THE THIRD FOUNDATION:

'Shia Democracy': Myth or Reality? (Sreeram Chaulia, February 16, 2007, World Press)

Discussions about the democratic deficit in the Muslim world tend to conflate Sunnis and Shias as culturally homogeneous groups. Nuances about diversity within Islam only come up related to the regional variation in practices and political institutions (e.g. Middle Eastern Islam, North African Islam, South Asian Islam, Central Asian Islam, and Southeast Asian Islam). Some scholars make the distinction between Arab and non-Arab countries with regard to their political culture and regime type. The unspoken assumption in studies proving the proclivity of Muslim countries toward authoritarianism is that sectarian schisms within Islam do not matter much when it comes to attitude and receptivity to democracy. Whether there are well-delineated differences between Shias and Sunnis in the way they conceive of--and construct--political authority has not been given much serious research. This is a surprising omission in contrast to the extent to which political scientists have debated the impact of the Catholic-Protestant schism on the evolution of capitalism and democracy in the Western hemisphere.

Blindness to the Shia-Sunni divide in the literature on democratization is likely to be the result of glossing over the smaller sect of Islam, Shiism, which claims no more than 15 percent of the world's Muslims. [...]

Masoumeh Ebtekar, the first female vice president of Iran under the reformist former President Muhammad Khatami, recently remarked that Shia gains through electoral means in Iraq will "encourage us (Iran) to open up, since we see a different example of governance but with similar mentality that is also Shiite" (2005, 58). This sentiment is echoed by the prominent Iranian dissident intellectual Abdol Karim Soroush's thinking that as the Shia majority in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq comes to power, there will be a shift in "the overall balance among Shiites toward democratic legitimacy and away from the idea of clerical rule we see in Iran" (2004a). Historian Juan Cole buttresses this school of thought by noting that between April 2003 and January 2005, Shias underwent a remarkable development in legal thinking about democracy that is not new and that will outlive the contingencies in Iraq:

The ideals of elections, representation of the people, expression of the national will, and a rule of law are invoked over and over again by the most prominent Shiite religious leaders. Unlike Khomeini in 1979, they are completely unafraid of the term "democracy" and generally see no contradiction between it and Islam. (2006, 34)

The first full-length treatment of the subject of Shias as democratizers has been given by Vali Nasr, another Iranian thinker, who extends the range of the projected democratic tide beyond Iran to Shia-populated parts of the Middle East and South Asia. The gist of his argument is as follows:

Shias are both an objective and a subjective democratic force. Their rise in relative power is injecting a robust element of real pluralism into the too-often Sunni-dominated political life of the Muslim world. Many Shias are also finding democracy appealing as an idea in itself, not merely as an episodically useful vehicle for their power and ambitions. (2006, 180)

Shias, unlike Sunnis, are supposed to be rebellious by nature and opposed to dutifully obeying authority that lacks legitimacy. Historically repressed and discriminated, Shiism's ideal was always to fight against Sunni injustices and tyrannical rulers. Since the origin of the Shia-Sunni split in medieval times, Shia imams (spiritual leaders descended from the Prophet Muhammad) invoked a fear of revolt among Sunni Caliphs and were countered with persecution, imprisonment, and killing. To survive persecution in the Sunni-dominated Caliphates and Ottoman Empire, ordinary Shias had to hide their sectarian affiliations (taqqiya) and their imams escaped to Iran and India to seek refuge. The germs of anti-authoritarianism and protection of minority rights were thus, according to Nasr, inherent in Shiism from the very beginning (c. eighth century A.D.).

The break Shias initiated from Sunnism centered on what they considered to be the morally just kind of political authority. In contrast, the Sunni understanding of worldly power concentrated on a preoccupation with order, not the quality of rulership. The theory of government developed by medieval Sunni jurists was to uphold any government as long as it maintained stability and order and protected the Muslim (Sunni) community. Shiism emphasized the substance and quality of a regime much more than its form, an important congenital characteristic that would resonate with the evolution of democracy in modern times.

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What Tehran Is Really Up To (Daniel L. Byman, February 18, 2007, Washington Post)

Ironically, Iran's long-term position could weaken when the United States draws down its forces. At first, the U.S. withdrawal will expand the power vacuum and Iran will try to fill it, but the limited chaos Iran foments can easily become uncontrolled. Iran's economic and military power is limited, and Iran's theocratic model of governance has little appeal for most Iraqis. Even many Shiite militants have at times been hostile to Iran, and respected moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani are careful to maintain their distance from Tehran. Sunnis already rage against perceived Iranian dominance.

In a postwar environment, Tehran will have lost a lever against U.S. pressure and may find itself both overextended and vulnerable in Iraq -- a weakness that the United States might exploit in years to come.

Why Iran 'meddles' in Iraq: Is Tehran's supposed involvement malign, or are its interests in the war legitimate? (Adam Shatz, February 18, 2007, LA Times)

If Iran wants to see a friendly government established in Iraq, it hardly lacks for reasons. Unlike the United States, Iran was attacked by Iraq, back when Hussein's regime enjoyed American support as a bulwark against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians died during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). When Iraq used poison gas against Iranian troops, the United States uttered not a single protest.

Not surprisingly, Iran wants to ensure that no government in Iraq will threaten it again. That's why Iran made no secret of its joy over Hussein's downfall, but it also refuses to accept a potentially hostile American base in the Persian Gulf or to cede absolute control over Iraq's future to the United States.

Iran also sees itself as a protector of Shiite interests in the region -- and is, with a mixture of gratitude and wariness, viewed as such by Shiites from the gulf to Lebanon to Pakistan. Iraq's Shiite majority, though Arab and nationalist, is linked to Iran's Shiites through both family and religious ties. It was in Tehran that many of the Iraqi Shiite parties in power today found sanctuary from Hussein's agents; many Iraqi clerics studied in Iran, and some -- most notably Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani -- were born in Iran. Every Iraqi Shiite politician must pay his respects to Tehran, including secularists such as Washington's former darling, Ahmad Chalabi.

The future Iraqi government, frankly, is likely to bear a stronger resemblance to the Islamic republic than to the liberal democracy the Bush administration publicly championed -- or to the "Saddamism without Saddam" scenario that many advocates of the invasion privately preferred. That Iran has acted to bolster the power of its Shiite allies in Iraq -- and to arm Shiite militias avenging Sunni attacks on their people and their shrines -- may not be to Washington's liking, but "meddling" doesn't seem the right word for it.

In thinking about Iran's behavior, it's important to remember that the United States has made plain its determination to curb Iranian influence in the region -- by force of arms, if necessary. From Iran's perspective, the U.S. is an implacable enemy that has rebuffed its diplomatic overtures. No state likes to see a hostile army stationed in its backyard.

If Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has indulged Ahmadinejad's rhetorical extremism, it may be because he expected to be rewarded, rather than punished, for Iran's assistance to the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As Gareth Porter recently reported in the American Prospect, Iran floated a proposal in May 2003, shortly after the fall of Baghdad, for a "grand bargain" with the United States. It offered to back the 2002 Arab Summit's proposal for a two-state solution in Israel-Palestine and to end its military support for armed Palestinian groups as well as Hezbollah in return for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Prematurely intoxicated by its "mission accomplished," the Bush administration reportedly ignored Iran's proposal and has since given every indication that it prefers regime change in Tehran to the kind of dialogue recommended by the Iraq Study Group. To this end, the administration has flirted with the Iranian Mujahedin Khalq, also known as MEK, a bizarre Maoist guerrilla group/cult that opposes the Islamic government and frequently launched attacks on Iran from Iraq with Hussein's backing.

Given the Bush administration's belligerent position, the Iranian government might have concluded that, with Hussein dead and the Shiite parties in power, Tehran's interests are best served by the withdrawal of American troops on its border. Even if the Iraqis fail to drive out U.S. forces, a deepening quagmire usefully distracts attention from Tehran's nuclear program and reminds the United States that it needs Iran in order to exit with its honor intact.

Like any state, the Islamic republic seeks above all to preserve itself. But, again, is this "malign intent" or a sober calculation?

Posted by Orrin Judd at February 17, 2007 4:10 PM