August 23, 2006
THEIR FIGHT:
The Battle of Baghdad (ZALMAY KHALILZAD, August 23, 2006, Opinion Journal)
The deterioration of security in Baghdad since February's attack on the Samara Mosque is the result of the competition between Sunni and Shiite extremists to expand their control and influence throughout the capital. Although the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq has been significantly attrited, it still has cells capable of operating independently in Baghdad by deploying car bombs to Shiite neighborhoods. At the same time, Sunni and Shiite death squads, some acting as Iranian surrogates, are responsible for an increasing share of the violence. This cycle of retaliatory violence is compounded by shortcomings in the training and leadership of Iraq's National Police. To combat this complex problem, Iraq's national unity government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has made securing Baghdad its top priority. The government's Baghdad Security Plan has three principal components:Posted by Orrin Judd at August 23, 2006 10:32 AM• Stabilizing Baghdad zone by zone.Four Iraqi Army battalions, two Coalition brigades and five military police companies will be redeployed to Baghdad, resulting in more than 12,000 additional forces on the city's streets. The National Police will simultaneously undergo intensive retraining, with each brigade to be subjected to a three-day assessment period, with its leadership evaluated and, if necessary, replaced. Each brigade will subsequently receive additional training focused on countering violent sectarianism before redeployment. Over the last 10 days this approach began to be implemented in five areas of Baghdad--Doura, Ghazaliyah, Rashid, Ahmeriyya and Mansour. In coming weeks other districts will be added.
Iraqi government and Coalition forces are adopting new tactics to stem sectarian killings. Increased checkpoints and patrols are being used to deny freedom of movement and safe haven to sectarian killers. The leaders of the death squads are being targeted. Security forces have started to work with cross-sectarian neighborhood committees. These and other new tactics will drive toward the goal of achieving security neighborhood by neighborhood. As each district of Baghdad is secured, operations will expand into contiguous zones over coming weeks and months.
• Disrupting support zones. Even as Iraqi and Coalition forces concentrate on securing specific neighborhoods, they will continue to conduct targeted operations in other zones that are staging areas for the violence. This includes targeted raids and other operations on areas outside of Baghdad's center, where planning cells, car-bomb factories and terrorist safe houses are located. This will degrade the ability of the terrorists and death squads to mount offensive operations into the areas we are working to stabilize.
• Undertaking civic action and economic development. One of the most tragic elements of the increasing violence in Baghdad is that it has robbed the Iraqi people of the sense of normalcy they desperately seek after living under crushing tyranny for more than three decades. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq's liberation, the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people was demonstrated as Baghdad's shops overflowed with consumer goods prohibited under the previous regime. However, the increasing violence in the streets of Baghdad has forced many Iraqis to close their shops for fear of their safety.
Consequently, after joint Coalition and Iraqi military operations have secured a neighborhood or district, a structure of Iraqi security forces sufficient to maintain the peace is expected to be left in place and reinforced with the capacity to undertake civic action and foster economic revitalization. This will be supported with $500 million in funds from Prime Minister Maliki's government and at least $130 million of U.S. funds.
These economic support funds will be used to offer vocational training and create jobs, especially for 17-to-25-year-old males; to foster public support through improved services, such as medical care and trash and debris removal; and to build local governmental capacity to protect and provide for their citizens. These goals will be achieved through a mixture of high-impact, short-term programs; mid-term programs designed to stabilize these initial gains; and programs focused on long-term economic development. Prime Minister Maliki's plan for securing Baghdad is also closely tied to the national unity government's larger program for reconciliation, which seeks to foster political understanding between Sunni and Shiite forces, including those that either control or influence unauthorized armed groups involved in sectarian conflict.
In addition, a moral compact between the religious leaders of the two Islamic communities--which will ban sectarian killings--will delegitimize the violence. Such a compact would deny the killers a political or religious sanctuary while Iraqi and Coalition forces deny them physical shelter. For the longer term, the plan seeks to induce insurgents and militias to lay down their arms by implementing a program to demobilize unauthorized armed groups. It will also review the implementation of the de-Baathification process--referring those accused of crimes to the judiciary and reconciling with the rest.
What about the de-Sadr process?
Sistani dies, it's going to get very interesting.
Posted by: Sandy P at August 23, 2006 1:47 PMSadr has no issue once we withdraw.
Posted by: oj at August 23, 2006 2:32 PMThugs like Sadr ALWAYS have an issue. It's what they live for. And to be the top theological dog - it's a dream come true.
Posted by: jim hamlen at August 23, 2006 3:04 PMHe's too young for that and when he's grown up he'll be a different man.
Posted by: oj at August 23, 2006 3:16 PMAre you auditioning for the NYT editorial staff?
Andropov couldn't have phrased it better.
What of the stories that M. Al-Sadr is eager to fill his father's shoes, but is a bit light in the head?
Obviously, if we could persuade him to support the government, and to co-operate with us instead of trying to cause trouble, that would be great. But he has made his bed (with the Iranians). That isn't going to change with age. He's a noisy pawn right now, but when Sistani goes, he will be more.
And we really can't play religious king-maker, anyway. All we can do is help the Iraqis uphold the law. If Mookie is breaking it, then arrest him. If his militia is killing and torturing Sunnis (and Shi'as in the government), then kill him (preferably before Sistani dies).
Posted by: jim hamlen at August 23, 2006 3:40 PMWhy should he co-operate with an occupying force? We wouldn't.
It's because he's a lightweight that he can't succeed Sistani.
Posted by: oj at August 23, 2006 3:56 PMI understand, but there will be a vacuum. Lightweight or not, he's young and eager and has lots of popular support (plus a powerful patron). He's the tip of the spear, so to speak, situated in Baghdad.
Are there any alternatives?
Posted by: jim hamlen at August 23, 2006 10:00 PMPolitical? No, he's probably the best option for the Shi'a of Baghdad and whatever else ends up in the central state when Iraq divides in three.
Religiously, plenty, which is why he's sought political power instead.
Posted by: oj at August 23, 2006 10:33 PM