A SUNNI PROBLEM:

When the real war began: In the second extract from his definitive history of the conflict in Iraq, Ali Allawi explains how rival factions vied to fill the power vacuum created by the invasion - and how a tide of mass slaughter was unleashed (Ali Allawi, 06 March 2007, Independent)

The lawlessness in Baghdad and in most of the country that followed the invasion in the spring of 2003 did not equate to a political resistance as such, and was mainly due to criminality. It was clear that most of the Shia went along with the occupation for the time being. The Sunni Arabs were another matter, though.

The first indications of Sunni Arab attitudes to the occupation occurred in Fallujah. Fallujah, in the middle of the tribal heartland of the Anbar province, was known for its conservative religious culture. The city had taken exception to the arrival of the troops who had taken up positions in the main municipal buildings and in a number of schools. Rumours began to circulate that the US army had been equipped with special binoculars that could see through people's clothes. This compounded the apparently heavy-handed patrolling and searches of homes, and led to a heightening of tensions.

A series of demonstrations against the US presence culminated in a major incident in front of one of the schools occupied by the US army. Shooting broke out and nearly 17 people were killed, and over 75 wounded. In a follow-up demonstration, a further three people were killed by US fire. Grenades were thrown at the building, injuring seven US servicemen. The pattern of incidents continued in the town in the months of May and June 2003. By the end of summer, the people of Fallujah were openly boasting that they were in outright rebellion against the occupation.

In May, many reports mentioned hostility to the occupation in the towns and villages of the upper Euphrates. In Hit, US soldiers were confronted with angry crowds demanding a cessation of the ubiquitous search operations. They attacked both the town's municipal building and its police station, and burnt them down. In Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, drive-by shootings at American soldiers became a regular occurrence. In Baghdad's predominantly Sunni neighbourhood of al-Adhamiyya, shoot-outs between US troops and armed groups erupted at the Abu Hanifa mosque. The imam of the mosque, in a sermon delivered on 6 June 2003, openly called for resistance to the occupation. His message was endorsed by scores of Sunni prayer leaders throughout the country. A series of small-scale attacks against American military convoys and checkpoints took place mainly in the Sunni triangle, and in the small towns and villages in the southern approaches to Baghdad. Iraqis cooperating with the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] became assassination targets. By the end of June 2003, central Iraq appeared to be in the midst of a low-level, decentralised insurgency. This was vehemently denied by the CPA, the military and the politicians in Washington and London. Even star reporters talked about resistance and guerrilla attacks, but not an organised insurgency. It would take a brave and prescient academic, Professor Ahmed Hashim, to declare that Iraq was indeed in the throes of an insurgency.

August 2003 was the month during which the actual dimensions of the insurgency, and its potential for derailing the plans for the occupation, began to emerge.