BECAUSE WHO EVER TIRES OF REFIGHTING WWII?:

REVIEW: of The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality (2000) by Richard J. Overy (BrothersJudd.com, 7/17/04)

The myth of the Battle of Britain goes something like this: in the Summer of 1940, Hitler having rolled over the rest of Western Europe, the British though undermanned and outgunned unified in unprecedented fashion and overcame staggering odds to fend off a German air campaign which had it been successful would surely have been followed by an unstoppable invasion. In this very short but sufficiently thorough book, Richard Overy pretty much demolishes each facet of this myth, but notes that the reality that remains was still important, maybe even decisive to the outcome of the war.

It may be easiest to see the shortcomings of the mythic version by going backwards. To begin with, Hitler seems to have been quite cautious, even reticent, about the prospect of actually invading Britain. His various services--Navy, Army, etc.--were dubious about the chances of succeeding and no one appears to have thought it even worth considering the attempt unless the airwar rendered the British air force completely ineffective. The collective reluctance makes good sense considering that even if the air campaign had succeeded the Brits still had a superior navy and would have been defending their home soil with a not inconsiderable army. Think of it this way: folks continually portray D-Day as a moment of high drama, which could have gone either way. But by then it was the combined forces of Britain and America, attacking occupied territory with a potentially co-operative populace, defended by a Germany that was taking a beating in the USSR, and so on and so forth. The odds against a German version of D-Day would have had to have been astronomically higher, if not prohibitive.

Meanwhile, it's all a moot point because there was never much likelihood of the Nazis winning the air war. Britain was more than a match in both men and material. It had innovative technology like radar. The Germans had to fly to Britain just to begin the fight, while the Brits were right there waiting for them. Everything favored the British.

Lastly though, the nation wasn't particularly unified, with many folks more than willing to consider a negotiated peace. To some considerable extent this was a function of the very mythmaking involved in the Battle. Had people understood how slim Germany's chances were of ever invading and holding the British isles morale probably would have been better. But as Mr. Overy says, the Germans genuinely did underestimate British strength while the Brits truly did overestimate the Germans. In these circumstances people were understandably worried.

Ultimately, the myth mattered because American opinion shifted behind Britain as the tiny underdog courageously fought the mighty Nazi war machine. Bombing of civilians--though carried out by both sides and not, at that point in the war, designed to terrorize the citizenry--won Britain further sympathy, not least because American radio networks were there reporting on it. And, of course, even when you have the advantage in warfare it's still possible to botch it. The Brits didn't. The Battle of Britain should be a source of pride, even if it wasn't as perilous as the myth requires. Mr. Overy makes the case for all this in a straightforward, nonpolemical, and eminently readable fashion.

If all nations require myths, imagine how much more ferocious the need for them in democracies, where the every act of the nation is the action of the people as a whole.

Posted by Orrin Judd at October 31, 2007 9:21 AM