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Sunnis Appear to Fall Short in Iraq Vote (LEE KEATH, Oct 16, 2005, AP)

Iraq's landmark constitution seemed assured of passage Sunday after initial results showed minority Sunni Arabs had fallen short in an effort to veto it at the polls. The apparent acceptance was a major step in the attempt to establish a democratic government that could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Opponents failed to secure the necessary two-thirds "no" vote in any three of Iraqi's 18 provinces, according to counts that local officials provided to The Associated Press. In the crucial central provinces with mixed ethnic and religious populations, enough Shiites and Kurds voted to stymie the Sunni bid to reject the constitution. [...]

The Sunni "no" campaign appeared to have made the two-thirds threshold in Anbar province, the vast western Sunni heartland; and Salahuddin, where Sunnis hold a large majority and as many as 90 percent of voters cast ballots.

But in two other provinces where Sunni Arabs have only slim majorities Ninevah and Diyala the "yes" vote won out.

Can't wait to hear how analysts explain their way out of the box they built: were Sunni in those provinces not even the majority that's claimed or were they supportive enough of the constitution to help pass it?

MORE:
Iraq's Sunnis must recognise new realities (Daily Telegraph, 17/10/2005)

[L]et us try a thought experiment. Forget the war, disregard the continuing occupation and instead ask, in the abstract, what kind of constitution Iraq ought to have. Our starting point must be the synthetic nature of the Iraqi state, which ropes together three large, distinct communities, as well as Turcomans, Armenians, Syriacs and others. From this fact, much follows. Unable to appeal to a shared civic patriotism, successive Iraqi regimes have ruled by elevating one group - Sunni Arabs - over the others. Today, the lack of a common identity has reduced Iraq to an almost Hobbesian condition, in which the forces of order have been supplanted by sectarian militias.

The way to address this problem is to recognise that Iraq is a plurality of peoples. This is precisely what the new constitution does. It was drawn up by Iraqis themselves, rather than foisted on them by a foreign power (as in 1925) or a revolutionary clique (as in 1958). Faithful to the aspirations of Iraq's communities, it disperses power. And a good thing, too. Everyone benefits if decisions are taken close to the people they affect.

To those who are chiefly interested in vindicating their opposition to the war, of course, none of this matters. The rejectionism of those who did well under Saddam is presented as a fundamental objection to the entire scheme. To see quite how odd this is, cast your mind back to the end of apartheid in South Africa. Then, too, the electoral process was disrupted by irreconcilable supporters of the old regime. But Western commentators never saw Boer grievances as an argument against democracy.

The truth is that a number of Sunni Arabs - notably those who were active Ba'athists - have yet to make the mental adjustment that their new status demands. Deep down, they still feel entitled to run the whole country. In much the same way, a number of Indian Muslims argued, in the 1930s, that, since the British had taken India from the Moguls, the entire subcontinent ought to be handed back to them. In time, of course, they realised that they would be better served by an autonomous Muslim polity. By the same token, Sunni Arabs will one day bless the federalism that their leaders currently decry. For, though they have yet to accept it, they are the minority now.

Posted by Orrin Judd at October 16, 2005 7:34 PM