THERE IS NO IRAQ:

Divided, Iraq might just have a chance (Gareth Stansfield, 19/03/2006, Daily Telegraph)

[F]uture historians may also consider that the terrible situation of Iraq in 2006 had deeper origins. The trauma inflicted upon Iraqi society by a decade of sanctions following a decade of war with Iran; the existence of an all-pervasive totalitarian state that broke social bonds and played upon differences in society to preserve the regime; the continued Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi state, resulting in the emergence of a Kurdish de facto state in the north; and the rise in political Shi'ism in the 1990s were all in place long before George W Bush's attention was brought so forcibly to Iraq in the days following September 11. [...]

Although politicians and academics are arguing about whether there is already a civil war raging in Iraq, the fact is, violence remains localised and there still exists a great deal of sentiment and hope among ordinary Iraqis - as expressed by political, religious and social leaders - that calmer heads will still prevail in these difficult times. However, with scores of bodies being found almost every day, it seems their voices are being increasingly ignored. If it is not yet a civil war, it is not far off being one.

What now needs to be addressed is what to do if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate. Does the Coalition sit back and watch what would be a chaotic unravelling of Iraq, with militias acting to defend their own communities and attack others (as is increasingly happening), and with the once cosmopolitan cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra exposed to the horrors of sectarian blood-letting?

Or should the Coalition, perhaps, be proactive in enforcing a managed partition of Iraq, decentralising political authority to the Shia in the south, the Kurds in the north, and the Sunnis in the centre? The fact is, this has already happened to a great extent, with the Kurdistan Region now codified, and Basra effectively out of the political orbit of Baghdad.

Though perhaps not the most desirable conclusion, a tripartite division was always the most likely. The biggest problem is that it's unlikely the Sunni would/could control a central state.

Posted by Orrin Judd at March 19, 2006 2:26 PM