The supercomputer is called Frontier; recently, a team of researchers recently used it to run the largest astrophysical simulation of the universe yet. The supercomputer’s simulation size corresponds to surveys taken by large telescope observatories, which to this point had not been possible. The calculations undergirding the simulations provide a new foundation for cosmological simulations of the universe’s matter content, from everything we see to the invisible stuff that only interacts with ordinary matter gravitationally.

We are all designist.

Statistical physicists have long studied systems where the variable of interest spans many orders of magnitude, the classic example is the relaxation times of glassy materials, which are often found to follow power laws. A power-law dependence has been found for the probability of transmission of COVID-19, as a function of length of time a susceptible person is in contact with an infected person. This is in data from the United Kingdom’s COVID-19 app. The amount of virus in infected people spans many orders of magnitude. Inspired by this, I assume that the power-law behavior found in COVID-19 transmission is due to the effective transmission rate varying over orders of magnitude from one contact to another. I then use a model from statistical physics to estimate that if a population all wear FFP2/N95 masks, this reduces the effective reproduction number for COVID-19 transmission by a factor of approximately nine.

Jews are not alone in this unenviable position. In an article titled “Is Antisemitism Generic?” the economist Thomas Sowell argues that such anti-Jewish attitudes reflect a broader pattern of persecution toward “middleman minorities.” Other groups that fall into this category include the Chinese overseas, Indians in Southeast Asia, and the Igbo people in Nigeria.

The rise of globalized trade and digital economies has only expanded the role of middleman minorities as they have moved beyond traditional industries like retail and exerted influence in global tech and e-commerce. After its forced expulsion from Malaysia, for example, Singapore transformed from a small island into Southeast Asia’s financial center and one of the world’s most developed countries in just thirty years. And in the United States, Silicon Valley’s South Asian diaspora has significantly contributed to advances in technology.

And yet the middleman minority, and his role in the economy, is as poorly understood as ever. In fact, this success comes in part from the suspicion with which they are often viewed. In his book Migrations and Cultures, Sowell argues that the “middleman minorities” were united by society’s reaction to them, as many individuals within these minorities may not hold middleman jobs but are nonetheless treated similarly by the majority population. While middleman minorities are not confined to a single race or culture, all have been persecuted for having something in common: what Sowell describes as the human capital of “experience and knowledge used in economic activity.”

So why are they seen as suspect if their contributions are so useful? Sowell notes that fewer people reach the upper echelons of middleman professions, which require greater education or sophistication, than the lower levels. Yet, what he calls “modest prosperity” among middleman minorities provokes more societal animosity than the wealth enjoyed by other groups, such as the nobility or entertainers. There is a common perception of middleman minorities as parasitic because the occupations they are associated with don’t produce goods directly, a view further intensified by their “racial or cultural differences” from the majority group.

During periods of heightened intergroup tensions, this can lead to mob violence. The Holocaust is an example of a culmination of centuries of resentment toward the Jewish people in Europe. In the May 1998 riots in Indonesia, anti-Chinese sentiment at the end of the New Order regime fueled mass lootings and fires targeting Chinese Indonesians, and during the 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom, mobs killed 8,000 to 30,000 Igbos en masse.

From the moment he took office last December, Milei wasted no time wielding his proverbial chainsaw, slashing public spending by nearly a third and erasing a fiscal deficit that had exceeded 5 percent of GDP. His reforms included halting budget transfers to provincial governments, dismissing over 30,000 public sector employees, cutting subsidies for public utilities, canceling most public works projects and reducing pensions by around 7 percent.

These drastic measures were effective at cutting public spending, but they came at a cost. A steep devaluation of the peso triggered short-term inflation, with prices surging by 25 percent in December 2023 alone. The economic fallout was severe: In the first six months of Milei’s presidency, an already deep recession worsened; wages lost significant purchasing power; funding for national universities plummeted by 30 percent; and poverty rose to 53 percent, up from 42 percent.

Despite these challenges, Milei’s approval rating remained remarkably stable, reflecting both the public’s disillusionment with traditional political elites and the gravity of the economic crisis he inherited. The chaotic Peronist administration of Milei’s predecessor, former President Alberto Fernandez, left the country teetering on the brink of hyperinflation and economic collapse. Many Argentines viewed Milei as their best hope for salvation, accepting the pain of his adjustment policies as a necessary cost to avoid catastrophe, even as they doubted his assurances that the burden would fall solely on the “political caste.”

In the end, their resilience appears to have been rewarded. Monthly inflation steadily fell from 20 percent in January to just 2.7 percent in October, a remarkable achievement for a nation long haunted by runaway prices. This newfound stability has fueled a modest recovery in real incomes and restored some ability for households and businesses to plan for the future. The gap between official and black-market exchange rates has also narrowed dramatically, from over 200 percent to less than 10 percent. With GDP projected to grow by 5 percent in 2025, Argentina is poised to rank among Latin America’s top-performing economies. Meanwhile, the government expects forthcoming data to confirm a significant drop in poverty, potentially bringing the rate well below 50 percent.