Constitution knew that six states in 1789 had official religious establishments that accorded Christianity, or even a particular denomination, privileged status, often in the form of direct financial support to that faith and no other.

As President Thomas Jefferson—himself in many ways a strict separationist—stated in his second inaugural address, “religious exercises are under the direction and discipline of state or church” (emphasis added). To be sure, Jefferson would have wanted New England states to shed their religious establishments on their own. But many founders saw a state-level affiliation of faith and government as a form of morally acceptable statecraft or as a genuine and positive benefit.

Israel’s founding embodied these points central to many in the founding generation and therefore would likely have won their support.

Of course, this argument favors Palestinian statehood for all the same reasons.

NOT YOUR FATHER’S ZIONISM:

The perversion of religious Zionism (AMOTZ ASA-EL, JUNE 7, 2024, Jerusalem Post)

The pair’s endgame is a restoration of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, a mad idea by any yardstick – national, international, or military – but a perfectly sound one in terms of their messianic theology, which is to plant Jewish settlements in every reachable corner of the biblical Land of Israel, regardless of who is there and what that entails. While even they understand this cannot happen immediately, they focus on what can happen: Israeli military rule across the Gaza Strip.

A ceasefire is anathema to them because it might generate an Arab regime in Gaza designed by Arab governments at peace with Israel, and also Saudi Arabia. To Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, such a scenario is a nightmare, not militarily or strategically, as they claim, but theologically as they do not openly admit.


RELIGIOUS ZIONISM and ultra-Orthodoxy have been at odds for more than a century. Their controversy was about the Jews’ role in shaping their future. Religious Zionists, like their secular allies, thought the Jews must fight for their freedom or they would be abused indefinitely. Ultra-Orthodoxy thought the Jews’ redemption was God’s task, and the Jews’ task was to pray that God would soon fulfill His task.

The Zionist goal, then, was Jewish liberation through Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish land. The Jews were the aim, and their land was the means. This view was shared by Religious Zionism’s politicians who in 1947 backed wholeheartedly the partition plan that created the Jewish state, and in 1967 backed with equal conviction the idea of land for peace, as did the greatest Modern Orthodox theologian, Rabbi Joseph Ber Soloveitchik (1903-1993).

Now the party that calls itself Religious Zionism not only doesn’t think of land for peace, it thinks of land for war. The hostages, in its view, are expendable for the hallucination of Jewish settlements in Gaza. The people, originally the aim, and the land, originally the means, have reversed roles. It’s a biblical tragedy.

WELL OUT OF IT:

The Implications of the Gaza-Israel War for U.S.-Jordanian Ties (Abdulaziz Kilani, June 6, 2024, New Lines Institute)

Prior to the war, Jordan had already been dealing with various challenges, including the smuggling of drugs and weapons over its border with Syria. The kingdom’s economy also continues to struggle, and continued U.S. assistance has played a role in maintaining its stability. Since the war began, those challenges have deepened, with economic impacts on tourism immediately after Oct. 7 and on trade coming from the Red Sea escalations.

The kingdom “has been walking a high wire” with Washington since the Oct. 7 attack, Jawad Anani, former chief of the Royal Hashemite Court, told the author. “Jordan still believes the U.S. has the upper hand in bringing the parties together,” Anani said, adding that diminished U.S. prestige in the region could have consequences for the kingdom. A November 2023 University of Jordan poll showed 99% dissatisfaction among Jordanians with the U.S. stance on the conflict.

The war also has increased Hamas’ popularity in Jordan, leading some to again call on the government to restore ties with the militant group. Such a move is unlikely; it would anger several of Jordan’s partners, including the U.S., and in April, officials and observers in Jordan accused the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas of inciting protests to destabilize the kingdom.

The violence has caused concerns over refugees. Although the focus currently is on Gaza, Amman is also worried that the West Bank might be the next point of escalation, bringing with it a possible new influx of refugees and a host of political, economic, security, and demographic obstacles. In 2020, Abdullah warned of “massive conflict” with Israel if it proceeded with its plans to annex large parts of the West Bank.

Amman has been clear that it will not accept more refugees, seeing the crisis as an Israeli attempt to settle the Palestinian conflict at the expense of Jordan. Washington understands the kingdom’s position, and some U.S. officials have privately acknowledged that countries such as Jordan have valid concerns.

Jordan’s ability to see to the needs of Palestinian refugees was dealt a further blow when the U.S. and several other countries suspended funding for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) after Israel accused 12 of the agency’s employees in Gaza of participating in the Oct. 7 attack. While some nations eventually reinstated funding, the U.S. has not reversed its decision. The UNRWA took charge of all refugee expenses, including those for education and health care; the suspension leaves Jordan struggling to find alternative means to make up the deficit.

The war has also increased Israeli-Iranian tensions. On April 13, Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles toward Israel in response to its strike on Tehran’s consulate in Syria earlier in the month. Jordan intercepted missiles and drones that entered its airspace during the attack, a move some social media activists interpreted as defending Israel. However, officials in Jordan insisted the move was in the context of self-defence and protection of the kingdom’s sovereignty. Abdullah made it clear that the kingdom “will not be a battlefield for any party.”

The Kingdom has to liberalize next.

MONOTHEISM IS THE WHOLE MAGILLA:

Civilization is from the Jews (Andrew Doran, May 25, 2024, European Conservative)

Most will agree that civilized behavior, at a minimum, consists of abstaining from ritualistic torture, rape, sexual mutilation, human sacrifice, cannibalism, and related conduct. Yet for most of human history such conduct was normative and often sacralized. Habits of ritual violence and scapegoating to satisfy blood lust and communal anxiety were ubiquitous.

Human sacrifice was a near-universal practice in primitive pagan societies, even among sophisticated pagans. Greeks had elaborate religious rituals for killing their pharmokoi (scapegoats). Romans buried sacrificial victims alive in religious rituals to spare Rome from enemies like the Carthaginians, and though human sacrifice was later banned, crucifixion, mass executions, and murderous entertainment continued until banished in the Christian era. The Carthaginians, like their Phoenician and Canaanite ancestors, sacrificed their own children, as did many Mediterranean peoples. Aztec, Maya, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian civilizations all had rituals for human sacrifice.

Ritualistic violence among low pagans was less well documented but often more horrific. Christians from the medieval to modern eras, travelers like Ahmad ibn Fadlan and Samuel de Champlain, and missionaries all personally witnessed ritualized torture, murder, and cannibalism, from North America to Northern Europe and Asia. Celtic and Baltic, Germanic and Angle, Comanche and Guanche—more peoples partook than can be numbered because most have gone extinct. Ritualistic barbarity was universal.

We probably cling to the myth of the noble savage despite the evidence because the truth—that we all descend from inbred cannibals who made a sacred ritual of torture, rape, sexual mutilation, child sacrifice, and murder—is too unpleasant. We have no desire to confront our history, ourselves, or what the world looks like with different gods. The earth beneath us is a vast crime scene, and those of us walking around descend from something far worse than our simian ancestors. Apes are incapable of the tortures humans inflict on one another.

So what brought most of that savagery to an end? And why do we believe in universal moral norms that restrain violent impulse rather than indulge it? Each inquirer is free to examine cause and effect throughout history. But if by progress we mean the spread of universal concepts of human dignity, equality, and morality—rather than, say, democracy or roads or sound architecture or law—then it all began with the Hebrews. It was the Jews who gave us monotheism, universal moral standards, the notion of the human person, and much else besides. Civilizational progress came from the Abrahamic faiths—unevenly, imperfectly, and undeniably.

Sacrificial violence and scapegoating were cathartic. They satisfy blood lust and the innate sense that there is injustice, that something is wrong, and that someone ought to be held to account, hence the sacrificial victim. The Hebrews shifted the violent cathartic urge from man to creature, and Christians shifted it to bread and water.

There are of course examples of civilized conduct among high pagans, though many of these had a threshold for quotidian violence that we conveniently ignore. And there are Abrahamic peoples who, often in the name of God, inflict unspeakable violence—much of it on each other, and the worst of it on the Jews. However, in general, civilized conduct among high pagans requires a deviation from pagan norms, and uncivilized behavior among Abrahamic communities requires a deviation from their own morality. Sorting through the genealogy and authenticity of moral systems today is nearly impossible for many reasons. Suffice it to say, most of us behave very differently from our pagan ancestors—and why we do so has everything to do with Judaism.

A RACE OR A RELIGION?:

For many American Jews protesting for Palestinians, activism is a journey rooted in their Jewish values (Atalia Omer, 5/21/24, Religion News Service)

When I asked Rebekah – a pseudonym for a college student in the American South whom I interviewed for my book – how she understood her Jewishness, she told me: “I have always maintained that the basis for my activism was my Jewish ideals, the radical equality I had absorbed at home.”


For Rebekah and many other American Jews, the cultural memory of the Holocaust, and the common refrain “Never Again,” inspires their activism for Palestinian rights.

“Growing up in Hebrew schools, you grow up with the nightmarish Holocaust films,” she stressed. “The conclusion of this education should have been clear: ‘You can’t do it to another group of people!’”

This lesson is reflected in the cry “Never again to anyone,” heard at demonstrations over the past few months.

WE ALL KNOW HOW IT ENDS:

Israel Does Not Know How To End the Gaza War: Military and political analysts now say the conflict is unwinnable, but no one has an exit plan (Lisa Goldman, May 21, 2024, New/Lines)


Israel is in a “plonter.” The Hebrew word, which translates as a knot that defies untangling, is often used to describe an intractable situation. It’s a word one hears frequently from Israeli political commentators these days, as the army grinds through its seventh month of war in Gaza without having achieved the two goals stated at the outset of the campaign — the destruction of Hamas’ military capacity and the release of the captives. Now the prevailing opinion of establishment experts — journalists, policy specialists, senior military veterans — is that those goals are unachievable and the war unwinnable.

But neither the political leadership nor the army’s high command has thought of an exit strategy, let alone a plan for the day after — assuming there will be a cease-fire at some point. From the Israeli perspective, all the options are bad. A return to the status quo ante, with Hamas resuming its governance of Gaza, is not on the table. Even if the reinstatement of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party as the governing body in Gaza were desirable, the obstacles are practically insurmountable (in 2007 Hamas engineered a violent putsch to oust Fatah’s leadership from Gaza). Among Palestinians, the PA is widely considered to be corrupt and ineffective, with no authority to govern. Israel’s far right wants to reestablish the military bases and settlements that were evacuated in 2005; the army’s senior command has vociferously rejected this idea. But no Israeli leader has offered a practical suggestion that would fill the power vacuum created by the war. Nor has the United States or any other outside body offered a workable, practical solution. And so the world watches as the war drags on and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza grows more acute.

You can’t exterminate Hamas without exterminating the Palestinians, since it is the political party they support. (Abraham Lincoln did not get rid of the Democrats, just the Confederacy.)

The Palestinians, like every other people, are endowed with the right to self-determination. Recognize the nation and let them elect Barghouti president with a Hamas legislature.