Probably no Republicans will do so, but every House and Senate candidate should take 10-20 minutes at each campaign stop and simply read these two points and then ask his audience - "Do we want the media to have this power over our military?"

Of course, I do not expect anyone to ask every Democratic candidate the same question. But the Republicans should. I know I will, if given the chance.

Right on. A Democratic House? In the middle of a war? Against Islamist terrorist savages the Democrats seem to think aren't worth fighting?

We don't need that. We don't need that.

Sorry to post anonymously (a fairly regular poster), but I have it on first person authority that they had al-Zarqawi in their cross-hairs but were unable to shoot because of "political" constraints. Allawi was supposed to deal with him but by the time proper diplomatic channels were observed, the beast escaped.

This was with Bush in the White House and Republicans controlling both houses.

So what difference will it make if Democrats control the House?

It seems unlikely that the GOP will lose the House:

http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110008288

If Democrats can't win the Senate, GOP control of Congress is almost certainly safe. By Jay Cost [All emphasis added]

[I] would be interested to read a thorough argument that supports a Democratic takeover [of the House]. Many pundits draw this conclusion, but I have yet to read the support necessary for it. [...] [M]any facts of importance, like 2004's 98.8% incumbent retention rate or 2006's incredibly low 4.6% incumbent retirement rate, are mentioned only to be unceremoniously dismissed. [...]

For the Democrats to take the Senate, they would have to defeat incumbents in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Montana, Missouri and Rhode Island; win the open seat in Tennessee; and hold seats against strong challengers in Minnesota, Maryland, New Jersey and Washington. This amounts to a sweep of all 10 of National Journal's 10 most vulnerable races. Most would thus admit that the Senate is not on the table; those who make no such admission usually grow silent when asked to explain why they refuse. The consensus on the Senate is actually a major problem for the consensus on the House. Historically speaking, the House switches only when the Senate switches. In other words, the improbability of a Democratic capture of the Senate is a sign that a capture of the House is improbable. Consider the following. The 17th Amendment, which mandates the direct election of senators, took effect prior to the 1914 election. Since then, the Senate has changed hands 10 times due to the biannual congressional election. The House, on the other hand, has changed hands only [seven] times due to the biannual congressional election. [...]

Of these seven times the House has switched, the Senate has also switched. Not only does the Senate switch more frequently, it always switches with the House. A switch in the Senate, therefore, seems to be a necessary, but insufficient, condition for a switch in the House. Conversely, a switch in the House is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a switch in the Senate. Thus, historically speaking, three scenarios are possible: both House and Senate stay the same, the Senate alone changes, or both the House and the Senate change. Is this simply historical coincidence, or is a causal logic driving the correlation?

A pattern that holds over 46 observations without exception is probably not random. Most important, however, is that this sort of pattern coheres with what we already know about Senate and House elections--namely, House elections are much less susceptible to national trends than Senate elections. This is the case for several reasons.

First, senators lack the ability to draw district lines to minimize opposing partisans. Second, Senate challengers tend to be more qualified and better funded than House challenges. Third, these challengers can use campaign resources more efficiently. Many House challengers cannot efficiently spend money on television advertisements because it is wasted on voters in other districts; however, with Senate elections, there are efficient ad markets. Fourth, senators are less able to cultivate close relationships with constituents--they lack the requisite geographical proximity. Fifth, senators are much more visible to the public; whereas House members can operate in the Capitol without much scrutiny, constituents tend to be more aware of their senators' activities. Thus, Senate elections are contests where the partisan division is more equal, the average voter has a more balanced view of the candidates, and he has more information about the issues in the race. Like House races, they tend to be referendums on incumbents; Senate incumbents are simply less favored. It is thus no surprise that senators' re-election rate is consistently lower than representatives'. [...]

Since the House incumbency advantage is greater than the Senate advantage, we should expect the Senate to switch when the House switches. If the mood is strong enough to change the House, it will be strong enough to change the Senate. On the flip side, we can expect relatively milder political moods to change the more competitive Senate, but not the House. [...]

One of the reasons pundits are so prone to write off [Dems winning] the Senate is that they know more about the individual elections (this, by the way, is in keeping with senators' reduced incumbency advantage--individual senators are better known). They have a better sense of the electoral landscape, and therefore can appreciate that a net of six is prohibitively difficult. However, pundits know less of the specifics of House contests; thus, the House seems more promising. They cannot name the seats the GOP would have to lose to lose the House. If they could, they would find themselves naming many members most think are secure. A switch of the House still seems plausible, in other words, only because details are lacking. History indicates that when the House switches, the Senate switches, too. Our knowledge of congressional elections implies that this is not coincidence. Accordingly, we can conclude that the safety of the GOP Senate strongly implies the safety of the GOP House.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/blog/2006/04/busby_finishes_under_50_in_ca.html

By Jay Cost, regarding the special election for "Duke" Cunningham's seat:

The Democrats had everything going for them in this election. They had a corrupt felon-incumbent, they had low turnout, they had a well-financed challenger, and they had a divided Republican field. They had a district that has, in the last 10 years, skewed Republican less and less. And they only managed to get about 8% more of the vote when they needed 14% more. In 2004, Busby pulled in 36%. This time around she won 43.9%.

This is roughly equal to how both Kerry and Gore did in the district in the last 6 years -- and roughly what you would expect a Republican-leaning district to do with an open seat election: stay Republican by a slightly smaller margin than when the incumbent is running. [...]

[T]his is the type of seat the Democrats need to capture to take the House. As a matter of fact, they will have to win tougher seats than CA 50. With a Democratic loss there, it will become harder to see a Democratic victory in open seats like IL 06, MN 06 and WI 08. These are similar in their partisan composition to CA 50 -- but, unlike CA 50, none of them have a Republican incumbent tarnished by scandal and none of them have 13 Republican candidates fighting among themselves. These open seats need to switch to the Democrats for a change in control. A Democratic takeover of the House with CA 50, IL 06, MN 06 and WI 08 off the table is unimaginable.

It seems unlikely that the GOP will lose the House:

http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110008288

If Democrats can't win the Senate, GOP control of Congress is almost certainly safe. By Jay Cost [All emphasis added]

[I] would be interested to read a thorough argument that supports a Democratic takeover [of the House]. Many pundits draw this conclusion, but I have yet to read the support necessary for it. [...] [M]any facts of importance, like 2004's 98.8% incumbent retention rate or 2006's incredibly low 4.6% incumbent retirement rate, are mentioned only to be unceremoniously dismissed. [...]

For the Democrats to take the Senate, they would have to defeat incumbents in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Montana, Missouri and Rhode Island; win the open seat in Tennessee; and hold seats against strong challengers in Minnesota, Maryland, New Jersey and Washington. This amounts to a sweep of all 10 of National Journal's 10 most vulnerable races. Most would thus admit that the Senate is not on the table; those who make no such admission usually grow silent when asked to explain why they refuse. The consensus on the Senate is actually a major problem for the consensus on the House. Historically speaking, the House switches only when the Senate switches. In other words, the improbability of a Democratic capture of the Senate is a sign that a capture of the House is improbable. Consider the following. The 17th Amendment, which mandates the direct election of senators, took effect prior to the 1914 election. Since then, the Senate has changed hands 10 times due to the biannual congressional election. The House, on the other hand, has changed hands only [seven] times due to the biannual congressional election. [...]

Of these seven times the House has switched, the Senate has also switched. Not only does the Senate switch more frequently, it always switches with the House. A switch in the Senate, therefore, seems to be a necessary, but insufficient, condition for a switch in the House. Conversely, a switch in the House is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a switch in the Senate. Thus, historically speaking, three scenarios are possible: both House and Senate stay the same, the Senate alone changes, or both the House and the Senate change. Is this simply historical coincidence, or is a causal logic driving the correlation?

A pattern that holds over 46 observations without exception is probably not random. Most important, however, is that this sort of pattern coheres with what we already know about Senate and House elections--namely, House elections are much less susceptible to national trends than Senate elections. This is the case for several reasons.

First, senators lack the ability to draw district lines to minimize opposing partisans. Second, Senate challengers tend to be more qualified and better funded than House challenges. Third, these challengers can use campaign resources more efficiently. Many House challengers cannot efficiently spend money on television advertisements because it is wasted on voters in other districts; however, with Senate elections, there are efficient ad markets. Fourth, senators are less able to cultivate close relationships with constituents--they lack the requisite geographical proximity. Fifth, senators are much more visible to the public; whereas House members can operate in the Capitol without much scrutiny, constituents tend to be more aware of their senators' activities. Thus, Senate elections are contests where the partisan division is more equal, the average voter has a more balanced view of the candidates, and he has more information about the issues in the race. Like House races, they tend to be referendums on incumbents; Senate incumbents are simply less favored. It is thus no surprise that senators' re-election rate is consistently lower than representatives'. [...]

Since the House incumbency advantage is greater than the Senate advantage, we should expect the Senate to switch when the House switches. If the mood is strong enough to change the House, it will be strong enough to change the Senate. On the flip side, we can expect relatively milder political moods to change the more competitive Senate, but not the House. [...]

One of the reasons pundits are so prone to write off [Dems winning] the Senate is that they know more about the individual elections (this, by the way, is in keeping with senators' reduced incumbency advantage--individual senators are better known). They have a better sense of the electoral landscape, and therefore can appreciate that a net of six is prohibitively difficult. However, pundits know less of the specifics of House contests; thus, the House seems more promising. They cannot name the seats the GOP would have to lose to lose the House. If they could, they would find themselves naming many members most think are secure. A switch of the House still seems plausible, in other words, only because details are lacking. History indicates that when the House switches, the Senate switches, too. Our knowledge of congressional elections implies that this is not coincidence. Accordingly, we can conclude that the safety of the GOP Senate strongly implies the safety of the GOP House.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/blog/2006/04/busby_finishes_under_50_in_ca.html

By Jay Cost, regarding the special election for "Duke" Cunningham's seat:

The Democrats had everything going for them in this election. They had a corrupt felon-incumbent, they had low turnout, they had a well-financed challenger, and they had a divided Republican field. They had a district that has, in the last 10 years, skewed Republican less and less. And they only managed to get about 8% more of the vote when they needed 14% more. In 2004, Busby pulled in 36%. This time around she won 43.9%.

This is roughly equal to how both Kerry and Gore did in the district in the last 6 years -- and roughly what you would expect a Republican-leaning district to do with an open seat election: stay Republican by a slightly smaller margin than when the incumbent is running. [...]

[T]his is the type of seat the Democrats need to capture to take the House. As a matter of fact, they will have to win tougher seats than CA 50. With a Democratic loss there, it will become harder to see a Democratic victory in open seats like IL 06, MN 06 and WI 08. These are similar in their partisan composition to CA 50 -- but, unlike CA 50, none of them have a Republican incumbent tarnished by scandal and none of them have 13 Republican candidates fighting among themselves. These open seats need to switch to the Democrats for a change in control. A Democratic takeover of the House with CA 50, IL 06, MN 06 and WI 08 off the table is unimaginable.

Ooohh! Our very own anonymous leaker! Isn't that special!

As for Noam, basing predictions of future elections on past performance is numerology in disguise, and just as scientific. The elections of '98 and '002 have shown that.

Raoul,

So is predicting Dem gains based on both Bush being in his 6th year in office and by basing the "corruption" issue that allegedly cost Dems the House in 1994.

The Republican Party has failed in one of the critical tasks in war leadership - maintaining the morale of the country. This can't be attributed to the media. Conservatives control the most popular cable news station and talk radio. The eroding support is due to critical errors made by the Bush team that has convinced the American people he does not know how to achieve victory and is simply hoping Al Qaeda gives up.

The GOP has failed (qualitatively, Iraq is not a debacle and the US is not a defeated nation, but clearly our performance should have been better) and showed be voted out in an ideal world. Of course, in an ideal world there is a viable opposition which I'm not sure the Democrats qualify as. There are other factors of course including immigration.

My prediction is that the GOP loses seats across the board, but will probably retain control of both houses.

Raoul Ortega:

What exactly does a "scientific prediction" about future elections look like ?

What else do we have to go by than how people have behaved in the past ?

Where's the tidal wave of support for Dem Congressional candidates, or the overwhelming disgust at incumbents, anything that might give strong support to a guess that the Congress will change hands ?

All I've seen is a generic "Dem vs. GOP" poll, which indicated that there's lukewarm support for the idea of a Dem Congress.