PROXIMITY IS NOT CAUSALITY:

NO 'NIGHTMARE': WHY 'SURGE' IS WORKING (PETE HEGSETH, October 23, 2007, NY Post)

The new counterinsurgency approach - namely, to take territory from al Qaeda, hold it, secure it and empower tribal sheiks to work together and rebuild their communities - finally provides an effective "counteroffensive" to the chief tactics of al Qaeda militants and Shiite death squads.

America's enemies in Iraq, radical insurgents living and fighting among the general public, understand that they can't continue their fight without capitulation from ordinary Iraqis. Finally, after almost four years, the U.S. military understands this as well.

Whereas we used to emphasize overwhelming firepower (even when I was there in 2006), we now emphasize firepower as a last resort. Whereas we used to rush to the scene after the violence occurs, we're now there to repel it or deter it altogether.

This commitment - up and down the chain of command - has made a major impact on the tit-for-tat death toll that was threatening to tear the country apart. Sectarian violence has been severely curtailed.

Since last December, sectarian deaths throughout Iraq have dropped over 50 percent; overall attacks against civilians are down 50 percent. In Baghdad - the focal point of Petraeus' strategy - sectarian deaths are down almost 80 percent in 10 months and large al Qaeda-style truck and suicide bombings have dropped over 50 percent.

Moreover, ordinary Iraqis are providing far more tips and other information. We now get some 23,000 tips a month, four to five times the level of a year before. This measure - which directly correlates to the trust and support of the population - is promising.

These are significant and consequential numbers and indicate real successes in stomping out the civil war. But it's not just numbers that make the case that the civil war is ending. Look, too, at what the new strategy lets commanders do in their now-daily discussions with ordinary Iraqis.

Petraeus reports that foreign (non-Iraqi) recruits conduct over 80 percent of al Qaeda's attacks; and therefore, by refocusing local tribal leaders on this fact, American commanders are making a convincing argument to the sheiks: Why launch an indiscriminate reprisal against another sect, ratcheting up the level of violence, when you can simply tell us and Iraqi security forces where the foreign insurgents are and we'll go get them? The numbers say that's exactly what's happening.

Despite our natural desire to feel like we're in control of events, it was inevitable that Iraqis, even their fellow Sunni, would tire of the jihadists and the fact that the exhaustion there coincided with the change in policy that our own exhaustion brought about may obscure how little we had to do with the change.

Posted by Orrin Judd at October 23, 2007 3:45 PM