August 29, 2004
LET SLEEPING REASON LIE:
The Sleep of Reason: a review of Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (Thomas Nagel, The New Republic)
Although Sokal and Bricmont focus on the abuse and misrepresentation of science by a dozen French intellectuals, and the cognitive relativism of postmodern theory, it broaches a much larger topic -- the uneasy place of science and the understanding of scientific rationality in contemporary culture.The technological consequences of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology permeate our lives, and everyone who has been around for a few decades has witnessed the most spectacular developments. That alone would give science enormous prestige; but it also reinforces the purely intellectual aura of science as a domain of understanding that takes us far beyond common sense, by methods that are often far more reliable than common sense. The problem is that it is not easy for those without scientific training to acquire a decent grasp of this kind of understanding, as opposed to an awareness of its consequences and an ability to parrot some of its terminology. One can be infatuated with the idea of theory without understanding what a theory is.
To have a theory, it is not enough to throw around a set of abstract terms or to classify things under different labels. A theory, whether it is true or false, has to include some general principles by which fresh consequences can be inferred from particular facts -- consequences not already implied by the initial description of those facts. The most familiar theories embody causal principles that enable us to infer from present observation what will happen or what has happened, but there are other kinds of theories -- mathematical, linguistic, or ethical theories, for example -- that describe noncausal systematic relations. A successful theory increases one's cognitive power over its domain, one's power to understand why the particular facts are as they are, and to discover new facts by inference from others that one can observe directly. Most important of all, it provides an understanding of the unifying reality that underlies observed diversity.
You don't have to understand quantum mechanics to appreciate the nature of science. Anyone who has taken introductory chemistry and is familiar with the periodic table of the elements has some idea of how powerful a theory can be -- what an extraordinary wealth of specific consequences can be derived from a limited number of precise but general principles. And understanding classical chemistry requires only a basic spatial imagination and simple mathematics, nothing counterintuitive. But it should be clear that not everything in the world is governed by general principles sufficiently precise and substantive to be embodied in a theory. Theories in the social sciences are possible which depend on principles, even if they are only probabilistic, that apply to large numbers of people; but to employ theoretical-sounding jargon in talking about literature or art has about as much effect as putting on a lab coat, and in most cases the same is true for history.
Unfortunately, the lack of familiarity with real scientific theories sometimes results in imitation of their outward forms together with denigration of their claim to provide a specially powerful source of objective knowledge about the world. This defensive iconoclasm has received crucial support from a radical position in the history and philosophy of science, whose authority is regularly invoked by writers outside those fields: the epistemological relativism or even anarchism found in the writings of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.
As Sokal and Bricmont explain, Kuhn and Feyerabend were writing in the context of an ongoing dispute over the relation of scientific theories to empirical evidence. The logical positivists tried to interpret scientific propositions so that they would be entailed by the evidence of experience. Karl Popper denied that this was possible, but held that scientific propositions, if they were to have empirical content, had to be such that at least their falsehood could be entailed by the evidence of experience. Yet neither of these direct logical relations appears to hold, because the evidentiary relation pro or con between any experience and any theoretical claim always involves auxiliary hypotheses -- things apart from the proposition and the evidence themselves that are being assumed true or false. There is nothing wrong with relying on many assumptions in the ordinary case, but it is always logically possible that some of them may be false, and sometimes that conclusion is forced on us with regard to an assumption that had seemed obvious. When that happens with a truly fundamental aspect of our world view, we speak of a scientific revolution.
So far, none of this implies that scientific reasoning is not objective, or that it cannot yield knowledge of reality. All it means is that a scientific inference from evidence to the truth or falsity of any proposition involves in some degree our whole system of beliefs and experience; and that the method is not logical deduction alone, but a weighing of which elements of the system it is most reasonable to retain and which to abandon when an inconsistency among them appears. In normal inquiry, this is usually easy to determine; but at the cutting edge it is often difficult, and a clear answer may have to await the experimental production of further evidence, or the construction of new theoretical hypotheses.
This means that most of our beliefs at any time must in some degree be regarded as provisional, since they may be replaced when a different balance of reasons is generated by new experience or theoretical ingenuity. It also means that an eternal set of rules of scientific method cannot be laid down in advance. But it does not mean that it cannot be true that a certain theory is the most reasonable to accept given the evidence available at a particular time, and it does not mean that the theory cannot be objectively true, however provisionally we may hold it. Truth is not the same as certainty, or universal acceptance.
Another point sometimes made against the claim of scientific objectivity is that experience is always "theory-laden," as if that meant that any experience which seemed to contradict a theory could be reinterpreted in terms of it, so that nothing could ever rationally require us to accept or reject a theory. [...]
As Sokal and Bricmont point out, the denial of objective truth on the ground that all systems of belief are determined by social forces is self-refuting if we take it seriously, since it appeals to a sociological or historical claim which would not establish the conclusion unless it were objectively correct. Moreover, it promotes one discipline, such as sociology or history, over the others whose objectivity it purports to debunk, such as physics and mathematics. Given that many propositions in the latter fields are much better established than the theories of social determination by which their objectivity is being challenged, this is like using a ouija board to decide whether your car needs new brake linings.
Relativism is kept alive by a simple fallacy, repeated again and again: the idea that if something is a form of discourse, the only standard it can answer to is conformity to the practices of a linguistic community, and that any evaluation of its content or its justification must somehow be reduced to that. This is to ignore the differences between types of discourse, which can be understood only by studying them from inside. There are certainly domains, such as etiquette or spelling, where what is correct is completely determined by the practices of a particular community. Yet empirical knowledge, including science, is not like this. Where agreement exists, it is produced by evidence and reasoning, and not vice versa. The constantly evolving practices of those engaged in scientific research aim beyond themselves at a correct account of the world, and are not logically guaranteed to achieve it. Their recognition of their own fallibility shows that the resulting claims have objective content.
There are few authors who it's more fun to watch try and extract themselves from the traps they accidentally laid than Mr. Nagel. Take just the last paragraph, which includes the following assertions: (1) that objectivity exists because there are domains we can get outside of; (2) that agreement in science only follows evidence and reasoning, never precedes; (3) that scientists uniquely aim at a "correct account" of the world and search for it beyond themselves; and (4) that so long as you acknowledge you are fallible you are therefore being objective. Relativism may indeed be nothing more than a fallacy repeated again and again, but can you really overcome that fallacy by simply asserting a countervailing fallacy of objectivity over and over again?
The problem, as always, is that folks like Mr. Nagel refuse--to their credit--to follow where a genuine skepticism would lead them, The Gay Science: Book V: We Fearless Ones (Friedrich Nietzsche)
How we, too, are still pious. In science convictions have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good reason: only when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses, of a provisional experimental point of view, of a regulative fiction, they may be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge—though always with the restriction that they remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust.— But does this not mean, if you consider it more precisely, that a conviction may obtain admission to science only when it ceases to be a conviction? Would it not be the first step in the discipline of the scientific spirit that one would not permit oneself any more convictions? ... Probably this is so: only we still have to ask, to make it possible for this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction, even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith, there simply is no science "without presuppositions." The question whether truth is needed must not only have been affirmed in advance, but affirmed to such a degree that the principle, the faith, the conviction finds expression: "Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value."— This unconditional will to truth: what is it? Is it the will not to allow oneself to be deceived? Is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the latter way, too: if only the special case "I do not want to deceive myself" is subsumed under the generalization "I do not want to deceive." But why not deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived?— Note that the reasons for the former principle belong to an altogether different realm from those for the second: one does not want to allow oneself to be deceived because one assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to be deceived,—in this sense, science would be a long-range prudence, a caution, a utility, but one could object in all fairness: how? is wanting not to allow oneself to be deceived really less harmful, less dangerous, less calamitous: what do you know in advance of the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally mistrustful or of the unconditionally trusting? But if both should be required, much trust and much mistrust: from where would science then be permitted to take its unconditional faith or conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than any other thing, including every other conviction. Precisely this conviction could never have come into being if both truth and untruth constantly proved to be useful: which is the case. Thus—the faith in science, which after all exists undeniably, cannot owe its origin to such a calculus of utility; it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility and dangerousness of "the will to truth," of "truth at any price" is proved to it constantly. "At any price": oh how well we understand these words once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar!— Consequently, "will to truth" does not mean "I will not allow myself to be deceived" but—there is no alternative—"I will not deceive, not even myself":—and with that we stand on moral ground. [...][I]t is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless ones and anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine ... But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie—if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie?
Or, as Karl Jaspers summarized: "once godlessness becomes a reality, the interest in truth will finally cease." Fortunately, hardly anyone--besides the occasional syphilitic German--is willing to contemplate such a reality. Posted by Orrin Judd at August 29, 2004 6:39 AM
Even if there is no God, scientific advances prove useful enough that it doesn't matter.
Even if we knew, with 100% certainty,* that neither God nor absolute truth existed, humans would still seek to understand and manipulate their environment, both because it satisfies a human psychological need, and to gain comfort and power.
Also, isn't Karl Jaspers' thought refuted by considering that the Muslim world, which is far more pious than the Christian world, is also completely uninterested in exploring any truths beyond those mined from the Koran ?
If the Middle East had been somehow isolated from any outside contact, and then, in 2004, Americans and Middle Easterners had met, the Americans would have flown in on jets, carrying semi-automatic carbines, and would have met people indistinguishable from the Three Wise Men who greeted Christ, riding on camels and carrying scimitars and spears.
The West, unsure that God exists, has provided to Muslims, who are sure, (publicly, at least), that God exists, with every advance beyond the concept of Zero.
*It is impossible to know with 100% certainty whether God does, or does not, exist. Even if humans could examine every particle of matter and charge of energy that exists in the entire Universe, in every spectrum and from every angle, there's still the possibility that God is hidden in alternate Universes or other dimensions.
And, should humans be fortunate to exist long enough to be able to plumb every Alternate Universe and peer into every dimension that exists, we wouldn't need to find God; we would be God.
Michael-
The theistic asumptions underlying western civilization are important. If they were not:
What limits are placed on science in such a world? How far will you go in pursuing the technological utopia? What is the value of an individual human being? Who determines the collective interest vs. the interests of the individual? Why should the human person have any dignity at all other than in direct correlation to what is seen as his proper contribution to the collective intersts? The constant comparison of Islam and Chritianity in order to prove a point is misguided and counter productive. One might as well use scientology or animism in the effort to discredit all metaphysics. It's always easier than making real judgements.
Posted by: Tom C, Stamford,Ct. at August 29, 2004 2:47 PMYou don't believe that there's any difference between Muslim and Christian societies ?
What limits are placed on science now, in a world which does believe in God ?
Are you claiming, as in the Jaspers quote, that without belief in God, nobody would care about science ?
Posted by: Michael Herdegen at August 29, 2004 4:05 PMMichael:
Yes. The belief in Truth is driven by Judeo-Christianity.
Posted by: oj at August 29, 2004 4:09 PMDemonstrated by the insistence of the Church that the Earth revolves around the Sun.
Tom's list of questions is completely outside the argument. If science is a system for acquiring ever closer approximations to events (as it obviously is), then "limits" on science are pointless.
The limits Tom is concerned with are human behaviors. If the Law of Conservation of Angular Momentum is valid, it doesn't matter whether we accept it or not. If it isn't, it won't matter, either, because we'll all be dead and these confused discussions will have ceased.
As far as I can tell, what belief in God brings is an excuse to kill people you don't like.
Not that it was needed.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at August 29, 2004 7:05 PMHarry:
The Universe revolves around the Earth--the sun is incidental to that.
Posted by: oj at August 29, 2004 7:49 PM"What limits are placed on science in such a world? How far will you go in pursuing the technological utopia? What is the value of an individual human being? Who determines the collective interest vs. the interests of the individual? Why should the human person have any dignity at all other than in direct correlation to what is seen as his proper contribution to the collective intersts? "
Tom, were these questions all answered by revelation at the outset of the Christian era, so that western civilization could build upon an optimized foundation of customs, ethics and morals? Or were the answers to these questions answered over many centuries by the harsh teacher of experience? What exactly is it that Christianity offered western civilization that it could not, or would not have developed for itself in relation to these questions?
Posted by: Robert Duquette at August 29, 2004 10:35 PMRobert:
Yes, but we've ignored the answers far too often in pursuit of science.
Posted by: oj at August 29, 2004 11:14 PMIt is well worth the time to read the book, instead of stopping at the review.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at August 30, 2004 7:42 AMRobert-
I assume you would agree that the American experiment is probably the high point or culmination of all of the trends of western civilization which is the BELIEF that the state derives its power from the consent of the governed and its purpose is the protection and encouragement of a society where life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are in fact the very purpose of social organization, that through the proper use and encouragemnt of ordered liberty the graeter good is served through the actions of enlightened yet self-interested men. Liberty within the context of self-restraint is good yet how can self-restraint be consistently encouraged on the basis of materialism? Outside of that context, i.e. self-restraint, liberty becomes an abstraction leading to license which finds it's restraint only through the police powers of the state. The morality of Chritianity, not the hypocrisy of the churches or individuals, is the foundation of the west.
The only justification for individual liberty or restraining the power of the collective over the individual is the belief in God as the ultimate ruler and law giver to whom even the collective interest in the state must defer. The point among secualrists seems to be that morality can be based on something other than religion which can only be pragmatism, utilitarianism or reason. I am unaware of the occassion where this has successfully occurred and the brave new morality has actually protected and encouraged life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness when such rights can be rationalized away in the name of the state. Yet the experiment will continue until they get it right, I suppose.
Posted by: Tom C, Stamford,Ct. at August 30, 2004 11:27 AMAnd where did those good things thrive under Christianity, Tom?
Posted by: Harry Eagar at August 30, 2004 2:39 PM"The only justification for individual liberty or restraining the power of the collective over the individual is the belief in God as the ultimate ruler and law giver to whom even the collective interest in the state must defer."
Nonsense. Individual liberty needs no justification, it only needs the initiative of individuals to defend their liberty. Liberty is a habit, it is a sign of people with a healty amoung of self respect. People who live in liberty get hooked on it, and are loath to give it up. There is no need for a philosophical or theological underpinning for such a way of life, unless you are of the persuasion that you feel you need God's permission to walk across the room.
Posted by: Robert Duquette at August 30, 2004 3:08 PMRobert:
That's just silly. Liberty isn't an end; it's a means.
Posted by: oj at August 30, 2004 4:14 PMWhat is your point?
Posted by: Robert Duquette at August 30, 2004 4:22 PM"Individual liberty needs no justification"
Posted by: oj at August 30, 2004 4:31 PMTo return to the tribe who can't count to three: If the number three has no objective existence, what would that imply about Trinitarian Christianity?
Posted by: Joseph Hertzlinger at August 30, 2004 6:07 PMMy understanding of what Tom C. wrote is somewhat different from Robert's.
It is true, of course, that the desire to enjoy liberty needs no urging or justification. However, this liberty, once attained, can become too much of a good thing, and it then turns into license (licentiousness) and all sorts of immoral and unethical behavior, not all of which can be legislated against (in a penal code) or suppressed by men wearing badges and wielding truncheons.
So, self-discipline -- an internalized moral code to live by -- becomes essential if liberty is to be sustained. History shows that there is no better system for civilizing the brute in us than organized religion. Non-theistic codes of social behavior always piggyback on the edifice of religion, therefore they cannot claim to be alternatives in the true sense.
Of course, the weakness in my argument is that it would lead me to utilitarianism after all, had religion nothing more to offer than the most effective means for instilling self-restraint.
Fortunately there is more to religion than that.
Posted by: Eugene S. at August 30, 2004 6:19 PMKilling thousands of people over the difference between homoousion and homoiousion is hardly an example of taming the brute.
More like goading him.
Whatever else religion does, it justifies murder.
And the Christian religion denies liberty; you must kowtow to some superstitious con artist, when you get down to it.
Robert is right. All you need to value liberty is self-respect.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at August 30, 2004 7:39 PMWe've just killed 40 million over the term viability. we never need much to justify mass murder.
Posted by: oj at August 30, 2004 8:47 PMThe claim that religion produces wars and atheism doesn't made sense a hundred years ago but not now. It requires ignoring twentieth-century history.
Wait a moment... I mean it made sense many years ago but not now. It requires ignoring manieth-century history.
Posted by: Joseph Hertzlinger at August 31, 2004 12:33 AMSelf-restraint requires a self, Eugene.
If you've given over your right to call the shots -- if you're a Christian, you have -- then any restraint you feel is compulsion.
Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, as one of Christianity's pithier victims put it.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at August 31, 2004 1:56 AMHarry, one of several ways of looking at religion is that it represents (generally) many centuries of working out a moral code for its adherents.
Even if we discard religion we are still standing on the shoulders of those generations, in ways that may not be clear to us.
With each successive a-theistic generation, however, this heritage crumbles and fades. I believe there is danger in this fading away.
I am not familiar with the situation in which Lord Acton coined his famous aphorism. Was he a "victim of Christianity"?
Posted by: Eugene S. at August 31, 2004 4:47 AMHarry:
Self restraint is the restraint of animals. Humans require external restraint--morality.
Posted by: oj at August 31, 2004 7:27 AMTom:
"Liberty within the context of self-restraint is good yet how can self-restraint be consistently encouraged on the basis of materialism?"
Your question is self answering--see the last word. Liberty within the context of self-restraint yields better material results than the absence of self-restraint. Unlike the Left, I am not willing to conclude that people, in general, are too stupid to know what actions produce desirable outcomes. In contrast, I assume that,in general, most people, without external compulsion, are able to figure out for themselves whether they should sit around the house and goof off all week, or exercise the self-restraint required to get to work on time every day.
When people have charge of their own lives, mutual self restraint follows because it yields the most materially successful outcome. In the US, more so than anywhere else, people have charge of their own lives.
And we have the most materially successful outcome.
There's your answer: Enlightened, materialistic, self-interest.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at August 31, 2004 7:49 AMJeff:
To the contrary, we have the least in the West because we are essentially Creationist and feel ourselves bound by God.
Posted by: oj at August 31, 2004 8:44 AMOJ:
Wrong. People feel themselves far more bound by material considerations than some eschatological payback scheme, particularly when that scheme involves having all your earthly sins forgiven.
Virtually everything you would consider immoral behavior has a real risk of significant material consequences.
You call it God, I call it common sense. I'll bet the latter explains what people do at least as well as the former.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at August 31, 2004 12:04 PMJeff:
People may, though there's little evidence of that anywhere. Americans are quite another matter.
Posted by: oj at August 31, 2004 1:18 PMMaybe not clear to you, Eugene. Try studying the history of your religion and much will become understandable.
If people can learn from one kind of mistake, why would they not be able to learn from a mistake of religion?
Well, the answer is, they cannot learn from their mistakes made in the name of religion without abandoning their religion, which they are reluctant to do.
Therefore, they are condemned to repeat the same mistakes for centuries, which is the history of Christianity.
I wrote here about Acton just a week or so ago. The most learned Christian of his time, he published a magazine in the late 1860s-'70 to debunk the historical background claimed by Pio Nono for the doctrine of papal infallibility.
Pio Nono won that argument by the simple order to Acton to cease disputing the Church.
So much for liberty.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at August 31, 2004 3:08 PMHarry:
What does that have to do with liberty? He chose to be a Catholic not a heretic.
Posted by: oj at August 31, 2004 3:16 PM"So, self-discipline -- an internalized moral code to live by -- becomes essential if liberty is to be sustained." Agreed.
"History shows that there is no better system for civilizing the brute in us than organized religion."
I would say that history shows that organized religion takes credit for civilizing the brute in us, as to whether this is true is debatable.
Organized religion is a legitimization vehicle - it legitimizes the persons and institutions that hold power, and the customs and mores of society. As new mores evolve, they come into conflict with the established mores as proclaimed by religion. If the new mores prove useful and popular by society, then religion re-interprets its sacred texts to legitimize them.
"Non-theistic codes of social behavior always piggyback on the edifice of religion, therefore they cannot claim to be alternatives in the true sense."
Non-theistic codes need be no different than theistic codes in the behaviour they proscribe. The only difference is in the perceived need to ground these codes in theology. It is a matter of whether you think you have to ask permission from god before you decide to do what you believe is right. What you believe is right comes first, and does not require religion. Religion adds the "god seal of approval" for those who believe that they need it. That is the only difference.
Posted by: Robert Duquette at August 31, 2004 5:26 PMRobert:
You'd be wrong. Non-theistic codes are entirely dependent on Theism for even the concept of a code.
Posted by: oj at August 31, 2004 5:50 PM"Non-theistic codes are entirely dependent on Theism for even the concept of a code."
And you base that assertion on what?
Re: Acton. Apparently part of that code involves the purveyors of the code lying about history. Now that is encouraging.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at September 1, 2004 7:25 AM3.000 years of Western philosophy .
Posted by: oj at September 1, 2004 7:30 AMThe quesion is not as between Catholicism and heresy but between liberty and tyranny.
If somebody else gets to tell you what to think, but you do not get to tell him what to think, that's tyranny.
Posted by: Harry Eagar at September 1, 2004 3:07 PMNo, that's civilization.
Posted by: oj at September 1, 2004 3:34 PMCall it what you want, it's still tyranny.
Less objectionable, though, if the one calling the shots happens to be right, which never happened yet with a pope
Posted by: Harry Eagar at September 1, 2004 10:59 PMHarry:
Exactly. Living with others in a society requires that you submit your desires to the tyranny of others. It's the mark of a decent person.
Posted by: oj at September 1, 2004 11:43 PMExactly not.
The tyranny of which Harry speaks is one imposed upon others by a group which feels no such pressure in return.
Your kind of decent person is far more reminiscent of sheep.
Posted by: Jeff Guinn at September 2, 2004 7:04 AM