THE ACTUAL NUCLEAR THREAT:

With little confidence in deterrence, might Israel find greater advantage in using the threat of nuclear attack as a means of coercion? During the Cuban missile crisis, the US raised its strategic arsenal alert level in order to browbeat the Soviets. During the 1969 Ussuri River crisis, the Soviets conducted nuclear military exercises to intimidate China. And nuclear sabers have long been rattled in Indo-Pakistani crises and wars to focus minds on both sides.

Israel, however, has always kept its nuclear card in the shadows. In so doing, it has honored the 1969 Nixon-Meir pledge, agreeing to remain silent about its own nuclear breakout to avoid encouraging regional proliferation. Even in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as invading Syrian forces threatened to split the country, Israel did not resort to nuclear deployment either as a deterrent or as a hammer.

Iran's nuclear program, however, represents something Israel has never faced: a tangible nuclear threat. Israeli leaders therefore must consider whether it is time to buck US objections and reverse the longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity. That would mean moving toward a coercive diplomatic strategy in which the tactical nuclear threat is used to ensure that Israel's voice is heard when it says, "Don't mess with us."

At the lowest rung of the threat ladder, the Israel government could sow angst in Tehran by leaking information about its arsenal's size or delivery systems. Climbing the ladder, reporters' inquiries might be met with statements confirming that the government will not exclude a preemptive strike as "appropriate" to stop Iran's nuclear breakout. More leaks could then generate more news stories about nuclear exercises and preparation.

Were Israel's nuclear resolve to be questioned in this scenario, it could follow the model China applied in the Ussuri River crisis when it conducted a nuclear test to signal to Moscow that it would not be intimidated. There are also echoes of this tactic in Israel's own planning during the 1967 Six-Day War, when it conjured an exploding device in a remote corner of the Sinai to signal that it would stop at nothing were Egyptian forces to breach its defenses. Applied today, the aim would be to tell Iran, "We mean business. Stop the nuclear rollout."

Such a ladder of escalation would undoubtedly generate a host of issues at every rung. Just how far should Israel climb? Will aggressive posturing provoke the Islamic Republic into some spiteful military act that could unleash all-out war? Will the US, fearing a regional conflict, demand that Israel stand down or lose US diplomatic support and military assistance? Alternatively, if Israel chooses the nuclear ladder but then acts too timidly, would the Iranians call its bluff?

These are all valid questions. But a less ambiguous Israeli nuclear posture plausibly offers more opportunities on the diplomatic front. It could shake the complacency out of talks, giving the US a new card to play against the Iranians. "Better strike a deal now," American interlocutors could say, "We don't know what Israel will do if we don't make progress. We can't control Bennett and the hawks." But, of course, Iran may well respond by digging in: "No negotiation until Israel disarms." The unknowns about nuclear posturing are and always will be manifold.

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