A PASSING PROBLEM AND A PERMANENT ONE:

A Moral Core for U.S. Foreign Policy (Derek Chollet and Tod Lindberg, 12/14/07, Real Clear Politics)

The emphasis placed on promoting liberal values internationally has drawn increasing hostility among traditional liberals and within the Democratic Party. Many of those who once embraced the proud liberal tradition of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy find themselves questioning their assumptions. And for those liberals who still embrace the importance of values, their numbers are fewer. According to a June 2006 poll commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, only 35 percent of Democrats said that the United States should "help establish democracy in other countries" -- whereas 64 percent of Republicans responded favorably.1

This skepticism is driven by several factors. First, and most fundamental, is the fact that this approach is so closely identified with President Bush and his administration 's policies. In the wake of 9/11, Bush tapped into many common (and bipartisan) themes about the enduring importance of American values, but his vision is infused with a religiosity that leaves many liberals nervous. Yet even when he got his rhetoric right -- for example, many liberals admired statements like his November 2003 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy -- the means he chose to implement policies, such as the war in Iraq, have proven very costly. The result now is that for many on the left, efforts to pursue policies largely rooted in values, especially democracy promotion, have become discredited and are increasingly unpopular politically.

For some liberals, the political difficulty of supporting a values-based foreign policy stems from a second factor: the structural incentives of the current political environment. Because an unpopular president has so closely identified his policies with the promotion of values, liberals are driven to oppose him. In fact, the president 's leadership style has offered very little in return, even to those liberals who might agree with him. So for many on the left, if Bush is for it, they must be against it -- even if this means embracing the cognitive dissonance of turning away from long-held beliefs and traditions. For many liberals, it has become politically incorrect to admit it when Bush has actually gotten something right. With Democrats in control of the U.S. Congress, these incentives of opposition are now also institutional. This creates a dynamic similar to that of the aftermath of the 1994 congressional elections, when the new Republican majority turned increasingly inward in opposition to the internationalism of the Clinton administration. Whereas the Bush team came into office in 2001 with an "ABC" policy -- anything but Clinton -- the Democratic Congress today, and a possible Democratic president in 2009, will be tempted to do exactly the same: anything but Bush.

But liberal skepticism is more than structural or institutional -- it is also internal to the debates among different camps within liberal politics. The history of the past seven years -- and the consequences of a policy perceived as driven more by values than interests -- has been sobering for a number of left-leaning members of the foreign policy establishment. Many supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq for the same reasons that they supported confronting Saddam Hussein during the Clinton years. And many applauded President Bush when he talked about the importance of democracy promotion. Yet now that the costs of such policies are apparent -- whether in terms of political capital, U.S. global prestige, or blood and treasure -- many in the foreign policy elite have become more cautious, scaling back ambitions and endorsing more realistic goals. For many mainstream foreign policy liberals, the downfall of Britain 's Tony Blair -- who championed values-based concepts like "humanitarian intervention" during the late 1990s, -- is a stark warning about the costs of embracing such policies too tightly.

The intellectual and political disconnect between the liberal establishment and the liberal grassroots activists is growing, especially over U.S. foreign policy and the purpose and use of American power. The convulsions within the political left that began in the late 1990s -- illustrated by the rise of the antiglobalization movement and division over the Clinton administration 's military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and its 1998 air strikes against Iraq -- have only become more severe and divisive. To be sure, this reflects anger with President Bush. But it is more than that. When it comes to national security issues, the left has become splintered in a way not seen since the 1970s, when Vietnam split the Democratic party and ruined the post-World Warii liberal establishment. A similar dynamic is at work today as a new generation of liberal activists (fueled by the power of the blogosphere) rages not just against Bush, but against a Democratic foreign policy establishment they perceive as aiding and abetting the Bush agenda -- central to which is the promotion of American values. If this divide deepens, it will become very difficult for Democratic leaders to embrace explicitly values-centered policies even if they want to.

The impulse towards reacting against George W. Bush will obviously not long endure, but what interest can a secular individualist party have in the liberty of other peoples?

MORE:
The New Iraq (Oliver North, 12/14/2007, Human Events)

The slogan “de oppresso liber” is Latin for “free the oppressed.” It's the motto of the U.S. Special Forces, but it has also been adopted by several of the Iraqi military and police units our FOX News War Stories team has been covering here in the land between the rivers. These Special Operations troops -- Americans and their Iraqi counterparts -- have become the tip of the spear in the war against radical Islamic terror.

Posted by Orrin Judd at December 15, 2007 8:56 AM