2024

AND WE ALL RECOGNIZE SOLIDITY:

A Comedian of Order (Titus Techera, 7/23/24, Law & Liberty)

The moral authority of the decent American is the running theme of Bob’s first big show, in which he plays Robert Hartley, a psychologist. On the one hand, it’s as normal as you could want—he plays a Midwesterner, he works in Chicago. On the other hand, life is crazy and psychology isn’t going to fix it, all it can really do is foster forbearance and even that is difficult. Freedom is hard to deal with, because everyone else is also free. […]

The comedy show as a whole suggests that there is something that endures in America, despite social transformations. Put otherwise, what’s funny about people is the variety of ways in which they fail to be solid. You want to think the best of people, in part because it helps you can go on with a sense of your own dignity; comedy suggests that’s much harder to do once the difficulties of life set in—in fact, you might go mad. In this sense, the show is all about a sound man confronting reality.

ALL COMEDY IS CONSERVATIVE:

The philosophical genius of P.G. Wodehouse (WILLIAM FEAR, 7/22/24, Englesberg Ideas)

As one would expect, Jeeves has a rather more precise grip on philosophy than Bertie. He is a keen reader of Baruch Spinoza, the 17th-century rationalist philosopher. This is noteworthy because Spinoza was known for his ardent determinism and his denial of free will. Jeeves is also familiar with Marcus Aurelius. He offers a quote of his to Bertie in a time of difficulty:

Does aught befall you? It is good. It is part of the destiny of the Universe ordained for you from the beginning. All that befalls you is part of the great web.

Bertie responds by saying: ‘Well, you can tell him from me he’s an ass.’

In Wodehouse’s world, the ‘the great web’ doesn’t equate to the bleak, windswept attitude of a pessimistic fatalist. Instead, it represents a kind of optimistic determinism. In other words: there’s a certain degree of equanimity that comes with resigning oneself to the fact that the future is decided, one being unable to change its course.

Wodehouse’s stoical optimism doesn’t just appear in the Jeeves novels, but in Wodehouse’s earlier work. His 1909 school story Mike makes a similar observation:

When affairs get into a real tangle, it is best to sit still and let them straighten themselves out. Or, if one does not do that, simply to think no more about them. This is Philosophy. The true philosopher is the man who says ‘All right,’ and goes to sleep in his arm-chair.

Wodehouse wasn’t merely a champion of the stiff upper-lip, but a true stoic. He believed in adapting the self to the world, rather than trying to change the world to fit around the self.

ALL JOE HAD TO DO WAS NOT BE DONALD:

The Dark Protectionism of Trump and Vance: Goodbye to competition; hello, inflation (ROGER LOWENSTEIN, JUL 18, 2024, Intrinsic Value)

The policy that will mark the Trump era in the history books is protectionism—a 180-degree pivot from seven decades of postwar, bipartisan support for free trade.

Trump’s venom for trade, a staple of his naïve fantasy to remake America as he imagines it used to be, is a bedrock belief. It’s one of few issues on which he has been consistent (something that cannot be said for his views on abortion, entitlements, or any number of others).

And it’s emblematic of his larger nationalism—his wish to fence in America and make it, like Trump himself, suspicious, hostile, and defensive. It expresses his essential pessimism, which darkens his view even of market competition and private enterprise. Better to let the economic commissar in the red necktie decide which products Americans can buy from whom: Don’t leave it to private businesses or consumers, that is, to the American people.

J.D. Vance has Trump’s populist, neo-interventionist instincts. If Mike Pence’s nomination in 2016 represented a ransom check to evangelist Republicans, Vance signals the former President’s wish to solidify and extend tariff policy and his (similarly harmful) anti-immigrant nativism.

In some ways, Vance is more Trump than Trump. As an economic populist, he is openly skeptical of business and an admirer of Lina Khan, President Biden’s FTC chairwoman, known for creative theories of antitrust and, so far, mostly losing litigation.

But Vance is a newcomer to protectionism. In Hillbilly Elegy, his 2016 memoir of growing up poor in Appalachia, the book that made him known, he recounted the widespread unease of folks in Middletown, Ohio—Vance’s hometown—when Kawasaki, a Japanese firm, bought a controlling share of Armco, a steel company. After the furor abated, Vance’s grandfather, who had worked at the steel plant, told him, “The Japanese are our friends now.” As Vance wrote, “If companies like Armco were going to survive, they would have to retool. Kawasaki gave Armco a chance.” In the interconnected global economy, cutting off capital from a foreign source would be self-destructive, as the Yale Law grad had come to understand.

Or had he?

No one can ever have expected Joe Biden to be an even mildly competent president, nevermind a thoughtful one, but his great tragedy is the degree to which he aped Trumpism on immigration and trade. Of course, the problem is that these are natural positions in his party while they are an alien infiltration of the GOP.

BRING BACK W’S PERSONAL ACCOUNTS:

The Biggest Winners in the Stock Market (Ben Carlson, 7/21/24, A Wealth of Common Sense)

The stock market is hard to beat because picking the winning stocks is hard. Index funds own them regardless.

Winners > losers. Index funds also own the losers, of which there are many.

But the winners more than make up for the losers.

That’s the beauty of the stock market.

Compounding over decade-long periods is like magic. There are no stocks for the long run with crazy 20% or 30% annual returns over 8-9 decades.

From 1926-2023 the S&P 500 was up 10.3% per year so it’s not like the best-performing survivors crushed the market by leaps and bounds.

But those above-average returns compounded over 98 years added up to incredible growth over that time.

That compounding has been magic for the stock market.

THE REVULSION EATS ITS OWN:

Edmund Burke’s Critique of the French Revolution (Paul Krause, July 19, 2024, Discourses on Minerva)

[W]hat we will concern ourselves with is Burke’s analysis of “revolution society” and “constitutional society” and what is entailed in both.

Burke’s constitutional society is a well-ordered society from organic evolution with ancient and longstanding roots; a quintessentially conservative disposition. A constitutional society is the particularized manifestation of universal truths: such as the right to associate, right to organize government, right to dismiss corrupt rulers, etc. A constitutional society is a society of laws and “regulated liberty” for without laws and proper regulations no society can be orderly, effective in its composition and conduct, and have the legal means and juridical precedents to maintain itself while also allowing the means of dismissal, improvement, and ingenuity.

One of Burke’s key arguments in favor of organic institutionalism is how institutionalism has a transcendent character to it. That is, it is larger than the self. Organic institutionalism is our inheritance. It is what our ancestors worked and bequeathed to us. We honor our ancestors in accepting this inheritance. And we honor our ancestors in improving what they have bequeathed to us. We do this so as to bequeath to our progeny, children, a future too. In this manner the chain of history is tied together: past, present, and future are all linked together in the contract between dead, living, and to be born:

This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection, or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection and above reflection. A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temperament and limited views. People who never look back to their ancestors will not look forward to posterity. Besides, the people of England know well that the idea of inheritance provides a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement. . . . Whatever advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims are locked fast as in a sort of family settlement, held tight for ever. By a constitutional policy that follows the pattern of nature, we receive, hold, and transmit (i) our government and our privileges in the same way as we enjoy and transmit (ii) our property and (iii) our lives.

As Burke so poignantly reflects, a society that looks upon its ancestors with scorn, or doesn’t look upon its ancestors at all, doesn’t concern itself with the future either. It becomes selfish and self-centered and works only for oneself rather than others. Atomization results when one becomes self-absorbed and lifts oneself up as the center of the world and of history.

A constitutional society, however imperfect, is something ultimately good and that evolves in progress. It is good because it has established and worked to improve, the legal traditions, rights, liberties, and traditions which any society’s first principle of organization and development need. For Burke, the rejection of the organic and constitutional society is not only a rejection of nature, it is a rejection of humanity’s creaturely nature – it makes humans into God as humans believe they can create, from nothing (creatio ex nihilo) the perfect society.

Burke argues that France had its opportunity to transform itself. As a result of missing this opportunity, however, the “revolution society” is the opposite of an organic and constitutional society. The impetus of revolution is to destroy.

maga IS SELF-LOVE:

Sorting nationalism and patriotism with John Lukacs (Brad East, Oct 7, 2019)

Let me close with a sample set of quotations on the topic of nationalism. I commend the book along with Lukacs’s voluminous output to any and all who find themselves interested by this (pp. 35-36, 71-73; my bold print, for emphasis): […]

“After 1870 nationalism, almost always, turned antiliberal, especially where liberalism was no longer principally nationalist. …

“The state was one of the creations of the Modern Age. Its powers grew; here and there, sooner or later, it became monstrously bureaucratic. Yet—and few people see this, very much including those who prattle about ‘totalitarianism’—the power of the state has been weakening, at the same time the attraction of nationalism has not.

“Hitler knew that: I have, more than once, cited his sentence from Mein Kampf recalling his youth: ‘I was a nationalist; but I was not a patriot.’ Again it is telling that in Austria ‘national’ and ‘nationalist’ meant pro-German, and not only during the multinational Habsburg monarchy and state. Well before the Second World War an Austrian ‘nationalist’ wanted some kind of union with Germany, at the expense of an independent Austrian state. This was also true in such diverse places as Norway or Hungary or other states during the Second World War: ‘national’ and ‘nationalist’ often meant pro-German.

“Nationalism, rather than patriotism; the nation rather than the state; populism rather than liberal democracy, to be sure. We have examples of that even among the extremist groups in the United States, too, with their hatred of ‘government’—that is, of the state. We have seen that while true patriotism is defensive, nationalism is aggressive; patriotism is the love of a particular land, with its particular traditions; nationalism is the love of something less tangible, of the myth of a ‘people,’ justifying everything, a political and ideological substitute for religion; both modern and populist. An aristocratic nationalism is an oxymoron, since at least after the late seventeenth century most European aristocracies were cosmopolitan as well as national. Democratic nationalism is a later phenomenon. For a while there was nothing very wrong with that. It won great revolutions and battles, it produced some fine examples of national cohesion. One hundred and fifty years ago a distinction between nationalism and patriotism would have been labored, it would have not made much sense. Even now nationalism and patriotism often overlap within the minds and hearts of many people. Yet we must be aware of their differences—because of the phenomenon of populism which, unlike old-fashioned patriotism, is inseparable from the myth of a people. Populism is folkish, patriotism is not. One can be a patriot and cosmopolitan (certainly culturally so). But a populist is inevitably a nationalist of sorts. Patriotism is less racist than is populism. A patriot will not exclude a person of another nationality from a community where they have lived side by side and whom he has known for many years; but a populist will always be suspicious of someone who does not seem to belong to his tribe.

“A patriot is not necessarily a conservative; he may even be a liberal—of sorts, though not an abstract one. In the twentieth century a nationalist could hardly be a liberal. The nineteenth century was full of liberal nationalists, some of them inspiring and noble figures. The accepted view is that liberalism faded and declined because of the appearance of socialism, that the liberals who originally had reservations about exaggerated democracy became democrats and then socialists, accepting the progressive ideas of state intervention in the economy, education, welfare. This is true but not true enough. It is nationalism, not socialism, that killed the liberal appeal. The ground slipped out from under the liberals not because they were not sufficiently socialist but because they were (or at least seemed to be) insufficiently nationalist.

“Since it appeals to tribal and racial bonds, nationalism seems to be deeply and atavistically natural and human. Yet the trouble with it is not only that nationalism can be antihumanist and often inhuman but that it also proceeds from one abstract assumption about human nature itself. The love for one’s people is natural, but it is also categorical; it is less charitable and less deeply human than the love for one’s country, a love that flows from traditions, at least akin to a love of one’s family. Nationalism is both self-centered and selfish—because human love is not the love of oneself; it is the love of another. (A convinced nationalist is suspicious not only of people he sees as aliens; he may be even more suspicious of people of his own ilk and ready to denounce them as ‘traitors’—that is, people who disagree with his nationalist beliefs.) Patriotism is always more than merely biological—because charitable love is human and not merely ‘natural.’ Nature has, and shows, no charity.”

ALL THE QUEENS MAN’S MEN:

American Berserk (ROSS BARKAN, JUL 16, 2024, Political Currents)

Trump is a criminal, a pathological liar, a narcissist, and an inveterate bully. He has few deeply held beliefs. As a politician, he has no regard for the mechanics of government or the analysis of policy. He is, as his critics say, vacant. And he is also a genius—not in the sense of a soaring I.Q. or an aptitude for the sciences or any ability to make computations that most human brains cannot. He is, in no way, an intellect. His genius is for the all-American, for publicity, for having the native foresight, buried deep in his viscous core, to understand what he had to do. He had to perform. He had to shout fight, he had to hunt out the cameras, he had to get his fist in the air, he had to apprehend, somehow, what this all meant before the secret service barreled him away. He himself, in the hospital, seemed astounded by his own power. “A lot of people say it’s the most iconic photo they’ve ever seen,” he told Michael Goodwin, the sycophantic New York Post columnist. “They’re right and I didn’t die. Usually you have to die to have an iconic picture.” This is the platonic ideal of a Trump quote: self-aggrandizing, incorrect, and aimed straight, like an arrow into the heart, at all that he will ever care about, and all he has gained. He is known. He is forever known. He has fame, and the best kind, the American kind, that which, like Cronos, devours whatever else is on this Earth, so men and women in Paris and Egypt and Kampala can think of him and dream of him and even bear his likeness, this image of the blood and the flag and the fist, on a cotton t-shirt. What else, near death, can Trump long for? The presidency is beside the point. If he wins, as everyone seems to think he will, he’ll only get four more years anyway, no matter what they tell you about American Hitler. Trump has no genius for governing or genuinely dominating others; he cannot, like Napoleon, stand up a new empire or, like the Nazis and the Soviets, make fascism as real as the gun pressed to your temple. His political machine runs on the exhaust fumes of his own mania, and it can do little to discipline the states, the little republics of federalism that will choose, if governed by Democrats, to shirk Trumpism. Soon, Trump will be eighty, and this milestone will either be celebrated in the Oval Office or at Mar-a-Lago, in permanent exile as a two-time presidential loser.

BREAK THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:

How major rules are surging under the Biden administration (Clyde Wayne Crews • 07/15/2024, Competitive Enterprise Institute)

We’ve taken a look at the total numbers of significant regulations issued this year in the Biden administration as well as at the subsets of those rules affecting small business and state/local governments.

We have also pondered implications of the Congressional Review Act and the pressure it placed upon the administration to issue its costliest and most ambitious rules before late summer.

Waiting too late would render rules vulnerable to being overturned by a Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution of disapproval should there be a change in administrations in 2025. That’s because the CRA stipulates that rules not finalized before the final 60 legislative days of the 118th Congress would be candidates for overturn.

Against this backdrop, on July 5, the day after Independence Day, the White House released the Spring edition of the twice-yearly Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions depicting agency rulemaking priorities.

The new Agenda depicts 3,698 rules in the pipeline from more than 60 departments, agencies and commissions. These rules are comprised of those at the pre-rule, active (proposed and final) and long-term stages, as well as rules completed over approximately the past six months (that is, since the Fall 2023 Agenda).

Among the 3,698, there are 287 “Sec. 3(f)(1) Significant” (S3F1) rules in the new Spring Agenda.

SOVEREIGNTY REDEFINED:

Liberal Nationalism, Abraham Lincoln, and the Unification of Italy (Miles Smith, July 15, 2024, Providence)

American liberals in the nineteenth century weren’t libertarians, nor were they agnostic on the relationship between the state, order, and liberty. But they did believe the state should be limited, and that it could not and should not exercise coercive authority on matters of conscience. Nations were good, so long as they gave their people true freedom.

Only liberal regimes are legitimately sovereign.

THIS IS WHAT HE MEANS BY gREAT:

Donald Trump and the language of violence (Gil Duran & George Lakoff, JULY 14 2024, frame Lab)

[N]o one has done more to inject violence into our political discourse than Trump.

He demonizes his political opponents as “animals,” “scum” and “vermin.” He calls for jailing his opponents without cause and forcing them to stand before military tribunals. He speaks of the “bloodbath” that will occur if he loses the election. When a deranged man attempted to murder House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s husband with a hammer, Trump mocked the incident as his audience laughed.

Trump creates serious fear in the minds of many Americans with his promises to destroy democratic norms and become a dictator on “day one” if he gets re-elected president. On January 6, 2021, he urged his supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol and did nothing as they launched a violent insurrection to overturn the 2020 election. At the Capitol, Trump’s followers hunted Nancy Pelosi and chanted “hang Mike Pence.”

None of this justifies the attempt on his life – or any kind of political violence against anyone. Yet Trump has continually framed American politics as a violent struggle requiring bloodshed.