nATIONALISM DOESN'T WORK:

Overall, the early days of the Russian invasion were characterized by small units moving on their own, without logistics support or air cover, getting into skirmishes with Ukrainian defenders. An example was a seemingly halfhearted attempt by small detachments of Russian forces to take Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, in the first days of the war. This spread-out and haphazard approach was baffling to some of those who study Russian military tactics, which typically emphasize heavy artillery.

"From what we understand, or what we thought we understood, about Russian doctrine, they're doing everything wrong," David Shlapak, a senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, told Grid. "They came in completely ignoring the principles of combined arms. They came in without employing artillery and firepower the way we would have expected them to. They undertook some fairly risky operations. Their doctrine is actually pretty clear on how they intend to fight. And they just didn't do that."

Another mystery for many observers is why we haven't seen more concerted use of Russian air power. The invasion began as generally expected, with cruise and ballistic missile salvos against Ukrainian air defenses and radar systems. As Justin Bronk, an air power analyst at the Royal United Services Institute recently wrote, the logical next step "would have been for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to mount large-scale strike operations to destroy" the Ukrainian Air Force. It's a maxim of modern war; the first thing you do is take control of the skies. Instead, Russian fighter jets have launched only limited sorties into Ukraine, usually in singles and pairs at low altitudes to avoid Ukrainian air defense systems.

A "significant majority" of Ukraine's air force is still operational, according to U.S. officials. All this led Bronk to conclude in a follow-up analysis that the VKS simply "lacks the institutional capacity to plan, brief and fly complex air operations at scale."

Reports have been emerging of Russian troops surrendering en masse, sabotaging or abandoning their vehicles to avoid fighting, and even being forced to ask Ukrainians for food or loot grocery stores. These reports, which the Ukrainian government and its allies have an incentive to highlight, should be taken with a grain of salt. But it is becoming abundantly clear that many Russian officers were not aware they were going to be part of an invasion of Ukraine until just before it began. Some rank-and-file troops may not have known they were no longer on a "training mission" until after they crossed the Ukrainian border. This is all the more remarkable given the detailed accounts of Russian plans being publicized by Western intelligence agencies. It appears that officials in Washington and certain European capitals knew more about the mission than the Russian soldiers themselves.

Tweet   @brothersjudd