May 26, 2024

THE rIGHT IS THE lEFT:

The Perils of Right-Wing Economic Populism: A Conversation with Economist Ryan Bourne: The new right is embracing progressive economics to advance its regressive cultural agenda (AARON ROSS POWELL,
MAY 20, 2024, The UnPopulist)

Last month, Aaron Ross Powell sat down with Ryan Bourne, who is the R. Evan Scharf Chair for the Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute, to discuss the new right’s adoption of populist economics. The following Q&A has been adapted from their conversation on Aaron’s ReImagining Liberty podcast.

Aaron Ross Powell: Ryan, you’re an expert in the public understanding of economics. I want to ask you about an important shift that’s taken place since Trump’s takeover of the conservative movement. People on the right used to talk about the importance of free enterprise—certainly that was an emphasis of Reagan-era conservatism. Today, the right has a much more populist perspective on economics. What do they misunderstand about markets?

Ryan Bourne: As economists, we tend to think markets are quite valuable for society. They enable people to convey their subjective preferences about goods and services. Suppliers use those signals to try to meet our wants. In this and other ways, markets are incredibly pluralistic.

The new right, by contrast, believes markets deliver suboptimal outcomes. It thinks we should use the power of the state—through tax regulation and subsidies, tools progressivism has traditionally used to advance a particular social design—in pursuit of the national interest or common good. This makes its view more of a social theory of markets than a purely economic one. The new right’s insistence on a much larger manufacturing sector, a heavy industrial base, families that look a bit more traditional (single-income households, wife as homemaker)—these require configuring markets toward a specific set of social goals.

So instead of seeing markets as an economic mechanism that reflects our pluralism and enables us to satisfy our subjective preferences and desires, they conceive of them as vehicles toward a particular social vision. They set out what they perceive to be the national interest or common good and they’re willing to use the powers of the state to impose it. […]

An interesting feature of the new right is they’ve adopted an economic history of the last half-century that is distinctly progressive in that it believes we have been living under a radical libertarian experiment.

DEPLORABLE HOARDERS:

Trump Voters Don’t Just Expect Higher Inflation—They Get It Too: There has always been a difference between how Republicans and Democrats view the economy. But the gap has gotten bigger. (Justin Lahart, 5/25/24, WSJ)

Inflation estimates provided by Moody’s Analytics, combined with voting data, show that states where Donald Trump garnered the most votes in 2020 have on balance experienced higher inflation.

For example, South Carolina experienced the most inflation of any state since the pandemic hit. Its consumer prices rose at a 4.88% annual rate between December 2019 and last month. South Carolina elected Trump with 56% of the votes cast between him and President Biden in 2020.

In contrast, New Hampshire had the least inflation of any state, with prices rising at a 3.75% rate. It elected Biden with 54% of the Trump/Biden vote.

Just as importantly, Binder and her co-authors found that people in Republican-leaning states were more likely to expect that higher inflation. While feelings might seem superfluous, economists and policymakers widely believe that expectations do matter. If people think more inflation is coming, that can lead to higher inflation in fact.

NOT HOW IT WORKS:

C. S. Lewis & Maksym Kryvtsov: The Experience of War and Godforsakenness (Yuliia Vintoniv, May 20, 2024, Church Life Journal)

The multifaceted experience of Christ’s cry: the raw intensity of “cursing in fight and toiling,” and the desperate plea of “Stop! Stop it! Enough!” These evocative expressions paint a vivid picture of godforsakenness—that moment when grief plunges so deep that even faith and hope seem to waver. Yet, nestled within this existential struggle lies the possibility of kenosis, a self-emptying love we discover through Christ’s ultimate sacrifice.

Biblical commentators highlight Christ’s cry as a powerful expression of human despair and a desperate plea for help from the gathered crowd. This interpretation draws support from the Greek text, where words like βοάω (Mark) and ἀναβοάω (Matthew) signify a loud cry or an anguished outburst. Notably, Christ re-utters this cry at the very moment of his death (Matt 27:50; Mark 15:37; Lk 23:46). This echoes the cry that raised Lazarus from the tomb (Jn 11:43) and mirrors the cry accompanying the angel’s dramatic arrival in the Book of Revelation (Rev 10:3).[6] However, other exegetes offer a distinct perspective. They argue that Christ’s experience of Godforsakenness signifies him taking on not only the burden of “sin for us, who knew no sin” (2 Cor 5:21), but also the very consequence of sin itself: the agonizing separation from God and existence outside God the Father’s divine presence (cf. Gen 1-3). In this interpretation, Christ plunges into the depths of sin without succumbing to it himself.

Such exegetes simply can not accept God having become fully human.