IF YOU INTRODUCE A NUKE IN ACT ONE...:

The point is that taking action against Putin even though he uses nuclear weapons has risks, but not taking action also has risks. They are just a little bit further down the road.

This does not justify any and all calls to arms. Sending long-range Russian surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300s in NATO arsenals would make it more complicated for Putin to launch a missile with a nuclear warhead, and such transfers are receiving more support, since there are reports of Ukrainian defenses intercepting missiles. But Putin can salvo missile launches within which one missile has a nuclear warhead, and the defender may not know which to shoot at. What else can be done without undue risk?

The formidable array of U.S. systems that can detect the launch of missiles should be on high alert. U.S. systems, such as the AEGIS anti-missile system, should also be on high readiness.

But what if a nuclear warhead gets through and detonates on Ukrainian soil? We should still rely on nuclear deterrence to prevent Putin from using nuclear weapons on a larger scale. It may be possible if difficult to keep a war limited after one nuclear weapon is used. If Putin uses many, he knows that Russia will certainly face nuclear retaliation. But that logic suggests that the United States could turn the table on Putin. If he invades a non-NATO country and uses a nuclear weapon, the gloves should be off with regard to NATO non-nuclear military strikes against Russian military forces in Ukraine and Belarus. The political goal should be--must be--to deny a nuclear aggressor victory, because the global consequences would be dire.

In short, standing up to a Putin who used a nuclear weapon is risky. Living in a world in which there are many nuclear Putins may be even more risky. We should decide which risk is more acceptable, and prepare accordingly.

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