YEAH, BUT THE GOAL ISN’T PRODUCTIVITY…:

No, office mandates don’t help companies make more money, study finds (Danielle Abril, January 24, 2024, Washington Post)

“We will not get back to the time when as many people will be happy working from the office the way they were before the pandemic,” said Mark Ma, co-author of the study and associate professor at the Katz Graduate School of Business. Additionally, mandates make workers less happy, therefore less productive and more likely to look for a new job, he said.

The study analyzed a sample of Standard & Poor’s 500 firms to explore the effects of office mandates, including average change in quarterly results and company stock price. Those results were compared with changes at companies without office mandates. The outcome showed the mandates made no difference. Firms with mandates did not experience financial boosts compared with those without. The sample covered 457 firms and 4,455 quarterly observations between June 2019 and January 2023.

Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that over the past year, as more companies have debuted or doubled down on mandates, the number of people working from the office hasn’t changed much. About 78 percent of workers ages 16 and older worked entirely on-site in December 2023, down from 81 percent a year earlier. Of course, some professions like tech workers, who often have more flexible work schedules, have much lower averages, with only 34 percent working entirely on-site last month compared with 38 percent last year.

“There are compliance issues universally,” said Prithwiraj Choudhury, a Harvard Business School professor who studies remote work. “Some companies are issuing veiled threats about promotions and salary increases … which is unfortunate because this is your talent pool, your most valuable resource.”

…it’s just to pretend managers matter.

NOT EVERYONE IS AS LUCKY AS IBERIA AND CHILE:

Will Milei Make Argentina Great Again? (BRYAN CAPLAN, JAN 18, 2024, Bet on It)

As far as “emergency” measures go, Milei’s labor deregulation is notably mild: It lengthens new workers’ probationary period from three to eight months, cuts severance pay, and threatens dismissal for protesting workers who block traffic. But so far, these proposals have provoked the strongest pushback. The CGT, Argentina’s leading labor union, insists that the “only purpose” of these “ferocious” and “regressive” measures is to “hamstring union activity, punish workers and benefit business interests.”[viii] An Argentinian court almost instantly suspended Milei’s emergency labor deregulations, though perhaps he’ll win on appeal. The privatizations will be more significant if they happen, but since he declined to put them in his emergency decree, they’ll have to pass both houses of Argentina’s legislature.

What is the most likely scenario for Argentina? The monetary and fiscal stabilization is very likely to work. Argentina has faced far worse crises before: The hyperinflations of the 70s to the 90s multiplied prices 100 billion times. That’s like turning a billion dollars into a penny. Yet Argentinians ultimately overcame all these problems and more using the orthodox medicines of monetary restraint and fiscal responsibility. Since even politicians who ideologically opposed these treatments ultimately endured their short-run costs, it is a safe bet that a libertarian economics professor will do the same.

Turning Argentina, just a cut above Venezuela and Cuba in economic freedom, into a bastion of free-market policies is far less likely. Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza, has a tiny share of the seats in both houses of the legislature, and all of his allied parties are clearly less libertarian. While Argentina did have much more pro-market policies in the 90s, this was part of the global anti-socialist wave after the Soviet collapse.[ix] Admirers of the neighboring Chilean economy may note that Milei is much more ideologically committed to free-market policies than Pinochet ever was. Like many politicians, he is acting on the adage, “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” But Milei plainly has far less power to remake his country than the Chilean dictator.

MAGA MAN:

The New Deal’s Dark Underbelly: David Beito has penned one of the most damning scholarly histories of FDR to date (Marcus Witcher, 1/23/24, Law & Liberty)

The Roosevelt consensus among historians, to the extent that it ever existed, has been unraveling for some time. Free market critics such as Robert Higgs, Burt Folsom, Jim Powell, Thomas Fleming, and Amity Shlaes have rightly condemned Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression and his inclination to use the coercive power of the state to impose his policy prescriptions—often with undesirable results and unintended consequences. But there is also an emerging group of historians on the left—Richard Rothstein, Ira Katznelson, Linda Gordon, and Richard Reeves, among others—who criticize FDR for reinforcing the white male breadwinner home, for creating organizations such as the Federal Housing Administration that helped segregate America through redlining, for not supporting anti-lynching legislation, for not ensuring that the New Deal programs benefited minorities on a more equal basis, and for the internment of Japanese Americans. Even David Kennedy’s comprehensive history of the period is critical of Roosevelt on some margins.

Although some historians have criticized FDR, most of the historiography of Roosevelt gives him a pass on the abuse of civil liberties during his administrations and hails him as a champion of democracy often citing his soaring rhetoric and the Four Freedoms. In reality, as Beito demonstrates, Roosevelt’s liberalism did not lead him to care about Americans’ civil liberties and he violated the Bill of Rights time and time again while in office. […]

Roosevelt was not a passive and reactive participant in these events and his racist views of Japanese people influenced his later policies. In 1925, FDR wrote that “anyone who has travelled in the Far East knows that the mingling of Asiatic blood with European or American blood produces, in nine cases out of ten, the most unfortunate results.” In 1935, he insisted to a delegation that aggression “was in the blood” of Japan’s leaders. In 1936, when visiting Hawaii and thinking about the interactions between Japanese sailors and Japanese Americans on the islands, the president insisted that “every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp.”

After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt ignored information that did not confirm his negative view of Japanese Americans and instead “sought out, and then amplified beyond all proportion, statements or anecdotes that conveyed, at least in his own mind, a more negative impression.” For instance, Roosevelt received one report from his secret intelligence unit that insisted that Japanese Americans were no “more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with whom we went to war.” In another report, FDR ignored its conclusion that at least ninety percent of Japanese Americans “were completely loyal to the United States.”