THE SINS OF THE FATHER (via Kevin Whited):

Gulf widens between US and sheikhdoms (Trita Parsi, 6/07/06, Asia Times)

After the Gulf War, the US was in a unique position to construct an inclusive security architecture for the region. This would have been in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which put an end to the Iran-Iraq War and explicitly called for the Security Council to address - together with regional states - the question of security in the Persian Gulf.

But the United States' continued presence in the Gulf depended on its military protection of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states against external threats, that is, Iran and Iraq. The administration of president George H W Bush feared that a common security arrangement that included Iran could lessen the Arab states' dependence on Washington, give the leadership in Tehran undue influence and undermine the justification for Washington's military presence in the Gulf.

Recognizing that Iraq's defeat in 1991 provided an opportunity for it to mend fences with Washington and reintegrate itself into the region's political order, Iran aggressively pushed for a common security system that could end the perpetual insecurity that put a dark shadow over the energy-rich region.

But Iran was no match for the US at its unipolar moment. Washington defined the options facing the GCC - to seek a Middle East order with Iran, or an Arab order with the US. By offering the GCC states bilateral security deals, Washington preempted an inclusive Gulf security arrangement and managed to keep the mullahs in Tehran isolated.

America's wars generally end badly -- it may be that democracies, though uniquely skilled at waging war, are just incapable of the follow through required to win the peace -- but few did less good than Gulf War I.

Posted by Orrin Judd at June 7, 2006 10:59 PM