The End of the Chinese Dream (Yi Fuxian, Mar. 10th, 2025, Project Syndicate)
Back in 2016, I told the New York Times that China’s aging population and shrinking labor force would prevent its economy from overtaking America’s – a conclusion I had arrived at in the 2007 and 2013 editions of my book Big Country with an Empty Nest. Chinese authorities were not happy. I immediately went from being a state guest to a name on the government’s blacklist. Then, in 2019, I angered the authorities again by publishing a commentary bearing the headline: “Worse than Japan: how China’s looming demographic crisis will doom its economic dream.”
According to the dominant narrative at the time, the “Chinese century” was “well under way” (as The Economist put it). Nonetheless, my findings met with a receptive audience. In the introduction to a November 2020 Brookings Institution book on “the future of US policy toward China,” my commentary was the sole reference listed. (The author, Jeffrey Bader, had been one of the principal architects of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.”) Since then, the dominant narrative has shifted, with many more analysts warning of China’s “Japanification.”
Japan’s experience has confirmed that demographics matter for economic growth, and this will remain the case regardless of whether one looks at Germany, France, China, or any other country. Owing to a rapidly growing workforce and a young population, Japan’s GDP grew from a mere 9% of US GDP in 1960 to 73% in 1995, and its per capita GDP grew from 17% of America’s to 154% in the same period. By 1990, Americans had come to regard Japan as their chief rival, with polls showing that three times more Americans feared the economic threat posed by Japan than the military one posed by the Soviet Union.
Yet Japan’s GDP growth rate has been lower than America’s since 1992.
Fear of a rising China is just a function of Sinophobia.