A NEW TOWER OF BABBLE

For a new international community (Caroline Glick, Jerusalem Post, April 20th, 2006)

In a nutshell, the reason that the international community is unable to contend with the threat Iran poses to international security is because today's dominant international institutions are constituted in a manner that protects those who endanger international security at the expense of those they target with aggression. Today, most states in the world are neither stalwart US enemies like Iran and North Korea, nor stalwart US allies like Israel, Poland, Australia and Britain. They can roughly be divided into two groups.

First there are the states that do not share the US's perception of the threat of global jihad and those that believe that America's loss is their gain. China, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa, and - depending on the weather - France, Norway, Sweden and Belgium are members of this group.

The second group is comprised of states that do share the US's perception of the threat Islamo-fascism presents to international security. States in this category have two main reasons for not wishing to join the US today in contending with Iran. First, some of these states assume they can sit on the fence and still enjoy an American security guarantee. This group of free riders includes Canada, Mexico, the Philippines and Western European states, which - again depending on the weather - sometimes include France, Belgium, Norway and Sweden. Second, many states are simply unconvinced the US has the staying power to win this war and as a result are unwilling to risk the potential repercussions of joining forces with America. This group includes states like Singapore, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Holland and Indonesia.

As was the case three years ago when the US worked to build an international coalition ahead of its invasion of Iraq, today its attempts to build a coalition against Iran suffer from two critical weaknesses. First, the US is not making a distinction between states that have no interest in helping it and those who wish it to succeed. Indeed, Washington seems more intent on currying the favor of inherently hostile states like China and Russia than in engendering the support of inherently non-hostile states like Holland, Denmark, Singapore and even Britain.

Second, the US is seeking to build its coalitions within the framework of the UN and NATO, which are institutionally incapable of advancing US interests. The UN is controlled by countries like China and Russia that do not share the US's perception of threats to global security, by states that believe their fortunes are improved by US failure like Egypt, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, and by states like France that believe that they can get away with opposing the US because America will protect them anyway.

NATO was established in 1949 to contain the Soviet Union. It remained relevant until the end of the Cold War because the nations of Western Europe wanted the US to protect them from Soviet invasion and the US wanted to prevent Soviet expansion. But today, in the absence of the Soviet Union, NATO has no real importance. In the 1990s it was hoped that the alliance would be able to reinvent itself as a US-led international security organization. But in light of France and Turkey's refusal to participate in the war against the global jihad, NATO has been rendered incapable of playing a role in today's international security environment. So against Iran today, like against Iraq three years ago, the US is unable to use NATO as the basis for an international coalition.

In light of these realities, it is clear that if the US wishes to build an international coalition against Iran, it must fashion a new international organization that will provide incentives to countries like Germany and India to fight alongside the US. Three years ago, the US successfully convinced some 40 countries to join its campaign against Iraq. But that coalition of the willing was never institutionalized. Its members - like Spain and Italy - were free to come and go as they pleased. As a result, it cannot be relied on today against Iran. While the task of building a new institutional framework for international action against Iran - and perhaps against Syria and North Korea in the future - seems daunting, the US has vast military and economic and cultural resources that it can offer as convincing incentives for joining.

It’s hard to see where the usually tough-minded Ms. Glick is going here. If there is one thing we learned from Iraq, neither Washington nor even its most supportive friends are going to bind themselves to either engage or not engage in any theoretically foreseeable military action on the basis of a majority vote in a multilateral institution, incentives or no incentives. NATO was a specific response to a concrete threat in unique historical circumstances, not a model for ever-expanding internationalism. The really troubling issue here is the symbolic importance of “allies” on both sides of debate in the West, particularly in the United States. Looking back to 2003, one wonders just why Poland’s support and Canada’s Euro-cowardice were given the political importance they were, as no one ever believed either would make a military difference. Obviously, Iran has no such hang-ups.