btw, Dresden was Churchill's baby.

That Bomber Harris was a great American.

To call what LeMay and Harris did "terrorism" is to distort the word out of all sensible meaning. And being "essentially defeated" is rather different from actually being defeated, isn't it?

The point of bombing civilians is to terrorize them into forcing their government to change its behavior. It is terrorism. We've used it very effectively in a series of wars. It also works very well for native populations who wish to drive out foreign rulers and troops. It's ineffective for inchoate universalist ideologies like Marxism, Maoism and Islamicism--with Spain being the exception to that rule.

"The point of bombing civilians is to terrorize them into forcing their government to change its behavior. It is terrorism. We've used it very effectively in a series of wars."

Nonsense. Name one.

Civil War, Indian wars, WWII, Vietnam, Iraq....

Nope. In every one of those we attacked civilians in order to remove the ability of the enemy governments to continue to resist. We did NOT intend for the civilians to put pressure on & change their own government--we intended for them to die. The tactic WAS effective, but not for the reason you claim.

Iraq is a case where we did NOT bomb civilians, but rather thought that we could starve the people into forcing changes in their government. A policy simultaneously immoral and ineffective.

b:

Yes, targeting civilians to torgue up the pressure on governments is all that terrorism is. We're great at it.

Iraq was an empty vessel thanks to our bombings and sanctions. Terrorism worked as a military policy.

A policy simultaneously immoral and ineffective.

Sanctions worked in South Africa, didn't they? Which is why the Left claims it loves them as policy, as unlike most of their programs, they can actually point to a success.

Except that when it came down to it, the Afrikaaners weren't brutal thugs they were being protrayed as by the Left.

b, you are correct. I don't believe I've ever read anything indicating that the Allies hoped the bombing would cause Germans and Japanese to rise up against their governments.

In WWII specifically, the Allies found that targeting specific factories didn't work because they were too hard to hit. By bombing cities they could get both the factories and the housing of the workers who worked in them. In the case of Japan, a great deal of war production was actually done in small batches in civilian homes, which made them fair targets by the standards of the day.

B and Papaya are correct. The United States had bombed German and Japanese civilians not to terrorize them but to kill them--to eliminate them as an enemy asset in support of his war effort.

The "standards of the day" were those of necessity. Be thankful that technology keeps such necessity far from us--thus far.

No, we didn't care about killing them per se, just killing enough of them sufficiently randomly to terrorize the whole nation. You don't need populations to rise up, just political/military leaders to flinch. Worked.

“That aim is the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and the
disruption of civilised community life throughout Germany. It should be emphasised
that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives; the creation of a
refugee problem on an unprecedented scale; and the breakdown of morale both at
home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing are accepted
and intended aims of our bombing policy, they are not by-products
of attempts to hit factories.” Arthur Harris, October 25, 1943

I suppose it is a measure of where society is now that 4 small bombs on the subway can turn a nation (Spain), when 60 years ago, 2+ years of relentless mass nationwide bombings did not.

Under the policy of unconditional surrender, I doubt if any Allied general or political leader expected the Germans or especially the Japanese to quit just because part of the population was living in rubble and faced air raids every night. The Harris quote above mentions morale, but surely he knew the Germans weren't going to yield just to stop the bombings.

There may have been 'pressure' on Hirohito because of the fire-bombings; there certainly wasn't any on the military commanders. Ditto in Germany - remember Hitler's final comment on the Reich: "Sometimes, you regret being so soft".

Terror can work against governments where civilians have something to say. But not against totalitarian military states. However, I suspect a terror campaign (covert, not aerial bombing) would work wonders in Iran and probably Syria.

Both did quit.

Ummm, the Germans didn't (until they were overrun and their capital taken). And the Japanese were the victims of the 20th century's zenith with respect to warfare. Had we just kept fire-bombing them, they would not have surrendered. I suppose we could have blockaded Japan and just let 50 million of them starve, but that would have been too Stalinist, no?

Yes, LeMay thought nuking them superfluous, given that his fire-bombings were just as terrorizing.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey pretty much contradicts everything Mr. Judd has said:

THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS

Basic United States strategy contemplated that the final decision in the Japanese war would be obtained by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944, with that in mind as the primary objective. As in Europe prior to D-day, the principal measure of success set for strategic air action was the extent to which it would weaken enemy capability and will to resist our amphibious forces at the time of landings. This led, originally, to somewhat greater emphasis on the selection of targets such as aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods, destruction of which could be expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to resist at the Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, than on the disruption of the more basic elements of Japan's social, economic, and political fabric

...

With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan's capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disruption of her railroad and transportation system by daylight attacks, coupled with destruction of her cities by night and bad weather attacks, would have applied maximum pressure in support of either aim. This point of view was finally adopted. Although urban area attacks were initiated in force in March 1945, the railroad attack was just getting under way when the war ended.

The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was 656,400. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home islands of Japan. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons, Army aircraft other than B-29s for 7,000 tons, and the B-29s for 147,000 tons. By contrast, the total bomb tonnage in the European theater was 2,700,000 tons of which 1,360,000 tons were dropped within Germany's own borders.

Approximately 800 tons of bombs were dropped by China-based B-29s on Japanese home island targets from June 1944 to January 1945. These raids were of insufficient weight and accuracy to produce significant results.

By the end of November 1944, 4 months after seizure of the islands, the first of the long-range bomber bases in the Marianas became operational. The number of planes originally available was small and opposition was significant. Losses on combat missions averaged 3.6 percent. The tonnage dropped prior to 9 March 1945 aggregated only 7,180 tons although increasing month by month. The planes bombed from approximately 30,000 feet and the percentage of bombs dropped which hit the target areas averaged less than 10 percent. Nevertheless, the effects of even the relatively small tonnage hitting the selected targets were substantial. During this period, attacks were directed almost exclusively against aircraft, primarily aircraft engine, targets. The principal aircraft engine plants were hit sufficiently heavily and persistently to convince the Japanese that these plants would inevitably be totally destroyed. The Japanese were thereby forced into a wholesale and hasty dispersal program. The continuing pressure of immediate military requirements for more and more planes during the campaigns in the Pacific had prevented any earlier moves to disperse. When dispersal could no longer be avoided, the necessary underground tunnels, dispersed buildings, and accessory facilities such as roads, railroad spurs and power connections were not ready. As a result the decline in aircraft engine production, which shortages in special steels requiring cobalt, nickel and chrome had initiated in mid-1944, became precipitous.

Yes, the words you highlight were why it was terrorism. Indeed, the strategic needs were being met by firebombing, which is why much of the military opposed using nukes, which were a mere terror weapon.