May 13, 2005

WHEN REALITY INTRUDES:

Force Requirements in Stability Operations (JAMES T. QUINLIVAN, Winter 1995, Parameters)

Military requirements for the post-Cold War environment are the central question of a large, somewhat disorganized, debate. The concept of conducting frequent and extended "peace operations" has produced a significant effort to understand both their political context and their military requirements. One category of peace operations, interventions to restore and maintain order and stability, continues its prominence as current news and as a recurring theme in nightmare visions of the future.

It is sometimes difficult to anticipate the force size and the time required to restore and maintain order in a failed or failing state. The force size is driven by two demographic revolutions of the last decades: dramatic growth in the populations of troubled states, and the movement of a considerable portion of that population to the cities. The movement from rural to urban settings is so significant that the populations of some cities exceeds that of many states. The duration of such operations is affected both by their inherent difficulty and by the implicit need in most cases to recreate internal forces of order. Duration adds another dimension, defined by the force available to conduct the intervention and the duration of each unit's stay in the region.

This article investigates the numbers required for stability operations, both for entire countries and individual cities, and explores the implications of those numbers for deployment, rotation, readiness, and personnel retention.

Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, defines the general concept of "peace operations." Within the broader category, "peace enforcement" is further defined as

the application of armed force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to authorization, to compel compliance with sanctions or resolutions--the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.[1]

Within the general definition of peace enforcement, "restoration and maintenance of order and stability" are those peace enforcement activities in which

Military forces may be employed to restore order and stability within a state or region where competent civil authority has ceased to function. They may be called upon to assist in the maintenance of order and stability in areas where it is threatened, where the loss of order and stability threatens international stability, or where human rights are endangered.[2]

In this article, the term "stability operations" refers to operations in which security forces (combining military, paramilitary, and police forces) carry out operations for the restoration and maintenance of order and stability.[3]

The Problem of Numbers in Stability Operations

There are no simple answers to the question of how many troops are required for any sort of military operations. However, the purpose of stability operations--to create an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions could be carried out--suggests that the number of troops required is determined by the size of populations. This section discusses the general rationale for such an approach, illustrates the range of force numbers that have been used in military operations that seem to correspond to the definition of stability operations, and suggests implications for current population sizes in operations now described as peace enforcement.

From the start, practitioners of counterinsurgency have been clear in stating that the number of soldiers required to counter guerrillas has had very little to do with the number of guerrillas. As Richard Clutterbuck wrote of Malaya in 1966,

Much nonsense is heard on the subject of tie-down ratios in guerrilla warfare--that 10 to 12 government troops are needed to tie down a single guerrilla, for instance. This is a dangerous illusion, arising from a disregard of the facts.[4]

Conversely, a "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency campaign places the focus on the people, the military consequences of which are requirements for population control measures and local security of the population. Population control measures and local security both demand security force numbers proportional to the population. The static forces that protect the population from insurgents and cut off any support the population might provide to them are essential to the campaign. Consequently, in any stability operation it is almost certain that the force devoted to establishing order will be both larger in numerical terms than the forces dedicated to field combat and more aligned to political aspects of a "heart-and-minds" concept of operations.

This requirement for forces other than in the jungle or its equivalent is a general condition. Over a range of stability operations in which opposition has not progressed to the stage of mobile warfare by main force units, the size of stabilizing forces is determined by the size of the population and the level of protection or control that must be provided within the state. Simply generating forces does not guarantee success. Forces in a stability operation serve a broader political-military approach than simply countering or eliminating insurgencies. The ability to generate forces for a stability or peace enforcement operation is a most necessary condition for success--for even successful political strategies in such situations have a military component. The generation of forces is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving stabilizing objectives.

This proposition is illustrated rather than proven through some historical examples, each of which is described briefly below. Figure 1, below, shows historical cases of forces devoted to particular stability operations.
Figure 1.

The figure relates force size to population, showing the security force size per thousand of population. The figure portrays a range of situations, from enforcing the laws in a generally ordered society to situations of maintaining order where the rule of law has collapsed. The numbers shown are simply the aggregated number of police and army (the "security forces") used in particular cases to achieve results that do not always equate to "victory" or "success." The cases are suggestive rather than definitive, but they provide a sense of scale for the resources required in various situations.

• Force ratios of one to four per thousand of population. At the low end of the force requirement scale are the police present day-to-day in generally peaceful populations such as the United States. Overall, the United States is policed at a ratio of about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand of population. If the ratio is calculated to include the civilian support apparatus of police departments, the ratio increases to 3.1 law enforcement personnel per thousand.[5] Similar numbers are found in the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) and other European countries.

There are applications of numbers of this scale to military stability operations. The occupation of Germany immediately after the surrender used nine US divisions in the American Zone. In October 1945, policy changed and the operation shifted to a "police-type" occupation. This change led to the creation of the United States Constabulary (organized as a single large division) charged with the internal security of most of the American Zone of Occupation. The constabulary was created on the basis of one constable for every 450 German civilians (2.2 per thousand).[6] The force was entirely adequate to its limited objectives of enforcing public order, controlling black market transactions, and related police functions.

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) deployed about 20,000 security forces (16,000 troops and 3600 civilian police) for a variety of duties that included supervision of the cease-fire and voluntary disarmament of combatants, supervision of about 60,000 indigenous police to provide law and order, and administration of a free and fair election. In a population of roughly 9.1 million, the UN force had a force ratio of about 2.2 per thousand of population. By itself, the UN did not have a presence outside of large population centers nor a plausible capability for coercion, control, or protection of either the combatant factions or the civilian population.

• Force ratios of four to ten per thousand of population. A number of operations have used security and military forces at such force ratios:

Ongoing operations in India's Punjab state against Sikh militants deploy a security force of about 115,000 (regular troops, paramilitary security formations, and police) to secure a population of about 20.2 million, giving a force ratio of 5.7 per thousand.[7] The counterinsurgency campaign in the Punjab has been denounced as routinely violating human rights by causing hundreds of disappearances and summary executions. In the face of some popular support for the insurgents, even such a harshly punitive campaign has required large forces to protect and coerce.[8]

In 1965, the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic to stave off an incipient civil war. The United States deployed soldiers and Marines to separate the protagonists and assumed responsibility for stability in much of the country, particularly the capital. Peak deployment of US forces brought 24,000 to stabilize a population of about 3.6 million, giving a force ratio of about 6.6 troops per thousand.[9]

• Force ratios above ten per thousand of population. Force ratios above ten per thousand have been mounted in stability operations. In 1952 the British forces in the Malayan Emergency deployed close to 40,000 regular troops from Britain and the Commonwealth as well as the regulars of the Malay Regiment itself.[10] At the same time, the police force had 29,800 regular police together with 41,300 special constables,[11] for a total full-time security force of more than 111,000. With a population at the time of 5,506,000, the British generated a force ratio of about 20 per thousand of population. If the Home Guard force of 210,000 (1953 strength, not all of whom were either armed or active at any given time) were added to the previous figure, the force ratio would be even higher.

In Northern Ireland the British government deployed for more than 25 years a security force of around 32,000 (including both British military forces and the Royal Ulster Constabulary) to secure a total population of just over 1.6 million, giving a force ratio of about 20 per thousand. The British have recently reduced their military forces as part of an ongoing peace process.

Implications of Force Ratios Based on Population

These population-driven force ratios have a number of implications. For total populations, they imply that stability operations could demand large numbers of peacekeeping forces. For urban populations, they suggest that initial commitments could also be large. Finally, these ratios indicate that long-term commitments might be difficult to sustain without exacting unacceptable tolls on readiness or retention.

Implications for Entire Populations

The populations of countries in the underdeveloped world have expanded markedly relative to the population of the United States. More particularly, the populations of Third World countries have expanded even more dramatically relative to the size of the American military.

Figure 2, below, shows the population of various states on the framework used in Figure 1 to illustrate the historic force requirements for stabilization operations.

The figure suggests two implications. First, very few states have populations so small that they could be stabilized with modest-sized forces. Second, a number of states have populations so large that they are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces. Between the two extremes are countries large enough that only substantial efforts on the part of great powers or substantial contributions from many states could generate forces large enough to overcome serious disorder in such populations. Consider, however, that even many of these countries have populations so large that relatively modest per capita force deployments would entail moving, sustaining, and employing tens of thousands of troops in what the Army calls a "bare-base environment." The more rustic the environment, the larger the logistics tail needed to sustain the force.


And so, the obvious question arises: how was a Germany of 80 million people going to subjugate and control a Soviet Union of 180 million peoiple that stretched all the way to the Pacific? Nevermind retaining control of the rest of Europe? And, if we strain credulity, having done so what sort of threat could it conceivably pose with all its time, energy, resources, and men devoted to this futile task?

Posted by Orrin Judd at May 13, 2005 10:54 AM
Comments

It could only be justified if you believed you represented the 'master race' or the 'vanguard of the proletariat' and that history was a 'science' and it's unfolding could be determined rationally. In other words if you're nuts.

Posted by: Tom C., Stamford,Ct. at May 13, 2005 11:01 AM

OJ:

IIRC, the Pripet Marshes practically bisect Russia, and make a formidable natural barrier.

Meaning control all the way to the Pacific would be unnecessary.

Finally, the manual cite above is predicated on avoiding slaughter, not a particularly prominent part of Nazi theology.

Posted by: Jeff Guinn at May 13, 2005 11:30 AM

The post is a giant non sequetor.

Hitler had no plans to "subjugate" the Slavs. He intended to exterminate them. You do know there is a difference between the two don't you?

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 11:30 AM

daniel - Hitler intended to exterminate a lot of people, including all Christians. But he was politic enough not to reveal his intentions or to attempt all exterminations at once. Any revelation that he intended to exterminate the Slavs would have inspired fierce resistance - think the Warsaw ghetto, multiplied a thousandfold in numbers.

Posted by: pj at May 13, 2005 11:41 AM

Hitler didn't want the entire Soviet Union. He was interested in a long term Lebensraum in Europe. So we're talking to the Urals here. He wanted the farmlands of Ukraine and the oilfields of the Causcasus, not Central Asia or Siberia. 20 million Russians died in the war. In case of victory, up this number.

In a German victory, there would be no need for Hitler to occupy much of Europe. There were already plenty of collaborators, and a Nazi victory would increase that. So no troops in France, the Low Countries or Scandinavia. Hitler also had plenty of allies in Eastern Europe: Hungarians, Croatians, Bulgarians, and Romanians. They can occupy themselves. What's left? Serbia and Greece? Even assuming need for troops, let Italy handle them for their reward as allies.

So we're only talking European Russia here. And even now the size and numbers are deceiving. The Finns and Baltics were all ostensible allies and sufficiently Aryan. There's also plenty of restive groups the Nazis can temporarily favor as well as larger groups who can actively collaborate, such as the Volga Germans.

I don't know the full details of the intended occupation in the East, but it would involve "rewarding" German veterans, especially SS, with land in the east. Presumably long term colonization would be helped through increased births from the Lebensborn program.

How successful would this be? And more important what would it mean for the US? Too many unknowns to fully guess.

However, we do know that the entire European economy is now integrated to support the Nazi war machine. Hitler now has control over both the Ploesti and Caucasus oil fields, as well as much influence in the Middle East. The prestige of victory bolsters support in not only his wartime allies, but all over Europe. Highly likely the returning Waffen SS recruits from Holland, Norway, France, etc. increase their countrie's allegiance to Hitler's New Order. Plus it will now be much harder for neutrals like Turkey, Sweden, or Spain to not be more pro-Hitler. And of course Germany has ballistic rockets and jets which the US doesn't have. And assuming the US still proves atomic weaponry is feasible, Hitler fires Heisenberg and puts someone better in charge of their atomic weapon program.

Seems to be me that even considering some troubles in the East, Hitler's resources are now greatly increased. In twenty years he took a defeated, dejected country and made them masters of Europe and prosperous to boot. He "saved" civilization from Bolshevism. I don't expect a fall in support anytime soon.

Posted by: Chris Durnell at May 13, 2005 11:54 AM

PJ, what would "fierce resistance" accomplish against a man-made famine similar to the Ukrainian genocide of the 1930s?

Fierce resistance by guerrillas in Warsaw was crushed in a matter of days by a defeated and retreating German army. Any modern urban area is only a few days from mass starvation. Establishing a cordon around a rebellious city reduces the inhabitants to cannibalism and rat eating in a matter of days. Disease sweeping through a population weakend by starvation does the rest.

Fierce resistance to occupation forces in Europe was a myth (except for Tito's guerillas). Collaboration was the reality. The countryside of eastern Europe is flat and provides no cover for guerilla operations. Kill sweeps by einzatsgruppen and later by the NKVD easily exterminated guerillas by exterminating the populations they relied on.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 11:56 AM

WTF? I can't make heads or tails of that post.

Posted by: Pepys at May 13, 2005 11:57 AM

Chris,

All very good points. Had Germany won, by the 1950s the few remaining Slavs would have either escaped east of the Urals, be living like hunted animals hiding in the countryside or reduced to helot status on German plantations.

Mostly they'd be dead.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 12:01 PM

In a German victory, there would be no need for Hitler to occupy much of Europe. There were already plenty of collaborators, and a Nazi victory would increase that.

As a quick follow up to your point Chris, please note that collaboration was so extensive in Beligum (starting with its pro-German king) the Nazis required only a dozen admininstrators to manage occupied Belgium.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 12:10 PM

Gee, what a hard question.

How did Britain control 170 million Indians with 1,000 civil servants?

I guess that never happened.

Posted by: Harry Eagar at May 13, 2005 12:20 PM

Likewise, we "controlled" Hiroshima and Nagasaki in one day each, with no civil servants.

Posted by: h-man at May 13, 2005 12:41 PM

Harry;

so now you';re comparing the Soviets--who you yesterday had fightimng ;like tigers to defend their East German possessions--reduced to a docile Third World people under benign rule? Boy, you really do believe socialism superior to democracy.

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 12:46 PM

Jeff:

So the Russians regroup on the other side and the Germans can afford to leave them there as overstretched as they are?

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 12:48 PM

h;

Yes, that's how we could have controlled Moscow, though not all of Russia.

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 12:52 PM

daniel:

No, what's the difference in terms of logistics and manpower?

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 12:55 PM

No, what's the difference in terms of logistics and manpower?

The difference between what? The engineered famine was accomplished with a handfull of Chekists. Compared to the logistical requirements of the Holocaust (especially in terms of people killed) the Ukrainian famine was far more efficient.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 1:34 PM

There was nothing especially benign about the Raj, but most of the policing was done by the indigenes.

The Germans easily recruited millions of USSR citizens, the 'hiwis.' The death camp guards were not usually German. Orthodox Christian Jew bashers were easily recruited.

In most empires, the imperial possessor is interested in maintaining most of the conquered as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The Germans were unusual in that respect. They wanted to murder everybody.

It does not take a lot of manpower to police the dead..

Posted by: Harry Eagar at May 13, 2005 1:48 PM

Hitler also had plenty of allies in Eastern Europe: Hungarians, Croatians, Bulgarians, and Romanians. They can occupy themselves.

That is a useful reminder to those who bemoan the fate of the so-called victims of eastern Europe.

Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria were minor Axis allies of Hitler and participated in the invasion of Russia.

The Poland of 1939 was an anti-Semitic, fascist military junta. It was not a democracy. The Poles, Balts, Ukrainians and other Eastern Europeans actively and enthusiastically participated in rounding up the Jews for the Holocaust. One of the dirty little secrets of WWII is just how popular the Nazi's anti-Jewish policies were throughout occupied Europe. From Ukrainian concentration camp guards to Vichy police officials, the occupied peoples of Europe happliy helped with the Holocaust.

The only Axis member with clean hands was Finland, and they were not occupied by the Soviets.

We Americans owed the peoples of Eastern Europe nothing in 1945. They were either the enemy or collaborated with the enemy. We had no obligations to them whatsoever.

Posted by: at May 13, 2005 1:53 PM

Scenario 1: A complete Nazi victory over the Soviets. Probable outcome: something similar to the Cold War, with Nazi hegemony over many nations much like the Soviet Union's, maintained through collaborators and puppet dictatorships supported by Nazi army divisions. But the fall of the Soviets would have prevented later Communist victories in China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. So we would have lost a few hundred million Europeans to tyranny, while gaining a billion Asians to liberty.

And then we would have won the Cold War against the Nazis the same way we won it against the Soviets, and now the whole world would be free, instead of China and other Communist backwaters posing a continuing threat.

Scenario 2: give the Soviets just enough aid to stave off the Nazis, while defeating Japan in the Pacific first. Soviet-Nazi stalemate exhausts both. We get nuclear bombs and dictate settlement terms to both: Communism lives in the Soviet Union but all Europe is free. Then we win the Cold War as we did.

These are at least plausible scenarios. Now, I agree that these might be worse for many Jews than what happened. However, the time to help the Jews was the 1930s, not 1945. FDR refused to give them a haven. The fate of the Jews cannot be used to rehabilitate FDR's WWII decisions.

Posted by: pj at May 13, 2005 1:56 PM

This is all very interesting, but I still have no idea what Orrin was trying to say in the original post.

Posted by: Pepys at May 13, 2005 2:34 PM

But the fall of the Soviets would have prevented later Communist victories in China

That is flat out wrong.

Stalin advised Mao not to try to take over China, he didn't think Mao could win (and he didn't want a rival Communist super state). Mao ignored Stalin and beat the incometent, decrepit and corrupt Nationalists all by himself.

No matter what the outcome in Europe, it had no effect on China. Mao would have won no matter what happened in Europe.

Scenario 2: give the Soviets just enough aid to stave off the Nazis, while defeating Japan in the Pacific first. Soviet-Nazi stalemate exhausts both. We get nuclear bombs and dictate settlement terms to both: Communism lives in the Soviet Union but all Europe is free. Then we win the Cold War as we did.

Whoa there cowboy. How does a stalemate result in the destruction of Nazism?

As for Lend Lease, while helpful, the Russians beat the germans on their own. What aid we sent them via Persia and Murmansk was a drop in the bucket compared to there own war production.

The one exception being medium and heavy trucks. Without these trucks the Red Army would not have been nearly so mobile as it was in the later stages of the war. The stunning success of Operation Bagration (the destruction of Army Group Center which occured at about the same time as the Normandy landings) was made possible by American trucks.

So if you want a stalemate on the Eastern Front, don't give the Russians more. Given them nothing.


Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 2:49 PM

daniel:

Nuking Moscow would have had no effect on whether other nations chose communism under similar threat? tee-hee...

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 3:32 PM

What does nuking Moscow have to do with the point I was responding to, PJ's scenario of a Nazi victory over Russia?

And what exactly is the difference between millions of people being killed by Stalin and millions of people being killed by OJ?

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 3:57 PM

Daniel: Lend lease, particularly in 41, 42 and 43, allowed the Russians to keep fighting and to ramp up their own production. It was not by any measure a minor factor. In particular, we supplied enough food to feed 12 million men for the entire war and about 40% of the explosives for the ammunition that the Russans used. The planes we supplied early in the war robbed the Germans of air superiority. The steel and trucks we supplied were the only reason the Russans were able to produce much in the way of armor. The trucks, in particular, were the equivalent of giving them a fully staffed, supplied and equiped light truck manufacturing facility. The Russians did the fighting and the dying, and more power to them, but Lend Lease was probably a necessary component of that victory.

Posted by: David Cohen at May 13, 2005 4:11 PM

Lend Lease may have been a necessary compnent of victory, but it wasn't necessary to prevent defeat. From an operational analysis:

The subject of Lend-Lease and other aid to Soviet Union during W.W.II has been the subject of considerable discussion. Opinions vary, even amongst the Russians, as to the effect of this Allied assistance on the Eastern Front.

The first question to be considered is; did Lend-Lease prevent the defeat of the Soviet Union? Probably not, the most important defensive battles were fought and won, before the arrival of large amounts of Allied aid. The survival of the Soviet Union was secured essentially with its own resources. The campaigns during the summer to the end of 1942, were definitely influenced by the Lend-Lease materials received until the Soviets production was brought up to capacity and then was further enhanced.

This brings forward the final question to be considered. Was Lend-Lease the factor that enabled the Soviets to win their war with Germany? A qualified yes. An examination of the types and volume of aid the Russians received very strongly supports this view. The enhancements to all aspects of Soviet mobility provided by large numbers of U.S. trucks can not be overstated. Most importantly, the Soviet logistics system was considerably augmented by the large numbers of trucks received. Each successive Soviet offensive launched in the second half of the war required longer and longer preparation times. This was primarily due to logistics difficulties caused by longer and longer lines of supply. Any serious reduction of the number of trucks available would have increased greatly the preparation time for each Soviet offensive.

Soviet ammunition shortages were almost entirely eliminated by Lend-Lease shipments of munitions. Were these shipments not made, ammunition supplies would have been an inordinately large factor in Soviet doctrine and planning. The resulting shortages of ammunition would certainly have led to even further delays of Russian offensives. Allied transfers of non-military items, such as food, enabled the Soviets to release large amounts of manpower for direct military use. This made it possible for the Russians to stave off manpower shortages until late in the war. All things considered without Lend-Lease the Soviet Union would probably have only been able to liberate its own territory by the time the Allies eventually defeated Germany.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 4:21 PM

daniel:

Dead Russians to create a Communist dictatorship is bad. Dead Russians to end one is good.

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 4:21 PM

daniel:

Yes, even absent Lend Lease Hitler couldn't take Russia, as we've been saying. But absent Lend Lease and a Western Front Stalin couldn't have taken Hitler either.

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 4:29 PM

Containment (what we actually did) to end Communist rule without any dead Russians was even better.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 13, 2005 4:32 PM

Daniel: Wargamer.com? Seriously?

I prefer to stand with Marshall Zhukov, who said:

Speaking about our readiness for war from the point of view of the economy and economics, one cannot be silent about such a factor as the subsequent help from the Allies. First of all, certainly, from the American side, because in that respect the English helped us minimally. In an analysis of all facets of the war, one must not leave this out of one's reckoning. We would have been in a serious condition without American gunpowder, and could not have turned out the quantity of ammunition which we needed. Without American "Studebekkers", we could have dragged our artillery nowhere. Yes, in general, to a considerable degree they provided our front transport. The output of special steel, necessary for the most diverse necessities of war, were also connected to a series of American deliveries.

Or, better yet, Zhukov as secretly recorded by the state security organs in 1963 and discovered in his file after the fall of the USSR:

It is now said that the Allies never helped us . . . However, one cannot deny that the Americans gave us so much material, without which we could not have formed our reserves and could not have continued the war . . . we had no explosives and powder. There was none to equip rifle bullets. The Americans actually came to our assistance with powder and explosives. And how much sheet steel did they give us? We really could not have quickly put right our production of tanks if the Americans had not helped with steel. And today it seems as though we had all this ourselves in abundance.

Posted by: David Cohen at May 13, 2005 4:47 PM

Containment = Zero Dead Russians but also = 45,000 Dead Americans in Vietnam = Many Dead Americans in Korea. Not to mention the costs to our economy and society to maintain it over 50 years.

Containment may have worked out all right in the end but that did not make it a wise policy.

Posted by: Bob at May 13, 2005 4:48 PM

Containment was in fact a disaster domestically.

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 4:53 PM

David:

Now you've done, we'll need the soft restraints for Harry...

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 4:54 PM

I hate the Germans as much as any but to think that even Hitler wanted to or could kill every Slav is flat out wrong. Look at the numbers of civilans actually killed. Other than Jews, no majority of any large population was exterminated, not even in Russia.

The Germans certainly wanted to reduce these people to slavery but who would have worked in the mines or worked in the factories or grown the wheat?

Posted by: Bob at May 13, 2005 5:00 PM

In the Yalta threads, DD thought the Russians were invincible. Now they couldn't have even beaten the Germans without Lend Lease. Sort of proves OJs points.

Posted by: Bob at May 13, 2005 5:06 PM

Germany failed to defeat the USSR in September-October 1941. Lend Lease had nothing to do with that.

Without Lend-Lease, the death struggle would have lasted a lot longer -- to Orrin's glee, I guess -- but the outcome would not have changed -- Germany would never have defeated Russia. As Manstein says, Germany's best hope was for stalemate in the east, a standdown and organization of her conquests in the west.

Eventually, Russia would have rolled Germany out of Russia, Poland etc.

The US could, by then, have dropped Abombs here and there, though it is insane to think that it would have.

But that's hindsight. Orrin is wrong to say that Americans did not want war in Europe. My father, among many, chose a military career before Pearl Harbor because he opposed the dictators.

By the time he had helped dispose of 3 of them, the 4th was too powerful to attack.

Orrin's views boil down to this: bolshevism wa so weak it had to fall of its own dead weight, but it was strong it was worth destroying half of Europe to get rid of it.

Anonymous's point that no one would have seen any reason to fight for Eastern Europeans is right both in prospect and in retrospect.

No one at the time thought it worth the bones of a Pomeranian or any other kind of grenadier for those evil, hopeless countries; and knowing what we know now, nobody's opinion needs to be revised.

Posted by: Harry Eagar at May 13, 2005 5:18 PM

My grandparents opposed war in Europe. So that's 80-20%

Posted by: oj at May 13, 2005 5:44 PM

I know I'm a little late to this, but doesn't preventing the extermination of the Jews of Europe count as a reason to have gotten involved, even if that reason was unknown at the time. Not to mention femme gays, gypsys, and other undesirables.

While it's a pity that we couldn't save the Kulaks, too, you have to pick your battles.

Am I hearing what I think I'm hearing up there? Tell me this is an academic exercise.

Posted by: Seven Machos at May 14, 2005 1:53 AM

Seriously David.

Before you go all ad hominem on me, kindly take the time to actually read the article and review its impressive list of source documentation.

The reality remains as follows:

The Nazis failed to defeat the Russians ouside of Moscow before America was even in the war.

The Russians defeated the Germans at Stalingrad a year later before Lend Lease supplies were significant. At this point the Germans could not have defeated Russia.

Once Lend Lease became significant, the critical supply was medium and heavy trucks. These made true mobile operations for the Red Army possible, operations like Bagration in the Summer of 1944.

Without Lend Lease, logisitical constraints would have slowed down and limited the extent of any Soviet counter-offensive. As such it is doubtful that the Russians would have reached Berlin before the Americans.

Unless, however, the Wehrmacht transfered more divisions from defending against the ponderous Russians to stop the rapid Americans. In which case, the war would have lasted until 1946, with greater loss of Allied lives - including American GIs.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 14, 2005 7:12 AM

Containment = Zero Dead Russians but also = 45,000 Dead Americans in Vietnam = Many Dead Americans in Korea.

Do you think America would have been able to go to war with Russia in 1945 and not suffer any casualties?

Not to mention the costs to our economy and society to maintain it over 50 years.

So how much is a human life worth to you in terms of percentage of GNP? Do you really think we would have no world wide military committments and costs after WWII? Do you really think America could have returned to a pre-war isolationism?

Containment was in fact a disaster domestically.

How so?

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 14, 2005 8:01 AM

Containment = Zero Dead Russians but also = 45,000 Dead Americans in Vietnam = Many Dead Americans in Korea.

Do you think America would have been able to go to war with Russia in 1945 and not suffer any casualties?

Not to mention the costs to our economy and society to maintain it over 50 years.

So how much is a human life worth to you in terms of percentage of GNP? Do you really think we would have no world wide military committments and costs after WWII? Do you really think America could have returned to a pre-war isolationism?

Containment was in fact a disaster domestically.

How so? How many people did containment kill domestically?

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 14, 2005 8:02 AM

In the Yalta threads, DD thought the Russians were invincible. Now they couldn't have even beaten the Germans without Lend Lease. Sort of proves OJs points.

Bob, your historical ignorance doth exceedeth OJ's. The massive victorious Red Army of 1945 and the Yalta was not the same animal as the battered and decimated defenders of 1941.

Posted by: daniel duffy at May 14, 2005 8:16 AM

Seven:

No. No one is saying it wasn't good that Hitler was stopped from killing Jews, gypsies, Christians, etc. before he was finished. But since we didn't fight him in order to stop him the question is was fighting him at the cost of merely replacing him with Stalin the best course of action.

Posted by: oj at May 14, 2005 8:17 AM

We Americans owed the peoples of Eastern Europe nothing in 1945. They were either the enemy or collaborated with the enemy. We had no obligations to them whatsoever.

Nobody except Harry has addressed this point, and he agreed with it.

Any of you Nazi lovers, er I mean FDR haters, care to dispute this point?


Posted by: daniel duffy at May 14, 2005 8:20 AM

daniel:

Yes, well into the 50s we could have done the regime without American casualties.

Yes, we've always returned to a fairly non-interventionist posture. It's impossible to put a dollar figure on the 100 million dead we allowed the Communists after WWII.

45 million so far.

The Russians are magicvally transformed into mythical fighting beastsat the precise point FDR, Harry and daniel choose to feed them Eastern Europe...

Yes, I'll address it. FDR made the same point at Yalta--he too hated the Germans, Poles and other Eastern Europeans and pretty much figured they deserved whatever they got. May as well have let Hitler do it.

Posted by: oj at May 14, 2005 8:27 AM
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