TAKE IT, DON'T CIRCLE IT:

How to Take Baghdad (DARYL G. PRESS, March 26, 2003, NY Times)

Recent history suggests that well-equipped armies, especially if their soldiers are taught to exercise initiative, can seize urban areas at surprisingly low cost. In 1967, Israeli soldiers defeated the approximately 6,000 Jordanian troops who held East Jerusalem; 200 Israelis were killed. The following year, American marines fought roughly 4,000 North Vietnamese soldiers south of the Perfume River as part of the battle to retake the city of Hue; 38 marines died in the fighting. And in 1989 the United States Army fought against approximately 5,000 Panamanian Defense Forces for control of Panama City; 23 Americans were killed in action.

The fatality ratios are especially revealing. In Jerusalem the Israelis lost three men for every 100 Jordanians deployed to defend the city; in Hue the ratio was one marine for every 100 enemy soldiers killed, wounded, captured or driven away. In Panama the fatality ratio was half that suffered by the marines at Hue.

What do these numbers suggest for a battle in Baghdad? To estimate coalition losses one must first estimate how many Iraqis might fight. The Iraqi fedayeen militia has at most 40,000 men. The paramilitary Special Republican Guard has another 20,000. Add several thousand more from the palace guard and the intelligence services, and the combined forces in Baghdad would total about 65,000 men.

In addition, Mr. Hussein might pull one or two Republican Guard divisions into Baghdad, adding 10,000 to 20,000 troops to his defenses.

With their technological advantages, coalition forces in Baghdad should perform at least as well as the Marines in Hue; the poorly trained Iraqis can be expected to fight less effectively than the North Vietnamese did. Depending on how many Iraqis resist, total coalition deaths might be in the 400 to 800 range. However, if the Iraqis perform as poorly as the Panamanians, coalition fatalities would be only half as high. But if the Iraqis are as skillful as the Jordanians were in 1967--which seems unlikely because the Jordanians at the time were the best soldiers in the Arab world--then coalition losses could rise to between 1,000 and 2,000 dead.

Even if a battle for Baghdad "only" claims several hundred coalition lives, it would be terrifying for the combatants and horrifying to watch on television. Coalition infantry companies that are ordered to clear well-defended buildings, or that are caught in ambushes, will pay dearly. And the number of injuries will be several times higher than fatalities. Soldiers will be taken prisoner.

While images from the battle are likely to shock us, they are also likely to inflame much of the world. Civilians will be caught in the crossfire. Images of the dead will be broadcast around the world. The Israeli assault on the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank last spring, portrayed by the world's press as a massacre, claimed the lives of fewer than 30 noncombatants. An assault on Baghdad will be far worse.

We're increasingly of the opinion that such a level of lethality may be just what is required at this moment in time. First, because Islamicists must be shown, in the most brutal fashion possible, that they are on the wrong side of history and must accept either reformation or death on our terms, not theirs. Second, and most unfortunately, because they must see that we are willing to accept casualties ourselves and inflict casualties on them. It's not enough to show that they can't win; we also have to show that we have the will to win.

MORE:
Allied blockade of Baghdad is best (John Keegan, March 26, 2003, Chicago Sun Times)

The Americans shrink from street fighting precisely because tanks and armored vehicles are of limited use in cities. What is true for them is, however, is also true for the Iraqis. If they decide to withdraw their tanks from the countryside to shelter them in the city, they are effectively taking them out of the battle altogether.

If that analysis is correct, then it may be to the allies' advantage for the Iraqis to avoid battle outside Baghdad and to withdraw the Republican Guard armor into the city, both of which would effectively be self-neutralizing moves.

The moves would absolve Franks of the need to send American troops into the streets, at least in the immediate term.

They could wait outside, imposing a blockade and watching to see how long resistance would continue. Frustration at the allied refusal to engage in street fighting might provoke Saddam into launching forays, which would prove costly to him.

On the other hand, the allies cannot allow this war to drag on. Protraction will have a depressing effect on the markets and on economies in general, while fueling the anti-war movement.

Franks needs an outcome without serious delay and that increasingly seems to mean that he needs more troops, quickly.

Whatever the truth of differences of opinion in the Pentagon last year between supporters of a "light" and "heavy" war, and whether there is indeed a "Rumsfeld doctrine" vs. a "Powell doctrine," the truth has to be faced that the allies are trying to capture a country the size of California with one heavy division, one airborne division, and a U.S. Marine force or roughly two light divisions.

Posted by Orrin Judd at March 27, 2003 8:51 AM